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cial phenomenon in Shakespeare’s work with ramifications for contempo-
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numerous scenes of hospitality—with their depictions of greeting, feeding, 
entertaining, and sheltering—the collection demonstrates how hospital-
ity provides a compelling frame for the core ethical, political, theological, 
and ecological questions of Shakespeare’s time and our own. By reading 
Shakespeare’s plays in conjunction with contemporary theory as well as 
early modern texts and objects—including almanacs, recipe books, hus-
bandry manuals, and religious tracts—this book reimagines Shakespeare’s 
playworld as one charged with the risks of hosting (rape and seduction, 
war and betrayal, enchantment and disenchantment) and the limits of gen-
erosity (how much can or should one give the guest, with what attitude 
or comportment, and under what circumstances?). This substantial volume 
maps the terrain of Shakespearean hospitality in its rich complexity, offering 
key  historical, rhetorical, and phenomenological approaches to this diverse 
subject.
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Introduction
David B. Goldstein and Julia Reinhard Lupton
In act 1, scene 4 of Macbeth, Duncan, having declared Malcolm his suc-
cessor, announces that he will be traveling to Inverness as Macbeth’s guest. 
Macbeth responds by electing himself the king’s “harbinger”:
The rest is labour, which is not used for you;
I’ll be myself the harbinger, and make joyful
The hearing of my wife with your approach.
So humbly take my leave. (1.4.45–47)1
Although by the end of the play, the word “harbinger” bears our modern 
sense of an omen or forerunner (5.6.10), its appearance here is more techni-
cal: the harbinger was the court official who preceded the monarch on his or 
her progresses in order to ensure, among other things, that “the bedrooms 
had chairs, beds, carpets, and hangings”—tasks gathered under the rubric of 
“appareling,” the same term used when great halls and banqueting houses 
were set up as theaters using timber frames and handsome textiles to assem-
ble stages and seating.2 Duncan has just spoken of “investing” Malcolm as 
heir (1.4.41), one of many references to formal attiring in the play. What 
is at stake in the harbinger’s charge is another kind of investiture, not of 
persons but of spaces, which will be decked with special fabrics whose affor-
dances of enclosure and warmth also symbolize magnificence and support 
the tremulous sense of occasion required by the hosting of a king.3 Duncan 
will presumably meet his end in a properly outfitted state bed, a confec-
tion of elaborate tapestries hung on a wood frame that erected a chamber 
within the chamber, a holy of holies for royal guests.4 Duncan is killed as a 
guest in his sleep, a violation of the simultaneously social and somatic forms 
of trust that the rituals, architecture, and accoutrements of hospitality are 
designed to cultivate.
In a similar complex of hospitality rituals and theatrical actions, the stag-
ing of the banquet scene (what kind of table? how is it brought on stage? 
how is it angled? what seating will furnish it?) often shapes a range of other 
dramaturgical choices in response to the affordances of the theatrical  setting. 
On one hand, banqueting tables carried in by servant-stagehands and set on 
trestles aptly link the great halls of Renaissance England to the fast scene 
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changes required of theatrical work; such tables, moreover, with their clear 
heads, sides, and lower reaches, also support the hierarchy of formal dining 
that is with us still. A round table or even simply an open circle of stools 
(as Trevor Nunn imagined it at The Other Place in 1976), on the other hand, 
activates a thrust stage or theater in the round and conscripts the audi-
ence as guests at the party, occupying their own outer ring.5 However and 
wherever it is staged, the scene draws on hospitality’s play between hierar-
chy and equality, both among hosts and guests and between chairs of state 
and mere stools, and it builds the hospitable scripts of invitation, greeting, 
toasting, and leave-taking into its dramatic action.6 The scene incorporates 
liturgical and Eucharistic resonances—hosting as Hosting—into its ritual 
texture while maintaining those references on the profane plane of exposure 
to the forms of creaturely life that hospitality tends to: our need for shelter 
and sleep and food and drink as well as recognition and acknowledgement, 
and the various ecologies of building types, durable goods, consumable 
offerings, and social scripts that communities have composed to shape the 
 delivery of those benefits.
Macbeth, like many of Shakespeare’s plays, is as fascinated by the failure 
of hospitality as by its invocation. Against a set of ideals about the obliga-
tion to shelter, feed, and honor the guest within one’s literal and prover-
bial walls—ideals that early modern England both held sacred and fiercely 
debated—Macbeth depicts hospitality in the form of its own undoing. 
It “repeatedly evokes the rites and pleasures of conventional hospitality,” 
writes James Heffernan, “even as it undermines them.”7 The play forms and 
dissolves around scenes and spaces of welcome: the castle that is also a trap, 
entered through a door whose gatekeeper—the porter—provides comic wel-
come for the audience even as he tries to keep out devils and  Jesuits. The 
play’s intense focus upon eating and banqueting culminates in the witches’ 
cauldron, a meal that is poisonously open to anyone—“Open locks,  whoever 
knocks” (4.1.61). If in King Lear, the door is constantly being shut in some-
one’s (Cordelia’s, Kent’s, Edmund’s, Lear’s, Gloucester’s) face, in  Macbeth 
it is constantly flung wide open to unsuspecting guests or (in  the case of 
Lady Macduff) hosts. The dangerous permeability of  Macbeth’s spaces 
of  welcome gives spatial form to hospitality’s most frightening trait—the 
absolute vulnerability of guests and hosts to each other. The leap of faith 
hospitality demands, noble as it may be, is under constant pressure in the 
Shakespearean playworld. Hospitality is the space of negotiation between 
subjects. It is the warmth and peril of acknowledging other people.
This collection explores the range of connections between hospitality 
and theater in the plays of Shakespeare. The staging of acts of hospitality, 
we argue, bids readers and audiences to attend to Shakespearean drama 
in manifold ways. As culturally expressive forms of life, hospitality rituals 
disclose a historically contingent, time-bound and place-rich world of ritual 
and routine. Insofar as acts of hospitality require self-disclosure before an 
assembly of others, their staging solicits a theatrical space in which symbolic 
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welcome and political and commercial transaction coincide and collide. And 
finally, insofar as greeting guests engages foundational questions concerning 
the claims of the stranger, hospitality belongs to philosophical inquiries into 
the ethics of obligation and reciprocity. Taking up the historical, theatri-
cal, and philosophical dimensions of meeting and greeting in Shakespeare, 
these essays explore hospitality as vernacular phenomenology: as a daily 
engagement, at once cognitive and embodied, into the conditions of human 
co- existence in a world of dearth and plenty as well as risk and trust. In the 
process, we aim to test hospitality as a compelling framework for inquir-
ing into the core ethical, political, theological, and ecological questions 
of Shakespeare’s time and our own. Who is my neighbor? What is a gift? 
Whom should I feed? What is for dinner, where will I sleep, and when can 
I leave? These intimate questions, their answers derived from highly coded 
social customs composed out of mixed media in response to the available 
affordances of particular environments, are at once practical, existential, 
and theatrical. It is the constitutive braiding and mutual implication of those 
vectors that renders hospitality as a rich terrain for literary and philosophi-
cal exploration and theatrical inventiveness.
The later Tudor and Stuart period was marked by a sense of what 
observers decried as the “decay of hospitality and good housekeeping,” 
brought about by both the pressures of the Reformation and the rise of 
early  capitalism.8 (See essays in this volume by Andrew Hiscock, Jessica 
Rosenberg, and Michael Noschka.) Hospitality drew on the medieval, 
 chivalric, and Catholic past while also absorbing Renaissance motifs from 
the Continent and looking forward to aspects of liberal modernity, includ-
ing discourses of tolerance and pluralism as well as mass “entertainment.”9 
In Shakespeare’s England, a decrease in celebrations in the patriarchal old 
style elicited fears of declining charity for the poor, diminishing care for 
servants, and a general weakening of neighborly generosity—the kind of 
crisis that besets As You Like It, a play that begins with Oliver and Duke 
Frederick’s renunciations of hospitality, and initiates the process of recuper-
ation with Duke Senior’s offering of hospitality to Orlando and Adam, as 
explored by James Kuzner in this volume. If As You Like It reveals itself as 
a play intimately engaged with questions of service, sustenance, accommo-
dation, and their interlinked environments, so too does nearly every other 
play in the Shakespearean canon, from The Comedy of Errors with its clos-
ing doors and beckoning meals, to King Lear’s poor hovel on the heath, to 
Pericles with its seaside and ship-bound scenes of welcoming and care. 
In each play, the historical pressures and mixed ingredients of fast-changing 
and unevenly developing repertoires of reception and hosting are assembled, 
dramatized, resolved, and charged anew.
If hospitality in Shakespeare’s England has a history, it also evokes a phil-
osophical tradition that crosses periods and places. Biblical and classical 
writings on the rights of guests, early Protestant discourses on hosting and 
gifting, Immanuel Kant’s essay on “Perpetual Peace,” and Emile Benveniste’s 
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philological scansion of hospitality’s internal divisions and reversals (hostis 
as host, guest, and enemy) continue to inspire ethical, juridical, and phe-
nomenological responses to the problem of the stranger.10 (On this complex 
of conversations, see essays in this volume by James Kearney and Sean 
Lawrence.) As taken up by contemporary philosophers and critical theorists, 
hospitality engages both the most intimate acts of domestic experience and 
the broadest platforms of law, diplomacy, theology, and ethics.11 Hospitality 
builds its spaces of refuge, succor, and entertainment out of a mix of real 
materials (foods, décor, serving implements, lighting techniques) and aspi-
rational desires (for salvation, happiness, love, recognition, or respite from 
need). Housing their own incipient theorization in response to the occasion 
and resources at hand, such spaces are at once date-stamped by history and 
animated by perennial questions around the status of the stranger and the 
place of human beings in larger economies of debt and benefit.
Theater itself constitutes a hospitality event, the convening of a com-
pany around an act of entertainment that incubates and amplifies the the-
atricality incipient in all human exchange. Hospitality and theater share a 
set of actions, including invitation, approach, entry, welcoming, reception, 
and exit—routines that allow persons and things to appear and resonate 
in shared spaces that contribute actively to both cognition and action. 
(See essays by David Hillman and Thomas J. Moretti on hospitality as the-
ater.) If all men and women “have their exits and their entrances,” as Jaques 
famously says in As You Like It, then these comings and goings dramatize 
spaces of hospitality, roleplaying, and disappearance—including the requi-
site, if tragic, hospitality of death. As a form of home theater, hospitality 
events craft scenes for appearing, whether we are witnessing the tremulous 
encounter among persons unknown to each other, or apprehending objects 
and environments as supporting actors in the drama of reception. Moreover, 
theater as an institution was closely bound up with the entertainment needs 
of the court while also contributing to an increasingly commercial hospi-
tality industry. It is no accident that scenes of hospitality and its violation 
abound in dramatic literature, since the theater recapitulates the host–guest 
relation in its economic transactions and spatial environments.
By reading Shakespeare’s plays in conjunction with contemporary the-
ory as well as early modern texts and objects—including almanacs, recipe 
books, husbandry manuals, religious tracts, and other items designed to 
support hospitality—this collection reimagines Shakespeare’s playworld as 
one charged with the risks of hosting (rape and seduction, war and betrayal, 
enchantment and disenchantment) and the limits of generosity (how much 
can or should one give the guest, with what attitude or comportment, and 
under what circumstances?). This volume addresses the unique ways in 
which hospitality toggles between history and its sublations. We aim to 
map the terrain of Shakespearean hospitality in its rich complexity, demon-
strating the importance of historicist, rhetorical, and phenomenological 
approaches to this multifaceted subject.
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Characterizing the methodological richness of hospitality as an entry into 
Renaissance theater, the genres addressed in the volume include comedy (Twelfth 
Night, The Merchant of Venice, As You Like It), tragedy ( Hamlet, Othello, 
Troilus and Cressida, Coriolanus, King Lear, Timon of Athens, Antony and 
Cleopatra), and romance (The Winter’s Tale, and Day, Wilkins, and  Rowley’s 
The Travels of the Three English Brothers). Historical facets of hospitality 
addressed in these pages include the discourse of thrift, the politics of embassy, 
and the conventions of greeting before and after the Reformation. Theoretical 
issues include the tension between host and guest; the status of otherness; hos-
pitality’s contribution to concepts of charity, service, duty, friendship, and love; 
hospitality as theology and phenomenology; and the roles of gender, econom-
ics, and ecological interconnection in hospitality events. Taken as an ensemble, 
these essays configure hospitality as a set of responses and routines that draw 
hybrid galaxies of objects and ideas into affiliations and antagonisms both his-
torically contingent and existentially persistent.  Hospitality—as theme and 
ritual, idea, and act—summons us to work between historical and theoretical 
paradigms, accessing new archives while forging direct links between the past 
and its futures. Historicism provides key way-finding mechanisms for navi-
gating hospitality’s bio–political–theological terrain, but we must also turn to 
other resources, including cognitive and phenomenological models, to benefit 
from hospitality’s full range of performances.
The collection is organized into four sections that reflect the zones of 
action and reflection in which hospitality unfolds. Part I, “Oikos and Polis,” 
tracks hospitality’s management of the threshold between private and public 
spaces. Overflowing the borders of the household, hospitality concerns politics 
insofar as laboring, gendered, and foreign guests come to share with sov-
ereign hosts the eat–work–play spaces convened by acts of entertainment. 
Such spaces, often formed under highly regulated, punitive, or conscripted 
conditions, become themselves the topic of evaluation, acknowledgment, or 
reform within the framework of hospitality, which can also provide occa-
sions for normally silent persons to speak or act in public.
Part II, “Economy and Ecology,” considers hospitality’s organization of 
economic and environmental affordances in and around the oikos, whose 
efforts are dedicated to the labor of tending to creaturely life. Hospitality 
as a form of gifting concerns reciprocity, exchange, and their limits and 
failures among human actors. Hospitality’s rituals of sustenance also regu-
late interspecies dependencies within seasonal, regional, and climactic flows 
with their own distinctive tempos, durations, and fragilities.
Part III, “Script,” examines the theatrical rhythms native to hospitality 
and the manner in which the plays tap those rhythms for dramatic ends. 
Theater asks us to respond to an intrinsically open invitation, a form con-
stituted by its constant flux of adaptations and reimaginings as well as com-
ings and goings. All scripts are hospitable scripts, Shakespeare’s most of 
all, as seen by the longevity and global reception of his texts in a range of 
performance styles and traditions.
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Finally, Part IV, “Scripture,” focuses on the instances of community and 
discourses of virtue convoked by hospitality in its theological dimensions. 
In Jewish, Christian, and pagan routines of welcome, hospitality events dis-
close a repertoire of mythic scenarios (the disguised guest, the messianic 
banquet, the murderous host) that recur in various guises throughout the 
historical and geographical record, and that feed both the practical and the 
philosophical dimensions of the theater of hospitality.
Part I: Oikos and Polis
Regulating the relationship among strangers in prepolitical regimes such as 
those depicted in Homer’s Odyssey and the Hebrew Scriptures, hospitality 
cultivates the threshold between the oikos or household and the polis or city, 
bidding a provisional politics to pitch its tent upon scenes of sojourning, sup-
plication, and bodily care. The first set of essays examines the status of the 
oikos as a scene of immanent politics. Andrew Hiscock establishes the Greek 
origins of Renaissance hospitality in a reading of Troilus and Cressida; Jessica 
Rosenberg traces the resonances of husbandry and housekeeping in Hamlet; 
and Thomas P. Anderson looks at the politics of friendship in  Coriolanus. 
Using a range of sources and approaches that include  sixteenth-century 
household tracts, classical philosophy, and contemporary theory, this trio of 
essays establishes the domestic grounds and political stakes of hospitality in 
Shakespearean drama and the worlds on which it drew.
In “‘Will You Walk in, My Lord?’: Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida 
and the Anxiety of Oikos,” Andrew Hiscock turns our attention to the 
Greek oikos as a source of Western hospitality paradigms, drawing upon 
writings of antiquity (with their specific cultural concerns about gendered 
spaces and religious commitments in their understandings of hospitality and 
household) as well as early modern cultural debates surrounding the neces-
sary actions and obligations of the host. His essay considers the ways in 
which militarism, community-building, and the erotics of chivalry enable 
Shakespeare to diversify the conceptualization of home and hospitality in 
Troilus and Cressida. Paying particular attention to the trafficking of land, 
goods, and bodies, his discussion analyzes the ways in which fugitive images 
of the family and household become basic building blocks in the construc-
tion of cultural mythologies of belonging among both Greeks and Trojans. 
These in turn are played off against compelling concerns onstage through 
violent displacement, violated hospitality, and the pleasure principles associ-
ated with opportunism and appropriation.
In “A Digression to Hospitality: Thrift and Christmastime in Shakespeare 
and in the Literature of Husbandry,” Jessica Rosenberg places Renaissance 
husbandry and housekeeping discourses at the center of theatrical consider-
ations of hospitality by taking up Hamlet’s retort to Horatio as a key to 
the home economics of hosting: “Thrift, thrift, Horatio, the funeral baked 
meats / Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables” (1.2.178–180). With these 
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lines, Hamlet charges his mother with both good housekeeping and bad 
hospitality: she has observed the everyday imperatives of thrift but bro-
ken the ritual calculus of mourning. Though critics have suggested that the 
play distances itself from the mundane principles of household wisdom 
(most often ventriloquized by Polonius), Rosenberg proposes that Hamlet’s 
conflicted moral economy in fact repeats and extends a tension already central 
to the printed advice literature of husbandry and household management. 
Reading texts by Fitzherbert and Tusser, Rosenberg argues that hospitality 
holds an often-embattled position in husbandry manuals of the sixteenth 
century, pitting a neighborly impulse to spend against the basic imperative 
to save. In Tusser’s popular book of household rules, what Derrida calls the 
antinomy between the law of unlimited hospitality and the multiple and 
conditional laws of its application are echoed in the arrangement of the text 
itself. Returning to Shakespeare’s vivid image of leftover flesh, Rosenberg 
rereads Gertrude’s thrift and Hamlet’s superfluous mourning in light of the 
temporal politics of household economy. She reveals the play’s engagement 
with the aporia of hospitality already theorized in early modern practices 
of everyday life.
In “‘Here’s Strange Alteration!’: Hospitality, Sovereignty, and Political 
Discord in Coriolanus,” Thomas P. Anderson reads Levinas and Derrida 
in order to analyze and evaluate the politics and theology of hospitality. 
His essay forges a relationship between hospitality, as that which requires 
no invitation and is subject to no laws or limitations, and friendship in 
Shakespeare’s Coriolanus. He argues that the play offers an affirmative 
politics imagined in the portrayal of the intimate encounter between Aufid-
ius and Coriolanus in act 4. The scene of absolute hospitality between the 
two warriors destabilizes friendship as a political force at the same time 
that it allows us to glimpse its liberating potential. More precisely, Corio-
lanus’s new relationship with Aufidius reconceptualizes the logic of hospi-
tality common in the early modern period, suggesting that the play disrupts 
the communitarian space imagined in the classical rhetoric of friendship. 
In reconfiguring classical notions of friendship common during the early 
modern period, Shakespeare makes the case that sovereign absolutism is, 
in fact, nourished by hospitality characterized by consensus and  fraternity. 
Coriolanus, by contrast, represents a concept of hospitality fraught with 
division and violence. Drawing on recent accounts of the influence of an 
early modern politics of conflict, this chapter makes the case that the play’s 
representation of a dissensual politics of hospitality redistributes the force 
of sovereign absolutism by disrupting community in favor of division, dis-
agreement, or, according to the play, “perpetual spoil” (2.2.119). Anderson’s 
focus on the constitutive condition of friendship’s failure as a sustainable 
force that shapes political sovereignty in Coriolanus suggests that the play’s 
commitment to a dissensual politics generates an agonism that precludes 
rapprochement and establishes a form of contested friendship, or absolute 
hospitality, as a counter to political absolutism.
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Part II: Economy and Ecology
As Andrew Hiscock demonstrates in his essay, oikos is the root of  economy. 
Hospitality as the art of the oikos touches on a range of economic, 
 proto-economic, and aneconomic issues that stem from the reciprocity of 
the gift and the dream of a gift without exchange. Oikos is also the root of 
ecology, pointing to hospitality’s management of and interaction with mixed 
populations of plants, animals, humans, and things that coexist in complex 
terrains and climates. Essays by James Kearney and Sean Lawrence track 
the ethical challenges posed by exchange in The Winter’s Tale and Antony 
and Cleopatra.
In “Hospitality’s Risk, Grace’s Bargain: Uncertain Economies in The 
Winter’s Tale,” James Kearney draws on a long history of thought on hos-
pitality and obligation from Seneca to Luther to Derrida in an effort to 
grapple with the ways that hospitality crosses discursive registers—ethical, 
economic, and theological. Economic logic haunts the ethical in The Winter’s 
Tale, shaping notions of love and service, friendship and fidelity, and devo-
tion and grief. A crucial feature of this staging of a pervasive economic logic 
is the evocation of an idealized hospitality threatened by overwhelming obli-
gation. The Winter’s Tale begins and ends with scenes of hospitality that are 
concerned with the possibility of expenditure without exchange. But if this 
is a play in which an idealized hospitality promises to escape economies of 
debt and obligation, it is also a play in which hospitality is always threat-
ened by the possibility of the poisoned cup. Kearney’s contention is that 
Shakespeare’s desire to think with and through hospitality in The Winter’s 
Tale stems, in part, from hospitality’s peculiar position between idealized 
and agonistic relations, between the disavowal of the economic and the 
acknowledgment of the economic as an inescapable horizon.
In “Hospitality in Anthony and Cleopatra,” Sean Lawrence contrasts the 
approaches of Emmanuel Levinas and Marcel Mauss in order to address 
the politics and theology of a play saturated with unsatisfying acts of host-
ing. Shakespeare’s play alternates between two different worlds, Rome and 
Egypt, which both express their values by consumption and elaborate acts 
of hospitality. The triumvirs demonstrate their brief solidarity with Pompey 
by common inebriation in an all-male, all-night party aboard his ship. The 
canons of hospitality overrule even Pompey’s ambition when he refuses to 
kill his guests, although doing so would leave him, as Menas the pirate 
promises, “lord of the whole world.” For their parts, the Egyptians feast 
with competitive enthusiasm; even Cleopatra’s death is surrounded by imag-
ery of breast-feeding and is associated with figs. Yet all the relationships 
built on hospitality seem basically unstable. The alliance between the trium-
virs and Pompey, or even between the triumvirs themselves, barely outlasts 
their hangovers. Anthony explodes in rage at Cleopatra’s suspected perfidy 
at least three times, despite all their partying together. Lawrence argues that 
not only do the characters of Shakespeare’s play fail to create stable rela-
tionships through hospitality, but in fact they must fail. While a relationship 
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can be built on exchange, it can never overcome the suspicion of being 
merely tactical, self-serving, or temporary. Whereas Levinasian hospitality 
may not realize itself in a clear political expression, instead collapsing into 
competitive exchanges that constitute the Maussian gift, its radical perspec-
tive nevertheless allows a judgment of hospitable practice both in Mauss 
and in Shakespeare’s play.
Part III: Script
Composed of entries and exits, greetings and valedictions, anticipations, 
main events, and dénouements, hospitality is always incipiently theatrical, 
and relies on inherited routines and images for its deployment. The set of 
essays in Part III address the performative dimensions of hospitality. David 
Hillman analyzes greetings in Othello; James Kuzner tracks hospitality as 
the ability to entertain the scripts of others in As You Like It; and Thomas 
J. Moretti attends to the temporal dimensions of Lear as an event that must 
be endured.
In “Ave Desdemona,” David Hillman focuses on hospitality as a script 
that shapes the routines of coming and going. Greetings and leave-takings 
are key moments in every hospitality event, moments that encapsulate the 
paradoxes of hospitality as a whole—its ambivalence and equivocations, its 
heartfelt generosities and subtle power plays, its profound tensions between 
amity and enmity, servility and mutuality, spontaneity and calculation, and 
improvisation and rule. Salutations also manifest hospitality as dramaturgy 
(both theater and hospitality are structured around exits, entrances, and the 
forms of gesture and speech that they afford). Hillman’s essay examines a 
single, curious instance of greeting in Shakespeare—Cassio’s elaborate flour-
ish upon the arrival of Desdemona in Cyprus (“Hail to thee, lady! and the 
grace of heaven”). This salutation invokes the Ave Maria—a paradigmatic 
instance in Western culture of the greeting of the other as constitutive of their 
subjectivity. Cassio’s Ave, in evoking the idea of Mary as mediatrix, alerts 
us to a crucial feature of Othello: the role of intercession in the downfall of 
all the play’s protagonists. Hillman argues that it is through turning away 
from the directness of engagement potentially manifested in the moment of 
greeting that the play moves from comedy toward tragedy.
In “As You Like It and the Theater of Hospitality,” James Kuzner pays 
close attention to the way in which the play’s distinctly theatricalizing scenes 
of hospitality involve not so much individual inventiveness (as manifested in 
Rosalind’s self-authoring feats) as a willingness to welcome the pretensions 
and expectations of others. Being hospitable, Kuzner argues, means helping 
another person craft a scene in which to appear. The ultimate gift is to enter-
tain and acknowledge the fantasies that others hold about themselves, an 
ethical and political gesture that Kuzner sees at work in scenes involving the 
person of Orlando as he responds to Adam, Duke Senior, and Rosalind. As You 
Like It, Kuzner suggests, asks us to explore how to be hospitable when we 
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don’t mean it, “when the best we can do is play along,” and he suggests the 
relevance of this ethic to our practice of quotidian hospitality today.
In “Hospitable Times with Shakespeare: A Reading of King Lear,” 
Thomas J. Moretti shifts our focus to the act of theater as itself an hospi-
table event subject to the tensions of timing. Moretti argues that one of 
Shakespeare’s key theatrical projects was and is to make the theater inhospi-
table enough to accommodate insight, depth, and awareness. Theater com-
panies could be hospitable so long as they helped audiences to pass the 
time. And yet, certain of Shakespeare’s plays are often inhospitable precisely 
because they force audience members to dwell on excruciating moments of 
violence, loss, and grief. Moretti reads Jacques Derrida’s On Hospitality 
alongside Henri Bergson’s phenomenology of time to emphasize that timely 
affect is at stake during moments of hospitality in and outside the theater. 
He demonstrates how King Lear’s hastenings and delays directly signal to us 
what Shakespeare would have readers, auditors, and actors endure.
Part Iv: Scripture
Hospitality is a theological as well as an economic and political category. 
These final essays examine the role of Scriptural motifs in shaping the scripts 
of Shakespearean dramas of hospitality. Sheiba Kian Kaufman effects an 
interweaving of Kantian cosmopolitanism and a scriptural account of hos-
pitality to explore the nature of Elizabethan pluralism. Joan Pong Linton 
traces the Susanna story in the messianic moods of Twelfth Night, and 
Michael Noschka uses Biblical stewardship to evaluate hospitality and ser-
vice in Timon of Athens.
In “‘Her Father Loved Me, Oft Invited Me’: Staging Shakespeare’s 
Hidden Hospitality in The Travels of the Three English Brothers,” Sheiba 
Kian Kaufman addresses the cosmopolitan dimensions of hospitality that 
precede and follow from Kant, drawing on theologian Richard Kearney’s 
discussion of the anatheistic wager: the foundational moment in Abrahamic 
religions when the divine stranger manifests as an unheralded sacred guest. 
Her chapter considers the dramatic portrayal of an improbably hospitable 
Persia in The Travels of the Three English Brothers (1607) by John Day, 
George Wilkins, and William Rowley; and in dialogue with the seemingly 
hostile Venetian terrain found in Shakespeare’s Othello and The Merchant 
of Venice. An integral component of peaceful and just coexistence is exer-
cising hospitality toward the stranger, yet in Othello and Merchant such 
hospitality is merely narrated, while hostility is frequently performed. 
Ultimately, Kaufman argues that by reading Shakespeare’s narrations of 
hidden hospitality through parallel scenes of manifest hospitality between 
English Christians and Persian hybrid-Muslims in Travels, a more nuanced 
vision of early modern religious pluralism emerges.
In “Hospitality in Twelfth Night: Playing at (the Limits of) Home,” Joan 
Pong Linton combines Tracy McNulty’s gendered intervention into the 
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hospitality relationship with treatments of the messianic by Walter Benjamin 
and Giorgio Agamben. In Twelfth Night, Olivia’s household exemplifies 
Illyrian inhospitality, being headed by an unmarried hostess who has clois-
tered herself from the world. Closer examination reveals a noble house in 
disrepair, overrun by male dependents all having designs on her body as 
property up for grabs. Yet in the first meeting between Olivia and Viola 
(disguised as Cesario), the two quickly fall to playful mockery of hospital-
ity and courtly rituals. In this face-to-face encounter, the two women play 
at the limits of home and hospitality, each bringing “home” a stranger as 
an anagrammatic version of herself. Their encounter brings into play two 
biblical unveilings that locate home and hospitality within a larger political 
theology. The first links Olivia to Susanna, the biblical heroine and Christ 
figure in a long tradition of sermons and ballads, whose public unveiling in 
a rigged trial re-poses Olivia’s domestic predicament as a question of justice. 
The second is the Pauline anticipation in 1 Corinthians of seeing God face 
to face, a subtext emerging in Feste’s last song, which recalls Paul’s use of the 
image of the child becoming man. Even as Paul’s message—also a focus of 
Kaufman’s essay—culminates in a call to love as the force drawing together 
the community of Christians, so Feste’s song, in mediating between the play 
and the audience, calls both communities, imperfect as they are, into their 
messianic potential. Attention to biblical connections allows us to discern 
a subtextual, figural energetics of the theater, rendered through devices of 
comic disproportion and sacred parody, where the Shakespearean whirligig 
is charged with shards of messianic time, and small shifts in positions and 
dispositions register perceptible and purposeful difference.
In “Thinking Hospitably with Timon of Athens: Toward an Ethics of 
Stewardship,” the closing essay of the volume, Michael Noschka rethinks 
hospitality in the present moment by way of a return to an earlier definition: 
hospitality as stewardship. Stewardship is used here in the Judeo-Christian 
scriptural sense of the term, as respect for and care of an other. Hospital-
ity as stewardship emphasizes relationality over economic arrangements, 
whereas hospitality in our contemporary milieu typically tends toward 
an economic register that is decidedly materialist. Monetized definitions 
fall short of hospitality’s ethical imperative, because they do not consider 
human personhood beyond material bodies and material needs. An alter-
native means of recouping hospitality is available via stewardship in its 
scriptural inflection. Noschka’s essay considers hospitality in a composite 
archive: Timon of Athens, cognitive theories of hospitality management, 
and Judeo- Christian scripture. Theater both enacts and promotes reflective 
thought, and as Shakespeare’s most steward-centric play, Timon represents 
the problem of materialist hospitality in distinctly visceral fashion. Cogni-
tive theories of hospitality management provide terminological frameworks, 
while also revealing the ethical limitations of materialist thinking about 
hospitality. Cognitive research in hospitality management shows that we 
think about hospitality in relation to “servicescapes” before we experience 
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emotional responses to hospitable actions. Noschka argues that Timon’s 
failure to enact hospitality beyond the material stages our own contempo-
rary misapprehension of what hospitality is and could be.
The question of what might make a hospitable text is implied throughout 
this collection, in which a number of scholars shelter, spinning out tales and 
commentaries for the reader. It is our hope that we editors act as  harbingers—
not, let’s hope, of Macbeth’s variety, but rather in the sense of rushing ahead 
to fashion a welcoming space to consider hospitality as a subject of present 
importance. How does one make a place for another, in acts of dialogue 
and exchange, in the space of the page? How do writers and readers (and 
playwrights and directors and actors) create scenes and acts of hospitality? 
How does the inhospitable sometimes aid this process, as the inhospitality of 
 Macbeth’s characters encourages the hospitality of being its audience? Here are 
some tapestries, some forks and plates. Enter, sit. Make of them what you will.
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Oikos and Polis
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1 “Will You Walk in, My Lord?”
Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida  
and the Anxiety of Oikos
Andrew Hiscock
Thy Tigrish mind who could haue well detected?
In mortall breasts so great barbaritie?
What forward sprite could haue such spight suspected?
In hospitalitie hostilitie?1
Here, the grieving Croesus, eponymous hero of one of William Alexander’s 
“monarchicke tragedies” (1604), gives way to an outpouring of vitriolic 
outrage against his guest—a guest whose desire for a boar hunt unwittingly 
brought about the very thing that the king had long sought to avert, the death 
of the royal heir. In direct comparison with a host of early modern texts, 
notably playtexts, this key moment of narrative crisis in Alexander’s closet 
drama urged early seventeenth-century readers to interrogate the culturally 
charged commitment of hospitality—how the yielding of time, space, and sus-
tenance might impose acutely frictional obligations of investment, custody, 
stewardship, and public witness. Indeed, such dramas as Croesus intervened 
in a vigorous, if thorny debate in post-Reformation Britain in which if the 
clergy were forsaking their ethical and spiritual duties of keeping a good table 
for guests and strangers, those who came to replace them among the ranks of 
the nation’s elite could prove equally unforthcoming in their offerings of good 
cheer: Elizabeth’s premier minister, William Cecil, Lord Burghley, cautioned 
his eldest son, “Touching the government of thy house, let thy hospitality be 
moderate and according to the measure of thine own estate, rather plentiful 
than sparing—but not too costly.”2 Given this parlous state of affairs, it may 
come as no surprise that one J. B., “Doctor of Phisicke,” chose to include “hos-
pitalitie” (“Entertainement of strangers, good house keeping”) in his English 
expositor teaching the interpretation of the hardest words vsed in our language 
(1616); and it has remained one of the most anxiety-ridden undertakings on into 
the twenty-first century where the welcome extended to the guest, the stranger, 
xenos (ξένος), continues to test sorely the many and various understandings 
we may have of the cultural scaffolding which supports our collective lives.3
Building upon the ideological foundations of ancient Greek society 
where both mortals and disguised immortals might present themselves in 
need of a domestic haven and just treatment (dikaiosuné), the Latin world 
also came to invest deeply in the ius hospitii not only as an axis along which 
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to gauge the mores of human exchange in a given society, but also as one 
of the organizing principles that should define the mission civilisatrice of 
the Roman cultural project. Indeed, Ladislaus J. Bolchazy argued forcefully 
that “The ius hospitii brought Romans from magico-religious xenophobia 
to altruism … with its insistence on kind treatment of a stranger, and its 
latent concept of the brotherhood of man, the ius hospitii became one of 
the factors which paved the way for the reception of the more advanced 
and reasoned teachings of Stoicism and Christianity.”4 Arthur Golding’s 
translation of the stoical Seneca’s De Beneficiis (1578), for example, not 
only acknowledged “how sacred a thing the table of hospitalitie is,” but 
reminded its early modern readers strategically of the manner in which the 
poor scholar Aeschines paid most fulsome tribute to the great Socrates: 
“Syr, I fynd nothing of sufficient worthinesse too bestowe vppon you, and 
by that meanes I feele myself too bee poore. Therfore I giue vntoo you the 
only thing that I haue, euen myself.”5 Whereas Seneca concerned himself 
with the moral treasures that might be secured by adopting the identities of 
host, patron, and donor, Cicero was more given to appreciating at length 
the social value of “this bond of hospitalitie.” In early modern translations 
of works such as De officiis and the Epistles by the revered “Tully,” the 
reader was repeatedly reminded that hospitality was not only an obliga-
tion and a fundamental adhesive agent in Roman culture, but that this 
“ domesticall friendship” might operate as a remarkably efficient vehicle for 
social preferment:
For it is (as methinketh) verie seemlie, noble mennes howses to be 
open for noble geastes. And yt also is an honour to the state: that 
outelandish men in our cite do not want this kinde of liberalitie. It is 
also exceeding profitable to them, who honestlie desire to be able to 
do much: to preuaile in power, and fauour, by their geastes, amonge 
forein nations.6
With the rise of Christianity, the most cursory glance at the New  Testament 
would encounter an analogous veneration for the rites of hospitality: 
“And whosoeuer shall giue to drinke vnto one of these litle ones, a cup of 
cold water onely, in the name of a disciple, verily I say vnto you, hee shall in 
no wise lose his reward” (Matthew 10:42); “Use hospitalitie one to another 
without grudging” (1 Peter 4:9). Moreover, among a number of the Church 
Fathers, Ambrose pondered with due care and attention the obligations of 
what Seneca’s Aeschines had proffered as an ultimate gesture of magnanim-
ity (magnus animus, greatness of spirit), the absolute extension of the self to 
the other: “It is most seemly in the eyes of the whole world that the stranger 
should be received with honour; that the charm of hospitality should not 
fail at our table … A man ought therefore to be hospitable, kind, upright, 
not desirous of what belongs to another, willing to give up some of his own 
rights if assailed, rather than to take away another’s.”7 Lest it should slip the 
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attention of the early modern reader, Erasmus for his part also underlined in 
his Paraphrases “vpon the Newe Testament” that the Old Testament equally 
paid long and ample tribute to the virtue of generous welcome: “hospitalitie 
is highlye commended before God, in so much that hereby Abraham dese-
rued to receyue vnwares Angels to lodgyng when he thought he had done 
that good tourne and pleasure vnto men.”8
Interestingly, it is becoming increasingly apparent that such acts of hos-
pitality (often with mixed responses among the host population) were 
being practiced at a national level in the second half of the sixteenth cen-
tury. Bindu Malieckal has estimated recently, for example, that “between 
1550 and 1585, up to 50,000 refugees may have entered England, includ-
ing Dutch and Belgian Protestants fleeing Spanish persecution, as well 
as Italian Protestants.”9 Thus, if Robert Robinson’s allegorical treatise 
The vineyarde of vertue (1579) drew attention to the “plant Hospitalitie” 
(“Hospitalitie is so thankfully acceptable before God, that not so much as 
a cup of colde water giuen with good wil, but it shall bee rewarded againe 
and recompensed five folde”), in his own textual hortus conclusus, William 
Vaughan went one step further at the turn of the century, contending in The 
golden-groue moralized in three bookes (1600) that this “plant” constituted 
“the chiefest point of humanity.”10
Resisting Welcome
At the dawn of the modern period, George Bernard Shaw argued that Troilus 
and Cressida was a work that revealed its author to be “ready and willing 
to start the twentieth century if the seventeenth would only let him”11; and 
indeed it is this classicized, medievalized play’s arresting ability to engage at 
very close quarters with the traumas with which early modernity and late 
modernity was/is wrestling that will govern the present discussion. If, later 
in that twentieth century which Shaw evoked, Walter Benjamin urged pre-
sciently that “the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception 
but the rule,” in later decades Jacques Derrida, among a number of eminent 
thinkers, sought precisely to anatomize this state of emergency in terms of 
the contrary motions that might lie at the heart of the relationship of host 
and guest, of “hostipitality.”12 If Derrida insisted that “what belabors and 
concerns hospitality at its core … like a promise as much as like a threat, 
what settles in it, within it, like a Trojan horse, the enemy (hostis) as much 
as the future, intestine hostility, is indeed a contradictory conception … a 
contradiction of welcoming itself,”13 Shakespeare’s own theater of hospi-
tality (which is enacted both within and without the Trojan walls) focuses 
most particularly upon the figures of the resisting host, the unruly guest 
and the violation of sacred obligations: we are transported to a dramatic 
world where an unreceptive “Achilles stands i’th’entrance of his tent” and 
his overlord Agamemnon is advised “to pass strangely by him, / As if he were 
forgot” (3.3.38–40).14
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In direct comparison with these Greek practices of inhospitality, within 
the walls of Troy the “stubborn-chaste” Cressida has to be cajoled to involve 
herself in the more intimate hosting envisaged by her uncle Pandarus for 
Prince Troilus: “Yet I hold off. Women are angels, wooing; / Things won 
are done” (1.1.93, 1.3.277–278). Indeed, later in the narrative, her father, 
the xenos, the defector Calchas is compelled to bargain with the distracted 
Greeks to press his demands for recompense as their agreed guest: “I have 
abandoned Troy, left my possessions, / Incurred a traitor’s name … / And 
here, to do you service, am become / As new into the world, strange, unac-
quainted” (3.3.5–6, 11–12). In these ways, Shakespeare’s play unveils a 
human environment deeply exercised by excessive appetites for control and 
subjugation—for the righting of past wrongs, the claiming of territories and 
bodies—and thus one wholly unfitted for the enacting of the sacred rites 
of hospitality. This is a world in which households are constituted on stage 
through bitter flyting, conspiratorial conniving, and physical menace:
AJAX: Thou bitch-wolf’s son, canst thou not hear? Feel, then.
THERSITES: being beaten. The plague of Greece upon thee, thou mongrel 
beef-witted lord!
(2.1.10–13)
Interestingly, if the Latin hostis perplexingly sustained meanings of both 
alien and enemy, Daryl W. Palmer has signaled an additional equivocation 
that lays at the heart of the early modern cultural lexicon: “The word host 
derives from the Latin hospes and hospitis. In these etymological origins and 
in Renaissance usage, the single term host signifies both host and guest.”15 
Indeed, the present inquiry into one of Shakespeare’s problem plays pro-
poses that the thorny contemporary debate (in which thinkers such as 
Derrida, Lévinas, and Ricoeur have been notable participants) concerning 
the volatile power relationships between the welcomer and the welcomed 
and the uncomfortable kinship of “hospitalitie hostilitie,” was already being 
shaped and developed in early modern performative cultures some four 
hundred years before.
The Theater of War
Dramatic narrative, whether presented on page or onstage, offers a perfect 
medium for such inquiries given that the medium in question thrives upon the 
enacting of oppositional values, beleaguered human experience, and beguil-
ing modes of seduction. As we have seen, the performance, or what Julia 
Reinhard Lupton has persuasively termed the “domestic theatre,”16 of hos-
pitality is envisaged by Derrida as one riddled with internal contradictions:
on the one hand, hospitality must wait, extend itself toward the 
other … But, on the other hand, the opposite is also nevertheless true, 
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simultaneously and irrepressibly true: to be hospitable is to let oneself be 
overtaken … Visitor and invited, visitation and invitation, are simulta-
neously in competition and incompatible.17
It swiftly becomes apparent that this attritional cycle of systolic and dia-
stolic human exchange dominates William Alexander’s account of progres-
sive collapse in a culture of hospitality: here, at the joyless court of Croesus, 
guests such as Solon, Aesop, and Adrastus find themselves alienated in quick 
succession and, to crown the royal achievement, the whole realm finally 
succumbs to Persian invaders. However, elsewhere, in the midst of the seem-
ingly ceaseless butchery that Troilus and Cressida evokes, audiences are 
also repeatedly called upon to ponder the performative status and func-
tion of hospitality in a strife-ridden landscape. Indeed, whether the focus is 
upon armed hostilities led by Darius or upon spectacular acts of aggression 
between Trojans and Greeks, in both texts we are introduced into morally 
unremarkable dramatic worlds where everyday life is governed by ruthless 
competition and the premature inheritance of superlative identities and 
privileged claims to ownership.
At the opening of Shakespeare’s play, we are presented with jaded politi-
cal communities compromised by impure motivation, political lethargy, and 
failing humanity: the Greek commander Agamemnon bears ample witness 
to the fact that “we come short of our suppose so far / That after seven 
years’ siege yet Troy walls stand” (1.3.11–12). If the Volscian servant in 
Shakespeare’s later Coriolanus insists “Let me have war, say I. It exceeds 
peace” (4.6.218), such sentiments would garner little support in the war-
weary communities on the Dardan Plain in the earlier play. Troilus him-
self queries, “Why should I war without the walls of Troy, / That find such 
cruel battle here within?” (1.1.2–3). Moreover, late Elizabethan audiences 
were thoroughly acquainted with the tribulations surrounding failing mili-
tary campaigns and the reluctance of a great many to enter the profession 
of arms, as the Captain in Robert Barret’s The theorike and practicke of 
modern warres (1598) bore witness: “For long peace hath bred Securitie; 
securitie, carelesse mindes; carelesse mindes: contempt of warre; contempt 
of warre, the dispising of souldiarie and Martiall discipline; the dispising of 
Martiall discipline, vnwilling minds.”18
“Beginning in the middle,” Shakespeare’s bitter dramatic narrative com-
pels us into the company of “princes orgulous, their high blood chafed”; 
and the subsequent “broils,” or theaters of choler, with which we are con-
fronted are wholly shaped by the trafficking of bodies, whether initially 
across the waters of the Aegean or subsequently across the waters of the 
Styx (Prol. 28, 2, 27). Unsurprisingly, in this iron age of war, households are 
among the first casualties when everyday selves are translated into warriors. 
The abduction/seduction/reduction of Troy’s newest citizen and trophy wife, 
Helen, is merely a re-enactment of the spiriting away of Priam’s sister, Hesione, 
a generation earlier in retaliation for her father’s, Laomedon’s, broken vows 
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to the Gods and to Hercules. If Paris’s later supplication to the Greeks for 
the return of his aunt Hesione proved fruitless, he remained determined 
to return home with a woman of royal blood, namely, Menelaus’s queen 
of Sparta: “To ransack Troy, within whose strong immures / The ravished 
Helen, Menelaus’ queen, / With wanton Paris sleeps; and that’s the quarrel” 
(Prol. 8–10). In due course in Shakespeare’s play, as in every other account 
of Troy’s demise, this brokering of political ambitions back and forth across 
the Mediterranean with the currency of female bodies leads to the relin-
quishing of the trunks of dead warriors year after year from both Troy and 
Greece to the doleful waters of the Underworld.
In The Politics, Aristotle construed the “war-mad man” in consciously 
Homeric terms as “having no family, no law, no home,”19 and thus draws 
particular attention to the ways in which recourse to violence burns away 
and dissolves what he viewed as the fundamental principles of life in 
human society. If Shakespeare’s medievalized dramatic world may bear 
little evidence of an acquaintance with Aristotelian argumentation per se, 
it is thoroughly conversant with the realities of failed states and fugitive 
existences that the theater of war engenders. Equally significantly, the riven 
nature of Shakespeare’s warring societies is repeatedly expressed in terms 
of the crises being negotiated within the microcosm of the elite household—
oikos (or in the later Latin world, domus). The oikos was widely conceived 
as the basic building block of a city-state or polis: in the ancient world, 
it emerged both as the powerfully symbolic distillation and negotiation 
of the primary animating forces within a given society. Moreover, such 
thinking formed an integral element of the cultural legacy that antiquity 
was seen to have bequeathed to succeeding ages. The celebrated Spanish 
humanist Juan Luis Vives asserted authoritatively in De officio mariti 
(1529), “what a commoditie is the wife vnto ye husband, in ordering of 
hys house, & in gouerning of hys familie & housholde? by this cities are 
edified & buylded;”20 and, at the close of the sixteenth century, John Dod 
and Robert Cleaver contended without fear of contradiction in A godly 
forme of houshold government (first published 1598) that “An Houshold is 
as it were a little Commonwealth, by the good gouernment whereof, Gods 
glorie may be aduanced, and the commonwealth which standeth of seuerall 
families benefited; and all that liue in that familie receiue much comfort 
and commoditie.”21
If the concept of oikos nourished a mythology of belonging in the ancient 
world, linked to reserved spaces of dwelling (of family, property and 
buildings—oikia kai chorion22), it was evident from the founding of this 
mythology that the household community and estate supported multiple 
functions of reception and entertainment as well as opportunities for with-
drawal (otium) and intimacy. This division of the spoils of domestic life was 
widely appreciated in the early modern period, as Francis Bacon indicated 
in his Essayes: “Houses are built to Liue in, not to Looke on … I say, you 
cannot haue a Perfect Pallace, except you haue two seuerall Sides; A Side 
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for the Banquet … And a Side, for the Houshold: The One for Feasts and 
Triumphs, and the Other for Dwelling.”23 At the outset, immanent in such 
symbolic figurations of oikos was the assertion that the survival of these 
little  commonwealths remained apotropaic, keeping death (that is, the 
deadly competition for space and bodies) at bay. Nonetheless, if this cultural 
ideal was deployed conceptually as a prime guarantor of a society’s enduring 
integrity, it also frequently became the scene in which bitter conflicts of legal, 
political, spiritual, and kinship allegiances might be contested—conflicts 
which in the ancient world, as Richard Seaford has persuasively demon-
strated, could be communicated in the shape of the unruly god Dionysus. 
This wayward son of Zeus, source of the frenzied bakkheia, might simulta-
neously be viewed as “destroyer of the household” and, in his associations 
with the unruly collective life of the thiasos, as “a god of the whole polis.”24
In the conflicted world of postwar theorizing, Michel Foucault insisted 
that “the anxiety of our era has to do fundamentally with space.” However, he 
(in direct comparison with Shakespeare’s play) did not restrict the parameters 
of his investigations to questions of topographical, architectural, or somatic 
spaces—though these spaces certainly do exist in Troilus and  Cressida as we 
are invited imaginatively to penetrate “Priam’s six-gated city— /  Dardan and 
Timbria, Helias, Chetas, Troien / And Antenorides—with massy staples / And 
corresponsive and fulfilling bolts” (Prol. 15–18). Indeed, elsewhere, there are 
scenes of teichoskopia (or military spectating from vantage points) where 
Pandarus, for example, tempts Cressida to “an excellent place” (“Shall we 
stand up here and see them as they pass toward Ilium?’ 1.2.172–175), 
or Helen and Hecuba are known to have resorted “to the eastern tower, / 
Whose height commands as subject all the vale, / To see the battle” (1.2.2–4). 
Rather, Foucault’s readers were forcefully reminded that “we live inside a 
set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one another 
and absolutely not superimposable on one another … Thus it is that the 
theater brings onto the rectangle of the stage, one after the other, a whole 
series of places that are foreign to one another.”25 The theatrical analogy 
which Foucault pursues here, drawing attention to the slipping and sliding 
of material and ideological spaces upon each other as human experience is 
constituted, is of particular interest when considering a work such as Troilus 
and Cressida—a work that is profoundly concerned with the construction 
of social spaces of reception in and exclusion from matrices of intimate 
relations. In Shakespeare’s play world, ambitions to illuminate the dark 
corners of these ancient societies may, and frequently do, come to fruition 
with the assistance of intermediaries, eavesdroppers, and voyeurs with the 
invaluable resources of the unfettered imagination. Indeed, Pandarus occu-
pies himself throughout the dramatic narrative with his self-appointed role 
of host to the illicit loves of the protagonists: “I will show you a chamber 
with a bed; which bed, because it shall not speak of your pretty encounters, 
press it to death: away!” (3.2.202–204). Elsewhere, the petulant Achilles, 
for example, “Grows dainty of his worth and in his tent / Lies mocking our 
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designs. With him Patroclus, / Upon a lazy bed the livelong day / Breaks scurril 
jests,” while Ajax too is “grown self-willed, and … / … keeps his tent like him” 
(1.3.145–148, 188–190). In his Essayes, mindful of Aristotelian thinking, 
Francis Bacon argued that “Whosoever is delighted in solitude, is either a 
wilde Beast, or a God. For it is most true, that a Naturall and Secret Hatred, 
and Auersation towards Society, in any Man, hath somewhat of the Sauage 
Beast.”26 Achilles clearly assumes both of these identities at different points 
and communicates them most often in his unwillingness to share his dissaf-
fected oikos with the broader society of the Greeks. At such points, we may 
be reminded of a similarly rebellious lord who found himself holed up with 
his familiars in the aftermath of a flawed demonstration of military leadership: 
“the Earl of Essex is now returned to London, and it is much noted how his 
doors are set open to all comers … many captains, men of broken fortunes, 
discontented persons.”27
More generally in Shakespeare’s bitter comedy, two warring societies are 
yielding simultaneously to the beguiling pleasures of military and erotic ser-
vice in order to safeguard key cultural investments and to gratify cherished 
pleasure principles. Nonetheless, in the midst of this tale of abductions, 
invasions, and parleys, it matters little whether we keep company with the 
besieged Trojans or the estranged Greeks; we are forced to engage with 
the overarching narrative of violent trauma from a markedly domicentric 
perspective.28
Broken vows and Broken Laws
When early modern minds contemplated these remote societies locked in 
combat over the fates of Hesione and Helen, they were often little given 
to celebrating the decorum with which the hostilities unfolded—certainly 
not the chivalric courtesies that Chaucer and Shakespeare introduced into 
the emotionally charged intrigues of Troilus and Criseyde or Troilus and 
Cressida. While much has been justly made of the Tudor mythologizing of 
its Trojan origins looking back to the flight of Brute from the Mediterranean 
world of his forefathers and to the founding of Brutayne, there is every rea-
son to believe that the immured space of the Priam’s six-gated city may have 
generated a much greater breadth of response in Tudor and Stuart society 
than signaling a powerful site of cultural belonging. Indeed, immured spaces 
might constitute on certain occasions the precise inverse of the early modern 
subject’s desired state of well-being. In an ambitious and revealing discus-
sion, Mary Thomas Crane has underlined in a timely manner that “Critics 
have paid less attention to the fact that real privacy, especially for illicit activ-
ities, was, until well into the seventeenth century, most often represented as 
readily attainable only outdoors.”29 Turning in a more focused manner to 
those locked in war-torn societies, we may be reminded that Marlowe’s 
Tamburlaine rails at those who live “idle in the wallèd towns,  / Wanting 
both pay and martial discipline”30; and, with just a little less vehemence, 
“Will You Walk in, My Lord?” 25
William Harrison submitted in his account of castles and fortified places in 
his Description of England (1587):
it is not the nature of a good Englishman to regard to be caged vp as 
in a coope, and hedged in with stone wals, but rather to meet with his 
enimie in the plaine field at handstrokes, where he may trauerse his 
ground, choose his plot, and vse the benefit of sunne shine, wind and 
weather, to his best aduantage & commoditie.31
Here, Harrison is thinking specifically about the playing out of armed hos-
tilities, but may also be offering food for thought more generally about 
the varietas in early modern constructions of belonging and dwelling. The 
slippery nature of such discourses has been revealingly highlighted by 
Michael C. Schoenfeldt, for example, in his account of Spenser’s Castle of 
Alma in The Faerie Queene (“surrounded by enemies and under constant 
siege”) to which even the knights errant Arthur and Guyon initially fail to 
gain access (2.11.10): “An ethic of hospitality here collides with an image of 
self in a continual state of war.”32 Like Spenser, Shakespeare in Troilus and 
Cressida has a consuming interest in unpicking the ethics of hospitality for 
wider scrutiny in scenes of siege warfare and in those of potentially equal 
import unfolding in domestic chambers privy to the inspection of fewer 
pairs of eyes. Interestingly, if, during the reign of Henry VIII, Sir Thomas 
Wyatt sailed back to his native capital, “to the town which Brutus sought 
by dreams,” and Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey, called “to mind the navy 
great / That the Greeks brought to Troia towne,”33 their contemporary Sir 
Thomas Elyot was recalling for this same generation of Henrician England 
that although “ardentelye belouyd of Stenobea, the wyfe of Pretus kynge 
of Ephyra,” Bellerophontes would not succumb to an adulterous relation-
ship, “fearyng the vengeance of Iupiter god of hospitalitie.”34 Subsequently, 
his Tudor reader was reminded that, “Hospitalis Iupiter, was soo called, 
bycause straungers or Gestes whan they were yll intreated in theyr lodgin-
ges, they called hym to witnes, desyringe hym to reuenge hym.”35
This concern with Iupiter xenius and the sanctity of the laws of hospi-
tality over which he presided would surface in many and various guises 
throughout the early modern period. In Lysimachus and Varrona (1604), 
for example, John Hind had his characters “beseech Iupiter Xenius the 
patron of hospitalitie, and protectour of strangers, to blesse our labours, 
prosper our attempts.”36 Philip Sidney’s own prose romance celebrated 
“the right honest hospitalitie which seemes to be harboured in the Arcadian 
brests” and the “sacred protection” of a guest; and, in his poetic collection 
 Parthenophil and Parthenophe (1593), Barnabe Barnes summoned the figure 
of Atlas who “(through fierce crueltie/And breache to lawes of hospitalitie  / 
When lodging to a straunger he denied) / Was turned to a stonie moun-
taine straight.”37 Elsewhere, Philemon Holland’s translation of Ammianus 
Marcellinus’s The Roman historie (1609) underlined that “Among other 
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Attributes given to Iupiter, one was Xenius, or Hospitalis, the Superintendent, 
as it were, of guests, and their entertainement. So religious they were in old 
times, that a guest once received should be inviolable”; and Shakespeare’s 
Lucrece “ coniures’ the brute Tarquin ‘by high Almightie Ioue, / … By holie 
humaine law, and common troth, / By Heauen and Earth, and all the power of 
both: / … Quoth shee, reward not Hospitalitie, / With such black payment.”38
Moreover, there was a growing number of voices who were willing to 
attribute the basest of motives to the Trojan prince who set out to redeem 
Hesione from her Greek hosts. Thomas Fenne, for example, was not dis-
posed to celebrate the supposedly Trojan ancestry of his nation and railed 
in Fennes frutes (1590) that it was “a disgrace, and also a foule discredit, to 
Englishmen … to deriue their pedigree from such an vnfaithfull stock, who 
were the chiefe causers of their own perdition.” In Fenne’s account, despite 
being “right Princely intertained by Menelaus King of Lacedemon, who 
right honorably banqueted and feasted both him and his companions” and 
benefiting from the fact that the king had “commaunded Helena his beau-
tiful Queen so entertaine her guest in his absence,” Paris was prey through-
out to his “owne lecherous motion”: “for which friendly entertainment and 
gentle courtesie … to requit the gentle King stole away from thence his wife 
Helena, whom he entirely loued.”39 Thus, both memory and morality play 
the young prince false, and this lust-crazed guest violates a sacred under-
taking with his host. Elizabeth I’s godson, Sir John Harington, quipped in 
verse that if “Pastor Paris” had seen the loveliness of one Olympia (“all was 
as white as milk, / As smooth as Iuory, and as soft as silke”), “For Helena 
he had not cared at all, / Nor broke the bonds of sacred hospitalitie, / That 
bred his country wars and great mortalitie.”40 Furthermore, the severing of 
such sacred ties are uppermost initially in Helen’s own thoughts in Thomas 
Heywood’s Troia Britanica (1609) when she rebuts the amorous advances of 
the Trojan prince, declaring, “Dar’st thou (Oh shamelesse) in such heynous 
wise, / The Lawes of Hospitality despise? And being a straunger, / from thy 
Countries reach, / Solicite a chast wife to Wedlocks breach?”41
Understandably, when George Chapman renewed Homer’s epic poems 
for British readers with new translations in the vernacular from 1598 
onward, due attention was necessarily afforded to ‘humane Hospitality,’ 
given the thematic emphases of his source texts: “Guest? If one much wurse / 
Arriu’d here then thy selfe; it were a curse / To my poore meanes, to let a 
Stranger tast / Contempt, for fit food.”42 Moreover, this acquaintance with 
the sacred laws of antiquity did not forsake Shakespeare’s contemporary 
when he turned his attentions to the stage. In The Revenge of Bussy D’Ambois 
(1613) Clermont queries, “Who was in fault for all the slaughters made / 
In Ilion, and about it? Were the Greekes? / Was it not Paris rauishing the 
Queene / Of Lacedæmon? Breach of shame and faith? / And all the lawes of 
 Hospitalitie?”43 It might also be added that, during his long years of captiv-
ity in the Tower, Walter Raleigh devoted himself principally to the narrative 
labors of The History of the World (1614) and, for his own part, also found 
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much with which to take issue in the received accounts of the travails of 
Agamemnon’s Greece and Priam’s Troy. Rather than indulging his reader’s 
appetites for heroic exploits and tender insights into domestic havens, the 
chronicler all too often chose to shine a light upon the chaotic conditions of 
existence of these warring races and their barbaric appetites for scavenging 
and violation:
I thinke that Paris had no regard, either to the rape of Europa, Medoea, 
or Hesione: but was meerely incited by Venus, that is, by his lust, to doe 
that which in those dayes was very common. For not onely Greekes 
from Barbarians, and Barbarians from Greekes, as Herodotus dis-
courseth, but all people were accustomed to steale women and cattell, 
if they could by strong hand or power get them … It is true that in these 
times Greece was very saluage, the inhabitants being often chaced from 
place to place, by the captaines of greater Tribes: and no man thinking 
the ground whereon hee dwelt his owne longer than hee could hold it 
by strong hand … briefly, Greece was then in her infancie.44
Thus, rather than uniformly celebrating the thoughts, words, and deeds 
of antique heroes, this agon of everlasting memory continued to generate 
widely differing responses in early modern England. Moreover, equally inter-
estingly, the proliferating narratives surrounding Paris and Helen might not 
only trigger a meditation upon the nature of violated hospitality, but lead to 
a wide-ranging and biting critique of all parties drawn into the deadly fray 
around the walls of Troy.
“What’s Aught, But as ’tis valued?”: Combative Spaces  
and Household Transactions
Shadowing in many ways the steps of Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, 
Shakespeare introduces us into a medievalized world of figures distracted by 
their appetites for self-gratification. Neither of these narratives is principally 
concerned with clamorous armies locked in combat on killing fields or with 
aggrieved disputants on Olympus. Instead, the landscape of the city-state 
and the Dardan Plain is punctuated by countersites of individuated human 
interest—palace chambers and city walls, encampments, and conspirato-
rial gatherings: if Troilus himself acknowledges the pressing business of the 
“sport abroad,” he has no hesitation in stating his true inclinations: “‘Better 
at home, if ‘would I might’ were ‘may’” (1.1.110–111).
Chaucer’s Troilus is found at points in the long narrative poem to 
pathologize his trauma by memorially remapping the architectural spaces 
of his besieged city (“Lo, yonder saugh ich last my lady daunce; / And 
in that temple, with hire eyen cleere, / Me kaughte first my righte lady 
dere. / … And at that corner, in the yonder hous, Herde I myn alderlevest 
lady deere” [5.565–567, 575–576]). However, in contrast, Shakespeare’s 
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play urges us to attend to what Foucault termed as sets of relations that 
delineate sites. Moreover, such discursively constructed sites may be specifi-
cally gendered in nature, as Henry Smith urged in A Preparative to Marriage 
(1591): “the Cocke flieth abroad to bring in, the Dam sitteth vpon the nest 
to keepe al at home. So God hath made the man to trauaile abroade, and the 
woman to keepe home … for the mans pleasure is most abroade, and the 
womans within.”45 Such divisions of labor are ranged clearly into view in 
the couplings and wranglings that describe the oikoi of  Shakespeare’s dra-
matic world. Andromache urges, for example, “Unarm, unarm, and do not 
fight to-day,” whereas Hector only makes further investment in the extra-
mural, public domain of military heroism—“Get you in. / By all the ever-
lasting gods, I’ll go!” (5.3.3–5). If, locked in the court world of  Cleopatra’s 
charms, Shakespeare’s Antony complains that he has relinquished his role 
as one of the triple pillars of the Roman world, similarly enslaved to desire, 
Troilus in the earlier play bemoans that it is “womanish” (1.1.103) to be from 
the battlefield, and deems himself “weaker than a  woman’s tear, / … Less 
valiant than the virgin in the night” (1.1.9, 11) in devoting himself to the 
cult of love within the city’s walls. (Interestingly, it soon becomes apparent 
that his witty mistress, the lady Cressida, knows exactly what it is for an 
unseasoned man “to be baked with no date in the pie” [1.2.247–248].) 
Elsewhere, the in-tented Achilles is maligned as “over-proud / And 
under-honest,” liable (like the female body) to “pettish lunes, his ebbs, his 
flows” (2.3.121–122, 128). Disdaining the Greek society that pays him lit-
tle homage, Achilles refuses to “untent his person” (2.3.165). Ulysses and 
then Ajax are sent to the wrathful warrior, but to little avail: the King of 
Ithaca subsequently submits, “There is no tarrying here; the hart Achilles / 
Keeps thicket” (2.3.252–253).
The reiterative narrative and locus amoenus of this play world is the pre-
sentation, but most frequently yearned-for penetration, of reserved, intimate 
space: Troilus reflects at the beginning of the play, “I cannot come to Cressid 
but by Pandar, / … Between our Ilium and where she resides, / Let it be 
called the wild and wand’ring flood” (1.1.91, 97–98). In both the Greek and 
Trojan communities there persists an obsessive interest in willing oneself to 
be a guest in order to gain prized access to household space and knowledge: 
the gatekeeper Patroclus informs Agamemnon that the intemperate Achilles is 
“Within his tent; but ill disposed,” whereas the ever watchful Ulysses snarls, 
“We saw him at the opening of his tent. / He is not sick” (2.3.74, 82–83). 
Furthermore, when the Trojan guest Aeneas is granted safe passage into the 
palpable disarray of the Greek camp, he pointedly queries whether it is pos-
sible here even to differentiate the confidential from the commonplace, nay, 
the master from the minion:
AGAMEMNON: What would you ’fore our tent?
AENEAS: Is this great Agamemnon’s tent, I pray you? …
Which is the high and mighty Agamemnon? …
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AGAMEMNON: Sir, you of Troy, call you yourself Aeneas? …
What’s your affair, I pray you?
AENEAS: Sir, pardon, ’tis for Agamemnon’s ear.
AGAMEMNON: He hears naught privately that comes from Troy.
(1.3.215–6, 232, 245, 247–9)
Significantly, Agamemnon seeks to resolve this Trojan challenge to Greek 
chivalry and galling estimation of Greek confusion by asserting his authority 
with the public, indeed ostentatious performance of hospitality. By assuming 
the role of host, the King of Mycenae aims to subject the unruly stranger 
and, into the bargain, his quarrelsome retainers to his overlordship: “Fair 
Lord Aeneas, let me touch your hand; / To our pavilion shall I lead you first. / … 
Yourself shall feast with us before you go / And find the welcome of a noble 
foe” (1.3.304–305, 308–309).
Shakespearean dramaturgy frequently draws attention to the recid-
ivist behaviors of those seeking to secure precarious claims to sover-
eignty: purposefully and repeatedly Henry IV and Henry V confuse 
militarism with government, for example, and in the tragedies, figures 
such as  Macbeth and Claudius can choose to promote their own royal 
legitimacy through spectacles of welcome and feasting. Interestingly, at 
the close of Troilus and Cressida, Agamemnon returns to this favored 
strategy of power assertion with the tactical performance of hospita-
ble entertainment (of inter tenere or holding together46) when he greets 
Hector as his guest in the wake of the gladiatorials with Ajax: “all you 
peers of Greece, go to my tent; / There in the full convive we … / Beat 
loud the tabourins, let the trumpets blow, / That this great soldier may 
his welcome know” (4.5.271–272, 275–276). However, as the Jacobean 
preacher Thomas Adams cautioned in his sermon The sacrifice of thanke-
fulnesse (pub. 1616), the assembled company might do well to be on its 
guard when faced with such histrionic displays: “Gallant prodigalitie, 
like fire in flaxe, makes a great blaze, a hote shew: but Plaine hospi-
tality, like fire in solide wood, holds out to warme the poore: because 
God blesseth it.”47 Indeed, this was a sentiment that had already been 
explored at length by William Vaughan in The Golden-Grove (1600), a 
near contemporary of Shakespeare’s bitter comedy:
They are greatly deceyued, who thinke, that hospitality doth consist in 
slibber-sauces, in spiced meates, or in diuersities. For these are nought 
els, saue fooleries, and fond wasting of goods, whereby the flesh is 
prouoked to lechery, & becommeth altogether inflamed, massy, and 
diseased. Further, experience teacheth, that none are more subiect to 
sicknesses, then they, that gurmaundize and feed on sundry kindes 
of dishes … Good hospitality therefore consisteth not in gluttonous 
diuersities, but rather in one kind of meat, in clothing the naked, and 
in giuing almes vnto the poore.48
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In Troilus and Cressida extravagant displays of greeting and good cheer 
are keenly contrasted with more intimate scenes of invitation, reception, 
and predation elsewhere in this unraveling world. The schemer Achilles, for 
example, plans to send “sweet Patroclus” to summon Thersites so that he 
may inform Ajax “T’invite the Trojan lords after the combat / To see us here 
unarmed. I have a woman’s longing, / An appetite that I am sick withal, / 
To see great Hector in his weeds of peace” (3.3.238–241)—in the event, the 
cynic Thersites arrives unbidden and thus abbreviates the aspiring host’s line 
of command.
Interestingly, while much is made in narrative terms of Cressida’s entry 
into the sexual market of Troy with the greeting of the brothel, “Will you 
walk in, my lord?” (3.2.59), the role of the sexually available woman, the 
hetaira or courtesan in the ancient world, clearly unpicks any publicly 
acknowledged codes of hospitality, scrambling our understanding of the 
identities of host and guest: indeed, Cressida herself teasingly queries amid 
the assembled company of her Greek suitors at the end of the play, “In kiss-
ing, do you render or receive?” (4.5.37). In his discussion of the thriving sex-
ual trade in classical Athens, Simon Goldhill highlights importantly that the 
“hetaira is a particularly difficult figure for the dynamics of male authority. 
Beautiful and desirable—but who’s in charge? Not biddable nor buyable—
but perhaps persuadable. Male self-determination—self-sufficiency—is set 
at risk by the figure of the hetaira.”49 In Shakespeare’s play world, Troilus 
finds himself incapable of self-government on account of his unruly pas-
sions, and this most unaccommodated man roams histrionically about the 
city in search of a most particular invitation: “I stalk about her door / Like 
a strange soul upon the Stygian banks / Staying for waftage” (3.2.7–9). In due 
course, the quick-witted Cressida repeats “Will you walk in, my lord?” 
playing willing hostess to an all-too willing guest—“O Cressida, how often 
have I wished me thus!” (3.2.95, 60). Nonetheless, in this scene of lightly 
veiled passions, all the agents (including Pandarus) are at a loss to determine 
whether it is better to give than to receive, even to differentiate meum from 
tuum: “My lord, I do beseech you, pardon me; / ‘Twas not my purpose thus 
to beg a kiss” (3.2.132–133).
In the event, some early modern eyes, such as Thomas Nashe’s in Christ’s 
Tears over Jerusalem (1593), had little difficulty in identifying the true 
nature of the welcome on offer in such dwellings of the nation’s capital: 
“London what are thy Suburbes but licensed Stewes’ and complained of 
the ‘Prouident Iustices, to whom these abuses redress appertaineth, take a 
little paines to visite these houses of hospitality by night.”50 However, for 
others, such practices might not only be discovered in licensed premises: 
if little inclined to visit Troy’s stews, the watchful Pandarus seems to know 
the customs of the country and gleefully remarks on entering his niece’s 
apartments, “What’s all the doors open here? … How now, how now, how 
go maidenheads?” (4.1.20, 24). Indeed, in his lively sermon The  Devil’s 
Banquet (1614), Thomas Adams argued forcefully that the trade of the 
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“harlot” was a vicious mimicking of the practices of hospitality, for at the 
threshhold “shee presents her selfe to the common eye” and as for custom-
ers, “they come in troupes to her.”51 Furthermore, in direct comparison with 
the monitored movements of the lady Cressida (“Walk into her house. / I’ll 
bring her to the Grecian presently” 4.3.5–6), the prostitute might err about 
the city and constitute a moveable feast for the eyes of those beyond the 
bounds of oikos:
in the Citie. Whoredome, scornes to liue obscurely in the Suburbs: Shee 
hath friends to admit her within the walles. Nay, in the high places of 
the Citie: in the largest streetes, populous and popular houses … The 
feast is like to be good when an Harlot is the Hostice … A Harlot then, 
bids, and feasts, and kils: what other successe can be looked for? The 
Deuill hath feasted the wicked, and now the wicked feast the Deuill.52
The teasing Pandarus exclaims to his witty niece “One knows not at what 
ward you lie,” and receives the quicksilver response from his auditor, “Upon 
my back, to defend my belly” (1.2.249–251). If the whole of Shakespeare’s 
tragicomedy is exercised by the depredations brought about by the traffick-
ing of female bodies (Hector argues at the opening of the Trojan  Council’s 
debate, “Brother, she is not worth what she doth cost / The holding” 
[2.2.51–52]), by the end of the play Cressida at last finds herself among 
feverish supporters and eager clients in the Greek camp. Thersites quips 
that the subtle lady has learned her lesson well how to survive in a grubby, 
conflict-ridden society—“a juggling trick: to be secretly open” (5.2.26).
“Twere Better She Were kissed in General”:  
Concluding Thoughts
If, in the interwar period, the Russian Marxist critic A. A. Smirnov found 
Shakespeare’s comedy to be a “motley and contradictory play,” over half 
a century later in a wide-ranging and incisive discussion Barbara Bowen 
was drawing attention to “the misogyny and somatophobia of Troilus and 
Cressida’s analysis of war.”53 Lest any doubt should persist, Paola Pugliatti 
has concluded more recently that “Troilus and Cressida is a deeply unpleas-
ant play.”54 Whatever the justness of these contentions, if this bitter comedy 
(like The Taming of the Shrew and Measure for Measure, for example) has 
proved on occasions a little too intractable for prevailing taste cultures, it 
may indeed be that we have to rethink our critical lines of attack, rather 
than ensure that such texts are refin’d for the stage or deemed unfit for pres-
ent consumption.
The classical scholar Richard Seaford has tellingly underlined that “[t]he 
communality of the polis is established at the expense of women, who, with-
out power in the public sphere, were easily imagined as adhering excessively 
to the household and as resisting their public powerlessness”55; and, mining 
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an analogous vein in their own thought-provoking accounts of Shakespeare’s 
tragicomedy, René Girard stresses that “Cressida cannot become once again 
‘the thing ungain’d’ that she used to be, but she can be lost to someone else” 
and Dympna Callaghan argues equally persuasively that “there is a level at 
which [Shakespeare’s Cressida] refers not to women but to the masculinities 
she negotiates.”56 Elsewhere, pondering in detail the final challenges of this 
dramatic narrative (i.e., its remorseless investment in indeterminacy) where 
Cressida is handed on from the clutches of one Greek chieftain to the next, 
Alexander Leggatt has explored revealingly the manner in which “Cressida 
seems broken and re-made before our eyes through the pressure of relation-
ship … in her own way as unreadable as Lavinia. Calculation, fear, sexual 
interest, catatonic stupor—what lies beneath that silence?”57 Proliferating 
perspectives on an exceedingly perplexing dramatic moment, we might add, 
could this scene not also constitute an inverted ritualization of anakalupteria 
whereby the bride is unveiled and accompanied in procession to her future 
household? Or are we being presented with a bitter parody of ritualized 
gift-giving (or dora) in this definitive entry of the lady Cressida into the 
fiercely competitive world of adult sexuality? The possible angles of vision 
upon this remarkably elusive text are very far from being exhausted.
Generations of critics have taken up a challenge upon which they believe 
Shakespeare’s text insists, that of anatomizing its divided dramatic world 
into clearly delineated factions: E. M. W. Tillyard, for example, contended 
that we are thrust into the company of “antique” Trojans and Greek “new 
men”; Emil Roy unveiled a dramatic world of “warring halves, pitting Greek 
aggression against Trojan sensuality”; and Thomas G. West contrasted the 
materiality of the Greeks’ outlook with the Trojans’ continuing investment 
in acts of faith or “of the will.”58 However, it remains all too possible that 
Shakespeare initially proposes these tempting, reassuring polarities (like 
those of fifteenth-century England and France, of Capulets and Montagues, 
of Belmont and the Rialto, for example) only to indicate the imperfect nature 
of such navigational expectations in these darkly complex worlds. The pres-
ent discussion has concerned itself with the ways in which a dominant cul-
tural discourse, in this case hospitality, might offer a fruitful lens through 
which to contemplate the perceivedly corrosive undertaking of Troilus and 
Cressida. It is clear that in the early years of the seventeenth century when 
Shakespeare tested the boundaries of both tragedy and comedy, the plays he 
produced returned repeatedly to question the status and function of domes-
tic welcome: Brabantio in Othello queries vehemently the liberties that the 
Moor has taken as his guest; elsewhere, Gloucester protests to the “naughty 
lady” Regan in King Lear, “I am your host. / With robbers’ hands my hospi-
table favours / You should not ruffle thus” (3.7.36, 38–40). Moreover, Paul 
Kottman has illuminated the “perverse hosting” operational in Macbeth—
interestingly, this is a practice that is equally in evidence in a rather different 
key in another work from these years in Shakespeare’s career, The Merry 
Wives of Windsor.59 However, like the tragedies, Troilus and Cressida 
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presents a vision of life in human society in which loss is thematic, and the 
welcoming and expelling of strangers and guests from reserved spaces of 
dwelling is integral to all their dramatic narratives. In the final scenes of this 
problem play of Greeks and Trojans, we are urged to compare and contrast 
the yielding of Cressida to Greek competitive hospitality and the yielding of 
Hector to a more bloodthirsty version of it: “I’ll heat his blood with Greekish 
wine tonight, / Which with my scimitar I’ll cool tomorrow. / Patroclus, let us 
feast him to the height” (Achilles, 5.1.1–3).
At the beginning of this discussion, we considered how the ancient and 
early modern worlds identified strategic cultural capital in the sacred bonds 
of hospitality, how it came to constitute an indication of superlative human 
exchange, or of what Emmanuel Lévinas has termed for more contemporary 
audiences, the interhumain: “L’interhumain proprement dit est dans une 
non-indifférence des uns aux autres, dans une responsabilité des uns pour 
les autres … La rencontre d’Autrui est d’emblée ma responsabilité pour 
lui.”60 If this absolute realization of human potential through self-extension 
to others was acknowledged, as we have seen, in writings from antiquity, 
such as Seneca’s De Beneficiis, it does not pass unrecognized among the 
inmates of Shakespeare’s dramatic world: indeed, Ulysses’ reading matter 
forces him to consider that “no man is the lord of anything, / Though in and 
of him there be much consisting, / Till he communicate his parts to others” 
(3.3.116–118). Nonetheless, if Lévinas promoted a condition of existence 
in which “Nous sommes ainsi responsables au-delà de nos intentions,”61 
Shakespeare summons the terrifying prospect of the inverse of this postu-
late. The residents of his dramatic world can guess at what hospitality might 
be, but it becomes all too evident that they know not what it is in substan-
tive, human terms. With his wonted jaundiced vision of the world, Ulysses 
asserts that “Time is like a fashionable host / That slightly shakes his parting 
guest by th’hand, / And with his arms outstretched as he would fly / Grasps 
in the comer” (3.3.166–9); and the dying Hector protests, “I am unarmed. 
Forgo this vantage, Greek” (5.9.9). At the close of this play where the two 
cultures converge in a deadly banquet, the bereft Troilus petitions to be an 
eavesdropper, if he cannot be a guest, at the revelry in Menelaus’s tent where 
Diomedes feasts after his own manner, giving “all gaze and bent of amorous 
view / On the fair Cressid” (4.5.28–3). To its very conclusion, Shakespeare’s 
dramatic narrative concentrates upon those threatened with or forced to 
endure exclusion from designated spaces of hospitality.
A beleaguered Aeneas protests in the closing moments of Shakespeare’s 
play, “Stand, ho! Yet are we masters of the field. / Never go home; here 
starve we out the night” (5.11.1–2). However, Thomas Fenne had already 
reported for his late Elizabethan readers that at the Sack of Troy, this 
future founder of empires would leave the burning city “contemning all 
other things of great valew and estimation, [carrying] out with him the 
gods of  hospitality.”62 This defining scene for millennia to come of the vio-
lent unraveling of oikos (or domicide) had been envisaged from the outset 
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of the dramatic narrative where Troilus finds himself abandoned in “the 
wild and wand’ring flood” and the jaundiced words of Ulysses mourn 
“how many Grecian tents do stand / Hollow upon this plain” (1.1.98, 
1.3.79–80).63 Indeed, the very community of oikos, the family itself, is at 
no point protected from the wider dissolution of the warring societies on 
the Dardan Plain: like her near contemporary Helena in All’s Well That 
Ends Well, Cressida is able and willing in extremis to foreswear the most 
sacred ties of kinship, testifying, “I have forgot my father. / I know no 
touch of consanguinity; / No kin no love, no blood, no soul so near me / 
As the sweet Troilus” (4.2.97–100).
Recent critical debate has been much exercised whether this play, “too 
far ahead of its time,”64 may ever have found a Jacobean home: the “Never 
Writer” imparts “news” to the “Eternal Reader” in the opening pages of 
the 1609 quarto that this most demanding play was “never staled with the 
stage, never clapper-clawed with the palms of the vulgar, and yet passing full 
of the palm comical”—and even the reception of Troilus and Cressida into 
the First Folio does not seem to have been ensured from the outset.65 In the 
face of adversity, Cressida cleaves to “the strong base and building of [her] 
love” as “the very centre of the earth, / Drawing all things to it” (4.2.104–106), 
but this is all to no avail in a landscape condemned to destruction. In this 
doomed dramatic world, there is no space that may not be claimed, no act 
of hospitality that may not be revoked.
CRESSIDA: Who’s that at door? Good uncle, go and see.—
My lord, come you again into my chamber.
You smile and mock me, as if I meant naughtily.
(4.2.36–38)
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2 A Digression to Hospitality
Thrift and Christmastime in Shakespeare 
and in the Literature of Husbandry
Jessica Rosenberg
Thrift, thrift, Horatio, the funeral bak’d meats
Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables.
—Hamlet, 1.2.180–1811
With these lines, Hamlet charges his mother with both bad hospitality and 
good housekeeping: she has observed the everyday imperatives of thrift 
but broken the ritual calculus of mourning. By overlaying wedding onto 
funeral, Gertrude has failed at hospitality’s core law: not just failing to 
mourn, but neglecting to treat every hospitable occasion as exceptional. 
Hamlet is not alone in recognizing Gertrude’s imperfect hospitality, but 
he does see more clearly what may be at stake in the haste of her remar-
riage. Hamlet’s words respond in partial correction to the observation 
that Horatio has just made: “Indeed, my lord, it follow’d hard upon.” For 
Hamlet, Gertrude has not only moved too quickly from funeral to wed-
ding, she has, in practice, conflated them. Gertrude’s “seconding” brings 
about a category confusion—of sex and death, wedding and funeral—but 
it also interrupts the natural sequence that should run from father to son. 
In Horatio’s language, the marriage of Gertrude and Claudius moves hast-
ily: it follows “hard upon” the funeral. Hamlet’s image, though, is locked 
in time: in it, time seems to have stopped; marriage and funeral are over-
laid as if the meats served at a funeral stayed in place on the very table 
where, having grown cold, they are served upon occasion of a wedding. 
What’s moving hard and fast for Horatio is locked in a cruel stillness for 
Hamlet—cold and tabled.
But there remains something strange in the idiom to which Hamlet turns 
to condemn his mother’s marriage to Claudius. Curiously, the Prince twice 
gives the name “thrift” to the phenomenon of remarriage. Later in the play, 
Hamlet will lend similar language to the Player Queen: “The instances 
that second marriage move / Are base respects of thrift, but none of love” 
(3.2.177–178). Gertrude’s thrift suggests she has subscribed to an econ-
omy of equivalence that is indifferent to the particularity of husbands and 
fathers—an equivalence against which Hamlet’s exceptional and dilated 
mourning rebels. But why should Hamlet twice call upon this quotidian 
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language of household management to name the offense of his mother, the 
Queen’s, remarriage?
For a range of modern reciters, Hamlet’s phrase has become shorthand 
for an economic way of thinking—an efficient epitome of the ideological 
triumph of thrift in the modern world. Echoing the styles of rational cal-
culation that Max Weber saw in the spirit of capitalism, these first three 
words—“Thrift, thrift, Horatio”—deliver a cutting verdict on moder-
nity itself. As Jacques Lacan writes in his essay on the play, Hamlet here 
names “something that has been overlooked in the Marxian analysis of 
 economy, the dominant one for the thought of our time—something whose 
force and extent we feel at every moment: ritual values.”2 This third term 
becomes visible in its absence, the neglected other of modern capitalism. 
Slavoj Žižek cites Hamlet’s phrase as shorthand for the historical shift 
into the modern era, answering the question “What, then, is the nature 
of the break with modernity?”3 By adding an exclamation point and 
conscripting the phrase as a section heading, Žižek transforms it into an 
imperative by which his readers (as subjects of modernity) are likewise 
bound: “Thrift, thrift, Horatio!” He thus extends Hamlet’s attack on his 
mother to a critique of modern capitalism, such that the passage marks the 
central fracture in modernity not as absence but as superfluity: thrift, he 
writes, always threatens to become miserliness. The virtue of control con-
tains within it the inevitable vice of its uncontrolled practice. With these 
readings, Lacan and Žižek both take Hamlet’s side. They agree that there is 
something either missing or contradictory in the thrift that Hamlet diagno-
ses in his mother’s actions. Already ahead of his time, Hamlet’s words seem 
to these twentieth-century readers to mourn not just his father but a lost 
way of thinking.4 It turns out that modernity, like Gertrude, has gotten a 
bad reputation by going to bed too quickly with the profit economy, for-
getting the value of ritual dilation.
For Sigmund Freud, Hamlet’s line articulates an imperative governing 
the operation of the unconscious, the principle of economy behind psychic 
condensation. When Freud cites this line in Jokes and Their Relation to 
the Unconscious he does so as part of a gloss on condensation; this joke 
becomes the epigrammatic key to all jokes. With this economism, Freud 
turns to a strategy of condensation in his own argument: “All these tech-
niques are dominated by a tendency to compression, or rather to saving. 
It all seems to be a question of economy. In Hamlet’s words: ‘thrift, thrift, 
Horatio!’”5 For Freud, thrift names a principle of psychic exchange, gov-
erning the equivalences behind puns and slips, but by the same stroke 
becomes an engine of excess. Symptoms may work according to a logic of 
condensation, but they are hardly bound by conditions of scarcity. Much 
like Polonius’ sententious advice, thrift may stick to an ideology of mini-
malism, but—just as brevity may be the soul of wit (a passage that Freud 
also cites)—thrift tips quickly into excess (and its corollary, miserliness), 
the very paradox that Žižek sees enabling and plaguing modern capitalism. 
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It is fitting perhaps that one third of the phrase epitomizing modern effi-
ciency is redundant: thrift assumes imperative force in repetition (thrift, 
thrift!), as it is multiplied.
What these twentieth-century reciters have forgotten, however, is that 
Hamlet’s words are already a citation. By choosing to characterize Gertrude’s 
actions as “thrift,” Hamlet invokes the genre of advice that is the term’s 
home territory: early modern England’s many guides to managing a house-
hold. “Thrift,” in Hamlet’s echo, sounds tawdry, shamefully out of scale 
when applied to the Danish royal household.6 Gertrude’s remarriage is thus 
a double breach of decorum: she has transgressed the expectations of both 
her gender and her (regal) class. In Shakespeare’s play and in these later 
citations, “thrift” declares an imperative as much as it names a principle: 
while it stands for a theory of value, it also calls upon those in earshot 
to obey those values. In context, Hamlet’s phrase might be understood as 
either imperative or indexical: as an ironic exhortation to his friend, or as 
a damning diagnosis of his mother’s behavior. Among twentieth-century 
critics, its repeated citation has often come with the addition of an exclama-
tion point, a shift in mode to direct address that helps enable this rhetorical 
mobility. In the imperative mood, thrift itself becomes a kind of gift or 
offering (or, like many gifts, a burden)—a principle of economic possession 
in the process of rhetorical redistribution. That is, while  property may be 
controlled,  anyone can assert the law of its accumulation. An impera-
tive reading would have come naturally to Shakespeare’s audience, both 
because of the term’s implicit normative force and because of the genre 
in which its qualities were most frequently set out: books of advice and 
instruction, addressed directly to husbands and sometimes huswives. The 
core principle of governance for the miniature state of the household, thrift 
carries legislative force within the domestic sphere. In this sense, the queen 
is further diminished by the form of the advice, and not just by its mid-
dlebrow content—that is, that she should have obeyed an imperative at 
all. Rather than act as sovereign, she has subjected herself to the humble 
demands of household rule.7
The misogynistic core of Hamlet’s accusation lies in its central paradox: 
at the same time that Gertrude (a bad hostess) is not giving enough away, she 
is giving away far too much. As it extends a quotidian by-word for house-
hold order to the (dis)order of the royal Danish household,  Shakespeare’s 
play alights upon the same anxieties about excess that attached to thrift in 
the sixteenth-century literature of hospitality and housekeeping. The con-
flicted moral economy invoked in these two moments of the play repeats 
and extends a tension already central to the printed advice literature of 
husbandry and household management. Though thrift may stand as a gen-
eral law of the household for most of the year, at occasions demanding 
hospitality, thrift represents not prudence but stinginess. As the two core 
values of what a household is supposed to do, thrift and hospitality are 
fundamentally at odds. In the examples I consider in this essay, a tension 
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between the two imperatives—between spending and maintaining, giving 
out and taking in—is solved not by striking a prudential balance, but by 
manipulating the sequence of things, or suspending the passage of time. 
In this sense, the hospitable temporalities at work in the examples I con-
sider here provide a suggestive counterpoint to the messianic time that Joan 
Pong Linton, in her essay in this volume, sees at work in Twelfth Night—
another seasonal drama. Hospitality is a virtue that, if well performed, can 
undermine the household. In its suspension of everyday household law, it 
is often hospitality (to paraphrase Polonius) that seems to dull the edge of 
husbandry.
In this essay, I consider the ways in which both the failures and suc-
cesses of hospitality turn (as Hamlet suggests) on bad timing. In Hamlet 
and in a range of practical treatments of husbandry, the economic dilemma 
of hospitality is translated into a temporal problem—negotiated through 
formal, material, and ideological means as a dilation of the regular time of 
the household. A fascinating example of this is found in Thomas  Tusser’s 
A  hundreth good pointes of husbandrie (1557), where the exceptional hos-
pitality associated with Christmastime interrupts the regular time of the 
year and the expectations of household governance that accompany it. This 
conflict between expectations of spending and saving both organized and 
disrupted the temporality of domestic life in early modern England. In a 
household world in which the passage of time is marked by prudent accu-
mulation and restraint, seasonal hospitality—especially Christmas, a time 
organized by imperatives of expenditure and open doors—must always be 
vexed. Like Hamlet’s grief, holiday time is sanctioned as both necessary and 
exceptional. Various scholars have suggested that England’s sense of season-
ality was in flux in this period, transitioning away from a calendar shaped 
by regular religious and civic festivity. Early modern conflicts about moral 
economy took Christmas celebration as a special object: in its observance, 
a wasteful transgression of prudence, and in its breach, a miserly violation 
of hospitable obligation and charity. It could thus easily seem a break in the 
natural course of the year. As Marcellus says in Hamlet’s opening scene, the 
time of Christmas is “so hallow’d and so gracious” that its movement almost 
seems to stop: “The bird of dawning singeth all night long: / And then, they 
say, no spirit dares stir abroad; / The nights are wholesome; then no planets 
strike, / No fairy takes, nor witch hath power to charm”(1.1.165–169).8 
Traditionally the time of year when gentry expended their annual store in 
the charitable entertainments, the value and survival of “ancient hospitality” at 
Christmastime seemed urgently at stake in early modern England, as some 
critics attacked the vanity of festive entertainment, while others worried 
about the social effects of a decay in hospitality. Like Gertrude’s bad hos-
pitality, thrift resists such temporal dilation, while holiday festivity works 
by prying and holding open the passage of time. As it opens the doors of 
a particular moment in the year, hospitality is incited by the calendar but 
ignores its imperatives.
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Holiday unthrifts
In Thomas Tusser’s A hundreth good pointes of husbandrie, first published 
in 1557 and frequently expanded through the end of the century,  Christmas 
is given a special status within a yearly calendar otherwise governed by 
thrift and prudence. Tusser responds to these competing systems with a 
dramatic formal intervention: following months of rhyming couplets on 
household thrift, a new section called “Christmas” breaks into the text 
at the end of December, interrupting the regular calendric progression of 
points and the lessons of accumulation that they impart. By the edition 
of 1573, this section is significantly expanded and titled “A Digression to 
Hospitality.” In the spirit of the season, these short poems instead empha-
size the importance of giving to the poor and opening one’s home. In a 
sharp contrast with the rest of the book, they are presented typographically 
and generically in the style of a lyric miscellany, a change in mode that 
formally plays out the principles of generosity and hospitality espoused 
in the poems themselves. In Tusser’s rendering, however, the formal and 
temporal dilation performed by this poetic digression must be exceptional, 
a temporary reprieve from the everyday law and order of the household. 
In this sense, what Derrida calls the antinomy between the law of unlim-
ited hospitality and the multiple and conditional laws of its application are 
echoed in the arrangement of the text itself. Tusser’s “Digression to Hospi-
tality” disrupts and loosens the form of the text, such that efficient thrift of 
the points and of their message opens onto the liberality of lyric miscellany 
and of radical holiday hospitality. For Derrida, “an act of hospitality can 
only be poetic,” a suggestion to which this digression in the Pointes gives 
literal form.9 As the treatment of Christmas hospitality shows, the tension 
between thrift and hospitality is not always resolved by striking a pruden-
tial balance; instead Tusser, like Hamlet, negotiates it by means of formal 
digression and temporal dilation.
In Tusser’s Pointes, the strange untimeliness of  Christmas in both text and 
calendar follows from the way that the year itself is  fitted to the demands 
of husbandry and thrift, the everyday accumulation of provision that (as he 
reminds his readers) enables the expenditure of winter feasting. Hospitality 
is a key step in Tusser’s “Ladder to Thrift,” but one to be kept in check: the 
husbandman must remember “To kepe good  hospitality. / To hate all prod-
igality.”10 This core principle of the household’s moral economy is difficult 
to balance throughout the year, but comes to a head with the radical hospi-
tality that Christmas occasions—or threatens. In The Anatomie of Abuses 
(1583), Philip Stubbes worries that holiday “fooleries” license excessive 
consumption and invert natural, sacred, and political order. In matters of 
expense and consumption, Stubbes argues, Christmas was a time just like 
any other time, and so one ought “not to swil and gull more that time tha[n] 
at any other time, not to lauish foorth more at that time, than at another 
times.” Stubbes’ repetition of the word undifferentiates time, performing 
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the sameness among different times for which he is arguing and curbing 
the threat of unbridled consumption posed by exceptional time. Otherwise, 
such expenditures endanger not just moral and household integrity but the 
solvency of the commonwealth itself: “what dicing & carding, what eating 
and drinking, what ba[n]queting and feasting is than vsed more than in all 
the yeere besydes? to the great dishonor of GOD, and impouerishing of the 
realme.”11
Even when presented under the sign of thrift, the spirit of  Christmas 
threatens to undermine the household. It tends rapidly—as we see in 
the pairing of scrupulosity and excess in Freud, Žižek, Getrude, and 
 Polonius—toward extremes. In the 1936 animated short “Christmas 
Comes but Once a Year,” the narrative and its title song endorse a thrift-
iness about time itself: that the passing moment of the holiday should 
be seized and capitalized upon. The Depression-era fable of thrift pres-
ents itself as a lesson about adaptive household reuse: after a houseful 
of orphans is left crying when their threadbare Christmas presents fall 
apart, a jolly inventor passing by hears their cries and constructs new toys 
from everyday objects around the orphanage—vacuum cleaners, umbrel-
las, percolators. The story presents itself as an endorsement of thrift and 
ingenuity in the name of generosity, a potlatch fantasy in which nothing 
gets consumed and the joy of the gift is just a better kind of use. However, 
the benefactor’s repurposing of household objects is in fact a depurpos-
ing: he exploits the occasion and matter at hand, but abuses the objects 
themselves. The Christmas miracle effectively empties the orphanage’s 
storage closets and larder, in a transaction that turns profitable use into 
useless play and exchanges an army of round, weeping faces for smiling 
and singing ones. The profit is purely affective, which is—by most house-
hold  economies—no profit at all.12
Even this cartoonishly excessive version of Christmas utility inherits a 
version of thrift energetically articulated in early modern England. As long 
as there have been ideologies of thrift, there have been anxieties about 
its excessive application. “Thrift” was a complex word in  Shakespeare’s 
lexicon (as it was for his contemporaries), serving at times as a synonym 
for profit (close to its cognate, “thriving”) while also standing as a name 
for the methods to achieve such success. This latter—call it “methodolog-
ical”—sense is closer to our own usage, denoting a set of techniques of 
scrimping and saving leading to the accumulation of personal capital. 
Andrew McRae has argued that this individualistic sense first emerged in 
the mid-sixteenth century, as the meaning of the word changed alongside 
the role of the individual householder in the English moral economy.13 Any 
emphasis on profit, however, was complicated by the traditionally ambigu-
ous moral and social status of personal accumulation. Encouraged by biblical 
precedent, those who failed to redistribute their harvests had long been 
depicted as misers, starving the poor in favor of obsessive personal accu-
mulation. As McRae and Lorna Hutson have both shown, several lines of 
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argument in the sixteenth century reoriented this view, distancing “hoarders” 
of wealth and stuff from many of those negative associations.14 Craig 
Muldrew places Tusser’s moralizing advice in the broader context of the 
early modern English moral economy, as conceptions of thrift were closely 
tied to the symbolic link between social and financial credit.In these argu-
ments, the productivity of nature excuses the increase of husbandry and 
exempts it from charges of either usury or hoarding. Good husbands 
are simply making more, contributing to the common good rather than 
withholding from it. This resignification of “thrift” as profit is at work at 
 several points, for instance, in The Merchant of Venice, where at stake in 
every use of the word is the question of when it is valid to make money 
grow.15 In  Shylock’s mouth, his “well-won thrift,  / which he calls inter-
est”(1.3.48–49) is always a contested term: as he defends himself in refer-
ence to the story of Jacob, “This was a way to thrive, and he was blest: / 
And thrift is blessing if men steal it not” (1.3.87–88).
The embattled position of hospitality in husbandry manuals of the 
sixteenth century often turns on the same tension within moral economy, 
pitting a neighborly impulse to spend against the basic imperative to save. 
In its instructions on how to thrive, Fitzherbert’s Boke of Husbondrye 
(1523) warns readers against the slippery slope of unreasonable feasting, 
which begins with “loue & charyte” but “endeth in pryde & glotony,” 
advising them to keep measure in all things, especially spending. Many 
sixteenth-century husbandry books end up having it both ways when it 
comes to giving and saving: to give (appropriately and on the correct 
occasion) will pay back with more profit. Fitzherbert called this principle 
the “sede of dyscrecyon”: “For this sede of dyscrecyon hath a wonders 
property / for the more that it is take[n] of or lent of / the more it is. And 
therfore me semeth it sholde be more spyrytuall than temporall / wherin 
is a great dyuersyte / for a temporall thynge the more it is deuyded the 
lesse it is / and a spyrytuall thynge the more it is deuyded the more it 
is.”16 As Bataille or Mauss might observe, this compensatory model does 
not really count as giving freely, even if the symbolic burden of eventual 
compensation is placed on providence rather than social obligation. Like 
social obligation, however, it operates according to a temporal delay: 
Fitzherbert’s seed of discretion works like a wager or venture, betting on 
expenditure in the short term but counting on a restricted economy in 
future time.
Thomas Nashe’s Summer’s Last Will and Testament stages a conflict 
between miserly hoarding and wild prodigality among the seasons them-
selves. In Nashe’s play, a character called Christmas is a radical miser and 
one of the sons of Winter, who enters with the motto Liberalitas liberitate 
perit. In this Christmas philosophy, liberality consumes itself. Summer, 
who is attempting to select a proper heir, objects to Christmas’s exces-
sive scrupulosity, complaining: “Why, thou should’st spend, thou should’st 
not care to get. Christmas is god of hospitality.”17 Christmas responds, 
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“So will he neuer be of good husbandry. I may say to you, there is many 
an old god, that is now growne out of fashion. So is the god of hospitality.” 
Drawn conspicuously against type, Christmas is “a pinch-back, cut-
throate churle, / That keepes no open house, as he should do, / Delighteth 
in no game or fellowship, / Loues no good deeds, and hateth talke, / But 
sitteth in a corner turning Crabbes, / Or coughing o’re a warmed pot of 
Ale.”18 To  Summer’s outrage and confusion, Christmas refuses to enter 
singing a carol (“A merry Carroll would haue grac’t thee well, / Thy ances-
tors haue vs’d it heretofore”), and disdains all feasting and hospitality.19 
Nashe thus chooses to localize this conflict between generosity and scru-
pulosity—between good housekeeping and good hospitality—in the ironic 
rendering of Christmas, who believes the opposite of what he ought. In 
fact, as a reflection on the relationship between thrift, revelry, and inher-
itance—that is between dynastic time and seasonal time—Nashe’s work 
offers a fascinating foil to the household philosophies of Hamlet and Tuss-
er’s Pointes.20 Like Hamlet, Nashe’s play is a drama of inheritance, and—
like Shakespeare’s play—it turns on the possibility that an heir might be 
elected who disrupts the natural sequence of things. Like, Tusser’s Pointes, 
it approaches this reflection on time and sequence through the seasons of 
the calendar year.
The irony of Nashe’s miserly Christmas, however, is not quite so 
unprecedented: as Christmas says, the god of hospitality is grown out of 
fashion. Nashe’s depiction of chilly Christmas specifically evokes contem-
porary complaints of decay in the holiday’s observance, especially in the 
hospitality and generosity of aristocrats who traditionally opened their 
doors to locals for holiday celebration. Though there is some disagree-
ment among scholars about the degree to which Christmas celebrations 
actually were curtailed in practice in the late sixteenth century, a range 
of subjects, issuing widespread complaints about the decay of hospitality, 
understood a new neglect of Christmas entertainment to mark a break 
with tradition on the part of those “that ancientlie did entertaine hospi-
talitie.”21 As early modern subjects experienced what felt like an epochal 
break in the experience of Christmas and in the moral obligations of one 
social class to another, ancient hospitality seemed in the midst of being 
irrevocably lost.
Historians take this widespread anxiety about a “decline in hospitality” 
to be symptomatic of a transitional moment in the structure of English 
society and economy, as the social fibers of a moral economy seemed 
to come into conflict with a burgeoning profit economy.22 And, indeed, 
while some of this widespread anxiety about the decay of hospitality may 
reflect broader structural tensions at a transitional moment, Christmas 
nonetheless stood out for specific attack and took on particular symbolic 
value. Christmas had long been a time of “misrule”: of social inversion, 
excess consumption, suspension of regular standards and social restraints. 
So-called Lords of Misrule were appointed on Christmas day to head up 
an alternative hierarchy, acting as temporary sovereigns of households or 
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parishes.23 But, in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Lords 
of Misrule in particular were frequently sermonized against and banned in 
many parishes. Christmas thus seemed not only to oppose but to invert and 
overturn the household law that “thrift” names, and much celebration of 
Christmas turned not just on expectations of generosity but on the specific 
suspension of hierarchy.
Holiday time thus promised a special license, as Christmas expendi-
ture was tied to the performance of social inversion—a seasonal break 
with everyday life that seemed to shift household existence into the fes-
tive realm of play. Often, attacks against the prodigality and idolatry 
of Christmas took the specifically dramatic object of pageants, but the 
time of the holiday itself seemed performative and playful. A connection 
between Christmas reorderings and drama is recognized by Stubbes, who 
complains about “the other kinde of Playes, which you call Lordes of 
Misrule.”24 Tusser also uses the word “play” in proximity to the Christmas 
holiday, likewise signaling a shift in mode, or even a shift in rule. The 
seasons of life and of the year are “all quickly forgotten as a playe on 
a stage.” And, in the final stanza of “Against Fantasticall Scruplenesse,” 
Tusser asks his reader to “Play thou the good felow and harken to me, / 
hate none that be honest, though mery they be” (1570; sig. Diir). In the 
first point of January, the reader is told to return to his regular role, to “go 
play the good husba[n]d, thy stock to renewe” (sig. Diiv). Neither role, 
in Tusser’s view, is more natural—both require practice, habit, and disci-
pline—but both must be taken on and put off with the seasons. In either 
case, however, play is temporary, and depends on the liberty of movement 
between these different modes of being—albeit a liberty governed by the 
seasons themselves.
The possibility of reversing these roles—or moving between the time and 
space of play and not-play, or of holiday and thrift—could not be taken for 
granted. The main complaint of Nashe’s Christmas against seasonal hospi-
tality is that the temporary liberality of Christmas might be permanently 
destructive. Christmas refuses to entertain because seasonal hospitality 
would undo his house, literally undermining it:
Gluttony is a sinne, & too many dunghils are infectious. A mans belly 
was not made for a poudring beefe tub: to feede the poore twelue 
dayes, & let them starue all the yeare after, would but stretch out the 
guts wider then they should be, & so make famine a bigger den in 
their bellies, then he had before. I should kill an oxe, & haue some 
such fellow as Milo to come and eate it vp at a mouth-full. Or like the 
Sybarites, do nothing all one yeare, but bid ghestes against the next 
yeare. The scraping of trenchers you thinke would put a man to no 
charges. It is not a hundreth pound a yeare would serue the scullions 
in dishclouts. My house stands vpon vaults, it will fall if it be ouer-
loden with a multitude. Besides, haue you neuer read of a city that was 
vnderminde and destroyed by Mowles? So, say I keepe hospitalitie, 
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and a whole faire of beggers bid me to dinner euery day, what with 
making legges, when they thanke me at their going away, and setling 
their wallets handsomly on their backes, they would shake as many 
lice on the ground, as were able to vndermine my house, and vndoe 
me vtterly: It is their prayers would builde it againe, if it were ouer-
throwne by this vermine, would it? I pray, who begun feasting, and 
gourmandize first, but Sardanapalus, Nero, Heliogabalus,  Commodus, 
tyrants, whoremasters, vnthrifts? Some call them Emperours, but 
I respect no crownes, but crownes in the purse. Any man may weare a 
siluer crowne, that hath made a fray in Smithfield, & lost but a peece 
of his braine pan.25
Christmas entertainment would dig under the foundations of the house(hold) 
like a mole, undermining both its conceptual and material architecture. 
Feasting is here the habit of emperors—not just sovereigns, but “unthrifts” 
who are poor governors of their own households. Though seasonal enter-
tainment is defined by those boundaries, these limits are impossible to 
enforce, and threaten to turn all time into festival time.
Christmas Time in Tusser’s Pointes
Thomas Tusser responds to this danger by giving seasonal hospitality an 
ambivalent place in his calendar, calling this festive section at the end of 
the year “A Digression to Hospitality.” Tusser’s A hundreth good pointes 
of husbandrie thus tries to navigate the periodic passage between hospi-
tality and husbandry, theorizing along the way not just the management 
of superfluity but the strange place of holiday time in the annual calen-
dar. The text is assembled according to the passage of time and remains 
entangled in it: the time of the seasons, the time of youth and old age, 
and the time of the rhyming points themselves, the rhythms of which 
pace the rhythms of the calendar in their progress from one month to 
the next. Their progression, however, is neither homogeneous nor undis-
turbed. In the first edition, of 1557, one remarkable temporal distur-
bance goes under the name of “Christmas.”  Published by Richard Tottel 
in a slim quarto, the book begins with a brief dedicatory poem before 
turning to the four-line stanzas that comprise its century of instructive 
“points.” These rhyming lines are organized according to the months of 
the year, beginning with August and moving sequentially through the 
harvest months, winter, and the rest of the year. There are only two inter-
ruptions to this movement through the calendar: between March and 
April, “A digression from husbandrie: to a point or two of huswifrie” 
(1557; sig. Civ); and, between December and January, four points on the 
subject and occasion of Christmas. Like the months that precede and 
follow it, Christmas gets its own pilcrow and series of numbered points. 
The holiday thus looks like a month in itself as well as an exception to 
that otherwise regular temporal progression. Slipped between December 
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and January, a wrinkle in time at the turn of the year, it is both in and out 
of the calendar.
Christmas is not only strange because of its placement between the 
months, however. At multiple points, Tusser describes the annual rhythms of 
spending and saving as complementary. There is some tension, in this sense, 
between an annual cycle of saving and spending, and a longer, absolute 
course of increase. The points themselves follow this latter pattern in their 
enumerated accumulation through the volume. Indeed, both the text and the 
matter of the household are balanced between accumulation and dispersal, 
as husband and housewife must mediate between hospitality’s open door 
and husbandry’s closed storehouse.
In the editions of 1570 and 1573, the rupture at Christmastime has 
been amplified. The edition of 1570 turns from the monthly progression 
of points to a cluster of longer poems by announcing “A digression” and 
enjoining the reader to “leaue husbandrie sleeping.” In the 1573 volume, 
for which the titular number of points expands to 500, this festive section 
begins under the title of “A digression to hospitalitie,” but is called in the 
table of contents, “A digression directing to hospitalitie,” helping us see 
more clearly that the “to” of this alternate course is both spatial (hospi-
tality is the destination) and commanding, delivering not just the text but 
the obedient reader to the proper seasonal decorum. Beginning with these 
editions, the yuletide suspension of the calendar’s progress is accompa-
nied by a break in the work’s otherwise continuous formal composition. 
A small collection of poems follows, each appearing for the first time in 
the 1570 edition, a gathering that as a whole digresses from the com-
pact and practical “points” preceding them, from the work’s procession 
from month to month, and from the volume’s repeated endorsement of 
storage, accumulation, and thrift. The poems emphasize the importance 
of giving to the poor and opening one’s home during these often barren 
months, pairing these ethical instructions with reminders of the fragility 
of life and inevitability of death. (Winter is, Tusser reminds his reader, “a 
nipper of all thing in euery age.”) At the same time, the efficiently instruc-
tive points of November and December have given over to something 
more like a verse miscellany. These short poems do not participate in 
the volume’s general system of accounting, and make no contribution to 
rendering the debt of 100 or 500 points promised by Tusser’s title page. 
The  Christmastime poems, then, are presented not just as digression, but 
as surplus, a part of the book unkept by the bookkeeping to which the 
numbered points are subject.
In Tusser’s formulation, Christmas hospitality thus digresses from the 
regular course of husbandry on multiple registers, each layered in the book 
itself and in the everyday labors of the household: literary form, calendri-
cal form, and the form and content of household advice. These threads are 
already woven together in the collection as a whole, organized under the 
logic of what Tusser calls “thrift” to name a practice of prudent manage-
ment that combines sensible spending (in our modern sense) with the vital 
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proliferation we would now call thriving. This is hardly an original usage 
of the word, but it serves as a linchpin to the work as a whole, governing 
household matter and textual matter, the time of reading and the time of 
labor and provision. The goal, as Tusser explains in his “Ladder to Thrift,” 
is “To make prouision thriftilie,” and we ought to take this sense of provi-
sion precisely—an injunction to look forward, toward any future of dearth 
or cold or old age, and to gather accordingly. In the 1557 edition, a couplet 
concluding a sonnet on the properties of the months applies to the course 
of a year and to the course of a life: “So widsom bid kepe, and prouide 
while we may: / For age crepeth on as the time passeth away” (sig. Div). 
The practice of accumulation that Tusser’s Pointes delineate and exhort 
entails this distinctive temporal orientation, a turning out of the present 
and toward future contingency. The time of thrift is always turned away 
from itself.
Throughout the calendar, the time of reading is keyed to the time of 
the year, and Tusser explicitly marks any suspension in this correspon-
dence. In the only other nonmonthly section in the midst of the 1557 
edition—titled, “A digression from husbandrie: / to a point or two of 
huswifrie”—Tusser steps out of the course of time: “Now here I think 
nedeful, a pawse for to make: / to treate of some paines, a good huswife 
must take” (sig. Civ). This pause transforms the time of the text and the 
object of its address, as Tusser turns explicitly to the housewife, whose 
labors here follow a different seasonal and textual rhythm. With this 
“pawse,” Tusser asserts what we could call in narratological terms a dis-
parity between the time of story and the time of discourse.26 In doing so, 
he reminds us of the keyed pacing between point and calendrical time that 
we had previously been following, but also affirms our ability to step out 
of it—an assertion that objectifies and naturalizes the time of the calendar 
by setting it against the husbandly perspective onto time. A similar kind 
of stepping aside is essential when we come to Tusser’s digression at the 
end of December.
This general injunction to store for the future rather than spend in the 
present sits uneasily with the expenditures of Christmas. A time of pour-
ing out instead of taking in, of spending before saving, the holiday exhorts 
husband and housewife to “be mery, and thanke god of all: / and feast thy 
pore neighbours, the great with the small.” It is, as Tusser’s poem reminds 
us, “an apt time to spend.” The first of the 1557 Christmas points turns the 
poem’s address to the housewife:
Get Iuye and hull, woman deck vp thyne house:
and take this same brawne, for to seethe and to souse.
Prouide vs good chere, for thou knowst the old guise:
olde customes, that good be, let no man dispise.
(sig. Biiv)
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Tusser’s embrace of “olde customes” defends traditional hospitality against 
the attacks of those like Stubbes but also against social transformations that 
drew the gentry out of the country and into the city for holidays, leading 
to complaints of the “destruction of ancient hospitalitie.”27 Michael  Bristol 
attributes the gift-governed logic of Tusser’s Chrismastime to the force of the 
Nativity as a kind of “divine potlatch or lavish expenditure.”28 On one level, 
a suspension of the law of thrift places Christmastime under an alternate dis-
pensation, closer to the temporary festive jurisdiction overseen according to 
custom by the lord of misrule. As closer attention to Tusser’s text shows, the 
inversion of regular husbandry is awkwardly perched on the yearly calen-
dar and in the makeup of the book. If good husbandry promises to instruct 
in good household rule (specifically through the compilation of individual 
rules), it is not clear what the effect of possible misrule—or the suspension of 
rule in general—might be on either the form or content of Tusser’s advice.29
Tusser is clear that the time of Christmas can only ever be exceptional. 
January begins by marking this shift back into everyday husbandry: “When 
Christmas is done, kepe not Christmas time still: / be mindefull of rering, 
and loth for to kill” (1557; sig. Biiv). The break is firm. Christmas thus 
incites both a dilation and a caesura in the calendar, a time outside of time 
that overturns the moral economies and rhythms of nonfestive husbandry. 
As the lines that follow confirm, with this move out of the holiday, the mode 
of the Pointes has switched back from expenditure to increase: “For then 
what thou rerist, thou nede not to dout: / will double thy gaine, ere the yere 
come about”(1557; sig. Biiv–Biiir). With festive killing complete, the house-
hold can return to its habits of growth, the different arrangements of life and 
death that govern the rest of the calendar year. The Pointes paints husbandry 
according to a logic of (lively) capital and material accumulation—a turn that 
at once economizes the natural world and naturalizes and rationalizes the 
pursuit of profit.  Ventriloquizing husbandry, Tusser claims at one point that 
“The earth is my storehouse, the sea my fisheponde: / What they haue to 
pleasure with, is in my hand”(1570; fo. 2v).
Meanwhile, as was implicit in Tusser’s Pointes and poems on the holiday 
and would have been explicit in household practices, consumption oper-
ated by way of death. To be hospitable was to take the life of animals that 
might otherwise have continued to be “reared.” Like uprooting or nipping 
in the bud, it represents an absolute loss. In this version of housekeeping, the 
senses of “thrift” and “thrive” are still very close together, at times almost 
indistinct. Husbandly thrift enables the stuff of the household to thrive:
Be gredy to spende all, and careles to saue:
and shortly be nedy, and redy to craue.
Be wilfull to kill, and vnskilfull to store:
and sone giue vp houskeping longe any more.
(1557; sig. Biiir)
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In these four lines, killing and spending are paralleled, and “store” names 
not just the stockpiling of stuff but the kind of stock that proliferates by 
skillful cultivation. The husbandman is not an owner of inert matter but 
a custodian of the miscellaneous beings that comprise the household and 
its environs. His future orientation, keyed to their thriving, is in this sense 
collaborative and communal. The untimeliness of hospitality, on the other 
hand, is underwritten by bloodletting.
In her study of medieval illustrated calendars, Bridget Ann Henisch has 
found that it is only in winter scenes that the preparation and consumption 
of meals is depicted—particularly, in December, with attention given to the 
slaughter of livestock and the display of their parts. The contrast is reflected 
in the conclusion to a fifteenth-century rhyme: “At Martnesmasse I kylle my 
swyne; / And at Cristesmasse I drynke redde wine.”30 Christmas is the time 
of consumption, not production. And in this sense feasts are functional, an 
occasion to work through what has been culled and cannot be stored. How-
ever restrained by custom and decorum, Christmas entertainment does operate 
according to the fiction of free expenditure. As becomes especially clear in the 
emphasis on eating meat in the winter holidays, hospitality operates by con-
sumption, and might easily tilt into willful and wild destruction.31
Because of Tusser’s distinctive understanding of the nature and function of 
his book, these parallel transformations in calendar and economy are accom-
panied by a seasonal disruption of literary form. Throughout the various edi-
tions, Tusser makes increasingly clear that the points themselves are meant to 
participate in the logic of husbandry, counted among the res parvae that the 
husbandman busily amasses.32 The “Digression” that appears in the 1570 
edition also inaugurates a formal transformation. The poems that follow are 
organized in longer groups of stanzas and given titles printed in italic that sit 
above the denser blackletter verse below. We have wandered out of Tusser’s 
prudent precepts and into the realm of something more like a lyric miscellany, 
as if the Pointes have turned for the holidays from their regular progression of 
couplets to another genre entirely—one that formally plays out the principles 
of generosity and hospitality espoused in the poems themselves (including 
“A description of apt time to spend” and “Against fantasticall scruplenesse”).
The short poems that appear in this section have several remarkable affin-
ities with the most influential lyric miscellany of this period, the Songes and 
Sonettes first published, like the first edition of Tusser’s Pointes, by Richard 
Tottel in 1557. By the time Tusser’s 1570 edition had appeared, Tottel had 
brought out at least six editions of his miscellany. The poems in this section 
echo Tottel’s Miscellany both typographically and generically, displaying 
the verse itself in blackletter and the summary titles in an airier roman or 
italic font above, some of them with pilcrows. The titles—nearly all of them 
“A description of …”—also seem directly inspired by the patterns of titling 
in Tottel’s Miscellany. Compare the layout of the pages between Songes and 
Sonettes (Figure 2.1) and the 1570 Pointes (Figure 2.2), noting the visual 
shift that begins with the “digression.”
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Figure 2.1  Songes and sonettes, written by the right honorable Lorde Henry 
Haward late Earle of Surrey, and other (London: Richard Tottel, 1557), 
sig. Aiiv–Aiiir.
In his preface to the first issue of the Songes and Sonettes in 1557, Tottel 
associates the publication of poetry with a moral economy of expenditure and 
circulation, echoing popular complaints about Christmas in his accusations 
against inhospitable noble hoarders. In publishing poems previously limited 
to private manuscript circulation, he describes himself as obeying an ethical 
imperative of redistribution, a charitable impulse that he puts forth within 
a national frame: “It resteth now (gentle reader) that thou think it not euyll 
done, to publishe, to the honor of the Englishe tong, and for profite of the 
studious of English eloquence, those workes which the vngentle horders vp of 
such treasure, haue heretofore enuied thee.”33 For too long, he suggests, man-
uscript poetry had been circulated only in the hands of a few, locked up in the 
inhospitable spaces of the court. Tottel thus presents himself both as learned 
improver of the commonwealth and as a kind of Robin Hood figure, who has 
just broken vernacular poetry from the jail of aristocratic courtly circuits.34 
His purpose, then, is altruism and magnanimity: the book itself is presented 
as a hospitable space. With this attack on hoarding as ungentle, Tottel makes 
us ask what counts as the good husbanding of poems.
This social and economic logic is intensified when the miscellaneous poems 
appear at Christmastime, as they first do in the 1570 editions of the Pointes 
with these titles: “A description of time and the yere,” “A description of lyfe 
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and ryches,” “A description of house kepyng,” “A description of Christmas,” 
“A description of apt time to spend,” “Against fantasticall scruplenesse,” 
and “Christmas husbandly fare.” In this, they again closely echo Tottel’s 
Miscellany, the first four poems of which are likewise titled “Descriptions” 
of one kind or another, as are another dozen or so throughout the collection. 
This is one reason to think that this section has been reorganized by Tottel 
himself, who is now thought by many to be the editor of the Songes and 
Sonettes and, specifically, the source of the poems’ titles.35
Within the temporal pause that this digression represents—while hus-
bandry is still, at this moment, sleeping—these “descriptions” enact a prod-
igal performance of dilation. Introduced under the sign of digression and 
filling out the time of Christmas, the writing down that “description” names 
is also a writing off and a writing out—a performance of copiousness, in 
other words, that confirms the “apt time” to linguistically spend and resists 
“fantastical [lexical] scruplenesse” (a charge that might easily be levied 
against the rest of Tusser’s collection.)36 These poems are not sequentially 
sutured to a natural course of time like the monthly points that precede 
and follow them; indeed, unhooked from such a sequence, they unbind the 
reader from that determinate correlation, giving the (aspiring or just prurient) 
husbandman a vantage on the passage of time that is not bound by that 
Figure 2.2  Thomas Tusser, A hundreth good pointes of Husbandry, lately maried 
vnto a Hundreth good poynts of Huswifery (London: Richard Tottel, 
1570), fo. 12r–v.
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temporal movement. The digression withdraws from the calendar only to 
capture it symbolically. The exceptional time of Christmas expenditure, 
then, is also the strange time and space of literary proliferation. The lyrical 
and formal license that accompanies this logic of exception in fact performs 
a powerful version of the misrule that Stubbes and others feared, rewriting 
household jurisdiction from a position liminally outside of it, replacing it 
not with misrule but with the better jurisdiction of description.
Preserving Digression: Shakespeare’s Spendthrift Sighs
In describing Hamlet’s excessive mourning, Claudius also admonishes the 
Prince for having perverted a most natural sequence. By extending what 
should merely be a “term” of obsequious sorrow, Hamlet displays not grief, 
but a “simple and unschooled” understanding of it. Claudius reminds Hamlet 
that mourning (obsequies) follow a natural sequence and term, much like a 
genealogical sequence of fathers:
‘Tis sweet and commendable in your nature, Hamlet,
To give these mourning duties to your father,
But you must know your father lost a father,
That father lost, lost his – and the survivor bound
In filial obligation for some term
To do obsequious sorrow. But to persever
In obstinate condolement is a course
Of impious stubbornness, ‘tis unmanly grief,
It shows a will most incorrect to heaven,
A heart unfortified, a mind impatient,
An understanding simple and unschool’d.
(1.2.87–97)
The solution, Claudius proposes, is for Hamlet to “throw to earth / This 
unprevailing woe, and”—and this is the rub—“think of us / As of a father.” 
To exchange fathers, in Claudius’s mind, is not only necessary, but pious, 
manly, correct, fortified, and patient. Hamlet’s obsession with grief refuses 
Claudius’s proposed indifference to the particulars; “Why seems it so partic-
ular with thee,” Gertrude inquires of her son’s grief (1.2.75).
Patricia Parker has connected Hamlet’s comment on his mother’s 
 remarriage—“Thrift, thrift, Horatio”—to other examples of the play’s obses-
sion with sequence, its almost compulsive return to “preposterous” moments 
of sequential disruption or reordering.37 For all of Hamlet’s obsession with 
“ obsequies” and mourning, the play is overrun with the “maimed rites” 
(5.1.12) of terrible and abrupt burials.38 The violent insult of “thrift” in this 
case registers a deep untimeliness, a rupture in natural order vividly embodied 
in Hamlet’s description of cold, leftover flesh. Hamlet, to Claudius (as Gertrude, 
to Hamlet), suffers from a case of bad timing that fails to fulfill the expecta-
tions of his gender. Appropriate mourning—in its unthrifty mode—thus seems 
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untimely in the specific sense that it resists being bound by the finite “term” 
that shapes Claudius’s restricted temporal economy. Offering advice to Laertes 
after the death of his father, Claudius reiterates this emphasis on time:
Not that I think you did not love your father,
But that I know love is begun by time,
And that I see, in passages of proof,
Time qualifies the spark and fire of it.
There lives within the very flame of love
A kind of wick or snuff that will abate it;
And nothing is at a like goodness still,
For goodness, growing to a pleurisy,
Dies in his own too-much.
(4.7.109–117)
The stoppage of time that mourning represents quickly turns to excess: it 
“dies in its own too-much.” A technique of temporal management, prudence 
can never simply stay still. Claudius depicts the stillness of a temporal 
digression—like Hamlet’s mourning—as a deadly pathology.
Claudius continues his advice to Laertes by inverting Hamlet’s language of 
thrift, calling excessive mourning a kind of reckless expenditure and inaction:
That we would do,
We should do when we would; for this ‘would’ changes
And hath abatements and delays as many
As there are tongues, are hands, are accidents,
And then this ‘should’ is like a spendthrift sigh
That hurts by easing.
(4.7.117–122)
A close kin to this spendthrift sigh, Hamlet’s grief is exorbitantly unprof-
itable, poured out in the excesses of his speech, useless and—as a kind of 
 matter—without substance.39 Claudius’s “spendthrift sighs” offer one exam-
ple of a frequent use in Shakespeare’s works of negative cognates of “thrift” 
to refer to linguistic events. All of these unthrifty attempts at language or 
expression fall flat or pour out fruitlessly; they are what J. L. Austin would 
call “infelicitous” speech acts, in these cases not just ineffective but actively 
wasteful. Claudius’ phrase is closely echoed by Viola in Twelfth Night, who 
also wonders what fruit her performance might bear:
What will become of this? As I am man,
My state is desperate for my master’s love;
As I am woman,—now alas the day!—
What thriftless sighs shall poor Olivia breathe!
(2.2.36–39)
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The image of leaky passion likewise effeminizes Hamlet, suggesting with the 
word “sigh” that we should group his ritual insistence with other cases of 
(erotic) misrecognition. A spendthrift throws his or her affective energies at an 
improper object. Shakespeare’s Sonnets likewise connect material and tempo-
ral prodigality to a problem of language—here, the work of the poems them-
selves. Throughout those early in the sequence, the poet worries repeatedly 
about the young man’s unthriftiness—not just his vanity or prodigality in the 
sense that Helgerson describes the phenomenon of “Elizabethan Prodigals,” 
but in the precise sense of his failure to produce an heir, to bear fruit.40 As 
the poet asks in Sonnet 4, “Unthrifty loveliness, why dost thou spend / Upon 
 thyself thy beauty’s legacy?”(l.1–2). What might seem a static fault—his failure 
to produce—is in fact a kind of consumption. Sonnet 2 frames this imperative 
of use within the time of the agricultural calendar: in forty winters, will he 
have prepared prudently for the cold of old age? Poor thrift would leave him 
unprepared for winter: “Then being ask’d where all thy beauty lies, / Where 
all the treasure of thy lusty days, / To say, within thine own deep-sunken 
eyes, / Were an all-eating shame and thriftless praise” (l.5–8). This praise is 
thriftless specifically because it fails to produce a son: only the beloved can 
do that, by procreating. This waste is a kind of hoarding: unsoundly storing 
treasure deep within himself, rather than opening it to future use. Like Tottel’s 
hoarders-up of manuscripts, short-sighed and anti-social, there is something 
ungentle in this picture. Inhospitably, the beloved is not keeping his house 
(in the genealogical sense) warm for winter: “This were to be new made when 
thou art old, / And see thy blood warm when thou feel’st it cold” (l.13–14).
The young man is thus unthrifty in a sense we have seen several times 
over: he fails to extend a sequence. Like Claudius’s Hamlet, he “dies in his 
own too-much.” It also returns us to the misogynist logic behind the remark 
from Hamlet with which we began: with its instrumentalization of house-
hold intimacy, Hamlet’s language of thrift miniaturizes, domesticates, and 
feminizes the political force of Gertrude’s remarriage, eliding his own invest-
ment in a guaranteed succession. In its early modern articulations, discourses 
of household thrift were inseparable from the rhyming pair in which the term 
often appeared—“wiving and thriving.” The real and symbolic burden of bal-
ancing thrift and hospitality was often women’s work, and, as Lorna Hutson 
has argued, the resignification of thrift and profit in early modern England 
turned on a rhetorical strategy that symbolically deployed women to displace 
this responsibility.41 Reduced to the maxim offered in A Godlie Form of 
Household Gouernment (1612): “The dutie of the husband is, to be a giver: 
and of the Wife, to be a saver.”42 In Sonnet 2 (as throughout the first part of 
the sequence), the work of women in thrift and household maintenance is 
elided in favor of a masculine fantasy of increase—of fathers and sons and 
fathers ad infinitum. Hamlet’s vitriol toward his mother hones in precisely 
on her disruption of this fantasy; but from another angle, one that Hamlet 
cannot abide, her “thrift” is a rational strategy of household management. 
It serves—instead of a direct line of descent—herself and the household.
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Once again, a language of thrift emerges with urgency at moments where 
a natural sequence is threatened. But why should every digression represent 
a fatal disruption? As we have seen in Tusser and Nashe, digressions from 
sequence may not be disruptive at all. Tusser’s interruption of the sequential 
calendar is not preposterous; it does not disrupt or overturn the natural order. 
Instead, his seasonal digression elegantly manipulates the passage of textual 
time, while the digressive poems affirm the fixity of temporal sequence from 
a point outside of it. The holiday digression does not disorder the household, 
nor does it merely offer the kind of social safety valve that critics and histo-
rians have often attributed to carnival. Instead, it gathers and sequesters the 
potentially disordering license of festival time within the orderly aesthetic 
license of a miniature verse miscellany. By moving out of the time of the cal-
endar toward something that looks like literature, Tusser’s digression renders 
stable the object of the calendar itself. His digression from sequence feeds 
and fixes sequence by using the codes of holiday hospitality to enframe an 
abstract reflection on time and its passage. Crucially, however, the stabil-
ity of both modes is contingent on the terms of transfer between them—a 
spatial language of movement or transport that Tusser frequently uses to 
describe mediation between textual modes and between hospitable orienta-
tions. These metaphors of movement are essential: Tusser manages conflict-
ing times of hospitality by turning them figuratively into spaces, literary topoi 
with doors to be open or shut, and through which the husbandman might 
travel as both host and surveyor. His “digression” accords in this sense with 
the general spatial strategy of provision, which fixes the fleeting passage of 
time in the table of a calendar—a tropological domestication that preserves 
the expenditures of both time and of hospitality in the space of digression.
But there is something more to the resonances we hear between Tusser’s 
Pointes, Hamlet, and Sonnet 2. Echoing Claudius and Viola, the image of 
“thriftless praise” in Sonnet 2 has several senses that connect expenditure 
and waste to the stuff of linguistic utterance. More than a description of 
the beloved’s thriftlessness, the image captures something about the proj-
ect of the Sonnets in general: an anxiety that the efforts of poetic praise 
(like a “spendthrift sigh”) might not come to fruition. Lyric composition 
itself (again, like Christmas) enacts expenditure and loss. As Thomas Greene 
suggests in his reading of husbandry in the Sonnets, “To compose poetry is 
expensive, just as loving is expensive.”43 More expansively, Georges Bataille 
writes that poetry is synonymous with unproductive expenditure, as a name 
for “the least degraded and least intellectualized forms of the expression of a 
state of loss.”44 Barbara Correll has very suggestively argued we consider the 
mixing of erotic and economic registers in Renaissance poetry in the context 
of Bataille’s conception of a general economy, of “squandering without reci-
procity.”45 The common poetic language of debt, value, and currency is not 
merely metaphorical, she argues. Rather than borrowing from the separate 
sphere of a restricted economy, poetry participates in an economy, too—
though one of expenditure and loss and not scarcity and accumulation.
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By drawing on deep and longstanding tensions between hospitality 
and thrift, Tusser’s Pointes (with Tottel’s other poetic publications) lay the 
groundwork for an analogous view, inscribing an attachment to expendi-
ture in the visual form of the printed text. Lyric language—both volumes, 
in their various editions, seem to say—should not be understood according 
to a restricted economy of scarcity. According to this picture, poetry, love, 
loss, and Christmas hospitality all operate by pouring out rather than gath-
ering in. These are ventures that rarely pay off—and should not, perhaps, be 
undertaken with hope of compensation.
Thrift and the possibility of its breach have haunted both the material-
ity of household practice and the material of poetic language in the texts 
I have considered in this essay. This relationship, however, is not strictly a 
homology between kinds of efficiency, or between parallel economies, sym-
bolic and real. As Bataille writes, as a rarified form of unproductive expen-
diture, poetic expense may “[cease] to be symbolic in its consequences,” 
as it becomes a kind of sacrifice—for the poet, a real and not symbolic 
loss.46 With his poetic publications, Richard Tottel seems to agree, echoing 
the defenders of traditional Christmas hospitality in a refusal of “excessive 
scrupulosity.” In Tottel’s redistributive fantasy, the promise of the printing 
press thus looks something like Bataille’s image of the sun as a force that 
“gives without ever receiving,” the naturalistic core from which his concep-
tion of surplus was generated. Of course, Tottel is selling these books, and 
it is unlikely that this optimistic picture of textual hospitality is in reality a 
fantasy of loss and expenditure.47 As we saw with Tusser’s Pointes, these 
expenditures of form and time are always enframed—literally, bound.
But it is significant that this is the language in which a nascent literary sphere 
is delineated in this moment—that is, as a kind of effusive (and always poten-
tially self-destructive) hospitality. As Derrida writes, an act of hospitality can 
“only ever be poetic.” The examples I have considered in this essay help us see 
an unexpected richness in Derrida’s choice of the word “poetic” to denote these 
strange effects of hospitality. His use of the word, I would suggest, is in fact 
made possible by the specific history we glimpse in Tusser and in Shakespeare. 
“Poetic” here indexes the genealogy of a literary culture and social formation in 
which poetry comes to name a certain effect of openness and generosity—one 
that was fundamentally in formation at this moment in early modern literary 
culture. As Tusser, Tottel, and Shakespeare have shown us, however, we would 
do well to register the inverse of Derrida’s equation: an act of poetry in these 
works can only be legible as such if it is already an act of hospitality.
notes
This essay is deeply indebted to the conversations begun in our 2013 Shakespeare 
Association of America (SAA) seminar on “Shakespeare and Hospitality.” I am 
grateful to all of the participants and to groups at the University of Southern California 
and the Huntington Library who read this work and provided invaluable sugges-
tions. For their close engagement, I would especially like to thank the editors of this 
60 Jessica Rosenberg
volume as well as Dympna Callaghan, Margreta de Grazia, Heather James, Rebecca 
Lemon, Carla Mazzio, and Marjorie Rubright. Images included are by permission of 
the Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
 1. William Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. Harold Jenkins, The Arden Shakespeare, second 
series (London: Methuen, 1982). Further references to the play are to this edi-
tion and are noted parenthetically in the text.
 2. Ritual, Lacan goes on, has a special relationship to mourning, as it rewrites the 
particularity of loss under the absolute sign of symbolic lack. We might keep 
this difficult quality of ritual value in mind as we think through the openness 
of hospitality and the problems of memory both in Hamlet and in husbandry, 
remembering that ritual, as Hamlet insists here, cannot take on quantitative 
value as other kinds of value can, potentially stunting a totalizing system of 
exchange. Jacques Lacan, “Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet,” 
trans. James Hulbert, in Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977), 11–52; 40.
 3. Slavoj Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?: Five Interventions in the 
(Mis)Use of a Notion (New York: Verso, 2001), 39. As Žižek writes, “What, 
then, is the status of thrift as a vice? In an Aristotelian frame of mind, it would 
be simple to locate thrift at the opposite extreme from prodigality, and then, of 
course, to construct some middle term—prudence, the art of moderate expen-
diture, avoiding both extremes—as the true virtue. The paradox of the Miser, 
however, is that he makes an excess out of moderation itself” (41).
 4. In this sense, these readings offer another example of how later readers have 
retrospectively placed Hamlet ahead of his time, a phenomenon Margreta de 
Grazia has identified and unknotted in Hamlet without Hamlet (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), especially 7–22 and 23–44. In this case of 
“Thrift, thrift, Horatio,” the prince’s readers take his insights to be as much 
economic as psychological.
 5. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, trans. James Strachey 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1960), 47.
 6. G. R. Hibbard, in his annotation to this line, notes that “Hamlet, the Renaissance 
Prince, has nothing but scorn for this middle-class virtue so much prized 
by Shylock” (Hibbard, ed., Hamlet [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987], 165). 
R. S. White has suggested that Gertrude’s famous “enseamed bed” might also 
refer to an image of household thrift, namely, the practice of repairing old sheets 
by cutting them down the middle and resewing the edges together, to place 
new fabric at the worn center. White’s reading of this line as capturing a kind 
of thrifty “doubling” closely fits the doubleness of thrift I have argued here is at 
work in Hamlet’s accusation. I am grateful to Dympna Callaghan for this citation. 
R. S. White, “Ophelia’s Sisters,” in The Impact of Feminism in English Renaissance 
Studies, Dympna Callaghan, ed. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 93–113.
 7. Because hospitality must be offered graciously, “graciously offered beyond debt 
and economy, offered to the other, a hospitality invented for the singularity of 
the new arrival, of the unexpected visitor,” Derrida writes that the law of unlim-
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hundreth good poynts of huswifery: newly corrected and amplified with dyuers 
proper lessons for housholders, as by the table at the latter ende, more plainly 
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through sexual difference, fears about their  consequences” (The Usurer’s Daughter, 
50–51). We could also profitably read both Tusser’s huswife and  Gertrude’s thrift in 
light of Wendy Wall’s project to resignify domesticity and unearth forms of agency 
and power at work in domestic spaces in Staging Domesticity: Household Work 
66 Jessica Rosenberg
and English Identity in Early Modern Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 9; on Tusser, see 35–36.
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Man, 1598), 171. On the role of women in overseeing and keeping in order 
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Hartman (New York: Methuen, 1985), 241. Greene goes on to conclude that nei-
ther expense is truly recuperable. Barbara Correll argues, however, that Greene 
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in Bataille, but instead cashes out this picture of loss in the form of aesthetic 
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the anxiety it provokes” (Correll, “Terms of “Indearment”: Lyric and General 
 Economy in Shakespeare and Donne,” ELH 75, no. 2 [2008], 241–62; 247).
 44. Georges Bataille, “The Notion of Expenditure,” in Visions of Excess: Selected Writ-
ings, 1927–39 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 116–29; 120.
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 46. Bataille, “The Notion of Expenditure,” 120. Bataille here follows a division that 
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Shakespeare” and The Work and the Gift (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
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Shershow’s reading of Hyde, see The Work and the Gift, 139–40.
3 “Here’s Strange Alteration!”
Hospitality, Sovereignty, and Political 
Discord in Coriolanus
Thomas P. Anderson
In Coriolanus, Shakespeare rewrites early modern friendship theory, asso-
ciating it with a concept of hospitality that turns friendship’s emphasis on 
concord and amity into political liabilities. Depicting friendship as a form of 
hospitality, Shakespeare instead conceives the constitution of friendship as a 
political event that affirms antagonism and discord as irreducible dimensions 
of early seventeenth-century alternative political thought. In act 4, when 
Coriolanus arrives in Antium looking for Aufidius, the play stages the union 
between the two enemies as an event that embodies conventional friend-
ship theory estranged by the force of hospitality that informs it. Coriolanus 
arrives in Antium seeking hospitality, calling his enemy’s home a “goodly 
city” (4.4.1), and the Citizen tells Coriolanus that Aufidius “feasts the nobles 
of the state” (4.4.8) as he directs him to his enemy’s “house” (4.4.10). The 
language between Coriolanus and the Citizen establishes Antium as a place 
of conviviality, inviting even to its enemy who has “made thy widows” (4.4.2) 
and made “[m]any an heir … groan and drop” even before battle (4.4.2–4). 
Greeting his enemy with open arms, Aufidius implores the Roman warrior to
Oh, come, go in,
And take our friendly senators by th’ hands
Who now are here, taking their leaves of me,
Who am prepared against your territories,
Though not Rome itself.
(4.5.130–134)1
Aufidius describes his hospitality as “most absolute” (4.5.135), while seem-
ing to qualify it with the condition that Coriolanus turn his desire for revenge 
against Rome. After welcoming him into his home, he asks Coriolanus to “set 
down / … thine own ways, / Whether to knock against the gates of Rome, / Or 
rudely visit them in parts remote, / To fright them ere destroy” (4.5.137–142). 
In limiting absolute hospitality at the moment that he offers it to Coriolanus, 
Aufidius demonstrates the impossibility of an authentic welcome—one that 
is absolute and unfettered by the force of its own conditional demands that 
transgress it. Jacques Derrida comments on the force of transgression imma-
nent in hospitality itself, noting that “[i]t is as though hospitality were the 
impossible: as though the law of hospitality defined this very impossibility, 
68 Thomas P. Anderson
as if it were only possible to transgress it, as though the law of absolute, 
unconditional, hyperbolical hospitality, as though the categorical imperative 
of hospitality commanded that we transgress all the laws … of hospitality.”2 
The play’s qualifying language at the moment of the welcome announces the 
limits of hospitality. Aufidius directs Coriolanus to other guests in his house 
who will “[s]ay yea to thy desires” (4.5.149), and offers him “[a] thousand 
welcomes!” (144). At the same time that he opens his house to his enemy and 
he tells his rival that he is now “more a friend than e’er an enemy” (154), he 
hedges, as if to qualify the new friendship: “Yet, Martius, that was much” 
(146). Aufidius’s “yet” qualifies the event of friendship forged in this moment 
of intimate hospitality, measuring its value against what it might get Aufidius 
in return, and underscores its fleeting condition as a political force.
With the scene of intimate hospitality between Coriolanus and Aufidius 
serving as this essay’s focus, I argue that Shakespeare links early modern hos-
pitality to a concept of friendship fraught with division and violence. Putting 
into question the dialectic of virtue espoused in classical models of sovereign 
amity, this association between violence and friendship underscores hospi-
tality’s political potential.3 In reconfiguring classical notions of friendship 
common during the early modern period, Shakespeare makes the case that 
sovereign absolutism is, in fact, nourished by a form of hospitality predicated 
on friendship characterized by consensus and fraternity. More specifically, the 
play’s representation of a politics of friendship redistributes the force of sov-
ereign absolutism by disrupting community in favor of the force of division 
and discord. According to this reading of Shakespeare’s political philosophy, a 
form of political antagonism explored in Coriolanus through the contours of 
personal and political friendships is the basis for an eventful politics outside 
of the scope of early modern absolutist and republican models. In  Coriolanus, 
to know one’s friend is at the same time to know one’s enemy—or, more 
 precisely in relation to the depiction of hospitality at the center of this chapter, 
to welcome one’s friend at the same time is to welcome an enemy. Hinted in 
the rhetoric of hospitality characterizing the two warriors’ union is a concept 
of friendship that upsets the formation of community and exposes the limits 
of consensual politics that in Shakespeare’s political philosophy erases neces-
sary and constitutive antagonisms at the core of civic communities.
Friends Fast Forsworn
“Oh, come, go in” (4.5.130), invites Aufidius in act 4, in an instance of 
hospitality that calls attention to the threshold that demarcates the guest 
and host, the enemy and the friend. In Of Hospitality, Derrida explores the 
erosion of this threshold in moments of absolute hospitality, the kind that 
Aufidius appears to extend to his rival:
“Enter quickly.” Quickly, in other words, without delay and without 
waiting … the stranger, here the awaited guest, is not only someone to 
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whom you say “come,” but “enter,” enter without waiting, make a pause 
in our home without waiting, hurry up and come in, “come inside,” 
“come within me,” not only toward me, but within me: occupy me, 
take place in me, which means, by the same token, also take my place.4
Hospitality in Derrida’s account is depicted as an occupation, a surrogation 
that twines host and guest. At the threshold of the house, Coriolanus and 
Aufidius are transformed; the inviting host, as Derrida observes, “becomes 
the hostage. … The guest becomes the host’s host.”5 For Derrida, as for 
Shakespeare in this moment of hospitality and friendship, the “substitu-
tions make everyone into everyone’s hostage.”6 In Coriolanus, the threshold 
between guest and host structuring hospitality is obscured by the aporetic 
logic of substitution informed by the force of friendship that transforms 
enemies into friends.
Elsewhere, Derrida considers the surrogatory logic of political friendship, 
speculating on the potential meaning of Montaigne’s use of Aristotle’s 
declaration: “O my friends, there is no friend.”7 For Derrida, this “impossible 
declaration” (1) seems irreconcilable, “unjoinable” (1). Elaborating on the 
contradiction in the force of friendship expressed in Aristotle’s declaration, 
Derrida focuses on the declaration’s capacity to include opposing elements 
within the same syntactical structure: “In two times but at the same time, in 
the contretemps of the same sentence” (1). Derrida suggests that Aristotle’s 
declaration of friendship paradoxically “states the death of friendship” (27), 
which is, for Derrida, the “locus of the problem—the political problem of 
friendship” (27). In a politics of friendship that structures the scene of abso-
lute hospitality, the friend and the enemy “ceaselessly change places” (72): 
“Hence, every time, a concept bears the phantom of the other. The enemy 
the friend, the friend the enemy” (72). The rhetoric of friendship in Coriolanus, 
which dramatizes Aristotle’s paradox, offers a critique of sovereignty that 
redistributes the contours and consequences of absolutism to other, puta-
tively more democratic political formations. His depiction of friendship in 
the play, especially of the hospitality that Aufidius shows Coriolanus in 
act 4, where the Roman warrior is described as “more a friend than e’er an 
enemy” (4.5.145), challenges the culturally and politically dominant con-
cept of friendship informed by philosophers such as Aristotle and Cicero 
and outlined most recently by Laurie Shannon in Sovereign Amity. Shannon 
argues that “friends, flatterers, counselors, monarchs, tyrants and their min-
ions, and the tales of consent and counsel they enact all join to embody 
a mythography of the political institution before liberalism.”8 According 
to Shannon, Renaissance writers “stress the making of a consensual social 
bond or body that is not inherently subordinating.”9 Specifically, discourses 
of friendship in the sixteenth century “invariably link the mirroring of selves 
with this making of (quasi-civic) bodies.”10 This aspect of doubling common 
in the rhetoric of early modern friendship allegorizes an “instance of politi-
cal formation, and it finds repeated valorization in the texts of Renaissance 
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self-fashioning.”11 In drawing our attention to the period’s rediscovery of 
classical friendship theory, Shannon also shows us how early modern writ-
ers conceptualized the bonds of friendship as sovereign—that is, both salu-
brious and consensually hierarchical. In effect, sovereign amity, as Shannon 
points out, describes dual sovereigns consenting to a social form of parity. 
She writes, “Instead of expressing dissent as such, friendship models config-
ure an image of political consent, offering a counterpoint to prevailing types 
of polity. These political valences are central to ‘sovereign’ friendship’s rhe-
torical, affective, and political dispensations.”12 The intimacy of early mod-
ern sovereign amity, as Shannon shows, stresses parity and consent within 
friendship as viable political forces. Shakespeare’s Roman play shows, how-
ever, that while there can be no form of democracy without the hospitality 
of friends—“without the calculation of majorities, without identifiable, sta-
bilizable, representable subjects all equal” as friends13—these democratic 
forms must also respect the “irreducible singularity” that in Coriolanus is 
immanent in the political economy of friendship.14
Entering Aufidius’s house in act 4 after being banished from his beloved 
Rome, Coriolanus wagers that he brings more value to Aufidius alive than he 
brings to him dead. Antium, Aufidius’s city that Coriolanus once imagined as an 
apocalyptic site “to oppose his hatred fully” (3.1.20), is now invitingly hospi-
table, a “goodly city” (4.1.1), and the Roman warrior surprisingly announces 
that his “love’s upon/ This enemy town” (4.4.23–24). Indeed act 4, scenes 4 
and 5, in which Coriolanus and Aufidius forge an alliance against Rome, are 
remarkable precisely because of the shift from the militaristic, antagonistic 
tone that characterizes much of the play. Upon entering his sworn enemy’s 
house, Coriolanus’s vocative exclamation announces this shift: “O world, 
thy slippery turns!” (4.4.12). The “slippery turns” that Coriolanus goes on to 
describe involve both friendship and hospitality, specifically turning a sacred 
friend into an enemy and turning an avowed enemy into a friend:
Friends now fast forsworn,
Whose double bosoms seems to wear one heart,
Whose hours, whose bed, whose meal and exercise
Are still together; who twin, as ‘twere, in love
Unseparable, shall within this hour,
On a dissension of a doit, break out
To bitterest enmity.
(4.4.12–18)
The hero’s description of his former relationship with Rome is rich with 
the rhetoric of friendship common in the early modern period. The use of 
phrases such as “double bosoms,” “one heart,” “still together,” “twin,” and 
“unseparable” to describe the nature of the bond of friendship that conjoins 
him to Rome seems to have been taken directly from descriptions of amicitia 
perfecta from writers whose work Shannon explores in Sovereign Amity, 
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including John Tiptoft, Michel de Montaigne, Thomas Elyot, and Nicho-
las Grimald. As Shannon shows, as early as 1481 Tiptoft emphasized the 
similitude that characterizes ideal friendship, translating Cicero’s famous 
description of a friend as “another … same” and suggesting of friends that 
“of those tweyne he shold make wel nygh one.”15 Half a century later, Elyot 
writes that ideal “frendshippe” is “a blessed and stable connexion of sondrie 
willes, makinge of two persones one in hauinge and suffringe … properly 
named of Philosphers the other I. For that in them is but one mynde and one 
possession.”16 Employing similar tropes of friendship, Nicholas Grimald 
makes amity the subject of a poem that appears in Tottel’s Miscellany. 
In “Of Frendship,” he writes, “Behold thy frend, and of thy self the pattern 
fee: / One soull, a wonder shall it seem, in bodies twain to bee.”17
Other Renaissance humanists translate treatises into English that have 
friendship as their central theme. Nicholas Udall’s translation of Erasmus’s 
Apophthegmes describes the famous relationship between Alexander and 
Haphestion according to the proverb “amicus alter ipse … two frendes are 
one soul and one body.”18 Shannon has pointed out that the error in Udall’s 
translation is no mistake: “The errors here … substituting ‘one’ body for 
‘two bodies,’ make no mistake: two equal corporeal bodies bound in friend-
ship constitute a single corporate or juridical body, a legal fiction creating 
an operative unity.”19 Montaigne makes a similar observation in his essay 
“Of Friendship”: “In the friendship I speak of, our souls blend and melt 
so entirely, that there is no more sign of the seam which joins them. If I am 
pressed to say why I loved him, I feel that I can only express myself by 
answering, because it was he, because it was I.”20 Montaigne goes on to 
contemplate the “fusion of … wills” in an ideal friendship and concludes, 
“Everything actually being in common between them … and their relation-
ship being that of one soul in two bodies, according to Aristotle’s very apt 
definition.”21 Montaigne’s ideal friendship has “no other model than itself, 
and can be compared only with itself.”22
For these early modern writers, the bonds of ideal friendship appear 
unbreakable and irreplaceable; for Coriolanus, however, untwining his bond 
with Rome means also replacing one friendship with another and counting 
on the hospitality of his enemy:
Unseparable, shall within this hour,
On a dissension of a doit, break out
To bitterest enmity. So, fellest foes,
Whose passions and whose plots have broke their sleep
To take the one the other, by some chance,
Some trick not worth an egg, shall now grow dear friends
And interjoin their issues. So with me.
My birthplace hate I, and my love’s upon
This enemy town.
(4.4.16–24)
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Coriolanus’s rapid transfer of affection from Rome to Antium—“[o]n a dis-
sension of a doit” and “by some chance”—seems to counter the bonds of 
true friendship, which are, according to Elyot, “confederated” and “issuing … 
out of the one body, and entringe in to the other.”23 Using Coriolanus as an 
exemplum for failed friendship, Cicero warns that “alliances of wicked men 
not only should not be protected by a plea of friendship, but rather they 
should be visited with summary punishment of the severest kind, so that 
no one may think it permissible to follow even a friend when waging war 
against his country.”24 Yet, Coriolanus’s relationship with Rome suggests 
that he seems at least to view friendship as the core tenet of his political 
philosophy, more valuable than any doit—a worthless coin that Coriolanus 
says eventually pays for his break from his Roman fraternity.
Hostages for Rome
As the vehicle for Shakespeare to explore the force of dissensus in poli-
tics shaped by a form of absolute hospitality, the rhetoric of friendship in 
Coriolanus appears in both public and private settings. The play imbricates 
friendship and politics in its first scene, in which Menenius hears grievances 
from Rome’s hungry citizens. First Citizen describes Caius Martius as “chief 
enemy to the people” (1.1.6–7), and the friend–enemy distinction is rein-
forced when Menenius confronts the crowd. He calls the citizens, “my good 
friends, mine honest neighbors” (1.1.55–56). Four more times before Caius 
Martius arrives, Menenius addresses either the group of citizens or an indi-
vidual citizen as “friends” (1.1.58, 121, 132) or “friend” (1.1.118). His rhe-
torical attempt to quell the anger of the citizens notwithstanding, his use of 
the rhetoric of friendship in his address to the hungry mob frames the scene 
and suggests its role in the political dynamics of the play. Martius’s disdain 
for the citizens in this scene and throughout the play, I suggest, is his blunt 
rejection of comity and an extension of his insistence on an alternative form 
of a politics of friendship foundational to the Roman state.
The citizens’ position as “great toe” (1.1.146) of the Roman assembly 
describes their inferior position relative to other Roman statesmen and 
turns their supplication into a plea for conditional hospitality. In the fable 
of the belly, Menenius becomes a host, comparing the senators to “the 
good belly” (139) nourishing the citizens, who, as his guests, are “muti-
nous  members” (140), nerves, veins, and appendages of the body. Calling 
the citizens his “incorporate friends” (120), Menenius as host or “store-
house”  (126) administers food, delivering to the citizens their “natural 
competency / Whereby they live” (130–131). The very structure of power 
explored in this scene militates against a politics of friendship informed by 
similitude, confederation, and union.25 Friendship implies parity and sym-
metry, “through rational desire and free choice rather than hierarchy, phys-
icality, and self-loss or self-dilution.”26 Indeed, Martius’s rejection of the 
citizens in act 1, scene 1, along with his refusal of their desires throughout 
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the play, is a rejection of Roman republicanism figured as conditional 
hospitality. Coriolanus’s insults—he calls the citizens “curs” (1.1.159), 
“dissentious rogues” (155), “scabs” (156), and “fragments” (212)—are 
motivated by an implicit challenge to the political dependency that struc-
tures Roman politics in the play.
If, as I am suggesting, we view Coriolanus’s rejection of the citizens, along 
with his refusal finally to participate in Roman political custom later in 
the play, as a commitment to a form of friendship emerging in the space 
of failed republicanism, the play offers an affirmative politics imagined in 
the portrayal of the intimate hospitality between Aufidius and Coriolanus 
in act 4. Yet the alliance forged between the two bitter enemies destabilizes 
hospitality as a political force at the same time that it suggests its liberating 
potential.27 More precisely, the hospitality at the core of Coriolanus’s new 
relationship with Aufidius in act 4 radically reconceptualizes the logic of 
friendship common in the early modern period, suggesting that the play dis-
rupts the communitarian space imagined in the classical rhetoric of friend-
ship. In its wake, the play glimpses an irreducible, albeit unsustainable, 
anti-community that rejects consensus.
My focus on the constitutive condition of friendship’s failure, informed 
by the absolute hospitality in the scene, as a sustainable force that shapes 
political sovereignty follows rich lines of inquiry offered most recently by 
Graham Hammill and Julia Reinhard Lupton. In her reading of Marlowe’s 
The Jew of Malta, Lupton emphasizes the erosion of “prepolitical fellowship” 
into a notion of community formed by uncivil politics,28 and Hammill 
argues that Marlowe’s depiction of betrayal becomes his “response to … the 
sovereign bond.”29 Hammill elaborates on the productive nature of betrayal 
reflected in early modern literature in terms of the formation of political 
alternatives to sovereign absolutism: “instead of positing a public space 
based on national identity, [English writers] imagined a far more fractured 
and fragile sense of community based on temporary political affiliations, 
divided between friend and enemy, and threatened by the tyrannical incli-
nations of sovereign power—both real and imaginary.”30 At the core of the 
relationship between Aufidius and Coriolanus is the force of hospitality that 
precludes rapprochement and establishes rejected friendship as the critical 
force against Roman state absolutism.31
The treatment of Martius by an inhospitable Rome after his victory at 
Corioles expresses the political power of the concept of friendship in the 
play. Brutus acknowledges Coriolanus’s banishment in language that relies 
on the friend–enemy distinction: “There is no more to be said, but he is ban-
ished / As enemy to the people and his country” (3.3.114–115). Rejoicing 
over his banishment, other witnesses to Coriolanus’s punishment echo Brutus’s 
language. An Aedile says, “The people’s enemy is gone, is gone!” and the 
others on stage shout, “Our enemy is banished! He is gone!” (3.3.133–134). 
Indeed, even before his banishment, the custom of showing his wounds to 
the citizens and wearing the gown of humility is depicted as a ritual of 
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friendship. The Fourth Citizen, speaking for the common people, says to 
Coriolanus: “You have been a scourge to [Rome’s] enemies; you have been 
a rod to her friends. You have not loved the common people” (2.3.85–87). 
The Fifth Citizen follows, “We hope to find you our friend, and therefore 
give you our voices heartily” (2.3.97–98). As Coriolanus asks the citizens 
for their voices to make him consul, the citizens express their response in 
terms of friendship. Seventh Citizen says, “Therefore let him be consul. The 
gods give him joy, and make him good friend to the people!” (2.3.126–127). 
In an effort to save Coriolanus’s consulship, Volumnia compares honor and 
policy to “unsevered friends” (3.2.42) that in war “grow together” (3.2.43) 
and encourages her son to maintain the friendship between honor and policy 
in peace, where “each of them by th’ other lose / That they combine not 
there” (3.2.44–45). And in language that foreshadows Coriolanus’s alliance 
with Aufidius in act 4, she says, “I know thou hadst rather / Follow thine 
enemy in a fiery gulf / Than flatter him in a bower” (3.2.90–92).
The language of comity that structures the scene between Coriolanus 
and the citizens, as he struggles to ask for their voices, establishes friend-
ship as a force in support of absolutism even as the politics of friendship 
seem to enfranchise citizens, giving them a voice in the republic.32 In an 
acknowledgement of the paradox of their enfranchisement, Third Citizen 
says, “We have power in ourselves to do it, but it is a power that we have 
no power to do. For if he show us his wounds and tell us his deeds, we are 
to put our tongues into those wounds and speak for them. So, if he tell 
us his noble deeds, we must also tell him our noble acceptance of them” 
(2.3.4–9). The emptiness of the ritual, I suggest, hints also at the empti-
ness of hospitality that sustains Roman absolutism with friendship that 
makes  Coriolanus hostage to Rome. The Third Citizen identifies a type of 
friendship predicated on telling and speaking—vividly imagined as putting 
a tongue in Coriolanus’s wounds. In the play’s extended association of the 
coming political community and the rhetoric of friendship throughout acts 
2 and 3, the citizens’ voices depict a form of communicative sociability nec-
essary to sustain political friendship and by extension civic enfranchisement, 
a drive to expand the economy of friendship to include more friends in the 
communitas. Coriolanus’s rejection of this mode of friendship suggests his 
refusal to obscure the dissent at friendship’s core with the glib discourse of 
inclusion, unanimity, and agreement.
At the end of act 3, Brutus banishes Coriolanus after describing him as 
“enemy to the people of his country” (3.3.115). Coriolanus responds by 
reversing the terms of his exclusion:
You common cry of curs, whose breath I hate
As reek o’ th’ rotten fens, whose loves I prize
As the dead carcasses of unburied men
That do corrupt my air, I banish you!
(3.3.117–120)
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Coming immediately after Roman tribunes banish him—“It shall be so! it 
shall be so! Let him away! / He is banished, and it shall be so!” (3.3.102–104)—
Coriolanus’s decree reversing banishment and exiling the city complicates the 
logic of rejection at stake in the play. James Kuzner associates this moment of 
rejection with the trope of the gay outlaw or the sodomite, whose very vul-
nerability inaugurates and sustains his tenuous but potent political viability.33 
Coriolanus’s “[v]agabond exile” (3.3.86), in which he turns his back on the 
city in search of “a world elsewhere” (132), is precisely the moment that the 
reject assumes a force preventing him from becoming a static figure vitiated 
of a politically agonistic potential. The play’s reversal of the logic of exile 
exposes the fantasy of comity and accord in the exclamation from the Aedile 
and other citizens who witnessed the scene:
AEDILE: The people’s enemy is gone, is gone!
ALL: Our enemy is banished! He is gone!
(3.3.133–134)
In rejecting Roman hospitality, Coriolanus risks challenging the sovereign’s 
prerogative to establish the friend–enemy distinction, which for Carl Schmitt 
is at the core of sovereign power. The play’s exposure of the distinction, 
however, is only its first step in recalibrating friendship’s political potential. 
 Coriolanus enters exile “alone, / Like to a lonely dragon that his fen / Makes 
feared and talked of more than seen” (4.1.29–31). He proclaims the isolation 
of his reject status, boasting to his mother Volumnia that he “[w]ill exceed the 
common” (4.1.32) and defy capture. Given his dramatic exit as an outcast 
who transforms rejection into a form of heroism, it is curious that by the end 
of act 4 the Roman reject seeks an alliance with Aufidius. In turning away 
from Roman hospitality to Aufidius, however, Coriolanus not only separates 
himself from classical notions of friendship that have been co-opted by the 
state, but he also exposes friendship’s political force to its own limitations.
Coriolanus’s language as he enters Aufidius’s house in act 4 emphasizes 
conventional, early modern tropes of friendship and recalls the perversion 
that characterizes absolute hospitality. The rhetoric of hospitality sutures 
the divisions that previously separated the two rival warriors: “double 
bosoms” are now “one heart,” “still together,” “twin,” and “unseparable” 
(4.4.13–16). He imagines a future in which foes “grow dear friends / And 
interjoin their issues” (22). The next scene in Aufidius’s house reinforces this 
suture, as the stage directions announce that “Music plays” (4.5) and the 
servingman’s repeated request for “Wine, wine, wine!” (1) creates a sense of 
plenitude at Aufidius’s “hearth” (24). The companionship and plenitude 
suggested in the scene, however, prove equivocal, as the servingmen refuse 
to welcome Coriolanus into the “goodly house” (5). Framing the scene of 
friendship between rivals, then, is a division that persists beneath the hospi-
tality established in the opening lines of the scene. Coriolanus acknowledges 
this lingering division as he enters: “The feast smells well, but I / Appear not 
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like a guest” (5–6). The use of enjambment in these lines draws attention 
to the contrast (“but I”) between hospitality’s unconditional welcome and 
Coriolanus’s inability to participate unconditionally in the plenitude. The 
caesura in the line appearing after Coriolanus’s description of the pleasant 
smell of food and the conjunction “but” are formal reminders of the division 
that will subtend the two enemies’ eventual union.
The servingmen’s reaction to their guest, too, illustrates the tension between 
division and comity that informs the scene. Using the language of friendship 
in their address to Coriolanus, both servingmen express the ambivalence that, 
I am suggesting, is at the core of friendship in the scene. The First  Servingman 
says, “What would you have, friend? Whence are you? Here’s no place for 
you. Pray, go to the door”(7–9); followed by the Second Servingman, “Whence 
are you, sir? Has the port his eyes in his head, that he gives entrance to such 
companions? Pray, get you out” (12–14). Both servants describe  Coriolanus 
in terms common in the rhetoric of friendship in the period, yet both reac-
tions suggest that there is an aspect of Coriolanus that is not knowable: 
“Whence are you?” This question lingers as the play’s acknowledgment that 
an unutterable truth—what Derrida calls the “ nothing sayable” (1)—divides 
friendship and prevents it from being appropriated by sovereign absolutism 
in service of the state. Even as the ambiance of the scene—its music, its food, 
and its wine—intimates unity and hospitality,  Coriolanus introjects division, 
insulting the servingmen by ordering them to “[f]ollow your function, go, and 
batten on cold bits” (4.5.31–32), and saying to another, “Thou prat’st, and 
prat’st. Serve with thy trencher. Hence!” (47–48).
The scene’s ambivalence toward friendship and hospitality in the moments 
before the portrayal of the alliance between Aufidius and Coriolanus helps 
to shape how we might understand their strategic union.34 Coriolanus asks 
for an alliance based on revenge; in doing so, he intensifies his position as a 
reject—turning his passive disavowal of friendship into an active rejection, 
a “preemptive measure against lapsing into the all-too-human weakness for 
some amicability.”35 Coriolanus’s decision to surrender to Aufidius, eventu-
ally offering his throat to his enemy as a gesture of his abjection, implies his 
renewed commitment to his rejection of the type of friendship offered by the 
state. Coriolanus tells Aufidius:
But if so be
Thou dar’st not this, and that to prove more fortunes
Th’ art tired, then, in a word, I also am
Longer to live most weary, and present
My throat to thee and to thy ancient malice;
Which not to cut would show thee but a fool,
Since I have ever followed thee with hate,
Drawn tuns of blood out of thy country’s breast,
And cannot live but to thy shame unless
It be to do thee service.
(4.5.91–100)
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In asking Aufidius to “make [his own] misery serve [Aufidius’s] turn” (87), 
Coriolanus reminds us (and himself) that he is a reject in friendship, and he 
redirects the force of rejection against himself—a gesture intended to pre-
vent any rapprochement with Rome.36
Aufidius’s passionate reaction to his rival’s offer reconfigures the pro-
posed strategic alliance into a bond of friendship. He accepts Coriolanus 
into his home with the language of intimate hospitality:
But come in.
Let me commend the first to those that shall
Say yea to thy desires. A thousand welcomes!
And more a friend than e’er an enemy;
Yet, Martius, that was much. Your hand. Most welcome.
(4.5.142–146)
The surplus value in the hospitality voiced in Aufidius’s  greeting—“[a] 
 thousand welcomes” and “more a friend than e’er an enemy”—risks obscur-
ing the play’s recognition of the disavowed truth that immanent in absolute 
hospitality is a form of antagonism that defines the political. The ambivalence 
at the core of this expression of hospitality helps to explain the remarkable 
interplay of eroticism and violence that characterizes Aufidius’s extended 
response to Coriolanus:
Let me twine
Mine arms about that body, where against
My grainèd ash an hundred times hath broke,
And scarred the moon with splinters. Here I clip
The anvil of my sword, and do contest
As hotly and as nobly with thy love
As ever in ambitious strength I did
Contend against thy valor. Know thou first,
I loved the maid I married; never man
Sighed truer breath; but that I see thee here,
Thou noble thing, more dances my rapt heart
Than when I first my wedded mistress saw
Bestride my threshold …
Thou hast beat me out
Twelve several times, and I have nightly since
Dreamt of encounters ‘twixt thyself and me.
We have been down together in my sleep,
Unbuckling helms, fisting each other’s throat,
And waked half dead with nothing.
(4.5.104–125)
Aufidius’s desire to “twine” his arms around Coriolanus’s body is a reminder 
of his quest to defeat his Roman enemy, yet it is also a description of an 
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embrace of unrequited love that previously had “scarred the moon” (108). 
After acknowledging that his “rapt heart” (115) prefers Coriolanus to his 
“wedded mistress” (116), Aufidius extends both the violent and erotic imag-
ery of their new bond by describing how in his dreams their two bodies 
become one: “We have been down together in my sleep / Unbuckling helms, 
fisting each other’s throat, / And waking half dead with nothing” (4.5.123–126). 
In Aufidius’s rhetoric, their martial exploits morph into erotic play, and the 
two rivals merge into one indivisible body. The play’s imagery highlights the 
migration from difference to similitude, and emphasizes the suturing power 
of the rhetoric that sustains an economy of friendship in early modern politi-
cal philosophy. The violence embedded in the migration, however, captured 
in the active logic of the participles unbuckling and fisting, lets us glimpse 
the “motility of division”37—an ineradicable agonism—that structures a 
politics of friendship in this scene of hospitality.
Described as a “strange alteration!” (4.5.146), the new bond of friend-
ship manifest in the event of hospitality suggests union and similitude 
between enemies, but the servingmen reveal an aspect of the bond that 
exceeds indivisibility. The second servingman says of Coriolanus: “I knew 
by his face that there was something in him. He had, sir, a kind of face, 
methought—I cannot tell how to term it” (153–155), and the first serving-
man seems to agree, “He had so, looking as it were—Would I were hanged, 
but I thought there was more in him than I could think” (156–158). The 
play points to the surplus that always exceeds friendship’s claims of consen-
sus and union, a silent surplus that conceals the truth about political friendship: 
that is, friendship is predicated on irreducible division and enmity. Again, 
the play allows a servingman to express most cogently the play’s insight 
about friendship’s immanent division: “But the bottom of the news is, our 
general is cut i’ th’ middle and but one half of what he was yesterday; for 
the other has half” (197–199). The servingmen anatomize and divide the 
alliance that in Aufidius’s rhetoric of absolute hospitality was characterized 
by rapturous plenitude and erotic wholeness.
Though initially presented in terms that erotically imagine the unifica-
tion of two bodies into one soul, Aufidius’s understanding of hospitality’s 
political force relies on the recognition that friendship’s irreducible division 
is sutured by his own erotic rhetoric. The play hints at the covert nature 
of enmity—disguised, even as its presence is visceral in the imagery, by the 
erotic act of fisting each other’s throats—in the servingmen’s discussion of 
the ambivalence of Roman hospitality in the face of Coriolanus’s return. The 
servingman responds to a discussion of the violence in store for the Roman 
people when Coriolanus returns to “mow all down before him” (4.5.201): 
“Do’t? he will do’t! for, look you, sir, he has as many friends as enemies; 
which friends, sir, as it were, durst not, look you, sir, show themselves, as 
we term it, his friends whilst he’s in directitude” (205–208). Elaborating on 
his meaning, the servingman says, “But when they shall see, sir, his crest up 
again, and the man in blood, they will out of their burrows like conies after 
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rain, and revel all with him” (210–212). The servants’ discussion of covert, 
strategic friendship hints at its opposite—the irreducible, yet unspeakable 
hatred in the play that divides sovereign amity and fractures a concept of 
community predicated on it.
Let Me Have War, Say I
Aufidius’s form of hospitality—embodying the political ideology of dissen-
sus and not those attributes most associated with early modern friendship 
theory such as consensus, agreement, unity, or accord—is the productive 
force that drives polity. His actions after his allegiance with Coriolanus sug-
gest that he accepts, indeed even demands as a necessity, the incommensura-
bility of competing political claims. Shakespeare’s description of the citizens 
in act 4, responding to the news of Coriolanus’s return, reflects the play’s 
interest in interrogating an alternative concept of community. The play no 
longer employs the logic of Menenius’s belly metaphor to describe the citizens’ 
relationship to the Roman state that integrates them into a seamless, func-
tional political system. Indeed, by the end of act 4, Menenius twice calls 
the citizens “clusters.” Describing the citizens’ responsibility in banishing 
 Coriolanus, Menenius says, “We loved him, / But like beasts and cowardly 
nobles, / Gave way unto your clusters, who did hoot / Him out o’ th’ city” 
(4.6.121–123). The second use of the word occurs a few lines later, as a 
troop of citizens enter the scene. Menenius responds to the citizens’ arrival: 
“Here come the clusters. / And is Aufidius with him?” (128–129). According 
to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word clusters denotes a number of 
persons, animals, or things gathered or situated close together. In 1576, 
Abraham Fleming uses the word in a translation of Hippocrates to describe 
citizens who gather in a cluster, as in an assemblage, swarm, or crowd.38 
This is the only use of this word in Shakespeare’s entire body of work, and 
its appearance at this point in the play creates a distinction between how 
division operates early in act 1 and how the play understands its force by 
act 4 and 5. The rhetoric of friendship that shapes the belly metaphor in 
act 1—“good friend” (1.1.118), “incorporate friends” (1.1.121), “my good 
friends” (1.1.132)—is replaced by the concept of the cluster in act 4. As an 
assemblage, the cluster of citizens, I suggest, is an affiliation of differences, 
unintegrated by the belly metaphor into absolute sovereign power. Indeed, 
Menenius’s second use of the word—“Here come the clusters. / And is 
Aufidius with him?”—implies its capacity to include division as a primary 
force. The statement and question in the passage align three of the play’s 
antagonistic forces: common citizens (“clusters”), Aufidius, and Coriolanus 
(“him”). In doing so, Shakespeare imagines a politics that privileges division 
over incorporation and agonism over similitude.
Although the play ties Coriolanus’s fate to Aufidius’s jealousy at being 
overshadowed, or “darkened” (4.7.5), by the Roman warrior’s exploits and 
reputation, his betrayal of Coriolanus is also a reaction to the threat of 
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incorporation implied in Volumnia’s seduction of her son back into Roman 
society. Volumnia embodies the threat of rapprochement that defuses a pol-
itics of friendship predicated on division. In her plea to her son to spare 
Rome, the power of Volumnia’s appeal erases all antagonism and division:
If it were so that our request did tend
To save the Romans, thereby to destroy
The Volsces whom you serve, you might condemn us
As poisonous of your honor. No, our suit
Is that you reconcile them while the Volsces
May say “This mercy we have showed,” the Romans,
“This we received,” and each in either side
Give the all-hail to thee and cry, “Be blest
For making up this peace!”
(5.3.132–140)
Volumnia’s peace accord imagines a form of consensus with the power to repair 
the divisive desires that compel vying factions. Her extended appeal in act 5 
is an appeal for consensus that Coriolanus has already rejected.  Volumnia’s 
final words in the play, “And then I’ll speak little” (5.3.182) contrast with her 
gregariousness immediately before her silence, and the stage directions after 
her long plea reinforce this contrast, as Coriolanus “holds her by the hand, 
silent” (5.3). By silencing Volumnia at the moment of her rhetorical victory, 
where she ensures accord, unity, and peace for Rome, the play dramatizes the 
problem of consensus. That is to say, Volumnia’s silence even in her “happy vic-
tory to Rome” (5.3.186) jeopardizes her future political viability.  Coriolanus’s 
reaction to the new concord reinforces this point. He says to his mother:
But we will drink together; and you shall bear
A better witness back than words, which we,
On like conditions, will have counter-sealed.
Come, enter with us. Ladies, you deserve
To have a temple built you. All the swords
In Italy, and her confederate arms,
Could not have made this peace.
(5.3.203–209)
Coriolanus’s words return us to a concept of sovereign amity associated 
with conventional friendship. His reaction stresses harmony with words 
such as “together,” “like conditions,” “counter-sealed,” and “confederate 
arms.” Rapprochement is complete; division repaired. Aufidius’s aside at 
this moment, however, threatens the new concord: “I am glad thou hast set 
mercy and thy honor / At difference in thee. Out of that I’ll work / Myself a 
former fortune” (5.3.200–202). His refusal to accept Roman hospitality—
an insistence on the force of irreducible division—aligns him with the reject 
that enables a politics of dissensus critical in reshaping sovereign absolutism.
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With the collapse of the friend–enemy distinction in act 5, Shakespeare’s 
play tries to imagine the logical end to an early modern politics of friendship 
by reconfiguring traditional early modern models. In these models, the hos-
pitality produced by consensual social bond of friendship is political as well 
in that it serves as the structure for civic engagement defined by parity, agree-
ment, union, or accord. Entering the final scene, however, Coriolanus claims, 
“We have made peace / With no less honor to the Antiates / Than shame to 
th’ Romans” (5.6.78–80). He brings with him the seal of the Roman senate 
that “[t]ogether” with and “[s]ubscribed by” the tribunes represents what 
“[w]e have compounded on” (82–83). The language of consensus structures 
the scene but is quickly displaced by Aufidius’s insistence on division, calling 
Coriolanus a “traitor” (84, 86). Coriolanus himself implores the Volsces to 
“[c]ut me to pieces” (110), insisting yet again on the threshold that sus-
tains hospitality and on a polity structured on the logic and language of 
classical friendship theory. Coriolanus’s demand that they cut him to pieces 
becomes the demand of the people as well as of the conspirators: “Tear him 
to pieces!” (119), the people shout, followed by the conspirators, who shout, 
“Kill, kill, kill, kill, kill him!” (128). Division remains but not at the expense 
of a community-to-come that can absorb the loss. Aufidius says to the lords 
present at Coriolanus’s murder: “My lords, when you shall know … the 
great danger / Which this man’s life did owe you, you’ll rejoice / That he is 
thus cut off” (5.6.134–137). After the murder, Aufidius says that his “rage is 
gone” (5.6.145) and that he is “struck with sorrow” (5.6.146) at the event. 
His reaction captures the ambivalence of a politics of friendship necessarily 
fueled by enmity as much as amity, difference as much as similitude. Aufidius’s 
melancholic reaction is a reminder that the possibility of the death of a 
friend inhabits friendship itself as the irreducible division that creates desire 
and proves unsustainable an absolutist politics nurtured by conventional 
notions of sovereign amity.39
To conclude this essay on Shakespeare’s representation of the potential 
of the politics of hospitality fueled by the force of friendship in  Coriolanus 
that recognizes as a civic virtue the “dissension of a doit” (4.4.17), I want 
to return to the servingmen in act 4. Responding to the hospitality between 
Aufidius and Coriolanus, the servingmen in act 4 offer, arguably, the most 
pressing insight into the play’s political philosophy. After the compact 
between Aufidius and Coriolanus, the Third Servingman brings news of the 
impending war against Rome. His fellow servant asks, “But when goes this 
forward?” (4.5.213). The servingmen’s exchange is as follows:
THIRD SERVINGMAN: To-morrow; to-day; presently; you shall have the drum 
struck up this afternoon …
SECOND SERVINGMAN: Why, then we shall have a stirring world again. 
This peace is nothing, but to rust iron, increase tailors, and breed 
ballad-makers.
FIRST SERVINGMAN: Let me have war, say I; it exceeds peace as far as day 
does night; it’s spritely, waking, audible, and full of vent. Peace is a very 
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apoplexy, lethargy; mulled, deaf, sleepy, insensible; a getter of more bas-
tard children than war’s a destroyer of men.
SECOND SERVINGMAN: ’Tis so: and as war, in some sort, may be said to be a 
ravisher, so it cannot be denied but peace is a great maker of cuckolds.
FIRST SERVINGMAN: Ay, and it makes men hate one another.
THIRD SERVINGMAN: Reason; because they then less need one another.
(214–229)
On one level, this exchange articulates a concept of perpetual war that my 
reading of friendship and hospitality in the play risks ignoring. Indeed, to 
argue as I’ve done that Coriolanus’s disdain for others, shaped by and artic-
ulated through the rhetoric of friendship, is in fact the play’s expression of 
a counterpolitics to an absolutism obscured by the logic of sovereign amity 
is to seem to excuse the play’s state-sanctioned violence. The play calls this 
militant force “a perpetual spoil” (2.2.117), and until Coriolanus’s Rome 
has satisfied its imperial desire for “[b]oth field and city” (118), the war 
machine “never stood / To ease his breast with panting” (118–119).
The political philosophy of the servingmen, however, paints a different 
picture of perpetual conflict, one abstracted from the material effects of 
Coriolanus’s particular rage. Conflict is naturalized and nourished in their 
description, “a parcel of their feast” and as immediate as the wiping of 
their lips. Conflict holds the promise to produce “a stirring of the world 
again”—an energy that contrasts with what peace brings—“nothing but 
to rust iron.” In the final irony of the exchange, a servingman says that 
peace “makes men hate one another” because, he claims, “they then less 
need one another.” Even as Coriolanus and Aufidius are necessarily hos-
tages to Rome in a bond of friendship that has the two rivals “hate alike” 
(1.8.3), the irreducible division in their friendship gives the play’s depic-
tion of hospitality its political force. Rejection is embedded in Coriola-
nus’s need for Aufidius and in Aufidius’s reciprocal desire. It is a force in 
the play that ironically makes friendship asymmetrical,40 always appear-
ing elsewhere, and according to the philosophical servingman, “a strange 
alteration,” divided, fugitive, arriving “[t]omorrow, today, presently,” like 
the fragile form of community that briefly, if only imaginatively, emerges 
from it.
The servingmen’s mock encomium of war during this scene of hospitality 
dramatizes the antagonistic force of politics immanent in the new friendship 
between Aufidius and Coriolanus. To the servingmen, friendship produces 
“apoplexy” (4.5.223) and “lethargy” (223), and a world that is “mulled, 
deaf, sleepy, insensible” (223–224). In Schmittian terms, the friendship 
dramatized in the scene of hospitality worries the servingmen because it 
threatens to result in a “completely pacified globe.”41 With the confedera-
tion between Aufidius and Coriolanus, the servingmen witness simultane-
ously the birth of a new war machine—an assemblage with the potential 
to destroy Rome—and of an unconditional hospitality that guarantees a 
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disturbing consensus.42 The Third Servingman describes the strange effect 
of the union: “our general is cut i’ th’ middle and but one half of what was 
yesterday” (4.5.198–199). The unconditional hospitality that characterizes 
the warriors’ new friendship is a “strange alteration” not because the two 
warriors make awkward bedfellows. It is strange because their new confed-
eration ironically suggests the possibility of a depoliticized world—a Roman 
republic without politics. In their reaction to the events that transpire in 
front of them, the servingmen echo Schmitt: “A world in which the possibil-
ity of war is utterly eliminated … would be a world without the distinction 
of friend and enemy and hence without politics.”43 For the servingmen, the 
end of the political embodied in the warriors’ strange alliance makes the 
turn to the absolute hostility of war—“a stirring world” (218–219)—necessary 
to recover a form of civic life.
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4 Hospitality’s Risk, Grace’s Bargain
Uncertain Economies in  
The Winter’s Tale
James Kearney
In the opening scene of The Winter’s Tale, Shakespeare offers his audience 
a crash course in the social logic of hospitality. As the play opens, we learn 
that Polixenes and his Bohemian entourage have been enjoying the generos-
ity of Leontes and the Sicilian court for nine months. Since the Bohemians 
cannot reciprocate in kind, the Sicilians’ hospitality threatens them with 
the specter of crushing debt. Through the conversation between the court-
iers Archidamus and Camillo, Shakespeare stages the Bohemians’ sense that 
they are confronted with an oppressive obligation:
ARCHIDAMUS: If you shall chance, Camillo, to visit Bohemia on the like 
occasion whereon my services are now on foot, you shall see, as I have 
said, great difference betwixt our Bohemia and your Sicilia.
CAMILLO: I think this coming summer the King of Sicilia means to pay 
Bohemia the visitation which he justly owes him.
ARCHIDAMUS: Wherein our entertainment shall shame us; we will be justi-
fied in our loves. For indeed—
CAMILLO: Beseech you—
ARCHIDAMUS: Verily I speak it in the freedom of my knowledge. We cannot 
with such magnificence—in so rare—I know not what to say.1
A good reader of Marcel Mauss, Archidamus knows that the gift always 
exists within an economy of benefits and obligations, credit and debt.2 
Indeed, his sense of insufficiency leaves him at a loss for words. Playing the 
part of the good host, Camillo insists that this concern is out of place: 
“You pay a great deal too dear for what’s given freely” (1.1.16–17). But it is 
precisely the paradoxical nature of hospitable expenditure that is at issue in 
the play. For hospitality to be understood as gift, it must be figured as free. 
At the same time, as Archidamus intuits, gifts are never free.
The opening scene’s invocation of an unease engendered by hospital-
ity sets the stage for The Winter’s Tale’s meditation on the ways in which 
economic thinking—broadly construed—both subtends and compro-
mises social relations. Economic logic haunts The Winter’s Tale, shaping 
notions of love and service, friendship and fidelity, devotion and grief.3 
And a crucial feature of this staging of a pervasive economic logic is 
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the evocation of an idealized hospitality threatened by social and polit-
ical realities. If Shakespeare dramatizes aggressive, potentially agonis-
tic expenditure in this opening scene, he also flirts throughout the play 
with the possibility of expenditure without exchange, the possibility of 
some true act of hospitality. Shakespeare approaches the paradoxes of 
hospitality from a variety of perspectives in The Winter’s Tale; perhaps 
most consequential is his decision to invoke the notion of grace. A term 
that Shakespeare returned to again and again in his work, grace was a 
remarkably elastic and resonant concept in early modern England gener-
ally and the world of Shakespeare’s plays specifically. In this essay, I am 
concerned with the ways in which the term conjures both classical and 
Christian traditions, and moves across economic, aesthetic, and religious 
registers. Both Luther and Seneca deploy versions of grace to think about 
idealized forms of hospitality and generosity: transcendently harmonious 
social exchange in Seneca, the radically free, divine gift in Luther. In my 
argument, the repeated invocations of grace in The Winter’s Tale link the 
fraught dynamics of giving and hospitality within the drama to the nar-
rative movement from loss to redemption that Shakespeare foregrounds 
in the play’s final acts.
That early modern England theorized hospitality—that it was a culture 
that attempted to think through acts of giving and receiving, charity and 
sacrifice, gratitude and indebtedness—has been well established.4 In the 
limited space of this chapter I can only gesture toward some of the depth 
and complexity of the culture’s reflections on hospitality. My primary focus 
will be Shakespeare’s staging of the logic of hospitality in The Winter’s 
Tale, but in the course of my reading of the play, I turn to a variety of the-
orists of hospitable expenditure—Levinas and Derrida as well as Seneca 
and Luther—in an attempt to understand both why hospitality is such a 
vexed category in early modern thought and why it is so useful to think 
with. My contention is that the early modern desire to theorize hospitality 
and generosity stems, in part, from hospitality’s peculiar position between 
idealized and agonistic relations, between the disavowal of the economic 
and the acknowledgement of the economic as an inescapable horizon. In The 
Winter’s Tale Shakespeare seems particularly interested in exploring the 
notion that hospitality is defined by epistemological uncertainty and by 
the exposure to loss that such uncertainty entails. The tragic events of 
The Winter’s Tale are a consequence of Leontes losing faith in the fidelity 
of his wife, Hermione. Following John Milbank, I read Leontes’s original 
sin as refusing the original gift that Hermione offers, refusing the gift she 
gave when she opened her hand and took his (1.2.102–104).5 The Winter’s 
Tale is a play concerned with hospitality’s risks, risks that require one, as 
Paulina says, to awaken one’s faith. And the uncertainty that haunts hos-
pitable expenditure in The Winter’s Tale works to make that expenditure 
more gratuitous, more akin to pure gift, even as it threatens it with not 
being a gift at all.
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Surely oppression maketh a wise man mad: and a gift destroyeth 
the heart.
—Ecclesiastes 7:76
In the second scene of The Winter’s Tale, we see first Leontes and then 
Hermione attempt to persuade Polixenes to extend his stay as guest, to 
accept more of the hospitality the Sicilians offer. Hermione finally attains 
Polixenes’s consent to remain as guest by changing the terms of the argument:
Force me to keep you as a prisoner,
Not like a guest; so you shall pay your fees
When you depart, and save your thanks. How say you?
My prisoner or my guest?
(1.2.51–54)
If Hermione’s lighthearted banter with Polixenes helps unveil the power 
relations in the guest–host dynamic, she immediately works to remystify 
those relations.7 After she persuades Polixenes to remain as guest, Hermione 
abruptly expresses interest in the kings’ time together as boys:
HERMIONE:  Not your jailer, then,
But your kind hostess. Come, I’ll question you
Of my lord’s tricks and yours when you were boys.
You were pretty lordings then?
POLIXENES:  We were, fair Queen,
Two lads that thought there was no more behind
But such a day tomorrow as today,
And to be boy eternal
 …
We were as twinned lambs that did frisk i’th’ sun,
And bleat the one at th’other; what we changed
Was innocence for innocence—we knew not
The doctrine of ill-doing, nor dreamed
That any did. Had we pursued that life,
And our weak spirits ne’er been higher reared
With stronger blood, we should have answered heaven
Boldly ‘not guilty,’ the imposition cleared
Hereditary ours.
(1.2.58–74)
The famous description of the two monarchs as “twinned lambs that did 
frisk i’th’ sun” gestures toward an origin myth that seems to govern symbolic 
relations between Bohemia and Sicilia. In the opening scene Camillo objected 
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to Archidamus’s fear of overwhelming debt by citing the extraordinary child-
hood friendship of Leontes and Polixenes as evidence that the Bohemians’ 
fears were groundless. Here, Hermione invokes this narrative for the same 
reason that Camillo did in the previous scene: to maintain the view that the 
hospitality offered is given freely. As Camillo says, because of this origin myth, 
“Sicilia cannot show himself over-kind to Bohemia.” Given that The Winter’s 
Tale transforms hospitality into madness and tragedy, it is significant that, at 
the outset of the play, the hospitality of Sicilia toward Bohemia is consistently 
framed in relation to an impossible ideal: the kings’ boyhood friendship.
The myth of the twinned lambs suggests a fundamental openness to the 
other person that evokes the primary human relation at the heart of Emmanuel 
Levinas’s thought.8 Ethics is, famously, first philosophy for Levinas, and eth-
ics is a function of an encounter with the other that Levinas often character-
izes as, or in relation to, hospitality. In Totality and Infinity—which Jacques 
Derrida identified as “an immense treatise of hospitality”9—Levinas devotes 
a section to “Dwelling” in which he suggests that hospitality is constitutive of 
dwelling, which is in turn constitutive of the human subject.10 For Levinas, 
the phenomenon of human dwelling is defined by the potential to receive the 
guest, by the prospect of the hospitable act: “The possibility for the home to 
Open to the Other is as essential to the essence of the home as closed doors 
and windows.”11 Home and dwelling are engendered by the hospitality they 
potentially afford.12 Given that in Shakespeare’s Sicilia an idealized hospital-
ity is grounded in the origin myth of the “two lads” who were “boy eternal,” 
one might imagine that the conceptual space that  Shakespeare’s “twinned 
lambs” inhabit is proximate to Levinasian dwelling, that the myth of the 
twinned lambs describes a Levinasian encounter in which an absolute open-
ness to the other constitutes the subject as ethical relation. I contend rather 
that Polixenes’s description suggests a less well-known conceptual turn in 
Levinas’s thought: his critique of the “intimate society.”
Levinas is known as the philosopher of infinite obligation, a proponent of 
an absolute hospitality in which the self is hostage to the other. While impos-
sible demands are at the heart of Levinas’s thought, it must be remembered 
that the Levinasian demand is always situated in relation to the concrete 
situation in which we find ourselves; ethics, obligation, and hospitality are, 
for Levinas, always of this world. In an important essay that he published in 
the run-up to Totality and Infinity, Levinas offers a critique of what he calls 
the “intimate society,” which is
a society of beings that are totally present to each other … Such a truly 
intimate society is in its autarchy quite like the false totality of the ego. 
In fact, such a society is dual, a society of me and you. We are just 
among ourselves. Third parties are excluded.13
The model of the intimate society is the relation of lovers, the couple. It might 
seem strange for Levinas, the philosopher of the ethical relation, to critique 
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any iteration of the love relation, but for Levinas this kind of love does not 
contain “social reality” since society “inevitably involves the existence of a 
third party.”14 To love in this way “is to exist as though the lover and the 
beloved were alone in the world.” In the “intimate society” the “intersubjective 
relationship of love is not the beginning, but the negation of society … The 
society formed by love is a dual society, a society of solitudes, excluding 
universality.”15 The emphasis on universality and a third person outside the 
intimate society is significant here in that this is the essay in which Levinas 
introduces his concept of le tiers (the third), the third party that frames 
and infinitely complicates the encounter between self and other. The  figure 
of the third extends the self-other relation outward toward the social and 
the political and toward affective economies and ethical calculations.16 
Crucially, the intersubjective arena opened up by the third points to a con-
ception of the endlessly compromised space of human relations and to the 
endless acts of mediation (formal, aesthetic, economic) that constitute that 
space. If hospitality, for Levinas, is an uncompromising demand, it is also an 
inescapably compromised form of social, political, and economic life.
As The Winter’s Tale opens, we are already in the space of Levinas’s le 
tiers. If in the idyllic childhood friendship of the two kings Shakespeare 
offers us a vision of a relation before or beyond mere exchange, a vision that 
evokes hospitality outside economy, we learn that the two kings currently 
live in a world where friendly relations are necessarily mediated by political 
and economic realities and by the protocols of diplomacy and hospitality. 
As mentioned earlier, when Camillo objects to Archidamus’s articulation of 
the social debt incurred by the Bohemians in the opening scene, he cites the 
extraordinary childhood friendship of Leontes and Polixenes:
Sicilia cannot show himself over-kind to Bohemia. They were trained 
together in their childhoods, and there rooted betwixt them then such 
an affection which cannot choose but branch now. Since their more 
mature dignities and royal necessities made separation of their society, 
their encounters, though not personal, hath been royally attorneyed 
with interchange of gifts, letters, loving embassies, that they have 
seemed to be together, though absent, shook hands as over a vast, and 
embraced as it were from the ends of opposed winds. The heavens 
continue their loves. (1.1.20–30)
Camillo’s desire to affirm the continued attachment of Leontes and Polixenes 
serves to highlight the loss of that bond. If the nostalgic tale of the kings’ 
childhood relationship creates a mythical place without economy, their 
affection, rooted in childhood, must of necessity “branch” with maturation. 
In an attempt to overcome the division caused by this branching, their rela-
tion is “attorneyed” via “gifts, letters, loving embassies.” However much 
Camillo wants to mystify the exchanges that define this relation between 
states, these royal proxies serve to emphasize distance and difference.
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Hermione herself becomes a form of hospitable mediation, commanded 
by her king to “speak” on behalf of Sicilia (1.2.27).17 Polixenes, of course, 
agrees to stay at the “good Queen’s entreaty” when Leontes’s “petitions” 
had no effect, a fact that seems to precipitate Leontes’s mania (1.2.217, 212). 
In a provocative essay, Howard Felperin entertains the counterintuitive 
argument that Hermione may have in fact been unfaithful. While I will not 
address Felperin’s bracing act of critical intervention here, I do wish to take 
up Felperin’s larger point about linguistic indeterminacy and epistemologi-
cal uncertainty:
Why do we take for granted, as if it were a fact of nature, what can 
never be proved but only denied: that a king’s wife has not had an 
affair with his best friend and nine months later given birth to an ille-
gitimate daughter? How can we know that what has not been shown 
has not happened? In reaching the conclusion that we have unani-
mously reached as critics of the play, we have proceeded, indeed, been 
forced to proceed, in the absence of ocular or empirical proof, for how 
could there be ocular proof of what has not taken place?18
Felperin’s point seems indisputable: the audience, like Leontes, can never 
truly know. The initial plot of The Winter’s Tale is shaped by a tyrannical 
desire for certain knowledge running up against the inescapable reality of 
epistemological uncertainty.19 And throughout the play Shakespeare seems 
interested in addressing uncertainty in relation to the inherent risks of hos-
pitality, which are also the risks of Levinasian ethics: to offer oneself, to 
expose oneself to the other.
The desire to know the other completely, the desire for certainty in rela-
tion to the other, is at the heart of Levinas’s critique of the intimate society. 
In the intimacy of a love relation where “the presence of the other exhausts 
the content of … society,” the “affective warmth of love brings about the 
consciousness of … satisfaction, contentment, plenitude.” Against this 
self-satisfied and risk-free society, Levinas describes a form of love shaped 
by “universality,” in which the third is present and all the messy realities 
of social, economic, and political life intrude. Crucially, the “universality 
of love,” which embraces change and uncertainty, “can only be built up in 
time, by means of successive infidelities … by the change of friends.” 
Levinasian hospitality is then always a form of infidelity and a form of 
injustice (“the love of the neighbor depends on chance proximity; it is hence 
love of one being to the detriment of another, always privilege even if it is 
not preference”20), but it is only in a relation where infidelity and injustice 
are possible that we can ever hope to arrive at something approaching jus-
tice or fidelity. There is an unresolved and unresolvable tension at the heart 
of Levinas’s conception of hospitality, which points in two directions simul-
taneously. Levinasian hospitality is both infinitely demanding (and, there-
fore, impossible) and humble, fallen, always already compromised, always 
Hospitality’s Risk, Grace’s Bargain 95
already mediated by language, politics, economics, the inescapable reali-
ties of the social world.21 Moreover, Levinasian hospitality is faithful to 
the demand of the other and is, therefore, constituted by a series of 
 infidelities.22 In its opening scenes, The Winter’s Tale stages the essential 
problematic of Levinasian hospitality by pitting the desire for some realm 
of true hospitality beyond the merely economic (twinned lambs, intimate 
societies) against the fallen and messy reality of hospitality. In doing so, it 
sets the stage both for the tragic losses that follow and for the possibility of 
some sort of redemption.
“Take Hands, a Bargain”
time and chance happeneth to them all.
—Ecclesiastes 9:11, KJV
Polixenes’s story of original innocence implies a fall. Prompted by Hermione’s 
intimation that the “pretty lordlings” have “tripped since,” Polixenes impli-
cates the two queens in this fall by suggesting that they tempted the mon-
archs out of their state of innocence and away from each other (1.2.75). 
Hermione interrupts his misogynist argument before it can go any farther:
 Grace to boot!
Of this make no conclusion, lest you say
Your queen and I are devils.
(1.2.79–81)
“Grace to boot” is a curious exclamation in this context. Often used as an 
interjection like “Heaven help us,” the phrase here takes the playful form of 
a prayer for intercession.23 And as Stephen Orgel notes, “to boot” is idiom-
atic for “into the bargain,” and so Hermione would appear to be saying that 
“(you pay me) compliments in addition.”24 Hermione seems to be acerbi-
cally thanking Polixenes for this unlooked-for gift even as she playfully calls 
for divine aid in response to his misogynistic suggestion. And if grace has 
been thrown into the bargain, then perhaps Polixenes’s narrative of a fall 
is—or can be rewritten as—a happy one.
Readers and audiences have long understood that grace is a significant 
concept in The Winter’s Tale. Forms of the word occur thirty times within 
the text of the play, and in its audacious endgame the play seems interested 
in exploring the possibility of a return to some sort of grace after horrific 
crimes and devastating losses.25 Here, it seems significant that the term 
enters the play at Polixenes’s mention of a fall from innocence. Without the 
fall, of course, there is no need for redeeming grace. Polixenes would attri-
bute the death of innocence to the temptations of women, but Hermione 
playfully tells him to “make no conclusion, lest” he imply that “Your queen 
and I are devils” (1.2.80–81). Her interjection—“Grace to boot! / Of this 
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make no conclusion”—is an intervention that rewrites this tragic fall into 
a comic felix culpa by resisting closure, by insisting that the story is not 
yet over. In a play that dramatizes despair as stasis and seems to celebrate 
fulfillment through time, Hermione’s joke might be that the compensation 
(knowledge of women, sexual maturity, genealogical reproduction) is a 
greater good than the paradise allegedly lost. The movement from inno-
cence to experience would then not simply initiate the circular process of 
exchange but would offer to engender what Paulina later calls “a surplus 
of … grace” (5.3.7) that would move mere repetition into a new stage of 
possibility.
In response to Polixenes’s attempt to paint the two queens as serpents 
seducing the two youths away from innocence, Hermione claims that she 
and her Bohemian counterpart will answer “Th’offences we have made you 
do” (1.2.82). Before she can continue this exchange with Polixenes, however, 
Leontes intervenes to ask if his fellow king is “won yet” (1.2.85). When he 
finds that Hermione has persuaded Polixenes to stay, Leontes says that she 
has never spoken “to better purpose” or, as he clarifies, “Never but once” 
(1.2.88). Hermione’s witty response to this strange claim is also, I suggest, 
her answer to Polixenes’s misogynist accusation:
What, have I twice said well? When was’t before?
I prithee tell me
…
My last good deed was to entreat his stay.
What was my first? It has an elder sister,
Or I mistake you—O, would her name were Grace!
But once before I spoke to th’ purpose? When?
Nay, let me hav’t—I long.
(1.2.89–100)
Hermione here transforms the speech act to which Leontes refers (“Never 
but once” [1.2.88]) into a kind of original good deed. When Leontes reveals 
that this first instance of speaking well is—as Hermione and the audience 
intuit—her declaration of love for him, the audience sees how Hermione has 
skillfully positioned Leontes to answer Polixenes’s charge. What Polixenes 
would claim as an original sin and fall from innocence—temptation of her 
future husband, here revealed as acquiescence to that husband’s desire—
Leontes names a first good deed. Hermione playfully hopes that this first 
good deed—elder sister to her more recent example of virtuous speaking—
might be named “Grace.” And when Leontes names the first good deed for 
her, Hermione exclaims “’Tis grace indeed” (1.2.104).
Hermione’s reference to a Grace as an elder sister seems to mix registers, 
moving us from an anachronistic Christian narrative of a fall that allows for 
redemptive grace to the figures of the Graces from classical antiquity. Seneca 
offers an allegory of the Three Graces at the outset of his De Beneficiis. 
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Begging the reader’s indulgence, he offers to articulate the “force and property” 
of kindnesses, of doing “good turns,” by explaining
why there be three Graces, why they be sisters, and why they go hand 
in hand: why they look smiling, why they be young, and why they 
be maids … Some would have it meant thereby, that the one of them 
bestoweth the good turn the other receiveth it, and the third requiteth it … 
Why walks that knot in roundel hand in hand? It is in this respect, that a 
good turn passing orderly from hand to hand, doth nevertheless return to 
the giver: and the grace of the whole is marred, if it be anywhere broken 
off but is most beautiful, if it continue together and keep his course … 
Young they be, because the remembrance of good turns must never wax 
old. Virgins they be, because benefits must be without soil, pure, and holy 
to all men, wherein there ought to be no bondage nor constraint.26
In Seneca’s vision of the graces, they establish the ideal of exchange as a 
beautiful dance in which benefits move from hand to hand in an unbroken 
circle that continues to come back around, so that giver and recipient are 
indistinguishable. In the midst of the circular dance, there is no hierarchy or 
originary moment, only the always already of harmonious exchange, pure 
and open, transparent and smiling. Seneca’s vision of the Graces pushes in 
two directions at once. On the one hand, the image of harmonious move-
ment offers a vision of expenditure and exchange that is social, human, an 
image not of stasis but of movement in time. On the other hand, the dance 
of the Graces suggests a perfection that evokes the divine, the inhuman.
One of antiquity’s most sustained considerations of hospitable exchange, 
gift-giving, and the conferring of benefits, Seneca’s treatise is fundamentally 
social and anthropological in perspective, anticipating not only Mauss’s 
anthropology of the gift but also much modern thought on hospitality. And 
De Beneficiis is fundamentally concerned with the ways in which an act of 
generosity or hospitality can become an act of hostility or a source of resent-
ment.27 If there is an idealizing thrust to Seneca’s text, the fundamental ques-
tion that Seneca pursues in the treatise is how to arrive at an idealized form of 
social exchange when everywhere he looks he sees hierarchical relations, debt, 
and ingratitude.28 Indeed, it is never precisely clear that Seneca believes that a 
pure exchange—however desirable and however useful as a desire—is possi-
ble. He suggests that in giving without concern for return or recompense, we 
should seek to resemble the gods: “[a]gain, the Gods immortal are not driven 
from their needful lavishness, though men be wicked and without regard of 
them. They use their own Nature, and bear with the wicked: yea, and they 
do good even to those that abuse their gifts. Let us then follow them for our 
guides, so much as man’s frailty affordeth.”29 This resemblance can only ever 
be partial; in giving we imitate the gods to the extent that our all too human 
weakness allows, “so much as man’s frailty affordeth.” Hospitality is always 
compromised; we offer what we—as humans—can afford to offer.
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In Christian terms Seneca’s hospitality is fallen; unfolding within time, 
it is future-oriented, necessarily uncertain. If Seneca’s reading of the three 
graces dresses up giving and hospitality in a vision of the possibility of 
social harmony through movement and difference, through a happy and 
pure exchange, then the image of the childhood friendship of Leontes and 
Polixenes is an image of an eternal present, fixed and timeless: “Two lads 
that thought there was no more behind / But such a day tomorrow as 
today, / And to be boy eternal” (1.2.62–64). The myth is then an idealized 
vision of social relations not simply outside the political and the economic, 
but, crucially, outside time and change. The play itself, however, is firmly 
situated within time’s (or Time’s) dominion, a domain in which acts of hos-
pitality open onto the future and are thus full of risk. As an image of stasis 
in which there is no threat or exposure and no possibility of movement or 
change, the childhood paradise is, in a sense, the mirror image of the grieving 
Leontes that Time presents to the audience. With the power to “o’erthrow 
law” and to “o’erwhelm custom,” Time “slide[s]” over “sixteen years” as if 
the audience “had slept between” (4.1.5–17). And it seems that Leontes has 
remained fixed in the posture of grief for those sixteen years: “Th’ effects of 
his fond jealousies so grieving / That he shuts up himself” (4.1.18–19). 
In Time’s brief description, Leontes becomes an emblem of grief; and the 
frozen, seemingly timeless grief of Leontes finds its objective correlative in 
the statue of Hermione. In The Winter’s Tale Shakespeare gives us stasis as 
paradise in the childhood friendship of Leontes and Polixenes and stasis 
as hell or purgatory in the grief of Leontes and Hermione, but time and 
change ultimately come for and overwhelm both. The perfection of stasis 
(good or bad) gives way to compromise and mediation as these static figures 
fall into social life and cycles of exchange.
In the narrative that Polixenes offers to explain the fall from innocence 
to experience, the original, idyllic stasis is broken by desire and the risk that 
desire engenders. When Hermione asks when she first spoke well, Leontes’s 
response frames her acceptance of his love within a scene of risk, the risk of 
holding out one’s hand to another:
  Why, that was when
Three crabbèd months had soured themselves to death
Ere I could make thee open thy white hand
And clap thyself my love; then didst thou utter
‘I am yours for ever.’
(1.2.100–104)
To “clap thyself my love” is to take the loved one’s hand, but it also 
suggests the striking of a bargain. The Oxford English Dictionary offers 
the relevant definition of clap: “to strike (hands) reciprocally in token 
of a bargain.”30 Later in the play, the Old Shepherd attempts to give his 
“ daughter” Perdita to Florizel by suggesting they clap, or take, hands: 
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“Take hands, a bargain; / And friends unknown, you shall bear witness 
to’t– / I give my daughter to him” (4.4.378–380). By offering and taking 
hands, Hermione and Leontes begin a dance that is not a pure exchange 
outside of time but a series of compromised exchanges—bargains—
within time’s dominion. As that which overthrows law and custom, 
Shakespeare’s Time, however, mocks lovers’ claims to transcend time 
through the gift of self. Leontes’s account of Hermione’s gift—“‘I  am 
yours for ever’”—has an ominous ring precisely at this moment in the 
play, when Leontes begins to lose faith in the gift he has been given. 
However true the giving of self might seem, however strong one’s faith, 
in time it can always turn to poison. The fall out of innocence and into 
love’s hand is both risk and bargain, a fall into the world of time and 
exchange that holds out the promise of surplus grace even as it threatens 
irredeemable loss.
In a discussion of the relation of Christian thought to the philosophical tra-
dition’s conception of moral luck, the contemporary theologian John Milbank 
addresses the central crime of The Winter’s Tale—Leontes’s lack of faith—as 
a version of the fall of man. For Milbank The Winter’s Tale is a particularly 
useful story of the fall because it posits a prefallen state that “understands 
original blessedness by implication, not as deliberately ‘doing good’ but as a 
state of good moral luck, or reception of grace.” On this account, original sin 
must then mean some kind of “refusal” of this moral luck,
a refusal that commences in the suspicion that one does not, after 
all, receive a good gift from the other. This is articulated better 
by Shakespeare than by Genesis: in The Winter’s Tale … [the fall] 
involves not a first misdeed by Leontes, but rather a first suspicion that 
Hermione has committed the sin of adultery. Here the fall is not an act, 
but rather a first mistrusting of the joyfully confident ‘risk’ and uncer-
tainty constitutive of the field of action … Hence, ‘original sin,’ on this 
rendering, is the imagination of sin, the reading of the unknown as 
source of threat or poison rather than potential or gift.31
While I ultimately part ways with Milbank in both his reading of The Winter’s 
Tale and his understanding of the gift, this notion—that the original sin 
of The Winter’s Tale is Leontes’s failure to accept his state of moral luck 
or grace, his failure to accept the gift given—is crucial for my reading of 
the play. I follow Milbank in reading Leontes’s original sin as refusing the 
original gift that Hermione offered when she opened her hand and took 
his (1.2.102–104). If Shakespeare seems particularly interested in exploring 
the notion of hospitality as risk in The Winter’s Tale, these risks are more 
often than not simple, commonplace: opening one’s home to a friend, offer-
ing one’s hand to a lover or to a guest. Moreover, as the protracted stay of 
Polixenes suggests, the risk of such exposure persists over time. Leontes’s story, 
I argue, is a story about the possibility of risking and sustaining faith in the 
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gift given. And it is precisely Leontes’s pathological certainty—a rejection of 
the uncertainty and risk that faith in another entails—that sets in motion the 
tragic events of the first three acts.
Designing Hospitality, offering Impossibility
Present good is not yet altogether complete, some mischance may 
interrupt it; the future is in suspense, and uncertain.
—Seneca, De Beneficiis 3:432
It is often noted that the final scene of The Winter’s Tale ostentatiously and 
anachronistically imports a cluster of Christian concepts into a play that 
is ostensibly set in pagan antiquity. The pervasive religious and  Christian 
language—“chapel,” “grace,” “faith,” “redeems,” etc.—suggests that the 
audience is meant to experience this “resurrection” scene as somehow 
related to Christian thought. Even Paulina’s name directs the audience to a 
Christian reading of the scene. It is less often noted that this final scene, like 
the opening of the play and the sheep-shearing festival, is explicitly a scene 
of hospitality.33 For the first time in the play, Leontes—who had so dishon-
ored the office of host—is a guest.
The scene opens as the play does, with a discussion of hospitality and 
inordinate debt:
LEONTES:  O grave and good Paulina, the great comfort
 That I have had of thee!
PAULINA:  What, sovereign sir,
 I did not well I meant well; all my services
 You have paid home. But that you have vouchsafed,
 With your crowned brother and these your contracted
 Heirs of your kingdoms, my poor house to visit,
 It is a surplus of your grace which never
 My life may last to answer.
LEONTES:  O Paulina,
 We honour you with trouble; but we came
 To see the statue of our Queen.
(5.3.1–10)
Paulina suggests that their relation is both economical and equitable; she 
not only has done good works in his service but has intended good, while 
he has paid her in full (“paid home”). She then suggests that the honor of 
receiving these royal visitors “is a surplus of your grace which never / My 
life may last to answer.” These lines echo Polixenes’s claim that  Leontes’s hos-
pitality has placed him in perpetual debt. Here, Paulina reverses the terms, 
however, suggesting that she is indebted to Leontes for deigning to be 
her guest. In a characteristic move, Paulina has adroitly introduced the 
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idea that she is offering hospitality to Leontes while seeming to suggest the 
reverse. Leontes dismisses this notion by observing that her guests “honour” 
Paulina “with trouble,” another echo of Polixenes, who was concerned that 
the “charge and trouble” of his extended stay placed him in Leontes’s debt. 
The echoes of the opening scenes give the audience the sense of coming full 
circle, of revisiting the scene of the original sin against hospitality.
If Paulina refers to the setting of the final scene as a “chapel,” Leontes 
refers to it as a “gallery,” a gallery filled with rare and wondrous objects 
(“singularities”), objects that Paulina evidently owns (5.3.86, 10, 12). And 
there is a curious moment when Paulina makes a point of claiming owner-
ship of the statue of Hermione as well:
  Indeed, my lord,
If I had thought the sight of my poor image
Would thus have wrought you—for the stone is mine—
I’d not have showed it.
She moves to draw the curtain
(5.3.56–59)
Paulina gives, and Paulina can take away. In this scene Paulina first estab-
lishes that Leontes is a guest in “my poor house” (note the proprietary claim) 
and then that the statue is her gift to bestow as she wills (5.3.6). Paulina—
and by extension Shakespeare—takes great pains to stage this return within 
a scene of hospitality, to stage this resurrection as a gift. The question will 
be whether Leontes can accept the hospitality offered.
In the dramatic scene Paulina is staging, Leontes—who failed to have 
faith in the other, who failed to accept his own good fortune, the gifts he 
was given, who read his state of grace as fallen—must now accept the gift, 
the surplus of grace, Paulina offers. And it is a gift of a very particular kind: 
the kind of gift that, evidently, can only be received through an act of faith. 
As Paulina says, “It is required / You do awake your faith” (5.3.94–95). This 
is a more curious requirement than is often observed. Here, we have the 
inverse of doubting Thomas. Thomas refused to believe until he could see 
and touch, thereby becoming an emblem of the lack of proper faith. Paulina, 
in contrast, asks Leontes and the gathered nobles, as well as the audience, 
to perform an act of faith that requires no leap; she charges her audience to 
have faith precisely in what they see and touch, what is tangibly before 
them. We are enjoined to accept the scene as framed, as given, and we are 
told that this requires an act of faith. Crucially, Paulina is not asking us to 
believe in the possibility or plausibility of Hermione’s return; on the con-
trary, she is insisting that we believe in it as we would something impossible. 
The language of faith here works to evoke the miraculous, the impossible.
If Seneca’s De Beneficiis helped early modern culture theorize agonistic 
gifts and hospitable exchange, Luther was early modernity’s great theorist 
of the possibility or impossibility of accepting the gift given.34 In elaborating 
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his historically crucial understanding of grace, Luther theorizes the radically 
free gift, the impossible or unthinkable gift. Luther’s somewhat alien and 
alienating conception of grace was available to readers of English in the 
early modern period primarily in the form of his Commentary on Galatians.35 
And in his labored attempts to articulate his fraught understanding of righ-
teousness and justification, works and faith, Luther consistently wrestles 
with the impossibility of thinking the free gift of grace. In the  Commentary 
on Galatians, Luther suggests that “it is impossible for the human mind” to 
comprehend that God’s grace is free.36 Since we are subject to “human weak-
ness and misery” and faced with “the terrors of conscience,” we conceive 
“nothing except our own works, our worthiness, and the Law.” Because of 
this human weakness, “it is impossible for the human mind to conceive any 
comfort of itself, or to look only at grace amid its consciousness and terror 
of sin, or consistently to reject all discussion of works.” And for Luther, the 
problem is that fallen man cannot break out of habituated logics of eco-
nomic exchange; to escape the pull of economic logic long enough to under-
stand the radically free nature of God’s grace is simply “beyond human 
power and thought.”37 Both Seneca and Luther figure a pure act of giving, 
a pure hospitality as otherworldly or inhuman: an ideal, a desideratum, a 
consummation devoutly to be wished, but only possible “so much as man’s 
frailty affordeth.”
Luther’s conception of grace in Commentary on Galatians anticipates 
Derrida’s understanding of the gift in certain respects. Addressing the 
paradox of the gift, Derrida insists that the gift is only possible as gift if 
it is free:
For there to be gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, 
countergift, or debt. If the other gives me back or owes me or has to 
give me back what I give him or her, there will not have been a gift, 
whether this restitution is immediate or whether it is programmed by 
a complex calculation of a long-term deferral.38
At the same time, the gift is always and inevitably implicated in some sort of 
exchange. The gift always calls into being some kind of debt and payment, 
even if the debt is merely the expectation of gratitude from the recipient and 
the payment the self-congratulatory feelings of the donor. The giving of the 
gift is always, and indeed must be, thought of as aneconomic, and yet once 
the gift is recognized as gift it immediately enters the circle of exchange, 
the logic of the economic. Analyzing the paradoxes of the gift, Derrida pro-
poses that the gift is impossible.39 The gift figures the impossible for Derrida 
just as, for Luther, it approaches the unthinkable. If Luther keeps insisting 
that reason cannot help us understand the gift, however, he also suggests 
that reason can and must point us to this very problem. In other words, in 
Luther’s account—as in Derrida’s—the only way for fallen man to think 
the gift is to think of it as impossible. For Luther this means that the proper 
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understanding of the gift of God’s grace can only be realized through the gift 
of God’s grace.40 And to accept that gift, one must have faith.
The Winter’s Tale offers us two fundamental readings of the statue scene: 
a faith-based reading that accepts the miraculous transformation in the 
statue and the resurrection of Hermione at face value; and a skeptical read-
ing that views Paulina as the master of ceremonies at an elaborate—and 
really quite strange—deception. By requesting that Leontes and the audi-
ence awaken their faith, Hermione makes the request that every dramatist 
makes: that the audience accept the miracle of transformation and resurrec-
tion without looking too closely at the man or woman behind the curtain.41 
The scene makes explicit what the theater demands of its audience: that we 
simultaneously suspend our disbelief and remain aware that we are under 
the spell of artifice. And in presenting the statue in the way that she does, 
Paulina offers what the theater so often offers: the gift of wonder, the gift 
of the impossible. To awaken one’s faith is to accept Hermione’s return as 
a deus ex machina, a manifestation of the impossible (God, gift) that is—
perhaps—always necessarily a bit of theater. And here the insistent articu-
lation of an aesthetic realm in the scene—with its galleries and statues and 
singularities, with its evocation of “that rare Italian master Giulio Romano” 
(5.2.95)—establishes an artistic frame, establishes a theatrical design. The 
invocation of the aesthetic cues the audience to see the design at hand and 
perhaps to understand the ways in which hospitality is always a function of 
design, the ways in which hospitality always has designs on us.
And it is my argument that Paulina offers the impossible because this is a 
way for her to offer the gift of Hermione’s return or resurrection freely. She 
must awaken the faith of Leontes specifically, precisely so that he can under-
stand how to accept this free gift. For Luther, it is virtually “beyond human 
power and thought” to accept a gift as gift, outside of a logic of exchange, 
credit and debt, reward and punishment. For Leontes to awaken his faith in 
this context is to accept the impossible (Hermione’s resurrection) and therefore 
accept the gift as gift. And if this is a miracle, then Leontes need not inquire 
into the intentions of Paulina and Hermione, need not weigh his sixteen years 
of loss and suffering against the recompense he receives, need not think in 
terms of debt and payment, sin and its forgiveness. If this is a miracle, then the 
erstwhile tyrant of Sicilia need not dwell too long on the “many / A prayer” 
he has offered “in vain … upon her grave” (5.3.140–141).  Paulina’s hos-
pitable design attempts to move the play toward reconciliation and harmony, 
to be sure, but it must also be read as an attempt to manage and secure 
Hermione’s safe return to the social and political life of Sicilia. Given the 
fraught history the play recounts, such a return is necessarily hazardous.
The play’s endgame is, of course, often read in terms of forgiveness and 
absolution.42 One way to read the “miracle” of this scene is that Leontes 
receives forgiveness for his seemingly unforgivable crimes. And, this would 
dovetail with a Derridean reading of giving and forgiveness since for 
Derrida it is precisely the unforgivable crime that occasions the possibility 
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of true forgiveness.43 Here, however, I return to Levinas who rejects a notion 
of some absolute forgiveness in this world—not because it is impossible as 
Derrida would argue—but because it is undesirable.44 In Levinas’s critique 
of the “intimate society,” he takes special aim at a certain kind of forgiveness 
or absolution, what he calls “pardon”:
pardon presupposes, above all, that the one wronged received all the 
evil of the wrong, and consequently disposes completely of the right 
to pardon … But the conditions for legitimate pardon are only real-
ized in a society of beings that are totally present to each other, in an 
intimate society.45
Levinas here critiques the fantasy of absolute pardon, a fantasy of forgive-
ness as something apart from political life and justice, a self-contained abso-
lution that only implicates and concerns the benefactor and the beneficiary. 
For Levinas this absolute pardon and the kind of love-relation from which 
it derives participate in a totalizing logic that cordons off what Levinas calls 
“social reality.”46 The intimate society recreates Leontes’s mad solipsism in 
binary form; here, we have the tyranny of the closed society. And it remains 
tyranny unless and until it welcomes the Levinasian third (le tiers), which 
ushers in the complex and confounding realities of political and economic 
life.47 In Levinasian terms the conception of forgiveness implied by a reading 
in which Hermione simply pardons Leontes is impoverished and dangerous, 
recapitulating the totalizing and tyrannical logic that helped lead Leontes to 
his crimes. And as Julia Reinhard Lupton reminds us, we see no such act of 
forgiveness in The Winter’s Tale: Hermione never speaks to Leontes in the 
final “miraculous” scene, never addresses the possibility of forgiveness.48
The statue scene offers restoration as rebirth, with Paulina serving as 
midwife as Hermione is reborn into the social. And I contend that the stag-
ing of this return serves as an invitation to Leontes as well: Paulina’s theat-
rical event solicits Leontes to reenter the world, to leave behind the static 
posture of penitence he has held for seventeen years and return from the 
dead, not because he has atoned sufficiently, but because forgiveness and 
justice unfold in the space of the political and the economic (what Levinas 
calls the space of the third) and through the experiential time of lives lived 
together. Forgiveness and justice are a function of the social world, which 
is a world of uncertainty and hazard. Through her elaborate hospitality, 
Paulina does not offer absolution but attempts to create the necessary con-
ditions for rapprochement and reconciliation. When the statue “stirs” and 
Hermione descends, Paulina tells Leontes to present his hand as he did when 
Hermione “was young” and he “wooed her” (5.3.103–108). This is a reprise 
of that very first time Hermione spoke “well” in Leontes’s account of their 
lives together, when she opened her hand to him and said “I am yours 
forever” (1.2.89–104). The gift offered is not forgiveness but the invitation 
to rejoin the world of time and change, risk and hope.
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Of course, if the gift is impossible, we cannot expect that Paulina’s hos-
pitable design, her attempt to create the conditions for some true act of 
hospitality, necessarily works. Critics often want to insist that this scene 
either succeeds in eliciting a kind of sublime wonder and thereby success-
fully figures redemption or that it fails to do so. I side with those critics 
who read this scene as, on the contrary, founded upon uncertainty.49 The 
invocation to faith calls forth the possibility of both belief and skepticism, 
and skepticism leads to inquiry, leads to narrative, leads to accounts and 
taking into account. The play keeps returning to questions of epistemology, 
keeps asking “How do you know?” And as Cavell writes, “an answer to 
the question ‘How do you know?’ is provided by specifying how you can 
tell.” In Cavell’s account “telling” pertains to the play’s interest not only in 
tales, in relating and recounting, but in counting, “its preoccupation with 
computation” and exchange. 50 And when the statue of Hermione comes to 
life, the spectators want her to speak, to give an account of herself. Camillo 
exclaims, “If she pertain to life, let her speak too!”; to which Polixenes 
adds, “Ay, and make it manifest where she has lived, / Or how stol’n from 
the dead” (5.3.113–115). Wanting this bizarre scene to add up, Polixenes 
asks for an account of the missing years, the gap in the story, the deficit in 
the narrative. But Hermione is not yet speaking, and Paulina isn’t telling. 
In fact, Paulina short-circuits Polixenes’s request for narrative, his request 
for knowledge, by suggesting that any such telling would be dismissed as a 
tale: “That she is living, / Were it but told you, should be hooted at / Like an 
old tale” (5.3.115–117). Paulina here thwarts Polixenes’s potentially skep-
tical inquiry by suggesting that the skepticism that such a tale threatens to 
provoke precludes its being told.
When Hermione does speak, however, she not only begins to make an 
account of herself, but she figures that account as an exchange. Speaking 
for the first and only time in the scene, Hermione addresses her daughter, 
Perdita:
  Tell me, mine own,
Where hast thou been preserved, where lived, how found
Thy father’s court? For thou shalt hear that I,
Knowing by Paulina that the oracle
Gave hope thou wast in being, have preserved
Myself to see the issue.
(5.3.123–128)
Here again Paulina intervenes:
  There’s time enough for that,
Lest they desire upon this push to trouble
Your joys with like relation.
(5.3.128–130)
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Many editors and critics gloss Paulina’s response to mean that Hermione 
should forbear recounting her narrative for fear that at this critical moment 
the assembled observers should wish to interrupt this joyful reunion 
with their stories, their narratives.51 But I read the potential troubling of 
joys that concerns Paulina as arising from the assembled group demanding 
“like  relation”—“Where hast thou been preserved, where lived?”—from 
 Hermione. Dramatically, Paulina is thwarting the expectations of the audi-
ence, onstage and off, interrupting the relation that we all want to hear. 
Neither Paulina nor her various audiences are concerned with these other 
stories, other narratives. We are concerned with Hermione’s story, a story 
that threatens to undermine, indeed has already begun to undermine, the 
scene that Paulina is setting, the hospitality she is offering. In my reading, 
Paulina puts a stop to this exchange of tales because such an exchange 
will lead to what the audience on a certain level wants: a general giving of 
accounts, a weighing and measuring of suffering and loss that might very 
well lead to resentment and gifts repudiated. And, as it happens, the play 
ends with the promise or threat of just such an exchange.
In the final lines of the play, Leontes asks—or commands—his hostess to 
take them away from this gallery of miraculous hospitality, this chapel of 
impossible gifts:
  Good Paulina,
Lead us from hence, where we may leisurely
Each one demand an answer to his part
Performed in this wide gap of time since first
We were dissevered. Hastily lead away.
(5.3.151–155)
If this proposed telling of tales promises a leisurely swapping of narrative 
gifts in a potentially idyllic moment of exchange that would bring together 
that which was dissevered, it also jeopardizes Paulina’s carefully staged rec-
onciliation with a hasty movement toward demands and answers, demands 
for answers, a general reckoning, a settling of accounts, which might very 
well poison the hospitality offered. The play then comes full circle, culmi-
nating not in redemptive closure but in deferral and dilation, in risk and 
possibility. If Leontes’s story is, as I have argued, a story about the possibility 
of accepting, and maintaining faith in, the gift given, then his story does not 
come to an end with the end of the play. Paulina has attempted to create the 
conditions for a true act of hospitality, for a gift to be given and received, 
but the future, as always, remains uncertain. This is not to advocate a skep-
tical reading of the final scene of The Winter’s Tale. My contention is rather 
that skepticism is simply a necessary condition of Paulina’s gift—indeed, of 
all gifts—and one that haunts its future reception as well as its prove-
nance. If the impossibility of the statue scene was invoked by Paulina’s dra-
matic and theatrical hospitality, the gift of the impossible was never simply 
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Paulina’s to give. The potential marvel, rather, lies in the possibility of Leontes 
accepting.52 The wondrous turn the play hints at—but will not commit to—
would be for Leontes to accept the cup offered, to drink and, for once, not 
to look for the spider.
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5 Hospitality in Anthony and 
Cleopatra
Sean Lawrence
If we are to believe Enobarbus, the title characters of William Shakespeare’s 
Anthony and Cleopatra initiate their relationship with dueling offers of 
hospitality:
Upon her landing, Anthony sent to her,
Invited her to supper. She replied,
It should be better he became her guest,
Which she entreated.1
These initial invitations suggest an exchange, even a purchase. Anthony, 
Enobarbus claims, “for his ordinary pays his heart / For what his eyes eat 
only” (2.2.232–233). Enobarbus’s language implies a poor bargain. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines ordinary as “customary fare; a regular 
daily meal or allowance of food.”2 Enobarbus characteristically describes 
events in military terms; in this case, he deflates Cleopatra’s extravagant 
(one assumes) hospitality to mere rations. Moreover, it is a meal for which 
Anthony overpays, with his very heart, for what “his eyes eat only.” The 
relationship that gives the play its name finds its origin in hospitality, but 
this hospitality evokes the language of commerce.
Hospitality is not only a relationship between characters—a relationship 
of welcome, of solicitude and of love—but also an expression of this rela-
tionship, an expression that can be abstracted from the relationship itself. 
Signs of hospitality are no more stable than other signs, and therefore prove 
unable to assure characters of their relationships to one another. Enobarbus 
remarks that the defectors from Anthony to Caesar “have entertainment, 
but no / Honourable trust” (4.6.16–17). Similarly, Anthony and Cleopatra 
never quite trust each other, though they struggle with hyperbolic hospital-
ity to ratify their union by ever-greater entertainments. Neither character 
can be assured that the ceremonies of hospitality show a true welcome and 
not merely a political manipulation. In what follows, I contrast Emmanuel 
Levinas’s philosophy of hospitality, especially as expounded after his death 
by Jacques Derrida, to Marcel Mauss’s anthropology of the gift, to argue 
that not only do the characters of Shakespeare’s play in fact fail to cre-
ate stable relationships through hospitality but also that they must fail. 
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While a relationship can be built on exchange, it can never overcome the 
suspicion of being merely tactical, self-serving, or temporary.
Specifically, hospitality can always be understood as part of a power rela-
tion. Derrida opens his treatment of Levinas’s philosophy by acknowledg-
ing the suspicions elicited by hospitality. He references Émile Benveniste’s 
etymology of the word host, the French equivalent of which can also mean 
“guest.” Benveniste points out that in Latin hostis can even denote a for-
eigner or a public enemy.3 He follows Mauss in seeing hospitality as a gift 
offered in an exchange, demanding reciprocation and therefore threatening. 
Where Benveniste explicates the double-meaning of host in Latinate lan-
guages, Mauss shows that the word gift has a double meaning in Germanic 
languages, with German maintaining the meaning of “poison” and English 
the meaning of “present,” while Dutch maintains both meanings, distin-
guished only by grammatical gender. Moreover, this double meaning alludes 
to the potential threat of gifts in many cultures. Mauss compares ancient 
Germanic culture to Maori culture, where “[c]oming from one person, made 
or appropriated by him, being from him, [the gift] gives him power over the 
other who accepts it.” In the Germanic context, Mauss notes, gifts are almost 
always understood as drinks and, moreover, “[t]he drink-present can be a poi-
son; in principle, with the exception of a dark drama, it isn’t; but it can always 
become one.” In any case, “[i]t is always a charm” making a permanent claim 
on both the donor and recipient.4 Mauss underscores the importance of hos-
pitality, especially of consumables, as a gift, and shows how it always remains 
a potential threat. Benveniste credits him with having “showed that the gift is 
only one element in a system of reciprocal  prestations,”5 and applies Mauss’s 
theory of reciprocal gift-giving to hospitality:
Through hostis and the related terms in early Latin we can discern a 
certain type of compensatory offering that is the basis of the notion 
of ‘hospitality’ in the Latin, Germanic, and Slavic societies; equality of 
status transposes into law the parity between persons confirmed by 
reciprocal gifts.6
There are two reasons to be dubious of hospitality, though they often 
imply one another. To begin with, hospitality may be false and dishonest: 
one thinks of Anthony’s welcome of Octavia shortly before deciding that 
“I’ th’ East my pleasure lies” (2.3.38). Second, even a conscientious act 
of hospitality would nevertheless take place within a structure of recip-
rocal gift-exchange, where every gift stakes an insidious claim and where, 
therefore, every gift may be a poison and every host is potentially hos-
tile.  Shakespeare does not depict Pliny’s anecdote in which Cleopatra wins 
a bet with Anthony by swallowing a pearl dissolved in vinegar, perhaps 
because he does not wish to remind his audience of the “union” used to 
poison the wine (and hence  Gertrude) at the end of Hamlet.7 In Anthony 
and Cleopatra, only the clown’s gift of figs proves literally poisonous, but 
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all gifts nevertheless retain the poisonous potential that Mauss describes. 
All may impose insidious claims upon the recipient.
Derrida cites Benveniste in contrast to Emmanuel Levinas.8 I have 
argued elsewhere that Levinas’s understanding of generosity contrasts with 
Mauss’s.9 More relevant to the purposes of this volume, Levinas offers an 
understanding of hospitality, like that of gift, which contrasts it with com-
petitive exchange. Derrida makes the counterintuitive claim that “[a]lthough 
the word is neither frequently used nor emphasized within it, Totality and 
Infinity bequeaths to us an immense treatise of hospitality.” The claim 
becomes less counter-intuitive a few pages later, when Derrida adds that 
“[t]hough the word ‘hospitality’ occurs relatively seldom in Totality and 
Infinity, the word ‘welcome’ is unarguably one of the most frequent and 
determinative words in that text.”10 The ethical command which Levinas 
finds in the face of the Other can also be understood as the welcome of 
the Other in primordial, preoriginal hospitality. This hospitality is radical, 
Derrida specifies, “not simply some region of ethics, let alone, … the name 
of a problem in law or politics: it is ethicity itself, the whole and princi-
ple of ethics.”11 Levinasian hospitality therefore comes before all possible 
hostility. With a rhetorical question, Derrida suggests that Levinas’s phi-
losophy of hospitality would “in effect require us to think law and politics 
 otherwise.”12 The term politics is particularly apposite, because Mauss 
finds a power relationship in gift-exchange and in particular hospitality. 
A leader in the cultures Mauss studies
sustains his rank among the chiefs by giving back bracelets for neck-
laces, hospitality for visits, etc. In this case riches are from every view-
point as much a means of retaining prestige as something useful. Yet are 
we sure that it is any different in our own society, and that even with 
us riches are not above all a means of lording it over our fellow men?13
Mauss’s rhetorical question extends the range of his claim from the so-called 
primitive cultures that furnish the objects of his anthropology to his own 
European contemporaries. Instead of political relations, Levinas talks of ethical 
relations and, increasingly toward the end of his life, of love as an even better 
label for the sort of nonreciprocal relationship that Derrida would, after his 
death, term hospitality.14 Derrida carefully refuses to make Levinas’s “ethics … 
of hospitality” into the foundation for a “law or politics of  hospitality,” pre-
serving its radicality against appropriation by any discrete polemical posi-
tion. To Levinas, hospitality would not be a politics but an ethical command 
preceding social conventions.
Levinas’s radical understanding of ethics places it prior to politics but 
also prior to semiotics. Indeed, he argues that the ethical response to the 
Other inspires language in the radical sense of a response, a welcome of the 
Other, as a Saying. He explains this in an interview with Philippe Nemo: 
“The saying is a way of greeting the Other. … It is difficult to be silent in 
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someone’s presence; this difficulty has its ultimate foundation in this signifi-
cation proper to the saying, whatever is the said.”15 The Said, on the other 
hand, designates language as signification and structure or, in the words he 
used in a conference at the University of Ottawa, “all that can be written.”16 
Each act of hospitality can be understood as simultaneously a Saying and a 
Said, because every act of hospitality constitutes an address, a welcome of an 
Other, but also and at the same time an expression that must take the form 
of signs, if not always of spoken or written words. Greetings, welcomes, 
and acts of hospitality usually assume the form of the social conventions 
described by cultural anthropology, but arise from the primordial ethicity of 
hospitality. “In language qua said,” Levinas writes, “everything is brought 
before us, albeit at the price of a betrayal.”17 In this sense, every welcome is 
at once radical and conventional.
In the play, Anthony and Cleopatra’s love appears excessive and is cer-
tainly self-defeating. They ignore, indeed actively reject, the exigencies of 
politics in favor of excessive and self-giving love, giving away everything, 
even themselves, and therefore essaying hospitality in the radical sense 
Derrida finds in the work of Levinas. However, because their love takes 
expression in words, ceremonies, or objects given and received, it still elicits 
suspicions of falsehood. Hospitable words, hospitable actions, and hospita-
ble gifts all participate in the instability of the sign, and therefore offer them-
selves to suspicion. Moreover, though hospitality as ethics or love exceeds 
political calculation, its very expression transforms it into hospitality in the 
Maussian sense, where every gift demands reciprocation within a struggle 
for power and prestige. The play is set in a political world—indeed, a pagan 
world of war, before “the time of universal peace” anticipated by Caesar 
(4.6.4)—and in this world every act of hospitality generates political ramifi-
cations. Every apparently loving act can be taken as an effort at control. The 
very excess of these gestures of hospitality, however, shows their inspiration 
in radical hospitality, hospitality in the Levinasian sense, closely related to 
ethics and even more to love. The protagonists’ extravagant donations con-
demn them to gift-exchange, but show a determination to break free of 
this logic, to exceed it. By its very manifestation, the hospitality of the title 
characters betrays itself.
Because hospitality expresses itself as words and ceremonies, because it 
inevitably becomes Said, it can be misapplied. This is a general philosophical 
problem, so it is not surprising to find it in many contexts, including early 
modern contexts. The most important historian of early modern English 
hospitality, Felicity Heal, and the foremost historian of early modern French 
gifts, Natalie Zemon Davis, concur in finding a theological injunction at 
the root of practices of hospitality and generosity. In Heal’s words, the bib-
lical message “spoke of the paramount need of the outsider and the poor, 
and therefore promoted an identification between household charity and 
household entertainment.” Nevertheless, “it was common for prescriptive 
writers to acknowledge that entertainment had to be governed both by an 
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acceptance of existing social convention and by the constraints of intelli-
gent financial management.”18 According to Davis, gift-giving in early mod-
ern France was governed by two “age-old core beliefs,” the first of which 
derived from Christianity: “everything we have is a gift from God, and what 
comes in as a gift has some claim to go out as a gift.” The second core 
belief derived from pagan antiquity but also took form in popular expres-
sions in social practices. It emphasized reciprocity.19 To both historians, 
a radical belief in hospitality and generosity takes a quotidian, measured 
expression. Indeed, both emphasize instances of gifts gone wrong and hos-
pitality that fails. Davis even cites the cynicism of Shakespeare’s Timon, who 
declares that “each thing’s a thief,” but also outlines John Calvin’s insis-
tence on the status of Grace as a radically unilateral, nonreciprocal gift.20 
 Shakespeare’s first audiences were certainly conversant with the problem of 
how to express a gift in practical term, and whether this generosity could 
fail or even, perversely, become a demand. The events of the play project this 
everyday concern unto a vast canvas, where Anthony can “give a kingdom 
for a mirth” in Caesar’s disgusted phrase (1.4.18). Nevertheless, this fictive 
world of diplomacy and power politics reflects the everyday world, of gifts 
given and received, of hospitality offered and accepted or refused. Indeed, 
the problem that the play poses remains with us today. We too must ask 
whether hospitality inevitably proves hostile, and struggle to imagine how 
a truer hospitality could be expressed in our lives without collapsing into 
politics in the sense of cynical manipulation and bids for power. We too 
must ask how to offer without threatening and how to receive without sus-
picion. Shakespeare’s play depicts hospitality in an imperial political context 
and historiography of the early modern period places gifts in a local polit-
ical context; both illustrate the tendency for hospitality in the radical sense 
used by Derrida and Levinas to decline into hospitality in the sense used by 
Mauss and Benveniste.
In the play, as in early modern societies and indeed our own, a radical 
hospitality must express itself in quotidian, political terms, and therefore 
run the risk of going wrong. Cleopatra’s hospitality toward Thidias sends 
Anthony into a towering, torture-inflicting rage on the sight of “a fellow 
that will take rewards” being “familiar with / My playfellow, your hand” 
(3.13.124–126). This pattern of hospitality signifying the success or fail-
ure of relationships themselves extends beyond the relationship of the title 
characters. The play opens with Anthony’s failure to greet Caesar’s ambas-
sadors, a failure that leads to the coldness of his meeting with Caesar later, 
where each of the rivals ignores the other and instead addresses a follower 
(2.2.22). When they do concede to face-to-face communication, Caesar’s 
second complaint is that “When rioting in Alexandria you / Did pocket up 
my letters, and with taunts / Did gibe my missive out of audience” (2.2.76–78). 
This follows the complaint that Anthony’s “wife and brother / Made wars 
upon me” (2.2.46–47) and precedes the complaint that “You have broken / 
The article of your oath” (2.2.85–86). Caesar may not consider a failure of 
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hospitality to be as serious as waging war or violating a treaty, but man-
ifestly lists it among such offenses. Throughout the play, welcomes show 
political allegiance, friendship, and erotic partnership, but they also threaten 
to fail, exposing the wrong relationship or disclosing a relationship’s failure. 
Worse, they threaten to succeed too well, to convert a gift into a poison. 
They therefore elicit suspicion. Acts of hospitality and generosity show an 
unfortunate and paradoxical tendency to undermine rather than reinforce 
relationships.
The play’s Roman and Egyptian worlds are separated not only by cul-
tural difference and misunderstanding, but also and more obviously by the 
geographical distance across which characters communicate by messenger, 
sending embassies like that which Anthony ignores in the first scene. In three 
other early scenes Cleopatra hears of Anthony by way of a messenger after 
he returns to Rome. The first of these scenes establishes a pattern: Cleopatra 
greets Alexas, the messenger, ascribing to him some of Anthony’s charisma 
and inquiring as to her lover’s well-being. Anthony sends a message of 
love and expresses it with “[t]his orient pearl” (1.5.41). It may be ironic 
that Anthony, in Rome, sends a gift so overtly associated with the east to 
 Cleopatra, in Egypt, but he also promises to “piece / Her opulent throne 
with kingdoms” (1.5.45–46). She, in turn, not only greets his messenger but 
determines to send Anthony “every day a several greeting” (1.5.77). The 
greetings at this point are reciprocal: moreover, the play hints that the gifts 
merely circulate, because the pearl both comes from the east and returns 
to it. In any case, expressions of love are clearly material. Whereas in the 
play’s first scene Anthony protests that “[k]ingdoms are clay” and dismis-
sively compares political responsibility to the expression of love (1.1.37), 
here kingdoms express love as extravagant gifts. Anthony gives more than 
he has, promising kingdoms he has yet to conquer, and which anyway 
would be conquered in the name of Rome. The same scene already shows 
cultural misunderstanding. Anthony presents himself by proxy as “the firm 
Roman,” ascribing to himself a stoic calm identified with his national char-
acter (1.5.43). The next messenger scene shows that Anthony remains insuf-
ficiently firm in his commitment to Cleopatra to forgo marrying Octavia, 
so his self-description may be suspected of exaggeration, if not fraud. This 
hardly matters, however, because Cleopatra misunderstands Anthony’s 
self-declared temperance, mistaking it for violently contradictory passion: 
“Be’st thou sad, or merry, / The violence of either thee becomes, / So does 
it no man else” (1.5.52, 59–60). This scene presents a series of ceremo-
nies of hospitality: Anthony’s messenger is greeted, his master is greeted by 
proxy, the messenger greets Cleopatra, Anthony greets Cleopatra through 
the messenger, Anthony sends Cleopatra a gift, and Anthony promises more 
gifts. The scene also raises many of the worries that attend ceremonies of 
hospitality: the gift could constitute an attempt at manipulation, bribery, or 
even purchase; it might misrepresent the giver’s commitment; and the entire 
transaction might illustrate the mutual incomprehension of its participants.
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The second messenger scene, in which an anonymous messenger replaces 
Alexas, parodies the first. Cleopatra offers gold, but only if the news is good:
But well and free,
If thou so yield him, there is gold, and here
My bluest veins to kiss, a hand that kings
Have lipped, and trembled kissing.
(2.5.27–30)
It is again ironic that she offers the same favor to which Anthony takes such 
violent exception when it is later given to Thidias. She also offers the mes-
senger “[r]ich pearls,” echoing Anthony’s gift from the earlier scene (2.5.47). 
In this case, however, Cleopatra offers material rewards in an overt effort 
to control the news. When the messenger presents bad news anyway, 
Cleopatra attacks him and threatens him with death, though she also offers 
him “a province” to change it. She shows herself cruel as well as ignoble to 
strike the messenger, as she herself admits (2.5.83–85). More important, 
she exhibits a sort of irrationality, as though harming the messenger could 
change the message. Her irrationality nevertheless follows from the assump-
tion justified by the earlier scene, that welcomes take material or political 
form. The material form of welcome tempts Cleopatra to conflate the wel-
come with its expression and then attempt to control one through the other, 
as if they were simply the same. The expression of hospitality threatens to 
displace hospitality itself.
Starting with Anthony and Cleopatra’s first meeting, food constitutes an 
important expression of hospitality. Asking about Enobarbus’s entertain-
ment in Egypt, Mecenas retails a story about “[e]ight wild boars roasted 
whole at a breakfast” (2.2.186). In what is probably the best essay pub-
lished on food in Anthony and Cleopatra, Peter A. Parolin argues that 
“food plays a crucial role in elucidating” all of the “central struggles of the 
play.”21 Food has two obvious roles as a weapon: it can kill if withdrawn, 
but can also weaken through overindulgence. Parolin draws attention par-
ticularly to Philip Stubbes, who argues in his 1583 The Anatomy of Abuses 
against overindulgence in “dainty fare,”22 though one might also think of 
attacks against particular foods even today (gluten, perhaps, or saturated 
fats). Hence Caesar’s call on the absent and indifferent Anthony to “leave 
thy lascivious wassails,” referring to his earlier survival of “[f]amine  … 
whom thou fought’st against” as a model of behavior “like a soldier” 
(1.4.56, 59, 70). More subtly, food can also function as a weapon by claim-
ing reciprocation within an exchange of hospitality. A dinner invitation, like 
that of  Cleopatra to Anthony, places both the recipient and the host under 
obligation. Feasting affirms relationship, but also simultaneously casts sus-
picion on the relationship, because the feast might be no more than an 
act of “antagonism and rivalry,” to borrow the phrase with which Mauss 
describes First Nations potlatches.23
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Cleopatra is repeatedly described not only as something consumable, but 
also as herself a consumer, possessed of ravenous appetites for food, drink, 
and sex. In her first scene after Anthony’s return to Rome we find her exhib-
iting her desire for him—“O happy horse, to bear the weight of Anthony!” 
(1.5.21)—and her enjoyment of food amounts to a self-definition. “[S]ince my 
lord / Is Anthony again,” she says, planning to feast on her birthday, “I will 
be Cleopatra” (3.13.186–187). Finally, she imagines death as a withdrawal 
from gustatory pleasure: “Now no more / The juice of Egypt’s grape shall 
moist this lip” (5.2.280–281). “I drink,” an Egyptian Descartes might say, 
“therefore I am.” Mauss emphasizes the importance of presents of drink, but 
here the wine is not to be given but consumed. Cleopatra presents herself 
less as an object, a gift to be exchanged between men, than as a consumer.
Cleopatra both baffles and terrifies Anthony by her ability to rise above 
the status of a comestible. Karen Britland argues that “[e]xcess in the play is 
feminized, becoming conflated with the corrupting influence that Cleopatra 
and her Egypt have over Antony,”24 but Cleopatra’s excess distinguishes 
her from other women. In his description of her as “making hungry where 
most she satisfies,” Enobarbus explicitly contrasts her to “other women” 
(2.2.243–245). Anthony may find himself drawn back to Cleopatra, but this 
mystifies him: “She is cunning past man’s thought,” he declares early in the 
play (1.2.145). He later accuses her of witchcraft (4.13.47). Cleopatra defies 
the treatment of women as consumable or exchangeable for two reasons: 
First, she is an Other, in fact a beloved. The Other, according to Levinas,
resists me with all his force and all the unpredictable resources of his 
own freedom. I measure myself against him. But he can also—and here 
is where he presents me his face—oppose himself to me beyond all 
measure, with the total uncoveredness and nakedness of his defense-
less eyes, the straightforwardness, the absolute frankness of his gaze.25
Cleopatra does both. She resists reduction to the level of a consumable rad-
ically, by being the Other, the beloved. Even when comparing her to food, 
Enobarbus describes her paradoxically, as a food that increases hunger. 
Though Levinas does not cite Anthony and Cleopatra, the play anticipates 
his description of metaphysical desire, which he contrasts in Totality and 
Infinity with a desire capable of satisfaction: “Besides the hunger one satis-
fies, the thirst one quenches, and the senses one allays, metaphysics desires 
the other beyond satisfactions.”26 In one of his first essays of an independent 
philosophy, he asks his reader to “[c]ompare eating to loving, which occurs 
beyond economic activity and the world.”27 Cleopatra resists reduction to 
the status of food, of object, simply by being the beloved, who stands over 
and against Anthony as an appeal rather than as an opponent.
Second, Cleopatra resists reduction to an object of consumption in prac-
tical terms, by the hospitality with which she imposes a burden of response 
on Anthony. Britland shows how “she is both the active agent that is to 
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encourage Antony’s feasting, and the passive object that he will consume.”28 
On the River Cydnus, she presents herself as an object of admiration, at 
least, to Anthony. Enobarbus’s claim that “she pursed up his heart” implies, 
however, not that she becomes Anthony’s object, but that her magnificent 
self-presentation makes him hers. Her earlier self-presentation to Julius Caesar 
“in a mattress” makes an overt offer of her self and body, but unlike 
Octavia, she retains power in her relationships (2.6.71). She avoids becom-
ing an object exchanged by men by giving herself. In Mauss’s play on words, 
she offers a gift—herself—that can be suspected of being a poison. To return 
to the double meaning explored by Benveniste, she plays host, but thereby 
becomes something of a threat, if not quite an enemy.
Perhaps the feast on Pompey’s ship furnishes the best example of hospi-
tality simultaneously constructing and undermining a relationship. Honor 
forbids Pompey from killing his guests, the triumvirs. He explains this to 
Menas in response to the suggestion that he do just that:
Ah, this thou shouldst have done,
And not have spoke on’t: in me ’tis villainy;
In thee ’t had been good service. Thou must know,
’Tis not my profit that does lead mine honour;
Mine honour, it.
(2.7.74–78)
Pompey’s explanation, however much it fails to appeal to us, shows that the 
code of hospitality that he follows possesses all the complexity of a cultural 
belief system, placing him under an obligation that he respects to his mortal 
cost. More to my point, Pompey would avoid this obligation, wishing Menas 
had slit the throats of the drunken triumvirs before asking, because Menas is 
not the host and therefore not under obligation himself. In fact, as a recipient 
of Pompey’s patronage, Menas would be performing “good service” (2.7.76). 
Menas himself offers generosity, boasting to his patron that “though thou 
think me poor, I am the man / Will give thee all the world” (2.7.65–66). When 
Pompey refuses, Menas dismisses him with a proverb as ungrateful: “Who 
seeks and will not take, when once ’tis offered, / Shall never find it more” 
(2.7.83–84). Hospitality in the play neither appears in a pure, radical form, 
nor decays into pure cynicism. Rather, it maintains its claims even while 
being expressed in and perhaps betrayed by social conventions. Pompey 
respects the ceremonies and obligations of hospitality, refusing to kill his 
guests, but does not extend them hospitality in the radical sense Derrida 
finds in Levinas, welcoming the Other. Pompey’s refusal to kill the triumvirs 
combines with his wish that Menas had, to show the paradoxical force of 
hospitality as Mauss understands it, both sealing friendship and rendering 
it antagonistic. Pompey attempts to overcome his distrust of Anthony by 
partying with him: “O Anthony, / You have my father’s house. But what, we 
are friends?” (2.7.126–27). Events fully justify whatever anxiety the folio’s 
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question mark indicates, because Pompey is soon displaced, albeit by the 
sober Caesar. Britland argues that the feast onboard Pompey’s ship succeeds 
in achieving conviviality through its exclusion of the feminine.29 The situa-
tion is indeed strikingly all-male, if not positively homoerotic, ending with 
Enobarbus and Menas going off to bed together and incorporating an all-
male dance to the singing of a boy. Nevertheless, the conviviality depends 
on the humiliation of a drunken Lepidus, and Caesar clearly does not enjoy 
himself: “It’s monstrous labour when I wash my brain, / An it grows fouler” 
(2.7.96–97). Whatever alliance is achieved under these unpromising condi-
tions disappears with the hangovers. Caesar disposes of first Pompey and 
then Lepidus almost as soon as all three can get offstage. While hospitality 
in the radical sense (as Saying) might take the form of rules and rituals 
(the Said), these rules and rituals signally fail to generate a true welcome. 
On the contrary, the exchanges by which the triumvirs seek to maintain their 
alliance take place within a world of power struggles and are, therefore, 
always already suspect. Drinking together can express the loyalty of the 
triumvirs, but as an unstable sign, it can also falsely express a loyalty that 
simply is not there. More to the point, it can no more generate loyalty than 
Cleopatra’s elaborate donations to the messenger can change the news.
What Aufidius in Coriolanus calls “the hospitable canon”30 guards 
Pompey against Caesar’s ambition no better than it guards Coriolanus 
against Aufidius’s followers, or for that matter, than Lear’s division of his 
kingdom between his daughters guards the old king against homelessness. 
Rituals of hospitality should not be ignored, however, even though they fail 
to inspire the sort of affection that at least some of their participants wish. 
Anthony and Caesar each protests that the other has violated his bond. 
Anthony nevertheless refuses to ignore Caesar’s accusation, for, as he tells 
Lepidus, “[t]he honour is sacred which he talks on now” (2.2.90). As states-
men, the Romans operate in power relations, but they do not nihilistically 
embrace the pursuit of power as a total goal. Neither Anthony nor Caesar dis-
regards his own word; on the contrary, both attempt to reinforce their alli-
ance by the exchange of a woman, Octavia. This alliance, moreover, depends 
on real affective relationships. Caesar gives Anthony, as he specifies, “a great 
part of myself,” indeed the only blood relative he is shown to have in the 
play (3.2.24). Agrippa’s plan for the strategic marriage depends heavily on 
the two competitors’ mutual affection for Octavia, “To make you brothers, 
and to knit your hearts / With an unslipping knot” (2.2.132–133). The idea 
of building relationships between men through the exchange of a woman is 
almost a cliché of both anthropology and early modern diplomacy, but the 
play emphasizes how much it depends on both men actually loving Octavia. 
Nevertheless, as Enobarbus accurately predicts, “the bond that seems to tie 
their friendship together will be the very strangler of their amity” (2.6.119–121). 
Inevitably, the treatment of Octavia becomes one of the causes of the civil 
war. “[T]he high gods, / To do you justice, makes his ministers / Of us and 
those that love you,” explains her brother, filled with pious fraternal loyalty 
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(3.6.88–90).31 Even in its violation, the bond between Anthony and Caesar 
reveals its reliance on the radical claims of hospitality, as does Pompey’s 
decision to follow his culture’s code of hospitality. If Caesar had no affec-
tive ties to Octavia, then he would have less cause to go to war and, earlier, 
would be offering Anthony a gift of no value, inadequate to seal their alli-
ance. Like the relationship of the title characters, that between the two prin-
cipal triumvirs for control of the ancient world does not simply devolve into 
a cynical, cold, or calculating exchange. Their relationship takes the form of 
a particular cultural practice well documented by history and anthropology, 
and also relies on “ethicity itself,” which Derrida identifies with the radical 
hospitality described by Levinas. As an expression and application in social 
forms of such hospitality, however, it remains open to the suspicion of being 
not only a lie, but also and more damningly, a cynical and threatening bid 
for power.
The Roman culture of stoicism produces Anthony, whereas Cleopatra 
rules and personifies Egypt, a world of epicureanism, self-indulgence, and 
love. Both title characters, however, find themselves locked in a power strug-
gle, the exigencies of which apply to both worlds. Cleopatra wages love like 
Anthony wages war. “If it be love indeed,” Cleopatra demands with her first 
line, “tell me how much” (1.1.14). The lovers already exchange claims of 
affection, competitively, as they will soon exchange gifts to signify this love. 
Cleopatra implies that Anthony is subordinate to “the scarce-bearded Caesar” or 
perhaps “the shrill-tongued Fulvia” (1.1.22, 34). Cleopatra forces Anthony 
to defend himself against the emasculating implication of being ruled by a 
woman, thereby herself ruling him, ironically or perhaps just hypocritically. 
Anthony’s response—“Let Rome in Tiber melt” (1.1.35)—provides her a 
tactical victory, because he rejects Rome in favor of her, though she soon 
reverses her position, demanding that he “[h]ear the ambassadors” (1.2.50). 
The manipulation is trivial; Anthony can always hear the message later, 
and a delay does not change the news. The breadth of Anthony’s negligence 
regarding Roman politics, however, shows that Cleopatra makes a habit 
out of such manipulation. From the messenger’s report in the second scene, 
it appears that Anthony has missed three wars altogether (1.2.88–104). 
Prospero on his island could not be farther out of touch. More important, 
Cleopatra shows her determination to thwart Anthony’s desires, keeping 
him beholden to her, in her rejection of Charmian’s advice to “[t]empt him 
not so far” (1.3.11). Part of Cleopatra’s “infinite variety” is inconsistency, 
even perversity. “If you find him sad,” she instructs Charmian, “Say I am 
dancing; if in mirth, report / That I am sudden sick” (1.3.3–5). “You have 
been a boggler ever,” Anthony exclaims, with understandable exasperation 
(3.13.111). Cleopatra never surrenders herself to Anthony. Because women 
in Rome are exchanged between men when not dismissed as trivial pleasures 
by the likes of Enobarbus, she is no doubt wise to maintain her power in 
the relationship. The result of her strategy, however, is that until very late in 
the play, all Cleopatra’s hospitality to Anthony—her welcome of him into 
Hospitality in Anthony and Cleopatra 123
her kingdom, her bed and, when he sires her children, her body—may be 
suspected of being part of an effort to control him.
Cleopatra has reason to control Anthony, needing his military power 
at least as much as the other triumvirs need him to fight Pompey: “That 
Herod’s head / I’ll have—but how, when Anthony is gone, / Through whom 
I might command it?” (3.3.4–7). Her one disastrous attempt at tactical 
command during the battle of Actium shows how completely she relies 
on Anthony’s military skill. Even her retreat from Actium keeps Anthony 
dependent, because he is unable to conclude the civil war in victory, return 
to Rome, and forget her. One admires her ability to assert herself as “the 
president of my kingdom” (3.7.17) in so masculine a world. Cleopatra does 
not create the world in which power corrupts love; she merely flourishes 
in it. Cleopatra’s hospitality should be placed among the other practices of 
competitive hospitality in the play, and indeed, of the power relations tear-
ing apart the Roman world. She assumes the position of an agent and a host, 
but her hospitality elicits the suspicion—of Anthony and of generations of 
critics—that she is merely manipulative.
Cleopatra seldom praises Anthony to his face. Before he first leaves for 
Rome, she accuses him of faithlessness to Fulvia (1.3.62–65), betrayal to 
herself (1.3.24–25), dishonesty (1.3.37–39), and drama-king hyperbole 
(1.3.82–85). She indulges in emasculating claims about what would happen 
if “I had thy inches” (1.3.40). She nominates him “the greatest soldier of 
the world” but only in order to claim that he has “turned the greatest liar” 
(1.3.38–39). Once he is safely off-stage, however, she compares him favor-
ably to Julius Caesar and calls him “[m]y man of men” (1.5.72). She inflates 
him into a colossus after his death:
His legs bestrid the ocean; his reared arm
Crested the world; his voice was propertied
As all the tunèd spheres—and that to friends—
But when he meant to quail and shake the orb,
He was as rattling thunder.
(5.2.82–86)
Her praise of him reaches a crescendo in a sort of ontological proof for 
Anthony’s existence: “It’s past the size of dreaming” (5.2.97). Cleopatra lav-
ishes fulsome praise on her lover, but not to his face. To do so would render 
herself less powerful in the relationship, admitting, as she in fact does after 
his death, that she is “commanded / By such poor passion as the maid that 
milks / And does the meanest chores” (4.6.74–76). Cleopatra deploys pasto-
ral imagery, but with the effect of identifying herself with the most power-
less members of her sex. Whereas Marlowe’s passionate shepherd promises 
luxury and entertainment, Cleopatra imagines only demeaning labor and 
servility. Cleopatra seldom admits her love, and even less to Anthony’s face, 
lest it render it abject.
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The process of Anthony and Cleopatra’s destruction takes the form of 
expanding their exchanges of hospitality from the dueling invitations with 
which their wooing began on the River Cydnus into a vortex that consumes 
the eastern Mediterranean and then themselves. Their reciprocal donations 
constitute a potlatch more extreme than anything dreamt of by anthropol-
ogy. As Caesar reports in disgust, “Unto her / [Anthony] gave the stablish-
ment of Egypt, made her / Of lower Syria, Cyprus, Lydia, / Absolute queen” 
(3.6.8–11). Later, Anthony chooses to fight at sea, placing himself in 
Cleopatra’s power, but also allowing her to provide him “sixty sails” 
(3.7.49). This may not be as reckless as it appears. Anthony fully intends 
to fight a second battle on land, should the naval engagement prove unsuc-
cessful (3.7.52–53). The plan fails in the only way in which it could, when 
Anthony compounds defeat at sea with such utter disgrace that his land 
forces abandon him in disgust. In the next scene, he actually encourages his 
followers to desert, magnificently providing them “a ship, / Laden with gold” 
(3.11.4–5), before blaming Cleopatra for his loss. He nevertheless cites his 
disgrace as an overwhelming proof of his love for her: “thou knew’st too 
well / My heart was to thy rudder tied by th’strings, / And thou shouldst 
tow me after” (3.11.55–57). Having forced her to ask “Pardon, pardon!” he 
accepts a single kiss in repayment, literalizing Scarrus’s appalled metaphor 
in the previous scene: “[W]e have kissed away / Kingdoms and provinces” 
(3.11.72; 3.10.7–8). Anthony loses the battle of Actium, but gains the upper 
hand in his relationship with Cleopatra. His flight from battle may be seen 
as an effort to answer Cleopatra’s opening question: “If it be love indeed, 
tell me how much” (1.1.14). The answer is that Anthony loves Cleopatra 
so much that he will give up victory, the empire, his followers, and even his 
self-respect. Like an extravagant host, Anthony gives everything he owns, 
though also like an extravagant host, he may be suspected of only seeking 
to impose a burden of reciprocation.
Suicide might be taken as an even more extreme effort to answer the 
question of “how much” love would constitute “love indeed.” After the 
naval defeat at Alexandria, Anthony determines again that Cleopatra “[l]ike 
a right gypsy hath at fast and loose / Beguiled me to the very heart of loss” 
(4.13.28–29). In order to restore his love and trust, Cleopatra sends the lie 
that “I have slain myself” (4.14.7). Even she recognizes the risk inherent in 
this plan. Diomedes recalls that “[s]he had a prophesying fear / Of what 
hath come to pass” (4.15.121–122). Her reckless plan is in keeping, how-
ever, with other efforts to elicit obligation by donation, up to and including 
self-destruction. Besides, her plan works, only not in the manner she hopes. 
On hearing of her feigned death, Anthony declares that “I will o’ertake thee, 
Cleopatra, and / Weep for my pardon” (4.15.44–45). After Anthony’s actual 
if maladroit suicide, Cleopatra decides to kill herself “after the high Roman 
fashion” (4.16.88), thereby claiming him as her husband: “Now to that 
name my courage prove my title!” (5.2.287). Rather than working together 
to defeat their common enemies, the title characters lay claims upon one 
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another. The exchanges that reinforce their relationship must always grow 
larger, because the lovers’ claims on each other appear mutually threatening. 
As a result, the whole play becomes a desperately inflated effort to answer 
Cleopatra’s opening question.
Moreover, no response to Cleopatra’s demand to know “[i]f it be love 
indeed, … how much,” can silence the doubt it expresses, because the sorts 
of exchanges into which the characters enter can never shake the suspicion 
of being mere efforts at control. No number of losses by Anthony can make 
enough of a claim on Cleopatra to entirely ensure him of her loyalty. In what is 
perhaps Anthony’s most convincing statement of love, he explains to the sig-
nificantly named Eros that “I made these wars for Egypt, and the Queen— / 
Whose heart I thought I had, for she had mine / … has / Packed cards with 
Caesar” (4.15.15–19). In the context of Anthony’s rants, the words “Whose 
heart I thought I had, for she had mine,” each monosyllabic and Anglo-Saxon, 
produce a statement of great simplicity and candor. While these lines make 
eloquent expression of his love, however, they also show Anthony murder-
ously suspicious regarding Cleopatra’s.
As already noted, Thidias’s display of courtly manner rouses Anthony to 
fury. Before Anthony comes onstage in this scene, Cleopatra places herself 
under the control of Caesar at least rhetorically, while claiming that her 
earlier affair with Anthony was forced: “Mine honour was not yielded, / But 
conquered merely.” It is of course possible to find a reading of Cleopatra’s 
actions in this scene that remains charitable to her. The sentence just quoted 
is immediately preceded by the hyperbolic claim that Caesar “is a god, and 
knows / What is most right” (3.13.60–62). Hyperbole often implies irony, 
and the first sentence in this speech might ascribe the view expressed in the 
second to Caesar. In answer to Thidias’s claim that “he knows that you 
embraced not Anthony / As you did love, but as you feared him,” Cleopatra 
replies with a neutral monosyllable, “O” (3.13.56–57). A few lines earlier, 
Enobarbus greets Thidias with an elaborate but equivocal claim of loyalty 
to Caesar, built on the argument that Enobarbus is a follower of Anthony, 
himself willing to be a friend to Caesar (3.13.50–52). Cleopatra may make 
similarly equivocal or at least noncommittal gestures. Indeed, nowhere in 
the scene does Cleopatra in fact promise to surrender Anthony, though she 
also does not refuse. Rather the scene shows Cleopatra deploying careful 
diplomatic language. Thidias’s kiss of her hand reverses her claim to Caesar 
that “I kiss his conqu’ring hand,” while also respecting her abiding royalty 
(3.13.75). Cleopatra uses the occasion to recall her earlier sexual and politi-
cal alliance with Caesar’s father, and hence open the possibility of a renewed 
familial bond. Parolin credits Cleopatra with “culinary diplomacy” in her 
wooing of Anthony, and one might see her making a similar effort here, as 
Anthony himself recognizes in referring to Thidias as “a feeder.” According 
to Parolin, this is an attack on Thidias’s “social standing as a subordinate 
who eats what his master supplies,”32 but it also relates  Thidias’s gesture 
in kissing Cleopatra’s hand to the hospitality with which she offers herself 
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to Anthony in their initial dinner invitations. All such careful maneuvering, 
however, is tossed aside by Anthony’s certainty: “Favours, by Jove that thun-
ders!” (3.13.85). He replaces Cleopatra’s studied ambiguity with straight-
forward violence: “Whip him, fellows, / Till like a boy you see him cringe 
his face / And whine aloud for mercy” (3.13.99–101). One can make an 
argument in favor of Cleopatra’s ambiguity over Anthony’s simple and furi-
ous clarity, but it is Cleopatra’s ambiguity that invites Anthony’s response. 
Both subtlety and literalism rely on interpreting signs of hospitality. We can 
accuse Anthony of a coarse semiotics, but it is very difficult to tell from what 
Anthony sees—the tableau of Thidias kissing Cleopatra’s hand—whether 
Cleopatra flatters Caesar while remaining loyal to Anthony or abandons 
Anthony in favor of Caesar. Hospitality, in the sense of rituals of welcom-
ing, indicates Cleopatra’s loyalty throughout the play, so her hospitality to 
Thidias appears to make a new claim of loyalty, this time to Caesar. The 
situation calls for interpretation, but more important, it calls for interpre-
tation within a context where hospitality may be hostile. Anthony finds his 
fears being realized before his eyes and responds not with mere confusion or 
even disgust, but with destructive rage. The queen temporarily overcomes 
Anthony’s distrust by another offer:
From my cold heart let heaven engender hail,
And poison it in the source, and the first stone
Drop in my neck: as it determines, so
Dissolve my life; the next Caesarion smite,
Till by degrees the memory of my womb,
Together with my brave Egyptians all,
By the discandying of this pelleted storm,
Lie graveless, till the flies and gnats of Nile
Have buried them for prey.
(3.13.160–168)
Naseeb Shaheen finds in this passage three separate references to the plagues 
of Egypt described in Exodus.33 As an assurance, Cleopatra calls down a 
Biblical plague, offering her life, her progeny, and the population and sur-
vival of the kingdom with which she identifies. Anthony and Cleopatra raise 
the stakes of their relationship by making greater and greater offers, but 
these provide only temporary reassurance.
Their hospitality extends to the metaphysical, giving each other opportu-
nities to assume divinity and imagine a glorious afterlife. Caesar reports in 
disgust that Cleopatra assumes “th’habiliments of the goddess Isis” (3.6.17). 
When to everyone’s surprise Anthony sends Enobarbus his personal for-
tune, this proves that “[y]our Emperor / Continues still a Jove” (4.6.26–27). 
 Retrospectively deifying her lover, Cleopatra claims that “realms and islands 
were / As plates dropped from his pocket” (5.2.91–92), making him infinitely 
and impossibly generous.34 William Flesch notes that Anthony’s generosity 
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is always excessive, especially when he has nothing to give and even his god 
has abandoned him.35 Rather than depending on a divine patron, Anthony 
wishes to become an all-giving god himself. However, the play contains a 
good deal of evidence that he is not even a particularly good soldier, never 
mind, as Cleopatra extravagantly describes him early in the play “a Mars” 
(2.5.118). Ventidius observes that “[h]e and Caesar have ever won more in 
their officer than in their person” (3.1.16–17). Though he wins few battles, 
Anthony can nevertheless take the role of Mars in Cleopatra’s arms, especially 
if he accepts her self-presentation as Venus on the River Cydnus at their 
first meeting, surrounded by “pretty, dimpled boys, like smiling Cupids,” 
and “[o]’er-picturing that Venus where we see / The fancy out-work nature” 
(2.2.207–209). Perhaps more convincingly, “the holy priests / Bless her when 
she is riggish” as they would the goddess of sex (2.2.246–247). Conversely, 
although “wrinkled deep in time,” Cleopatra can assume the place of Venus 
by loving her Mars (1.5.29). Both Cleopatra’s memory of cross-dressing 
an unconscious Anthony (2.5.23–24) and his arming before the battle 
of Alexandria (4.4) imply a parallel with imagery of Mars and Venus.36 
Anthony, for his part, attempts to incarnate war, promising to violate all 
rules of chivalry: “I’ll set my teeth, and send to darkness all that stop me” 
(3.13.181–182). Shakespeare’s most famous ancient lovers attempt to raise 
themselves to the divine. By doing so, they ratify Anthony’s claim that, to 
“set a bourn how far to be beloved,” Cleopatra must “find out new heaven, 
new earth” (1.1.16–17). Having given each other kingdoms, heirs, and even 
their own lives, they also attempt to give each other divinity.
Of course they fail. Anthony replies to Cleopatra’s demand to know 
“how much” he loves her by declaring that “[t]here’s beggary in the love 
that can be reckoned” (1.1.15). There is also a sort of category error in 
trying to count love, as if it were a form of wealth or territory, as though it 
were to be expressed in ever more extravagant gifts. The characters attempt 
to give each other glorious afterlives, but this merely extends into eternity 
the very structure that dooms their relationship to murderous anxiety. From 
a Christian perspective, especially the Reformed perspective taking shape in 
Shakespeare’s England, unearned Grace would correspond to a radical gift 
of hospitality, a welcoming into heaven that is asymmetrical and extraor-
dinary, but these pagan characters prove unable to imagine it. Indeed, their 
imagery suggests failure as much as celestial success. They picture them-
selves as Venus and Mars, but their role models’ adulterous relationship ter-
minates in embarrassment when the lovers are revealed to all the gods, “with 
shame inough fast lockt togither.”37 “Dido and Aeneas,” says Anthony as he 
plans suicide, “shall want troops” (4.15.53), but Aeneas abandons Dido to 
found Rome, as Christopher Marlowe and Thomas Nashe show in Dido, 
Queen of Carthage, and Virgil’s Dido rejects Aeneas when they meet in the 
underworld in book 6 of the Aeneid. In an article first presented in the early 
1970s, Levinas argues that even the Apollo astronauts did not find a true 
elsewhere, but only a continuation of the same.38 Attempting to “find out 
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new heaven, new earth,” the lovers of Shakespeare’s play only extend the 
power struggle that defines their own world toward ever-receding horizons. 
They do not truly open themselves to each others’ alterity or even to the 
alterity of death.
Shakespeare’s protagonists may begin with Saying, with an extraordinary 
hospitality, a welcome of each other as Other, but the expression of their love 
moves it into the Said. Their acts of hospitality all suffer the instability of the 
sign: no one can tell what Anthony means by the gift of the pearl or even if 
he offers it in good faith; neither the on-stage nor the off-stage audiences can 
tell what Cleopatra means by allowing Thidias to kiss her hand; Cleopatra’s 
death may show her loyalty, but her first claim to have died merely manip-
ulates; Anthony accepts the offer of Cleopatra’s navy, but he may be merely 
testing her continued loyalty. At least as important, Anthony and Cleopatra’s 
acts of hospitality imbricate them in competitive donation. Beginning with 
their first dinner, their exchanges spiral out of control like a parody of the 
ceremonies Mauss describes, extending from absurdly elaborate meals to 
kingdoms, lives, and otherworldly myths. Rather than providing security in 
their trust in one another, every donation stakes a threatening claim. Derrida 
continues his discussion of the impossibility of building a practical politics on 
the foundation of Levinas’s theory of hospitality by asking “Does this impos-
sibility signal a failing? Perhaps we should say the contrary.”39 Hospitality, 
in the Levinasian sense, may not realize itself in a clear political expression. 
Attempts to give such hospitality political form, I have argued, merely betray 
it into the competitive exchanges that constitute hospitality in the Maussian 
sense. By its very contrast, however, Levinasian hospitality allows a judgment 
of Maussian hospitality as a whole. We can ask whether Shakespeare’s title 
characters truly welcome each other and critique their efforts; more generally, 
we can critique our own ceremonies and acts of hospitality, and call upon 
ourselves to welcome the Other more fully and generously.
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6 Ave Desdemona
David Hillman
There is no salut that saves or promises salvation.
—Jacques Derrida1
Greetings and leave-takings are key moments in every hospitality event, 
moments that encapsulate the paradoxes of hospitality as a whole—its 
ambivalence and equivocations, its generosities and power plays, its pro-
found tensions between amity and enmity, openness to the other and self- 
assertion, servility and mutuality, improvisation and calculation. The first 
and last moments of an encounter can be transformational, acutely charged 
with the usually unspoken potentialities of what two (or more) people can 
do to, and with, each other. Salutations also manifest hospitality as drama-
turgy: both theater and hospitality are structured around entrances, exits, 
and the forms of gesture and speech that they afford; opening gambits and 
parting shots help to set the tone for an encounter or to sum up what has just 
passed; they give it a dramatic frame. In this essay I wish to interrogate one 
particular moment of greeting that dances around the difficulties of hospi-
tality, and in particular an aspect of hospitality not, to my knowledge, very 
often discussed: the question of what happens in the absence of the directness 
intrinsic to any ethics of hospitality—the immediacy of engagement without 
which hospitality is emptied of meaning. Othello, I suggest, addresses the 
dangers of mediation, of what takes place when what  Emmanuel Levinas 
calls “the dual of the face to face, the singular welcome of the unicity of 
the other” is shunned.2 My essay approaches this by examining a single, 
curious instance of greeting in the play—Cassio’s elaborate flourish upon 
the arrival of Desdemona in Cyprus: “Hail to thee, lady! and the grace of 
heaven …” (2.1.85ff).3 As has often been noted, this salutation invokes the 
Ave Maria—a paradigmatic instance in Western culture of the greeting of the 
other as constitutive of their subjectivity. Cassio’s Ave, both in its avoidance 
of Levinas’s “uprightness of the welcome made to the face,”4 and in evoking 
the idea of Mary as mediatrix, alerts us to a crucial feature of Othello: the 
role of intercession in the downfall of all the play’s protagonists. It is, I argue, 
through turning away from the immediacy of the engagement so important 
to hospitality that the play moves inexorably toward tragedy.
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The word greet derives from the Old Germanic grôtjan, about which the 
Oxford English Dictionary tells us that “the senses of early occurrence in 
continental Germanic are ‘to approach,’ ‘to call upon,’ ‘to provoke or com-
pel to action,’ ‘to attack,’ ‘to irritate, annoy,’ and ‘to address, salute.’” It thus 
bears close parallels to what Derrida describes as the “self-contradiction,” the 
“troubled and troubling origin” of the word hospitality— incorporating as it 
does both friendliness and hostility, greeting, and grating upon.5  Greetings 
(and partings) can function as provocations, challenges, demands, wishes, 
prayers, dismissals, and empty formulae, practicalities. The various con-
ventional niceties and rituals of salutation help to structure and defuse the 
charged early moments of an encounter. They are designed to assuage anx-
iety, to smooth over or ward off the latent dangers inherent to transitional 
moments, turning away from any potential violence or sexuality. This is 
one of the reasons why the words accompanying these ceremonies of safety 
are almost all words of well-wishing, hopes and prayers for good health or 
safety, expressions of support or peace: pax vobis, I bring peace to you, not 
enmity. It also partially explains the frequency of invocations of divinities in 
salutations—god buy ye (the origin of good-bye), Godspeed, godden, adieu, 
and so on. And the desire to assuage anxiety also informs most of the tradi-
tional gestures of greeting and parting—bows, kisses, handshakes, embraces; 
these are in essence messages of peace, tentative nonaggression pacts and 
symbolic sublimations of aggression or sexuality (I kiss you rather than bite 
you; shake your hand rather than my fist, or spear; embrace you rather than 
squeeze the life out of you—or indeed leave you alone). The moment of 
meeting or parting involves first and foremost the establishment of a rela-
tion between bodies, a tactful/tactile interface of surfaces (grôtjan ultimately 
appears to derive from “the Germanic root *grôt- …, an extension of the 
root which appears in Greek as χρY with the sense ‘to approach closely, 
touch’”6). When one embraces, kisses, shakes hands, or even waves at the 
other, first and foremost one is sharing one’s body with the other—sharing 
one’s being-body, vulnerable and finite, with the vulnerable and finite other.
Connectedly, if more mundanely, salutations work to establish or at least 
confirm hierarchy or social rank; they ascertain belonging or nonbelonging 
to a given community, as well as degrees of intimacy or closeness within that 
community. And, while much here is pre-scripted (based on context, gender, 
age, status, and the like) and can be more or less taken for granted, a good 
deal remains up to the local nuances of a situation. (Indeed, this negotiation 
is the essence of tact; as Adorno writes, it is “the reconciliation—actually 
impossible—between the unauthorized claims of convention and the unruly 
ones of the individual” that constitutes tact, which “is the discrimination of 
differences”).7 There are minute decisions to be made all the time, delicate 
spatial and temporal calibrations: Is it going to be a handshake or have we 
graduated to a hug or a kiss? Who decides—who extends the hand first, what 
is the moment juste to lean forward for the kiss or to raise oneself up from the 
bow or curtsy? (This is why these moments are so frequently so awkward.) 
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These are decisions with a dramaturgic component; and one is often half-
aware of the scripted and performative aspect of greetings and partings, of 
an odd sense of being observed at these junctures—observed, and compared: 
the gradations of one’s greeting or parting are always set in relation to those 
of others.
Salutations are thus an important part of what Aufidius calls “the hospitable 
canon” (Coriolanus, 1.11.26);8 yet they tend to pass under the critical radar 
because they are apparently so unremarkable—ordinary, if perhaps modish, for-
malities, ornamentations to get past so that one can engage with the meat of the 
encounter. As Hamlet puts it, “th’appurtenance of welcome is fashion and cere-
mony” (Hamlet, 2.2.372–373): that which belongs to (or is  supplementary to) 
welcome is implicitly mere (passing) fashion and  (formulaic) ceremony. Like a 
well-placed “comma ’tween their amities” (5.2.43), a well-executed salutation 
is meant to go unnoticed. But the  (linguistic and gestural) rhetoric of greetings 
and partings was far from being overlooked in Renaissance England, where 
we find these ceremonies frequently commented upon: deployed extensively 
and self-consciously, and critiqued as hyperbolical or unnecessary or overelab-
orate. That Theseus can make fun of his underlings’ intentions to “greet [him] 
with premeditated welcomes” (A  Midsummer Night’s Dream, 5.1.94), or that 
Goneril refers disparagingly to France’s  “compliment of leave-taking” (King 
Lear, 1.1.292) only underlines the point: these mini- ceremonies may be easily 
dismissed or ridiculed, but they are noticed. The period from, say,  Erasmus’s 
pedagogical writings to the end of the  seventeenth century witnessed a height-
ened alertness to the significance of these formulae. One can see this, for exam-
ple, in the conduct (and letter- writing)  manuals: Erasmus’s Colloquies—one of 
the formative pedagogical texts of early modernity— begins with pages upon 
pages of precepts and examples of greetings and partings; a glance at the enor-
mous variety and subtlety of possible greetings and farewells such as that we 
find in Angel Day’s English Secretarie is revealing. It is also visible in the peri-
od’s travel literature, which often defamiliarizes norms of greeting and parting 
by drawing a contrast between the overelaborate gestures and empty rheto-
ric of European salutations, and the more straightforward or honest greetings 
and partings of other cultures; or in numerous theological tracts, to which I’ll 
return in a moment.
As just one telling indicator of the heightened attention paid by early 
modern people to salutations, take the emphasis placed by the Quakers on 
abjuring the formalities of greeting. The men and women who rejected what 
they called “idle, foolish, good-for-nought, Ceremonious Salutations,”9 in the 
name of both a disavowal of hierarchy and a sort of emotional purity, were 
regularly derided, beaten, fined, and imprisoned for their refusal to conform:
O the rage and scorn, the heat and fury that arose! Oh, the blows, punch-
ings, beatings, and imprisonings that we underwent for not putting off 
our hats to men … though it was but a small thing in the eye of man, 
yet a wonderful confusion it brought among all professors and priests.10
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Although formal salutation is repeatedly referred to in the Quakers’ writings 
as “such a trivial Thing,” “a “thing of small importance”11—on both sides, 
Quakers and oppressors, one can clearly see that what occurs at these junc-
tures really matters. The excessive rage to which nonobservance of norms of 
greeting and parting leads can be taken as evidence of the peculiar purchase 
of these mini-rituals, and also, perhaps, of the very violence that salutations 
are designed to hold at bay.
The Quakers’ focus upon salutations was, in fact, in no way an aberra-
tion in early modern religious debate: the period’s theological tracts and 
sermons are full of comment and controversy regarding these little rituals. 
Indeed, once one begins to contemplate the New Testament with an ear to 
these matters, the prominent place of salutations in the narrative of Jesus’s 
life becomes striking: the most dramatic points of the Gospel stories are 
punctuated by marked greetings. It is with an Ave that Jesus’s entry into 
the world is announced, closely followed in Luke by the narrative of the 
Visitation (the yet-unborn John the Baptist reacts to Mary’s greeting, we are 
told twice; as Elizabeth says: “For lo, as soon as the voice of thy salutation 
sounded in mine ears, the babe leaped in my womb for joy” [Luke 1:44; 
cf. Luke 1:41]); it is with conspicuous greetings—Judas’s kiss and “Ave, 
Rabbi” (or “Hail Master”), and the mob’s “scornfull salutation,”12 “Hail, 
King of the Jews!”—that Jesus’s betrayal is accomplished. It is with a kind 
of nongreeting, or rather the rejection of a gesture of greeting (“noli me 
tangere” [John 20:17]), that Jesus encounters Mary Magdalene, and with 
an emphatic triple greeting—“Pax vobis,” “Peace be unto you” (John 20:19, 
21, 26)—that he marks his return. Of this last postresurrection moment, 
Lancelot Andrewes declares:
Salutation is the very substance of the text: the rest but appendent, 
all. […] The speech, of it selfe, is a Salutation: any will so conceive it, at 
the first hearing. And, if it were but so, and no more; that, were enough. 
CHRIST’s salutations are not (as ours be) formall; but, good matter in 
them […] no sooner risen, but pax vobis. Apertio labiorum, “the very 
opening of His lips” was with these words; the first words at the first 
meeting, on the very first day. It is a sign it is so in His heart. That which 
most grieveth us, we first complain of; and that which most affecteth 
us, ever soonest speak of. This is the first error. That which was first 
with Christ, is last with Christians, and I would it were so last.13
Jesus’s life is thus narratologically framed by salutations. And the liturgi-
cal tradition adds to the gospels a focus upon Christ’s final leave-taking 
both from his mother and from the apostles. Renaissance artists were 
tireless in their depictions of these moments of greeting and parting—the 
 Annunciation, the Visitation, the leave-taking from Mary and the  Apostles, 
the Noli me tangere, and the Pax Vobis. Worth noting, too, are Christ’s 
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injunctions to “salute no man by the way” (Luke 10:4) and “when ye come 
into an house, salute it” (Matthew 10:12), implicitly constructing a kind 
of hospitality canon. All these were much debated in sixteenth- century 
theological writings, as were Paul’s oft-repeated instruction to greet those 
who are friendly to Christ’s doctrines (“salute them with an holy kiss” 
[Romans 16:16; 2 Corinthians 13:12; 1 Thessalonians 5:26]) and not to 
greet those who “bring not this doctrine”: “For he that biddeth him God 
speed is partaker of his evil deeds” (2 John 10–11). Salutations also play a 
central role in Paul’s epistles (“The salutation of Paul with mine own hand, 
which is the token in every epistle” [2 Thessalonians 3:17]); indeed, these 
sometimes consist of little more than a bare greeting (most usually Gratia 
vobis et pax) – as Andrewes writes of the pax vobis, “Salutation is the very 
substance of the text.” It is part of the legacy of all these marked and signifi-
cant salutations that the pax, the dominus vobiscum, and the osculum pacis 
are such central components of Catholic liturgy.
The most prominent biblical salutation, however, is the Ave Maria; and 
this greeting is what I want to focus on for the remainder of this essay. As 
commentators have insisted since the early Middle Ages, it was the Ave 
itself that reversed the trajectory of sin set in motion by the biblical Eve. In 
liturgy, song and prayer, hymns, and antiphons, what remains remarkably 
consistent throughout the many variations is the “ave” (or, alternatively, 
“salve”): Ave Maris Stella, Ave Domina, Salve Regina; it is the opening 
salutation that rings through the centuries.14 As one prominent counter- 
Reformation writer, Anthony Stafford, puts it, “omnis terra revibrat Ave” 
(“All the world reverberates with Ave”).15 Throughout the middle ages 
and early modernity, theologians got significant mileage from Gabriel’s 
Ave, finding in its three letters “the three persons [of the] holy Trinity—A, 
altitudo patris; V, veritas filly; and E, aeternitas spiritus sancti”—or spu-
riously tracing the etymology of the word: “Some Fryers have profoundly 
derived Ave of (A) privatively taken, and ve, quasi sine va, that is without 
woe” (in fact ave derives from the imperative form of avere “to be or fare 
well”).16 The hopes raised by Gabriel’s Ave are encapsulated by its reversal 
of the woe brought into the world by Eve, a play on words endlessly reit-
erated in these tracts:
QU: What three Letters are those that make us both Bondmen and Free?
ANS: They are EVA, which inverted, are Ave, the Angels Salutation.17
Robert Southwell’s “The Virgin’s Salutation” follows a myriad of writers 
over the centuries who rework this Eva–Ave jingle:
Spell Eva backe and Ave shall you finde,
The first began, the last reverst our harmes,
An Angels Ave disinchants the charmes …18
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Here as so often, it is the salutation that seems to be the agent of “disin-
chant[ing]” the fallen world, undoing the evil spell under which the world 
has been laboring: the focus is upon the greeting rather than the content of 
the message Gabriel brings.19
The Annunciation was frequently depicted in the mystery cycles, as well 
as in other ritualistic forms of commemoration of this narrative, especially 
in the mass. In many of these there is a similar emphasis upon the Ave, the 
moment of salutation. For example, in one sixteenth-century arrangement 
of the Annunciation Mass (at Tournai), the high point is the singing of the 
words Ave, gratia plena, during which “Gabriel bows to Mary thrice”;20 
in the Coventry Cycle (which Shakespeare was likely to have witnessed),21 
the narrator figure (Contemplacion) instructs the audience: “lystenyth, sove-
reynes, here is a conclusyon: / how the Ave was mad[e] here is lernyd us,” 
and ends the play with the words: “With Ave we begunne and Ave is oure 
conclusyon, /AVE REGINA C[A]ELORUM, to oure ladye we synge.”22
Gabriel’s Ave became the focus of heated controversy in the course of 
the Reformation. Protestant polemicists vehemently rejected the Catholic 
use of the angel’s salutation as a prayer; for them, this “doltish custome”23 
was a scandalous misconstrual of the words of the bible, “mak[ing] a pop-
ish Orizon, of an Angelike salutation.”24 Taking their cue from Calvin—
“ very grosse is the folly of the Papistes, which as it were by a magicall 
coniuring, have turned this salutation into a prayer [… For] they salute one 
that is absent”25—the Reformers debated two closely related issues; that 
of intercession, and that of Mary’s purported sinlessness (symbolized by 
her virginity):
[W]e may see how grossely the Papists are besotted in martyring 
(that I may use Luther’s word) the Angels salutation to Marie. For, 
1. whereas a salutation is a civil thing, they have turned this into a 
devout praier. 2. not to Marie whome the words concerned alone, but 
unto God at whose hands the repeating of it meriteth pardon of many 
sinnes. 3. whereas salutation is to be done to a partie present among 
us, this saluteth one absent. 4. whereas it was the angels dutie to carrie 
this message once to Marie; they thrust everie man and woman into 
the Angels office, to carrie the same message everie moment; as if it 
were a thing not alreadie accomplished. 5. what further good can they 
wish to Marie now in heaven: But they have despised the wisedome of 
God; and what wisedom can be in them?26
Protestant theologians over and over argued that the Ave cannot be a prayer 
either for Mary or to Mary. In the first case, praying for Mary shows that 
she was not free from sin (as the Catholics claimed), for (as John Boys 
writes) “if in her life shee was full of grace, and free from all sinne as they 
teach impiously; then assuredly she did not need any prayer of man or 
Angell.” Praying to Mary turns her into an intercessor, contradicting the 
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central Reformation tenet of sola fide, sola gratia and approaching idolatry. 
Protestant theologians asserted that saluting anything that cannot return 
the salutation, or anything that is not present—a statue, a saint, or dead 
person— implicitly renders the object an idol (hence the same goes for the 
All-hailing of the cross). The Reformers’ critique of the saluting of what is 
absent gives implicit emphasis to the way in which salutation demands direct 
engagement; concomitantly, it brings out a key element in almost all early 
modern discussions of salutations, that of the importance of mutuality: that 
greetings must be “enterchangeable” or “reciprocall”27 is something repeat-
edly stressed both in the courtesy manuals and in many theological tracts 
of the period. This question of mutuality is part of the reason that writers 
of this period insist that salutations are necessarily sublunary exchanges; 
as the seventeenth-century poet and lawyer Marc Lescarbot writes: “God 
saluteth no body: for it belongeth to him to give salvation, and not to wish 
it by praier.”28
It is worth noting that the Ave is sometimes referred to as “the angel’s 
salutation” and sometimes as “the virgin’s salutation.” The vacillation may 
serve to remind us of two things: First, the question of who is in a position to 
salute here—from what place, and in what capacity, can one offer hospitality 
to the other? What gives one the right to welcome? These are questions that 
Derrida has posed acutely, and we will return to them later. Second, refer-
ring to Gabriel’s Ave as “the virgin’s salutation” should serve to remind us 
that in the gospel narrative (and later representations) Mary is not recorded 
as returning the greeting; she is so “troubled at [Gabriel’s] saying” that all 
she can do is “cast in her mind what manner of salutation this should be” 
(Luke 1:29). Her silence may be taken to underline the uncalled-for nature 
of Gabriel’s arrival, and hence its potentially  traumatizing effect. It is (in 
Derrida’s terms) “the unforeseeable and irresistible irruption of a visitation” 
rather than the result of “the hospitality of invitation.”29 As the myriad 
medieval and Renaissance depictions emphasize, the moment is, first of all, 
a crossing of a boundary; it is a radically disruptive moment: Mary is often 
depicted in artistic representations as appearing to be shocked by the arrival 
of the angel, almost invariably she is interrupted (while  reading—usually a 
book of prayer—or sometimes while weaving).30 Mary’s stunned  (Erasmus 
describes her as “dismayed”)31 nonresponse is emphasized in many of the 
late medieval dramatizations of the Annunciation. In the N-Town cycle, for 
example, Gabriel “makyth a lytyl restynge and mary be-holdyth hym.”32 The 
dramatist here, writes Gail Gibson, “risks stillness and silence to enforce his 
point”: the Angel’s Ave is followed by a “charged and expectant silence.”33
From a theological point of view, the Annunciation is so important a 
moment in Christian thought because, of course, it marks the entry into 
history of the salvation of humanity. In nearly all its representations, this 
interruptive crossing of a threshold receives great attention. There is a close 
connection between Mary’s (Catholic) role as intercessor and the mes-
sage that crosses the divide—intercedes—between the angel and the virgin. 
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As Subha Mukherji has written, “the mythical moment [of the  Annunciation] 
is realised at a threshold … between invitation and invasion, hospitality and 
occupation.”34 It is at the threshold of the arrival of the Christian world. 
The column (or other architectural feature) that symbolically divides the 
Angel Gabriel from Mary in so many Annunciation scenes, as Georges 
Didi- Huberman argues, “marks both the uncrossable distance and myste-
rious journey through which the Incarnation has crossed every conceivable 
threshold” (the wordplay here—“conceivable”—emphasizes the almost 
 literally inseminating capacity of the Ave).35 But could not something simi-
lar be said of every meeting? As I began by suggesting, there is always some 
unbridgeable distance to be crossed, an element of radical uncertainty, even 
mystery, to the journey made when the paths of two human beings intersect. 
The Annunciation is thus a paradigmatic meeting—this is one of the sources 
of its power. Christopher Pye, calling the Annunciation “the ur- instance of 
subjective interpellation in western culture,”36 draws attention to the thresh-
old between viewer and scene featured in so many Annunciation depictions: 
“the combination of perspective recessions and flattened planes seems at 
once to draw us in and bring us up short.”37 And while it is usual to read 
these threshold-crossings theologically, as representations of the mysteries 
of the incarnation, one might also be reminded here of the way in which 
all greetings (and partings) at once “draw us in and bring us up short.” One 
could say that Mary’s nonresponse brings out the element of incommensu-
rability in all greetings.38
Early modern writers played with the etymological relation between sal-
vation and salutation (indeed the latter is just one letter away from salua-
tion in its most common Renaissance printhouse form):39 both words derive 
from the Latin salus, meaning “health” (as both hail and holy derive from 
the Old English halig, “health or wholeness,” something of which Heidegger 
makes hay). Indeed, Renaissance theological treatises and tracts often link 
the rituals of proper and heartfelt greeting to one’s own salvation (as does 
Shakespeare’s Corin, by implication, when he speaks of “find[ing] the way 
to heaven / By doing deeds of hospitality” [As You Like It, 2.5.83–85]). 
As William Phiston’s The schoole of good manners (1595) puts it, “a rever-
ent show in countenance or maner of greeting … is a signe of God’s great 
lasting favour, and of everlasting life in heaven.”40 In trying to understand 
the enormous emphasis placed in this period upon greetings, and especially 
upon Gabriel’s salutation, it may be helpful to turn to Derrida’s various 
writings on the word salut. Like those many early modern theologians, 
 Derrida plays on the common root of salutation and salvation, but he does 
this in order to make an argument for the ethical necessity of greeting as 
offering something like the opposite of salvation. He writes of
the double sense of the word “salut,” the greeting which one addresses 
to the other and the salvation which saves: the salut, on the one hand 
as a call launched … and on the other hand, the salut of salvation. 
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The two saluts greet each other from nearby or from afar, one like the 
other, one operating and co-operating in the other which remains nev-
ertheless apart, a sort of homonym or metonymical doublet.41
But for Derrida there is an irreducible difference between these two saluts: 
salut-as-salvation manifests an impossible (if all too human) desire to be 
immune—from death, disease, the thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir 
to; salut-as-greeting is an unconditional opening to the other, a receiving 
(accueillir) without presupposition or guarantee, “a benediction without 
any hope of salvation, an ex-hoped-for [exespéré] salve, an incalculable, 
unrepresentable salutation in advance renouncing Salvation.”42 As Derrida 
reiterates elsewhere: “the salut to the other ([Heidegger’s] Gruss, greeting) 
must suspend all assurance or all promise of salut as that which saves.”43 
True greeting “open[s] oneself to an other who can always cause harm or 
do evil”;44 and it is also an open-ended salut to “the other recognized as 
mortal, finite, in a state of neglect [à l’abandon].”45 In relations between 
human beings, unlike in relations between divinities and humans, there can 
be no guarantee of health or safety; all one can hope for is reciprocation. 
This suspension of (salvific) assurance, and the attendant anxiety, lies at 
the heart of all human salutation—as does the yearning to transcend these 
uncertainties. Derrida repeatedly calls for this kind of earthbound, nontele-
ological salut derived from, and dependent upon, the essential openness of 
our relations with others, a salutation “That has no relish of salvation in it” 
(Hamlet, 3.3.92). It is the essence of the unforeseeability or “opening,” as 
Derrida describes it, that hospitality enacts.46
There are at least two moments in Shakespeare where we might hear 
an echo of the Ave Maria.47 First, there is Lucio’s salacious greeting upon 
accosting Isabella the novice in her nunnery: “Hail virgin, if you be …” 
(Measure for Measure, 1.4.16). Perhaps Lucio is (as is his wont) casting 
aspersions, or perhaps he is implying that a virgin, in this Vienna, is akin 
to a miracle; certainly, conception in this play could hardly be further from 
immaculate. (It is interesting to note in this context that the penultimate 
claim in the central accusatory document against Christopher Marlowe 
(usually referred to as the Baines libel) is that the playwright is said to have 
declared “[t]hat the Angell Gabriell was Baud to the holy ghost, because he 
brought the salutation to Mary”; Marlowe’s alleged joke, like Lucio’s, plays 
on the scandalous potential of salutations to be sexualized). In any event, 
Lucio arrives at the nunnery aiming to elicit Isabella’s intercession with 
Angelo in order to save her brother, so that the referencing of the annuncia-
tion is hardly irrelevant. (The name Lucio in this context may evoke Lucifer, 
the fallen angel, as well as perhaps Luke, the gospel source of the Ave Maria; 
he himself is acting here as intercessor vis-à-vis an Angel[o].) It is also worth 
recalling that the dissolution of the monasteries and nunneries in England 
was closely linked to the disengagement from Mariolatry; hence the evoca-
tion of the annunciatory moment has a peculiar poignancy in this context. 
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Perhaps “Hail virgin, if you be” means not only “I hail you as a virgin (but 
am skeptical of your virginity)” but also “I hail you if you are a virgin—if 
not, there’s no point in my hailing you, since you can’t serve as an interces-
sor if you’re not immaculate.” (Si peccatrix, non deprecatrix, as the Reform-
ers’ tag went: if a sinner, not an intercessor (deprecatrix: “one pleading for 
mercy”); more on this hereafter.48
And then there is Cassio’s greeting to Desdemona in Cyprus:
O, behold!
The riches of the ship is come on shore!
You men of Cyprus, let her have your knees.
Hail to thee, lady! and the grace of heaven,
Before, behind thee, and on every hand,
Enwheel thee round!
(Othello, 2.1.82–86)
Thomas Rymer’s scathing critique of this speech—“In the name of phrenzy, 
what means this Souldier? or would he talk thus, if he meant any thing at 
all?”49—can alert us to the oddness of Cassio’s greeting. We might here recall 
that it is this particular scene, even more than the notorious handkerchief, 
that caused Rymer to fulminate and accuse Shakespeare of “un- hallowing 
the theatre, profaning the name of tragedy” in Othello.50 Alongside the 
“phrenzy” of Cassio’s praise, it is Desdemona’s subsequent off-color banter 
with Iago that incensed Rymer (and has perplexed many critics and audi-
ences since). Indeed, the barely buried Marian undercurrent of Cassio’s 
 salutation seems utterly out of place here: Cassio is no angel, Desdemona no 
Virgin Mary (though, pertinently, she may—or may not—still be a virgin); 
the Ave here is uttered not by the one arriving but by the one who is already 
there (though he has himself just arrived). I am far from the first, however, 
to see in these words an echo of the Ave Maria. Peter  Milward labels it a 
“remarkable” echo of the Annunciation; E. A. J. Honigmann suggests that 
Cassio’s welcome “comes close to being a ‘Hail Mary’”; Chris Hassell sees 
“Cassio’s extraordinary salutation and praise of Desdemona” as a “Marian 
allusion.”51 It is worth recalling here, too, that both Gioachino Rossini and 
Giuseppe Verdi saw fit to add an Ave Maria to their respective Othellos.52 
(In both, the Ave functions, interestingly, not as a greeting but as a parting.) 
Indeed, in Verdi’s opera, Desdemona’s aria follows hard upon her passionate 
parting from Emilia; in its stillness and pathos, it is one of the most moving 
moments in his masterpiece.
Verdi—along with his librettist, Piero Boito—chose to open his great 
opera at this juncture (act 2, scene 1). The scene of staggered arrivals in 
Cyprus gives us a kind of smorgasbord of greetings—the businesslike, the 
rushed, the naval, the courtly, the heartfelt, and the hyperbolical. What we 
have been led to expect at the close of act 1 is a meeting in the military 
sense, a martial encounter; instead, we get a series of joyful, quasi-amatory 
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reunions. The greetings appear to mark a watershed, a transition from the 
influence of Mars to that of Venus. Each of the arriving ships gives the tra-
ditional naval salute, letting off a cannon: “They do discharge their shot 
of courtesy” (2.1.57); “They give their greeting to the citadel” (l.94). Here 
again, the veil that covers the potential violence in every encounter is thin.
The multiple greetings in this scene evoke in particularly sharp form the 
problem of who is in a position to welcome as well as some of the other 
enigmas of welcoming—their liberality (in every sense) and inherent power 
plays. Derrida writes of “the danger of … usurpation” in every welcoming 
speech act:
To dare to say welcome is perhaps to insinuate that one is at home 
here, that one knows what it means to be at home, and that at home 
one receives, invites, or offers hospitality, thus appropriating for one-
self a place to welcome [accueillir] the other, or, worse, welcoming the 
other in order to appropriate for oneself a place and then speak the 
language of hospitality.53
Here, the Cypriots themselves are hardly in a position to be full hosts, since 
the island is a military garrison occupied by the Venetian state (though this 
also means that they are, oxymoronically, essentially obligated to provide 
hospitality).54 The order of the Venetian fleet’s arrival (first Cassio, then 
Desdemona, accompanied by Iago and Emilia, and finally Othello), as well 
as the fact that they are all guests in a foreign land, adds to this sense that 
no one here is in a position properly to occupy the role of host. This is, as 
Derrida argues, inherent to the notion of the host: Cassio is, precisely, both 
host and guest or stranger, an embodiment of the original etymology of 
the Latin hospes as described in Emile Benveniste’s classic study of Indo- 
European language and society.55 The questions (From what place can one 
offer hospitality? What gives one the right to welcome?) are never far from 
the surface of the opening scene of Othello’s second act.
Why does Shakespeare conjure with the Ave Maria at this juncture? 
 Certainly, there is hyperbole, idealization—even idolization—in Cassio’s 
elaborate flourish of greeting. As Neill writes, “it is not simply Cassio’s 
habit of courtly hyperbole that licenses the lieutenant to dress [Desdemona] 
in the poetry of Marian adoration.”56 The rhetoric is part of the religious 
discourse that permeates the entire play and that often raises Desdemona 
to a quasi-divine position. But more specifically, and keeping in mind the 
framework of the central Reformation controversies about the Ave Maria, 
we can say that Cassio’s salutation does two things: it puts (or rather keeps) 
in our minds the unresolved question of Desdemona’s virginity, and it places 
“the divine Desdemona” in the position of potential intercessor. The issue 
of Desdemona’s virginity, and hence of the meaning of virginity as such in 
the world of Othello, is a matter Shakespeare is careful to maintain hover-
ing at the edges of our consciousness throughout the play. Janet Adelman’s 
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description of Othello’s handkerchief as “a talisman that guarantees both 
virginity and its loss” moves toward a potential identification of Desdemona 
with the Virgin Mary: “the handkerchief increasingly becomes a fetishistic 
representation of specifically maternal virginity as the impossible condi-
tion of male desire.”57 Analyzing “Othello’s need for Desdemona to remain 
intact,” Adelman adds that her (imminent or accomplished) loss of virginity 
means that she “can no longer be the vessel of his perfection,” the signi-
fier of his intactness or wholeness.58 “Had she been true,” says Othello—
after he has killed his wife—he would not have sold her for “such another 
world / Of one entire and perfect chrysolite” (5.2.143–144). His imagery in 
act 5—the chrysolite, the discarded pearl (5.2.342–344), the “monumental 
 alabaster” (5.2.5)—repeatedly depicts Desdemona in such terms of entirety 
and unbroken perfection, a kind of statue that is, ipso facto, virgo intacta. 
She represents for Othello (and not only for Othello) something “intact, 
uncontaminated,” in Stanley Cavell’s descriptive phrase.59 (In his essay on 
the play, Cavell interrogates “Othello’s placing of a finite woman in the 
place made and left by Descartes for God.”60)
It is the idea of Desdemona as somehow “entire and perfect” that gives 
Iago his opening—he sees that the idealization can hardly help but collapse 
in the face of flesh-and-blood reality. Cassio’s Ave Desdemona opens the 
door to Iago’s concomitant debasement just a few lines later: you women, 
he says, are “saints in your injuries, devils being offended” (2.1.109), which 
we could gloss as introducing Cassio to the notion that (all) women have 
injuries—they aren’t intact (and, being offended, they offend—they aren’t 
sinless). (Compare the Protestant theologian Boys: “The whole neede not 
a Physitio[n], saith Christ: but Marie calles for a salue, therefore surely she 
had some sore.”61) We might similarly view Desdemona’s subsequent banter 
with Iago as implicitly aimed at negating the (desexualizing) idealization of 
Cassio’s greeting. We can see Iago’s modus operandi in what he is able to do 
with the simple gestures of greeting in 2.1. Note that he, like the Quakers 
and their oppressors, precisely indicates both the triviality of the gestures 
of courtly greeting and their potentially momentous implications: “with as 
little a web as this I will ensnare as great a fly as Cassio” (l.166). His brac-
ing commentary takes advantage of the way the courtesies of greeting can 
look like courtship, and courtship can be made to appear close to a sexual 
advance. It is noticeable how easily Iago slides from “courtesy” (l.99) to 
“courtship”—“I will gyve thee in thine own courtship” (l.167)—and back 
to “courtesy” (l.172). Greetings involve the preliminary  establishment of a 
relationship between surfaces or exteriors, a delicate negotiation of distance 
and proximity; Iago, in his evocation of “clyster-pipes” (l.174), almost phys-
ically transforms the gestures of salutation into the rawly penetrative. Not 
that Iago undoes the alienation implicit in Cassio’s greeting of  Desdemona; 
he merely reverses it—turns it inside out. As Adorno writes: “Estrangement 
shows itself precisely in the elimination of distance between people. For 
only as long as they abstain from importuning one another … is there space 
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enough between them for the delicate connecting filigree of external forms in 
which alone the internal can crystallize.”62 Iago’s  “little … web” (1.168), 
of course, aims to ensnare, or to hyperconnect, which amounts to the same 
thing: alienation rather than connection. If Cassio’s repeated gesture of 
kissing his three fingers is a displacement from kissing the other (the lady 
herself), Iago reverses the (upward) displacement, focusing attention back 
(down) onto what kissing itself attempts to displace, namely, the crudest or 
most carnal aspect of relations: “Yet again, your fingers to your lips? Would 
they were clyster-pipes for your sake” (ll.173–174).63  Greetings, for Iago’s 
purposes, are no more than “an index and obscure prologue to the history of 
lust and foul thoughts” (ll.249–50). If Cassio’s Ave creates an infinite space 
between himself and Desdemona, Iago collapses that delicate establishment 
of tactful space (“that fine mesh”) essential to all greetings (and partings). 
It is precisely in and through the gestures of courtly greeting in this scene 
that Iago finds sexuality: “They met so near with their lips that their breaths 
embraced together. Villainous thoughts” (ll.250–2). Like all of Iago’s insin-
uations, Othello eventually takes on this idea, for example, in the image 
of “[t]he bawdy wind, that kisses all it meets” (4.2.78);  compare Leontes’s 
maddened collapsing of “leaning cheek to cheek …  meeting noses … Kiss-
ing with inside lip” (and so forth) with “note[s]  infallible / Of breaking 
honesty.”64
It is as if the play is working something out, through Iago’s debasement of 
Cassio’s Marian homage to Desdemona, about the very concept of a Blessed 
Virgin, understanding its meaning on the basis of a diagnosis of the inverse 
of the fantasy. Cassio’s Ave Maria places Desdemona on a pedestal, relink-
ing the matter of virginity to a soteriological framework: his “Hail to thee, 
lady! and the grace of heaven,” in invoking the best-known form of the Ave 
Maria (gratia plenis), puts this issue in the context of the Virgin’s purported 
status as impeccabilis. Peter Brown, tracing the emergence and power of 
the idea of the perpetual virginity of Mary in medieval Christianity, shows 
how Mary’s virginity “stood for all that was unbroken and sacred in the 
world”—all that could remain unscathed (in particular by sexuality).65 
Eamon Duffy describes the “elaborate appeal [in late medieval English 
Christianity] to Mary and John the Evangelist precisely in their character as 
inviolate virgins”: “the dynamic of such prayers was not designed primarily 
to present the chastity of the saint as a model, but as providing the basis 
of their intercessory power.”66 The Virgin’s unscathedness is the source of 
her sacred power. Herein lies the link between virginity, intercession, and 
salvation. It is by virtue of being herself unscathed that Mary is able to 
offer the hope of such wholeness to humanity, and thus to be positioned as 
intercessor. We might here recall that for Derrida, what lies at the heart of 
the need for salvation is the desire to become “the intact, the unscathed, the 
safe (heilig).”67
Cassio’s Ave in Cyprus suggests that she symbolizes for him something 
along these lines, positioning her as a Mary-figure and implicitly endowing 
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her with the power of salvation. (Certainly, Shakespeare goes out of his 
way to represent Cassio elsewhere as thinking in salvific terms: “Well, God’s 
above all, and there be souls must be saved, and there be souls must not be 
saved … I hope to be saved … the lieutenant is to be saved before the ensign” 
[2.3.94–102].) The hyperbolic greeting comes immediately after Cassio has 
linked Desdemona with both safety and guiltlessness. He has just described 
the storm in the following way:
Tempests themselves, high seas, and howling winds,
The guttered rocks and congregated sands,
Traitors enscarped to clog the guiltless keel,
As having sense of beauty do omit
Their mortal natures, letting go safely by
The divine Desdemona.
(2.1.68–73)
The guiltlessness is transposed from Desdemona to the ship carrying her 
(“Guiltiness I know not,” she says on her deathbed [5.2.38]). If “omit / Their 
mortal natures” means that the murderous seas, winds, and rocks cease to be 
death-dealing, it also carries the implication that the nature of being mortal 
can somehow be omitted—the quintessence of salvific thinking. (The speech 
might also be taken as offering some insight into the  relation between 
 aesthetics—“As having sense of beauty”—and such thinking.) “The divine 
Desdemona” escapes “safely”—intact, unscathed. Sticking with Desdemona 
here might seem to offer safe passage; at this point neither we nor Cassio 
know whether Othello has escaped the mortal nature of the tempest (or 
indeed whether Desdemona is still a virgin). Here it is Desdemona who is 
implicitly positioned as the savior with whom one might throw in one’s 
lot—not Othello, the martial hero.
Northrop Frye, in his work on Romance, brings a different perspective to 
bear on the idea of virginity, but with similar conclusions: “What is symbol-
ized as a virgin [in Romance] is actually a human conviction … that there 
is something at the core of one’s infinitely fragile being which is not only 
immortal but has discovered the secret of invulnerability that eludes the 
tragic hero”68 (and especially, we might speculate in the context of Othello, 
the potentially circumcised tragic hero).69 Thus, it may be that the final 
nail in Desdemona’s coffin lies in her response to Othello’s “What, not a 
whore? … No, as I shall be saved” (4.2.86). It is an exchange that precisely 
pinpoints the delicate relation between salvific thinking and sexual purity 
or intactness. For from the point of view of Mariolatrous thinking, or from 
that of Frye’s Romantic hero, this is, so to speak, the wrong—the worst 
possible—answer: it is not so much that it shows that she is not looking to 
Othello (but rather to Christ) to save her; it is, more crucially, that at some 
level Othello has needed her to offer safety—to save him, not to be saved. 
Recall: “My life upon her faith” (1.3.295). “To make his ‘life’ depend upon 
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‘her faith’ is already to hold her responsible for anything that may hap-
pen,” writes Harry Berger.70 Here again, we might imagine Othello thinking, 
“if she needs saving, she can hardly be impeccabilis, free of sin—is no vir-
gin—must be a whore.” This is close to the logic of Protestant theologians 
vis-à-vis Mary:
He that hath no sinne, wants not a Saviour: … Our Advocate is our 
propitiation for sinne: but the propitiation for sinne, knew no sinne. 
Ergo, quae egebat, non agebat advocatum. And therefore Mary, who 
needed a Saviour her selfe, could not be a saviour of other.71
The emotional investment in Desdemona, by both Othello and Cassio, is 
too great—it can only function on the basis that she is beyond sin, beyond 
sexuality, beyond the human.
In making Desdemona a demi-goddess, Cassio denies her (sinful or error-
prone or just unideal) humanity, just as devotees of the Virgin Mary thought 
her “not to be considered as a meere woman, but as a Type, or an Idea 
of an Accomplished piety.”72 But as Kenneth Burke reminds us, Cassio’s 
 “reverence for Desdemona is matched by his cynical attitude to Bianca”73—
either way, the real, imperfect person in front of him is avoided. (From this 
perspective, the old misogyny of virgin or whore is rooted in, is one version 
of, a refusal or inability to see the female other as a person.) And if treating 
the other as a type is one way of avoiding the other, using intercessors is 
another. If one function of Cassio’s greeting is to create distance by rais-
ing Desdemona to a quasi-divine status, its second crucial function is to 
place Desdemona in the position of potential intercessor; it thus implicates 
the problem of indirectness in relations with others. Already here, before 
Iago has begun to exert his influence, and also before Cassio has reason 
to think he has need of intercession—he implicitly positions Desdemona 
as mediatrix. If you are, in Cassio’s odd phrasing, “enwheel[ed] round” 
(“Before, behind thee, and on every hand”) by “the grace of heaven,” you 
might not be deemed very approachable. Nor does “let her have your knees” 
sit very well beside  Levinas’s “uprightness of the welcome made to the 
face.”74 Coleridge called this strange greeting “Cassio’s … perfectly disen-
gaged praise of  Desdemona,”75 for it is at precisely the moment of potential 
engagement—the moment of greeting—that he wheels away from the flesh-
and-blood  person entering the scene.
It is also particularly noticeable, in this scene of multiple greetings, that 
Cassio and Othello are the only significant characters who do not greet 
each other—at all. In a scene of so many greetings, why should this be so? 
This is surely not a matter of mere dramatic expediency, for it is linked to a 
second, far more consequential question: Why, after the nighttime debacle in 
Cyprus, does Cassio not go directly to Othello with an apology and a plea for 
reinstatement? It is, I suggest, this habit of nonengagement or indirectness, 
rather than his “bestial” weakness for alcohol or his courtly pretensions, 
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which is the central cause of his downfall (compare Polonius’s fondness for 
“indirection,” or Duke Vincentio’s dubious, devious methods, or Pandarus’s 
unpalatable role as go-between).76 It is of course Iago who convinces him 
to address Othello via Desdemona, but his “Hail to thee, Lady” can hardly 
be attributed to Iago’s scheming. Cassio’s rhetorical flourish of greeting is 
almost the first we see of him in the play; by 3.1 we can see that the use of 
mediators, especially upon greeting, is integral to his way of being in the 
world: “Masters, play here, I will content your pains; / Something that’s 
brief, and bid ‘Good morrow, general’” (3.1.1–2) he instructs the musicians 
outside Othello’s window, deploying them to sweeten the ear of his general 
(with—under the circumstances—a strikingly underpowered greeting). That 
this moment bears such close comparison with Cloten’s modus operandi (in 
Cymbeline, 2.3) is telling. A few lines later Cassio announces that “I have 
made bold, Iago, to send in / To your wife: my suit to her is that she will / To 
virtuous Desdemona procure me / Some access” (2.1.33–35). Bold he is not 
(“I have made bold” is surely a sly joke upon the speaker): Cassio deploys 
an intercessor even in approaching his chief intercessor. Indeed the Clown 
in this scene seems to divine this about Cassio and to make fun of the habit:
CASSION: Dost thou hear, mine honest friend?
CLOWN: No, I hear not your honest friend, I hear you.
(2.1.21–22)
By the time we see him “steal away so guilty-like” (3.3.38) at the immi-
nent arrival of Othello, we may be expecting to see him avoiding direct 
engagement. Admittedly, this is Iago’s tendentious description, but it is 
 Cassio who rejects Desdemona’s injunction that he stay: “Madam, I’ll 
take my leave … I am very ill at ease, and / Unfit for mine own purposes” 
(3.3.29–31). It is just this sense of being “[u]nfit for [his] own purposes”—of 
 having to rely on another for one’s salvation—that Iago manipulates to 
such devastating effect.
Indirection and intercession replace engagement at almost every turn in 
Othello, serving as a strategy of avoidance, a technique of evasion.  Cassio, 
Brabantio, Roderigo, the Duke of Venice, and of course Othello himself 
all place their faith in intermediaries, instead of approaching the other 
directly. The pattern or precedent for this use of mediators is set by Iago 
early on, indeed before the beginning of the play. In his opening exchange 
with  Roderigo we learn—the information seems gratuitous—that Iago 
himself has apparently deployed intercessors to approach Othello on his 
behalf: “Three great ones of the city, / In personal suit to make me his lieu-
tenant, / Off-capped to him” (1.1.7–9); but Othello “[n]onsuits my media-
tors” (l.1.16). Perhaps this failure has something to do with Iago becoming 
the play’s arch-intercessor, a sort of demonic version of a mediatrix. But 
Iago is not the only one who has been availing himself of mediators. As we 
discover halfway through the play, this precedent too has a precedent, for 
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Othello himself has deployed an intermediary throughout his wooing of 
Desdemona: “from first to last,” we learn, Cassio “went between us very 
oft” (3.3.97–102). What is this but a sign of his sense of his own insuffi-
ciency or unfitness for his own purposes?77
Critics have sometimes noticed the profoundly monadic nature of the 
characters in Othello. G. Wilson Knight described the play as a “mosaic” of 
isolated subjects and objects, in which the characters all possess an “inward 
aloofness.” Kenneth Burke’s reading finds in the play a representation of 
the estrangement inherent to the notion of property as such. A. P. Rossiter 
claims that the multiple triangulations in Othello add up to “an infernal 
trigonometry” where “the closeness of all the personae which looks like 
intimacy reveals, on examination, an intricate pattern of insulations.” Harry 
Berger, Jr., points to “the spectre of contaminated intimacy” that the play 
offers.78 To these one should add that the ease with which Iago is able 
to keep the other characters apart has an essential role in the play; what 
he draws on and controls so expertly is their willingness—their all-too- 
willingness—to be segregated from one another. It is largely because they 
willfully avoid  facing each other, because they eschew direct engagement 
and resort to intermediaries, because they resort to “the third interrupting 
the face to face of the welcome of the other”79—that face-to-faceness so 
crucial to hospitality— that Iago’s machinations are so effective.
These are the play’s original sins. Recall from act 1: “And bade me, if 
I had a friend that lov’d her, / I should but teach him how to tell my story, / 
And that would woo her.” In the comic mode, Desdemona can joke and flirt 
with Othello about intercession; she knows that the indirection will find 
direction out. But intercession has its costs and consequences. By the time 
Othello parts from his wife with “[f]arewell, my Desdemona, I’ll come to 
thee straight” (3.3.88), we might hear an ironic inflection in that “straight”: 
we know that coming to someone “straight” (in the secondary sense of 
“directly”) is not the way of these characters. From the beginning to the end 
of the play—“from first to last”—indirectness prevails: “Will you, I pray, 
demand that demi-Devil / Why he hath thus ensnared my soul and body?” 
(5.2.298–299); even at the death, Othello is still not facing the other directly. 
These may be child’s games (“You ask him …”), but they have fatal costs.
I do not think, however, that Rossiter’s (or Burke’s, or Knight’s, or  Berger’s) 
readings constitute accurate characterizations of the whole play. The con-
trast between Cassio’s “Hail to thee, lady” and Othello and Desdemona’s 
mutual greeting a few lines later is, to my ear, striking (though of course 
that too has its undertones of trouble to come). Desdemona’s “[l]et’s meet 
him and receive him” (1.2.176) gives a sense of her greeting as the kind 
of unconditional opening to the other—the accueillir—of which Derrida 
writes in his meditations on hospitality. Similarly, we could say that the 
 Quarto’s stage direction—“they kisse” (omitted from the Folio)—may hint 
at the mutuality of the greeting, since “the usual formula is ‘[He] kisses 
her’”; “they kisse,” writes Honigmann in his edition, “may mean that she 
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gives as good as she gets.”80 (Compare Cressida: “In kissing, do you render 
or receive?” [Troilus and Cressida, 4.5.40].) It is precisely the fall from the 
possibility of such greeting, such directness of mutual engagement, face to 
face, that the play documents, and that makes it so hard to stomach.  Othello 
and Desdemona are not onstage alone again until it is too late—until he 
has already stoned his heart to her. By the end of the play, Othello can 
only imagine his posthumous meeting with Desdemona in these anguished 
terms: “When we shall meet at compt / This look of thine will hurl my soul 
from heaven” (5.2.271–272). In his mind, Desdemona’s final greeting will be 
an everlasting leave-taking—instead of offering salvation, the last greeting 
will set the seal upon his damnation. The difference between the greeting at 
Cyprus and this final vision is an index of the fall the play documents. For 
Othello is a tragedy about (among other things) the dangers of intercession, 
of not appealing directly to the other, of not greeting the other face to face, 
unconditionally, à l’abandon, as Desdemona greets her husband upon his 
arrival in Cyprus—for the last time: “My dear Othello!” (2.1.177).
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7 As You Like It and the  
Theater of Hospitality
James Kuzner
In As You Like It, the shepherd Corin criticizes his master by remarking that 
he “is of churlish disposition, / And little recks to find the way to heaven / 
By doing deeds of hospitality” (2.4.75–77).1 Whether any character recks 
to find the way to heaven by doing such deeds, scenes of hostility (between 
Oliver and Orlando, not to mention between Duke Frederick and just about 
everyone) create the play’s conflicts, while scenes of hospitality (when Duke 
Senior invites Orlando to feast and when Rosalind invites Orlando to her 
cote) enable its resolutions. These scenes, we will see, are highly stylized, 
even theatrical in the extent to which they foreground their artifice, and in 
this essay I explore the play’s distinctly theatrical hospitality, with an eye to 
its politics.
Criticism often traces the political implications of theatricality within the 
play—usually by considering how Rosalind’s performance of gender frees 
or fails to free her from patriarchal strictures and grant her some measure 
of autonomy, or at least agential capacity, in the fashioning of her identity.2 
That Rosalind shows, to a greater or lesser degree, how theatricality allows 
subjects to write or to own their own scripts, I would never contest. I merely 
want to focus on moments when characters entertain someone else’s script—
when they welcome someone else’s pretenses and play along with them irre-
spective of belief—in a way that has political potential. In As You Like 
It—to borrow from Julia Lupton’s account of connections between theatri-
cality and hospitality—being hospitable consists in helping another craft a 
scene in which to appear.3
This resolutely theatrical hospitality—practiced by Adam and Duke 
Senior in relation to Orlando, and by Orlando in relation to Rosalind—
offers different political possibilities from those often found in the theat-
rical. In the cases of Duke Senior and Adam, theatricality seems to throw 
shadows over their hospitality, but attention to Orlando’s willingness to 
play along with Rosalind casts the Duke and the old man in more gener-
ous lights. While analyses centered on Rosalind (with good reason) tend to 
focus on how performance frees or fails to free her from patriarchal social 
scripts, emphasis on Orlando shows how acceding to more marginal scripts 
can undo autonomy in a salutary way. In an earlier book, I detail a division 
in thinking about the political utility of Shakespeare. On one side of this 
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division, Shakespeare’s works have such utility insofar as they offer a vision 
of bounded, discrete, and empowered selfhood, and imagine vulnerability 
as what political activity ought to minimize.4 While As You Like It certainly 
can be read along these lines, I wish to focus on how vulnerability—in this 
case to the fantasies that others have about themselves—can be virtue.
Without question, the feigned, hedged hospitality of As You Like It is unlike 
the radical, infinite hospitality that, as I point out later, fascinates Derrida: 
a total, unconditional, dangerous openness in advance of any other. Readers 
have long acknowledged that Arden’s dangers distance it from Arcadia, yet 
the forest is commodious and comic enough that infinite hospitality appears 
there only to disappear, as risk dissolves in fellow feeling. Arden calls for a 
hospitality that, in its performativity, is of a more quotidian order than that 
imagined by Derrida. All the same, this ordinary, finite hospitality helps us to 
think through a problem of political life and of everyday living: of how to be 
hospitable when we don’t mean it, when the best we can do is play along.5
Welcome to Our Table: Duke Senior
In act 2, scene 7, Duke Senior, Jaques, and some lords are gathered together 
for fellowship when Orlando, desperate to find food for Adam, bursts upon 
the scene sword in hand. What stands out most to me in the exchange that 
follows is the composure, even the calm with which the ducal company 
receives the armed man. Neither Jaques nor Duke Senior, for instance, regis-
ter any distress; when Orlando commands them to “eat no more” (2.7.88), 
Jaques, ever a stickler, points out that he in fact has not eaten at all, while the 
Duke inquires coolly as to whether distress or just poor breeding accounts 
for Orlando’s boldness. When their intruder indicates that it is the former, 
the Duke observes that “[y]our gentleness shall force / More than your force 
move us to gentleness” (2.7.101–102), but for now Orlando would rather 
just force with force: “I almost die for food,” he says, “and let me have it” 
(2.7.103). Despite the advice just given—and despite Orlando still brandish-
ing his sword—the Duke invites the intruder to dine (“Sit down and feed, and 
welcome to our table” [2.7.104]), abandoning the rule he has just set as to the 
behavior admissible in his forest abode. If Orlando feels the need to comman-
deer food at sword-point, so be it. With hospitality that appears infinite, the 
Duke welcomes a declared, armed enemy. I say “infinite”—rather than, for 
example, “astonishing”—because the Duke’s openness conjures the pure hos-
pitality outlined by Derrida: “Pure and unconditional hospitality,” he writes,
hospitality itself, opens or is in advance of someone who is neither 
expected nor invited. … this is a hospitality of visitation rather than 
invitation. The visit might actually be very dangerous, and we must 
not ignore this fact, but would a hospitality without risk, a hospitality 
backed by certain assurances, a hospitality protected by an immune 
system against the wholly other, be true hospitality?6
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Like Derrida’s unconditional hospitality, the forest scene just described is 
one of visitation, not invitation; the Duke and his company at first have no 
assurance that their unexpected visitor will not slit their throats once he has 
his victuals. It is true, we should note, that Duke Senior attempts to convert 
an unconditional visitation (by which Orlando is to take under threat of 
violence) into a conditional invitation (by which Orlando is to partake so 
long as he is gentle), such that the Duke’s discourse at first resembles not 
hospitality so much as tolerance. “Tolerance,” Derrida writes,
remains a scrutinized hospitality, always under surveillance, parsimo-
nious and protective of its sovereignty … (“I invite you, I welcome 
you into my home, on the condition that you adapt to the laws and 
norms of my territory, according to my language, tradition, memory, 
and so on”).7
Still, Duke Senior’s conditional invitation sheds its condition almost imme-
diately. Orlando can bring the sword to table, for all that present company 
cares, as the finite becomes the infinite, the hedged and protected the open 
and exposed.
But then the danger dissolves and Orlando sheathes his sword.  Grasping 
the unconditional nature of the Duke’s hospitality, he wants the initial con-
dition restored. “Let gentleness my strong enforcement be,” he pleads. 
“I  blush, and hide my sword” (2.7.117–118). Paul Kottman argues 
that Shakespeare poses fundamental questions about attachment by way 
of Arden. “What forms of human attachment might survive the disappear-
ance of all preexisting social, familiar, or political bonds?” Kottman asks. 
“Can any form of human attachment or ‘affection’ uphold itself—provide 
for itself a future—fully independent of the preexisting social, or familial, or 
cultural dimensions that might sustain and facilitate such an attachment?”8 
By his own virulence, Orlando suddenly faces this question. With no answer, 
he insists on gentility, remaking the bond that he himself has broken.
Duke Senior seems pleased: “therefore sit you down in gentleness” 
(2.7.123). Repetitive gestures toward the gentle are risible by this point, 
particularly when compared with one of Shakespeare’s sources, Lodge’s 
Rosalynde, which resolves the issue without negotiation.9 All the same, 
Duke Senior reminds Orlando, indirectly, that “gentlemen only” is only a 
pretense and that there is not really any condition of entry: “take upon 
command what help we have / That to your wanting may be ministered” 
(2.7.124–125). Orlando has sought to command the Duke, and now is com-
manded by the Duke to command what they have. Orlando can behave as 
gently and as deferentially as he wishes, but as far as the Duke’s hospitality 
goes there is little difference between commanding and being commanded, 
being Duke Senior and being Orlando. Openness again appears infinite. 
Given this—that the Duke happily removes the one condition on which his 
hospitality hinges, then is willing, simply to please his guest, to pretend that 
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he does demand gentleness after all—he might strike us as a definite center 
of value. As You Like It presents a world where being a villain consists 
in being inhospitable, as we see when Oliver refuses to welcome his own 
brother on any condition, and when Duke Frederick banishes practically 
everyone. Duke Senior sparkles against this background, figuring what Derrida 
deems impossible: hospitality that is truly without condition.
And yet, at least for me, the scene is unconvincing as an instance of 
infinite welcome. Perhaps this is because Jaques and the Duke themselves 
seem unconvinced by Orlando’s show of violence, which in turn makes the 
Duke’s willingness to risk himself less than wholehearted. Say  Orlando’s 
blade was at Duke Senior’s throat—would the Duke still, in composed 
 whispers, invite the sword-bearer to sit and feed?10 The repeated insistences 
on gentleness bloat the exchange, stretch it with pretense, and the threat 
that seems not really a threat makes the unforced quality of the Duke’s 
hospitality seem, well, forced, expressed uncompellingly. When we hear that 
“[m]ost friendship is feigning” (2.7.179), in a scene where all seems feigned, 
it is indeed not easy to imagine how genuine friendship would appear. As 
Orlando exits to fetch Adam, the Duke seems to acknowledge the stilted, 
theatrical nature of the exchange, or at least to conceive of acting and living 
in terms of performing and playing:
Thou see’st we are not all alone unhappy:
This wide and universal theatre
Presents more woeful pageants than the scene
Wherein we play in.
(135–138)
Jaques responds with his famous speech in which all the world is a stage. 
Though he has asked for unlimited critical license—for “as large a char-
ter as the wind, / To blow on whom I please” (2.7.48–49)—he does not 
criticize the Duke. Instead, his speech, which labels all human endeavor as 
theatrical, works to preempt my reservations about the exchange we have 
just seen. Orlando carries Adam onto stage just after Jaques describes life’s 
“last scene,” “Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans every thing” (2.7.165), 
and this picture of embodied suffering—of what cannot be feigned or per-
formed but simply is—would seem a sharp riposte to Jaques’s sweeping 
claim,11 were it not the case that artifice also suffuses the moment of Adam’s 
reception:
DUKE SENIOR: Welcome. Set down your venerable burden.
And let him feed.
ORLANDO: I thank you most for him.
ADAM: So had you need;
I can scarce speak to thank you for myself.
(2.7.66–69)
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Adam speaks to assure the Duke that he can scarcely speak—quite 
remarkable given how laconic he is earlier in act 2, as he resolves to mea-
sure out his grave. What could make an otherwise unconvincing scene into 
a moment of arresting attention and care instead calls attention to its own 
artifice: to how starvation itself, once it enters the Duke’s orbit, comes to 
seem performed.12
There is nothing out of the ordinary in the mere fact that all seems per-
formed. Erving Goffman writes that “ordinary social intercourse is itself 
put together as a scene is put together, by the exchange of dramatically 
inflated actions, counteractions, and terminating replies. … All the world is 
not, of course, a stage, but the crucial ways in which it isn’t are not easy to 
specify.”13 What is out of the ordinary, I would argue, is the unconvincing 
quality of the performance. Goffman also writes that “[w]hen an individual 
plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impres-
sion that is fostered before them,” and while Orlando requests as much at 
first, no one—save Orlando himself—takes any impression very seriously.14 
The scene’s wide theater of hospitality swallows up a sense of the infinite.15
Go on, and I Will Follow Thee: Adam
Adam seems a more apt figure of unconditional—or, at least, genuine—
hospitality, as he gives Orlando so much place as to leave none for himself. 
As it happens, Adam’s first hospitable act is to warn Orlando away from 
a site (his brother Oliver’s estate), not to welcome him to it: “Come not 
within these doors” (2.3.17) he counsels after Orlando foils his brother’s 
plan to break his neck. If, as Yi-Fu Tuan puts it, “[p]lace is security,” Adam 
rightly declares that “[t]his is no place” (2.3.27); Oliver’s house has all of 
the risks that come with what Tuan would call space (rather than place), 
and none of the freedoms.16 Orlando replies that he can find no welcome 
elsewhere and that he is not about to become a beggar, but Adam has a 
solution: he gives Orlando five hundred crowns, his life savings, and even 
offers to accompany his master—averring that he, though nearly eighty, is 
in top physical condition. Adam impresses Orlando with his noninstrumen-
tal offer, with the fact that he sweats for duty, not for “meed” (2.3.58), and 
the old man’s next response reveals the stakes for him in joining Orlando:
ADAM: Master, go on, and I will follow thee
To the last gasp with truth and loyalty.
From seventeen years till now almost fourscore
Here lived I, but now live here no more.
At seventeen years many their fortunes seek,
But at fourscore it is too late a week.
Yet fortune cannot recompense me better
Than to die well and not my master’s debtor.
(2.3.69–76)
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For his master’s sake, Adam relinquishes not just his life savings but his life, 
the six decades that he has spent at the de Boys estate. Adam gives up every-
thing for Orlando—in rhymes that emphasize the importance of preserving 
Orlando (thee / loyalty) and his own impending annihilation (fourscore / no 
more)—so it is no surprise that the next time Adam appears, he, despite his 
protestations of health, resolves to measure out his grave: “Dear master, 
I can go no further. O, I die for food! Here lie I down, and measure out my 
grave. Farewell, kind master” (2.6.1–3). Like Celia earlier, Adam says that 
he is spent, but he does not just need a break. He is starving—and evidently 
has waited until he is ready to expire to say so. Yet Adam manages to begin 
and end what he takes to be his dying speech with terms of endearment 
(“Dear master … kind master”). What self-sacrifice and unsurpassed hos-
pitality, we might say: what welcome, openness, and attention to Orlando 
at his own expense. What hospitality that, in being total, has lost its hearth.
Adam measuring out his own grave seems especially impressive when 
we measure the distance separating him from the Adams of Shakespeare’s 
sources. Shakespeare’s Adam differs radically from the Adam of The Tale 
of Gamelyn—who agrees when Gamelyn (a source for Orlando) begs to 
be freed from the chains in which his brother has put him, but only “[i]n hope 
of avauncement,” only because Gamelyn has offered him land.17 When the 
Tale’s Adam struggles in the wilderness, he hardly accepts it as in  Shakespeare: 
“By Seint Richere,” he laments, “Now I see it is mery to be a spencere, / Yit 
lever me were kayes to bere, / Than walken in this wilde wode my clothes 
to tere” (614–617). Even the more virtuous Adam that we meet in Lodge’s 
Rosalynde struggles between his concern for himself and for Rosader when 
provisions run short. At first he falls into “bitter tearmes,” claiming that “all 
our pleasures ende in paine, and our highest delights, are crossed with deepest 
discontents.” He then corrects himself—“why ADAM doost thou exclaime 
against fortune?”—and resolves to die not just because he can no longer help 
Rosader, but also because he cannot bear to behold his master’s distress:
Ah ROSADER, could I helpe thee, my griefe were the lesse, and happie 
should my death be, if it might be the beginning of thy reliefe: but 
seeing we perish both in one extreame, it is a double sorrowe. What 
shall I do? preuent the sight of his misfortune, with a present dispatch 
of mine owne life. Ah despaire is a mercilesse sinne.
Before despair can issue in self-killing, Rosader himself complains about 
the prospect of dying of starvation rather than of battle wounds, and this 
provokes a thought in Adam:
Master (quoth hee) you see wee are both in one predicament, and long 
I cannot liue without meate, seeing therefore we can finde no foode, let 
the death of the one preserue the life of the other. I am olde, and ouer-
worne with age, you are young, and are the hope of many honours: let 
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me then die, I will presently cut my veynes, & master with the warme 
bloud reliue your fainting spirits: sucke on that till I ende, and you be 
comforted.
Lodge’s Adam is about to pull out his knife when Rosader, newly infused 
with courage, objects in favor of foraging. Shakespeare’s Adam registers 
none of this bitterness or conflict, simply remarking that the time has come 
to measure out his grave. While this has partly to do with issues of genre and 
length, Shakespeare might also seem particularly intent on presenting Adam 
as a figure of pure sacrifice. Shakespeare’s Adam, unlike Lodge’s, cannot 
even imagine his death as benefiting Orlando; neither despairing nor freight-
ing his death with significance, he cedes his interests entirely to his master’s.
Except Orlando will not accept the sacrifice:
Why, how now Adam? No greater heart in thee? Live a little; comfort 
a little; cheer thyself a little. If this uncouth forest yield anything sav-
age, I will either be food for it or bring it for food to thee. Thy conceit 
is nearer death than thy powers. For my sake be comfortable; hold 
death awhile at the arm’s end. I will be here with thee presently; and 
if I bring thee not something to eat, I will give thee leave to die; but if 
thou diest before I come, thou art a mocker of my labour. Well said! 
thou look’st cheerly; and I’ll be with thee quickly.
(2.6.4–14)
Orlando promises to sacrifice himself if need be, to die for Adam rather than 
the other way around. He even indicts Adam for histrionics—“Thy conceit 
is nearer death than thy powers”—and claims that if Adam dies before he 
returns, the old man does so willingly, even aggressively, mocking his master. 
If Adam wants to sacrifice himself, he better not do so before Orlando gets 
back. Dying then is not dying well. This may well be Orlando’s attempt at 
stern humor; but it, too, makes Adam’s possible sacrifice appear less real.
Adam says nothing before Orlando exits; he merely “look’st cheerly,” if 
Orlando is to be believed. (And perhaps he is not, speaking as he does for an old 
man—“Well said!”—who has said nothing.) Still, like Duke Senior, he accepts 
Orlando’s terms, at least tacitly, even if he neither agrees nor disagrees about 
the values in question. This leaves readers wondering whether they should be 
on Adam’s side or his master’s. First, just on the basis of the title, we have to 
be on Orlando’s; this is not The Winter’s Tale, characters cannot die for others’ 
redemption. When Orlando tells Adam that he would mock his labor by dying, 
the speaker might as well be Shakespeare (even though Shakespeare might well 
have played the role of Adam!).18 The old man can fade into figural oblivion, 
certainly, but he cannot upstage the comedy by marking out his grave onstage. 
Second, as we soon see in act 2, scene 7, Adam is not at death’s doorstep, if 
he ever set foot on it within Arden. Third, even were he at death’s doorstep, 
the text seems to suggest, who, possessing even a shred of sensibility, would 
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accept hospitality as unlimited as Adam’s? Accepting five hundred crowns is 
one thing; accepting an unmarked grave for the one who gave you the crowns 
is rather another. Adam’s terms become a burden, which he might realize were 
he not caught up in histrionics: in feigning death throes, announcing that he 
intends to measure out his grave, and, then, when the measurements appear 
premature, that he lacks the speech to give thanks for the food that keeps him 
going. (In this if in almost no other respect, Adam shares with Hamlet: “I am 
dead, Horatio … Horatio, I am dead … O, I die, Horatio.”) Adam’s total open-
ness to Orlando, like the Duke’s, seems less than genuine, so that the best we 
can say is that Adam accepts Orlando’s heroic pretenses, much as Duke Senior 
welcomes Orlando’s waffling about whether he is violent or gentle. Twice now 
the play’s foregrounding of artifice draws attention to hospitality’s theatrical-
ity, to how it is not pure but put on, so much so that Shakespeare’s view of 
Arden’s hospitalities seems cynical—until, that is, we encounter Orlando and 
Rosalind’s courtship, which allows us to see significance in these hospitalities 
that, from a Derridean perspective, appear so hollow.
Every Day to the Cote: Orlando
Through his portrayals of Adam and Duke Senior, As You Like It implies, 
as does Derrida, the impossibility of pure hospitality. But Shakespeare does 
not stop here. There is another—a limited yet legitimate—hospitality in the 
play, one that we can glimpse in Orlando’s relation to Rosalind, a glimpse 
that reorients our perspectives on Duke Senior and Adam.
Marjorie Garber has shown how Rosalind’s education of Orlando allows 
him to grow as a lover, to move from Petrarchism’s crypto-narcissism to some-
thing like actual other-concern.19 Orlando also, I want to argue, grows in his 
potential to be hospitable, to extend a kind of welcome. His growth begins as 
early as act 3, scene 2 when Rosalind, disguised as Ganymede and wishing to 
probe and test Orlando’s love, first convinces him to undergo treatment for 
lovesickness. Rosalind claims expertise in detecting love melancholy’s symp-
toms, none of which Orlando presents. Far from “demonstrating a careless 
desolation,” Orlando is “rather point-device in your accoutrements, as loving 
yourself than seeming the lover of any other” (3.2.353–362). Orlando objects, 
exhibiting as evidence the facts that he has defaced Arden’s trees with praise 
for his beloved and that “[n]either rhyme nor reason can express how much” 
he loves his Rosalind (3.2.373). She, seeing that Orlando speaks strictly in 
clichés, claims that “[l]ove is merely a madness” (374) and that counsel can 
be its cure, but Orlando wants to play the game of love as he has played the 
games of foraging and friendship: on his terms, not someone else’s. Then, in 
an exchange worth examining, he suddenly agrees to Rosalind’s proposal:
ORLANDO: I would not be cured, youth.
ROSALIND: I would cure you, if you would but call me Rosalind and come 
every day to my cote and woo me.
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ORLANDO: Now, by the faith of my love, I will. Tell me where it is.
ROSALIND: Go with me to it, and I’ll show it you; and, by the way, you shall 
tell me where in the forest you live. Will you go?
ORLANDO: With all my heart, good youth.
ROSALIND: Nay, you must call me Rosalind.
Come, sister, will you go?
(396–406)
Why does Orlando change his position so rapidly? Is he not as head over 
heels as his poems suggest? Does he see through Ganymede’s disguise, or does 
he just decide that coming to the cote would be a gamesome way to pass the 
time? I am not sure that these questions are answerable, nor, for the purposes 
of this essay, that they require answering.20 However we answer them, what 
we must observe is how the interaction differs from those that we have cov-
ered so far. We have seen Duke Senior accept Orlando’s pretenses—that the 
threat of violence is real, that Orlando is gentle nevertheless—without believ-
ing them. We have seen Adam do the same in allowing his master to fancy 
himself a hero. But here Orlando accepts Rosalind’s pretenses. In a literal 
sense, Orlando will go to Rosalind’s cote and be her guest; she will welcome 
him. In accepting her anti-Petrarchan pretenses rather than demand that she 
accept his Petrarchan ones, though, Orlando welcomes Rosalind, entertains 
her. Lupton, as I noted earlier, writes that hospitality shares with theatri-
cality in that both craft “scenes for appearing.”21 In agreeing to  Rosalind’s 
game, Orlando helps her craft a scene in which she might appear, not as a 
Petrarchan ideal—a “paper paragon,” as Garber puts it—but as “a woman 
of complexity, wit and passion.”22 The guest, in this sense, is the host.
Orlando plays along even though, presumably, he cannot believe that 
Ganymede will convince him that love is mere madness. Yet in accepting 
her pretenses, he comes to adopt a less pretentious view of love. When she 
claims—in the guise of Ganymede-as-Rosalind—that she will not have him, 
Orlando replies that “[t]hen, in mine own person, I die” (4.1.81), but Rosalind 
denies that anyone has died for love:
No, faith, die by attorney. The poor world is almost six thousand 
years old, and in all this time there was not any man died in his own 
person, videlicet, in a love-cause. Troilus had his brains dash’d out 
with a Grecian club; yet he did what he could to die before, and he is 
one of the patterns of love. Leander, he would have liv’d many a fair 
year, though Hero had turn’d nun, if it had not been for a hot mid-
summer-night; for, good youth, he went but forth to wash him in the 
Hellespont, and, being taken with the cramp, was drown’d; and the 
foolish chroniclers of that age found it was—Hero of Sestos. But these 
are all lies: men have died from time to time, and worms have eaten 
them, but not for love.
(4.1.82–95)
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Troilus had a death wish; Leander died due to cramps; only through fabri-
cations can we imagine that a man might actually die for love. While this 
seems merely a withering critique of lovesick rhetoric, Rosalind’s position 
cannot be that love should be free of pretense, but must be that love should 
be free of certain pretenses and of a certain approach toward pretense. Just 
as Orlando regards Adam’s supposedly infinite, self-sacrificing hospitality as 
a mere pretense, so now Rosalind regards the pretense of dying for love as 
emptily pretentious, as undermining love rather than confirming it. Orlando 
accepts Rosalind’s pretenses (for instance, that turning up an hour late for 
one of their sessions constitutes a serious offense) and in time sets aside his 
own (for instance, that being denied by Rosalind is fatal). I do not mean to 
suggest that Rosalind has access to “truth” that Orlando must accept whole-
sale; though it is tempting to regard her as shattering the false conceits of 
love to disclose what is real, her categorical claim—that no one in six thou-
sand years has died for love—strains credulity.23 Orlando himself objects, 
even ups the ante: “I would not have my right Rosalind of this mind,” he 
says, “for, I protest, her frown might kill me” (4.196–197), but when Rosa-
lind insists that Orlando is wrong (“it will not kill a fly” [41.1.98]), he does 
not press the point. He plays along. In so doing here and elsewhere, he 
affords Rosalind an opportunity to appear as a flesh and blood beloved, and 
prevents himself from disappearing in love’s platitudes. Eventually Orlando 
tires of the game they play—“I can live no longer by thinking” (5.2.48), he 
declares after Oliver and Celia fall for each other—at which point Rosalind 
asks him to accept a final pretense:
ROSALIND: Believe then, if you please, that I can do strange things: I have, 
since I was three year old, conversed with a magician, most profound in 
his art and yet not damnable. If you do love Rosalind so near the heart 
as your gesture cries it out, when your brother marries Aliena, shall you 
marry her. I know into what straits of fortune she is driven, and it is not 
impossible to me, if it appear not inconvenient to you, to set her before 
your eyes tomorrow, human as she is, and without danger.
ORLANDO: Speak’st thou in sober meanings?
ROSALIND: By my life, I do, which I tender dearly, though I say I am a magi-
cian: therefore, put you in your best array, bid your friends, for if you 
will be married tomorrow, you shall, and to Rosalind, if you will.
(1.1.49–70)
Rosalind-as-Ganymede asks more of Orlando here than she has hitherto. 
She claims that she can do strange things; that she has conversed with a 
magician from the age of three; that she herself is a magician; that Rosalind 
is in “straits of fortune” yet can appear “without danger.” She offers to marry 
him to Rosalind and asks him to believe she can do this all “if you please.” 
Her hedging and equivocation do not inspire confidence, yet Orlando agrees, 
commits himself to her scheme: this, despite the fact that, as he says to Duke 
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Senior, “I sometimes do believe and sometimes do not, / As those that fear 
they hope and know they fear” (5.4.3–4).24 In a fearful hope, Orlando only 
half believes what Rosalind says but plays along anyway; again, this time 
literally, he helps craft a scene in which she might appear. It is not too much 
to say that for Orlando playing along is hospitality: bidding welcome to the 
other’s pretenses, giving the other the (forest) floor, being willing to play the 
other’s game patiently so that the other might disclose herself.
If playing along can be thought to constitute hospitality, we can also cast 
a more generous eye on Duke Senior and Adam’s relation to Orlando.25 
Consider the objections I raised about the histrionic contexts of their 
hospitality: that Orlando’s threat is unconvincing, that Adam is not quite 
on the threshold of death that he claims to have reached. If infinite hospi-
tality is our standard, Adam and the Duke look meretricious, purporting to 
put themselves at greater risk than they truly do. This discrepancy, between 
apparent and actual risk, invalidates their hospitality. Yet if we attend to 
how these pretenses enable Orlando, how they allow him to form and sus-
tain a therapeutic view of himself—how, in this, Duke Senior and Adam 
help him craft a scene in which to disclose himself—our estimate alters. In 
allowing Orlando to reassert his gentility and to save a man who says he is 
dying, they welcome him to appear in a way that renovates his self-conception. 
When Orlando learns willingness to accept Rosalind’s pretenses, likewise, 
she not only has a chance to appear outside Petrarchan confines. He, too, 
develops a more flexible, dynamic form as a lover.
Conclusion
In waiting until act 3 to reveal the value of Adam and Duke Senior’s ear-
lier hospitalities, Shakespeare chastens readers (or, at least, this reader) for 
dismissing them as less than infinite. What sort of politics could be implied 
by this refusal to dismiss the theatrical and the finite? To address the ques-
tion we might consider Derrida again, and particularly the distinction, men-
tioned earlier, between the infinite and the merely tolerant. Derrida posits 
alternatives: radical, unconditional, risky hospitality on the one hand, and, 
on the other, conservative, conditional, hedged tolerance. Glossing Levinas, 
Derrida goes so far as to consider the proposition that “hospitality is infinite 
or it is not at all.”26 In As You Like It’s theater of hospitality these alterna-
tives overlap; hedged hospitality has its risks and we lack warrant to draw 
the “rather abrupt conclusion” about the inseparability of the infinite and 
the hospitable.27 First, Adam, Duke Senior, and Orlando’s hospitality is not 
particularly perilous, but accepting someone else’s pretenses always involves 
an element of risk; Orlando could kill Duke Senior, Adam might not die 
well in adventuring through Arden while pushing eighty. Second, Adam 
and Duke Senior welcome Orlando, and Orlando welcomes Rosalind, with 
something other than the sort of tolerance that would stipulate that the 
one welcomed must adapt to one’s own protocols. As we have seen, Duke 
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Senior imposes a condition (that gentleness is what sways) only to remove 
the condition; rather than insisting on the norms of his territory, he instead 
allows Orlando to de-territorialize Arden and demand food at sword-point, 
and when Orlando wants to rezone Arden as a place of gentleness, the 
Duke accedes. Adam for his part gives up familiar territory altogether, while 
Orlando sets aside the Petrarchan ideas framing so fundamental an idea as 
love. Derrida leaves us with an unpleasant pair of hospitalities: the infinite, 
which no one can achieve, and tolerance, which is not really hospitality at 
all. When I try to read As You Like It in Derridean terms, on the other hand, 
I end up rebuked, shown that hospitality can be finite—indeed, paradoxi-
cally, can be put on—and yet be genuine.
In Arden we do not find the infinite hospitality that, as some critics have 
shown, might be found in some of Shakespeare’s more tragic worlds.28 The 
comic hospitality of As You Like It lends itself more to quotidian concerns—
to how, for example, we respond to the upset drunk who embroils a dinner 
party, to the friend who insists that we need saving when we might prefer the 
dignity of being left alone, to the partner (or possible partner) who believes 
we do not love rightly or at all. As You Like It suggests that entertaining the 
trying person’s pretenses, helping construct the space in which they and their 
positions might appear, is worth our while. Good might come when we behave 
as though the partygoer has, in fact, every right to be upset, or as though we 
fail to understand love, or do need saving after all: when we behave as if these 
things are true regardless of whether we believe them to be so.29
Playing along means relinquishing our sense of ourselves as sovereign 
and self-determining, insulated from others’ pretenses and free to assume 
our own: to, as Goffman would put it, project a definition of our situation 
as we see fit.30 Alexander Leggatt argues that the play champions “an imag-
inative freedom to explore ideas and play roles—on one’s own terms, and 
for one’s own amusement.”31 While I agree—especially when it comes to the 
relatively liberating effect that role-playing has for Rosalind—the play also, 
I  think, champions role-playing on another’s terms, for another’s amuse-
ment. To be sure, playing along can point to radically different futures, some 
more exciting and full of possibility than others. Adam vanishes from the 
play equivocally; he does not die well, as he hopes to do, and indeed does 
not do anything at all. Duke Senior, for his part, is restored to his former, 
sovereign position; accepting Orlando’s pretenses—yielding to an inferior—
does not change his ducal horizon.32 Even more important: playing along 
in Arden can make its world more conservative. Many critics point out 
that Rosalind, having spent much of the play in (at least arguably) produc-
tive role-playing on her own terms,33 submits to patriarchal scripts in the 
end;34 after arranging and orchestrating the final scene, she declares that she 
belongs to Duke Senior as a daughter and to Orlando as a wife.35 No the-
ater of hospitality could eliminate relations of power, and As You Like It’s 
end suggests that playing along can be constraining rather than expansive. 
Harold Jenkins shows how in Arden every position finds its opposite, and 
As You Like It and the Theater of Hospitality 169
the position this essay describes finds its opposite in the play’s final scene.36 
Rosalind, who has not been my focus, shows how at times theatricality can 
and should serve strategic, self-interested purposes, reversing power rela-
tions and helping those in weaker positions to achieve their ends.
But at other times, as in Orlando’s case, playing along has value. A cynical 
reading, one in which he sees through Rosalind’s disguise from the beginning, 
might maintain that Orlando is strategic all along, that he plays along only 
in hopes that Rosalind will be his, elevating him from the Petrarchan lover’s 
relatively impotent role to a husband’s more powerful one. Such a reading, 
though, lacks the textual support that we can find to argue that Orlando 
opens himself to a more flexible view of love, one that is less Petrarchan and 
less one-sided and that comes to involve dynamic interaction and mutual 
understanding. Jon Erickson argues that in theatricality we see the produc-
tive interplay of two kinds of action as defined by Habermas: the strategic 
(that is, the self-interested, the dissembling and the manipulative), and the 
communicative (that is, the mutually interested, open, and coercion-free).37 
In the scenes before their marriage, Orlando and Rosalind’s theater of hos-
pitality shows this interplay. Dissembling and manipulation are everywhere; 
Rosalind conceals her identity when welcoming Orlando to her cote, hoping 
to whip Petrarch out of him without ever administering the promised cure, 
while Orlando means not to be cured even as he cedes to treatment. Yet 
neither quite coerces the other and something like mutuality, at least for a 
time, emerges; Orlando and Rosalind develop a working understanding of 
each other and of love.38 They have a chance to play with power and, in the 
process, to craft a scene that sustains their affection.39 Playing along has its 
problems. Yet amid them—amid this theater of hospitality that they don’t 
really mean—the two craft new meaning, new love, new life.
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8 Hospitable Times with Shakespeare
A Reading of King Lear
Thomas J. Moretti
Playing is an ornament to the Citty, which strangers of all Nations, 
repairing hither, report of in their Countries, beholding them here with some 
 admiration: for what variety of entertainment can there be in any Citty of 
 Christendome, more then in London? But some will say, this dish might be 
very well spared out of the banquet: to him I answer, Diogenes, that used too 
feed on rootes, cannot relish a March-pane.
—Thomas Heywood, Apology for Actors (1612), sig. F3r
Let me not stay a jot for dinner.
—King Lear, 1.4.81
Lett all your restes be hopes of happynes,
Which mercye’s musicke in the soule requires.
—Nicholas Breton, Countess Pembroke’s Love (1592), cvi2
Whether playing was an ornament to behold or a confection to savor, that 
theater welcomed strangers is Thomas Heywood’s point. A critic or cynic 
might counter that theatergoers had to pay for entry, that when inside they 
had to pay for apples, nuts, and ale, that true hospitality in the theater was 
necessarily lacking.3 Perhaps playgoing entailed a kind of “paying hospitality.” 
It costs money for the privilege of being a theatergoer, as if the price of 
admission at the theater was akin to an ideal hospitable exchange—a guest’s 
initial gift at the threshold. But upon entering the theater, there were no gifts, 
no dinner, no bed, no refuge (cue cutpurses), hardly manageable lighting, 
damp drafts, and, at least at the Globe, poor shelter.4 The only way for the-
ater companies to offer hospitality was to help theatergoers to pass the time.
Temporality is a key ingredient of hospitality in each of its conventional 
settings. The risks and promises of what I call “hospitable times” first sur-
face at the threshold, where waiting on the guest comes after waiting for the 
guest, who, as it happens, must wait to become the guest. To avoid any delay, 
the passing of time—not necessarily chronologically, but always affectively—
should be as accommodating, as pleasant, and as fulfilling as the roast and 
the wine. Once in the manor or the hall, hospitality obtains to the extent 
that the timing is right. No old gossip or repeated verses are allowed.5 
No one should wait too long, and no one should linger.
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Hospitality, no matter its location, is always bound up with the phe-
nomenological conditions of time. What distinguishes theater as a distinct 
site for hospitality is the extent to which theater manipulates timing and 
temporality—the subjective experience of time—for the sake of pastime. 
Elsewhere, perhaps coating the palate and filling the belly with the dietary 
prescriptions for humoral balance can make up for poor timing—the late 
start, the anxious conversations, the awkward silences, delayed arrivals, 
hasty departures. Despite the slippages between hospitality and hostility, 
guests and hosts alike can hope to relax and socialize after a satisfying meal 
(or jest during a bland one). In the theater, the drive to satisfy guests and 
hosts, theatergoers and players alike, can only succeed when it shapes time 
and temporality for the sake of theater people, when labor or currency is 
exchanged for a form of entertainment that gets the timing right for players 
and playgoers.
“Hospitable times” includes a range of theatrical offerings, some generic, 
others less so. Narrative delays increase suspense and thus pleasure; a series 
of sudden acts or witty repartees can equally satisfy a desire for comedy. 
Effectively situated soliloquys of mourning, like Hieronimo’s or Hamlet’s, 
can recalibrate dramatic pace for the purpose of reflection; sudden entrances 
or suspenseful scenes can give way to dramatic pauses that can accommo-
date revelation, disturbing (“Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow” 
[Macbeth, 5.5.19]), or profound (“I wasted time, and now doth time waste 
me” [Richard II, 5.5.49]).6 But stretching out torture scenes, rushing through 
musings and lamentations, or pausing too long in the midst of banter dis-
rupts expectations of pace and thereby unsettles theatergoers. To misman-
age timing and temporality is to make for an unwelcoming and unpleasant 
time for people in the theater. Bad timing on stage can lead to impatience, 
boredom, and vexation among the audience and on the stage.
Both King Lear and King Lear are especially attuned to hospitable times: 
“Let me not stay a jot for dinner,” growls Lear. It is not just food that he 
insists on but its timely appearance, too.7 What delays him at Goneril’s 
home (as well as everywhere else) affects his humoral balance more than 
would an overcooked capon.8 It does not matter what the dinner is, so long 
as Lear does not have to wait for it. King Lear fantasizes a life as a perennial 
guest whose reception must be instantaneous.9 As it might be for a theater-
goer, for Lear it is the timeliness of hospitality that counts.
But Lear never gets his dinner, and it seems we wait for a long time to 
go home to ours. Theatergoers worry as Lear rushes to judgment, and they 
must endure, if not agonize through Lear’s delays before and after the storm. 
Indeed, he and others hasten or are hastened, delay or are delayed, not just 
in their comings and goings, receptions and deprivations, but in their emotive, 
affective responses. What does King Lear tell us about hospitality in the 
theater, then, once its plot and pace become increasingly inhospitable to 
theatergoers, once delays in the drama seem analogous to the delays that 
tax Lear’s patience, and once decelerating action forces audience members 
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to dwell upon excruciating moments of madness, cruelty, loss, and grief?10 
What do we make of a tragedy that has auditors, like readers, pause over its 
most inhospitable moments?
This often unfulfilled desire to make time hospitable even during moments 
of suffering is integral to this play. Shakespeare adjusts tempo in King Lear 
to gratify theater guests no less than to pain them. At one moment, he accel-
erates dramatic action and poetic pace to heighten theatrical effect and to 
delight audiences with suspense, political treachery, and the promise of rec-
onciliation; just as suddenly, he slows tempo to make the theater (in)hos-
pitable enough for insight, depth, and awareness. What makes the world 
unaccommodating to Lear, and what makes the play inhospitable to us, are 
the hastenings and delays that theater might otherwise deploy to make the 
world bearable and the play recreational.
Hospitable times or affective temporalities in King Lear are fraught with 
the same sort of contradictions found in hospitality more generally. The 
benefits and concomitant vulnerabilities of  hosts and guests (hospitēs)—
as Jacques Derrida puts it, the “antinomy” and “aporia” of “hospitality, 
hostility, hostpitality”—go beyond physical protection and sustenance.11 
Hospitable acts determine the perception of time and duration, what with 
expectations of recreation and relief, of music, readings, performances, 
and conversations that hasten guests and hosts first to midnight, then to 
bed.12 Entertainment and companionship offer hospitēs timely respites from 
 discomfort, anxiety, isolation, and tedium, which are as imminent as rejec-
tion, abandonment, and hostility. Time, whether wasted, dragged, passed, or 
occupied, is crucial to hospitality and is intrinsically affecting.
To disentangle hospitality and time, Derrida directs our attention to 
 Oedipus at Colonus. Hospitality is exigent when, at death’s door,  Oedipus 
has his foreigner “host” Theseus take an oath never to reveal the tomb 
except when, dying, Theseus himself must pass the secret to a  trustworthy, 
honest man. The host (as well as Oedipus’s daughters and future  confidantes) 
is taken “hostage” by a dead man’s command for secrecy and tempered 
silence. For Derrida, this “scene of final hospitality” emphasizes how “[t]he 
guest becomes host to the host” and how everyone is made into everyone 
else’s hostage.13 Affective temporalities—“delay” and “haste”—enable these 
disruptions of hospitality. As soon as Theseus cannot satisfy Antigone and 
Ismene’s desire for grief and closure, the daughters at once receive no time 
to mourn and experience “an interminable  mourning.”14 The sisters cannot 
mourn because they are never able to see their father’s tomb; there is no time 
for grief because there is no place for grief. Simultaneously, Oedipus has given 
them a mourning without end, “a limitless respite, a sort of infinite time,” a 
parting gift “more generous and poisoned” than any other and made pos-
sible by Theseus’s hospitality.15 Even as mourning is interminably delayed, 
it is reallocated, redirected, and intensified by the desire to hasten through 
grief. Antigone wants, but fails to “ hasten back” to her father’s tomb, mak-
ing “the theme of delay […] insistent throughout this scene.”16 Oedipus 
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cannot delay death and so “dies without too much delay,” but mourning is 
continually delayed. Like Oedipus, one must be on time, and like Oedipus, 
and Antigone, and Ismene, one is always late “in some way.” Derrida sees this 
binary tension, this “contretemps,” as a managing condition of hospitality. 
In Oedipus at Colonus, what matters is not that time passes, but that time is 
felt to pass or not to pass, a cause for what Derrida terms “the incalculable 
timing of hospitality.”17
Henri Bergson clarifies the ways that hospitēs rely upon shared temporal-
ities to receive the benefits of hospitality.18 Challenging objective, historical, 
chronological time, Bergson calls it a construct that we equate with and 
mistake for space. This, in turn, is to undermine the measurable temporality 
that underwrites historicist criticism. When Bergson prioritizes phenome-
nological or subjective time, he challenges the primacy of linear time in the 
liberal arts, and he locates the imagined cultural landscapes that are the 
backdrops of much literary scholarship within a supplementary or ancil-
lary time, an emplotted chronology.19 Perhaps the only practical response 
to this Bergsonian challenge is to examine early modern English literature as 
David Wood has, by both historicizing and theorizing, in his case, the affec-
tive temporalities of early modern England in a concerted effort to consider 
anew that question of St. Augustine—“What, then, is time?”20
Time as “pure” or “true duration,” Bergson contends, is more music 
than history: incalculable, experienced, instant, affecting.21 Rather than 
isolate and evaluate each musical note or movement, the listener immedi-
ately blends the music into a rhythmic whole, quarter notes into the rests, 
the silences. Likewise, we get closer to an awareness of time when we are 
conscious of our varying somatic reactions as a durable and collected, as 
opposed to countable, moment. Bergsonian phenomenology thus suggests 
a sort of cognitive dissonance that transposes chronology for affect. So, 
although attention to the “quality” of time is possible “in the waking state,” 
it is more readily available in sleep. “[W]hen we dream” he notes, “we no 
longer measure duration, but we feel it; from quantity it returns to the state 
of quality.”22
Inversely, the quality of time in King Lear retreats to make space for a less 
meaningful quantification when one wakes to and consequently is delimited 
by a chronological, less hospitable world. “Louder the music there,” the doc-
tor orders, and Lear is slow to shake off his madness and move from an eter-
nal “wheel of fire” to a life “[f]ourscore and upward, not an hour more nor 
less” (4.7.25, 47, 61), a curiously inexact measurement of time made out to 
be exact. His dream of some hell or purgatory and his ekphrastic disclosure 
of that dream connote the quality of Lear’s sleep better than his age, which 
he fails to calculate accurately, but which seems not to matter here. The 
doctor warns Cordelia that “it is danger / To make him even o’er the time 
he has lost” (4.7.79–80)—that is, to historicize him, to set the moments of 
his sleep and dream to the pace of chronology—because Lear is not ready to 
reimmerse himself in objective time. Once Lear is ready, then the music can 
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stop. This is the wrong prognosis. The real danger, as Cordelia has already 
presumed, is the damning quality of Lear’s time: “O you kind gods! Cure 
this great breach in his abused nature; / Th’untuned and jarring senses, O, 
wind up / Of this child-changed father” (4.7.14–17a). What is needed is 
an instrumental retuning, a return to harmony, a phenomenological adjust-
ment. “Will’t please your highness walk?” Cordelia asks her remorseful 
father (4.7.82b), as if she hopes that their pace, regular but unmeasured—a 
walk, not a crawl—will somehow recalibrate a somatic, tonal clock in him, 
with him.23
Bergson helps to decipher how the duration of Lear’s time supplants cal-
culable time in this scene and in this play more generally.24 And when we 
set Derrida’s emphasis on “haste” and “delay” within the context of Bergson’s 
definitions, we learn that affective temporality subtends any promise of 
hospitality.25 Again in Oedipus at Colonus, Antigone and Ismene’s suffer-
ing occurs not simply because Oedipus has died, and not simply because 
his death is nonlocalized, displaced, and hidden, but because Oedipus has 
prevented his daughters from requalifying their temporal experiences. Their 
inability to mourn completely and to endure happily—Antigone’s fatalism 
is shaped at the moment of Theseus’s refusal—deepens Sophocles’s tragedy, 
for it constricts the human capacity to make time hospitable.
Shakespeare tests this capacity when the disguised Kent is forced into 
the stocks. Gloucester offers to “entreat” on Kent’s behalf, but the prisoner 
would rather try to make his time in the stocks more hospitable, bearable:
Pray do not, sir, I have watched and traveled hard.
Some time I shall sleep out, the rest I’ll whistle.
A good man’s fortune may grow out at heels.
Give you good morrow.
(2.2.153–156)
Kent details his need for hospitality, imagines his position as suitable for 
rest and recreation, jests, then wishes Gloucester well. It is as if Kent can 
host and entertain himself while his arms and feet hang in the stocks. 
Gloucester is unable to play the host at his own home; his other guests, 
Regan and Cornwall, deprive him of that role long before they “ruffle” his 
“hospitable favours” with a pluck of the beard (3.7.39–41). Kent accepts 
the role for himself. He signals what little of hospitality is left in this play: 
typically dyadic, hospitality is now only a self-directed activity. Whether 
through sheer force of hopefulness or through a fantasy of self-sufficiency, 
he claims power over hospitality and time within his otherwise “shameful 
lodging” (2.2.170).
When Lear first discovers his waking, trapped servant, he recalls Kent’s 
fantasy only to ridicule it: “Ha? Mak’st thou this shame thy pastime?” 
(2.2.197).26 In Kent’s attempt to make “shame” a “pastime”—a way to 
pass the time—the success of his self-referential hospitality in the stocks 
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is momentary, and it is exceptional. Attentive theatergoers too might ques-
tion their own reactions to the play’s disappointments and anxieties. Why 
stay to witness this drama as it unfolds, even to this point, or why try to 
distract oneself from a shameful play as it moves along impeded, deterred, 
decelerated, but not ended? Consider the Fool’s warning to theatergoers 
once Lear’s delayed transport finally arrives in act 1, scene 5: “She that’s a 
maid now, and laughs at my departure, / Shall not be a maid long, unless 
things be cut shorter” (1.5.49–50). A play is like the “thing” that, as Julia 
Lupton reminds us, Heidegger calls “the gathering to deliberate on a matter 
under discussion.”27 This play’s scenes are its gatherings which, if left to last, 
will violate those laughing now. Cutting short this play and its scenes, then, 
might lessen the shame and suffering to follow, but to do so would enervate 
(or, to extend the Fool’s trope, emasculate) the script.
Consider the shared reluctance among many contemporary directors and 
producers to cut Lear’s mock trial in the hovel (3.6).28 Shakespeare possibly 
excised the trial during revisions that led to the Folio version, and Roger 
Warren attests that the cut improves the play. But the mock trial is typically 
staged in modern performances; it serves to entertain theatergoers with mad 
Lear’s fantasy that he remains kingly enough to convict his daughters. Warren 
claims that cutting the mock trial could sharpen the audience’s focus on 
Lear and injustice, but as a result, theatergoers must witness the pain and 
suffering present in what remains of this scene.29 The Folio cuts perhaps 
signal “Shakespeare’s creatively retrospective revision,” but not necessarily 
for “the poetic and dramatic progression of King Lear” that Hans Walter 
Gabler claims.30 Rather, the sharpened focus on Lear’s inhospitable times in 
the Folio taxes theatergoers with little distraction.
In a mostly Folio King Lear, delays in gratification and pauses over suf-
fering are obstacles in the pursuit of satisfaction or entertainment. Contrarily, 
sleep to keep time and fill the rest with whistles, then the theater, the empty 
dining hall, the stocks, maybe even a hovel can be hospitable. At least, this 
is as far as Kent extends his fantasy of self-led hospitality, but it becomes 
untenable long before Lear takes shelter from the storm and Edgar guides 
Gloucester to Dover.
This tragedy’s characters, like theatergoers and perhaps readers, ulti-
mately prove unable to manipulate affective temporality for a self-serving 
and self-bestowed hospitality, but the play offers an alternative, an equally 
fantastic and ultimately tragic means toward hospitable times: to serve oth-
ers. In act 1, scene 4, as Lear waits and waits for dinner, Kent tries to change 
the duration of time for him. Disguised and returned from banishment, Kent 
replays a scene of hospitality that Lear almost reenacts: the king welcomes 
an unnamed stranger who requests to serve the king, who seeks the fruits 
of hospitality by taking on its labors in deference to Lear’s “authority” 
(1.4.9–40). To consummate this hospitable relationship, Lear calls for 
“[d]inner, ho dinner!” (1.4.42), but it does not come, and once Oswald 
ignores Lear’s demands, delay now signals that Lear “is not entertained with 
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[the] ceremonious affection as [he was] wont” (1.4.56–57). To regain con-
trol over Lear’s time at this crucial moment of temporal loss, Kent beats 
Oswald. “I thank thee, fellow,” Lear tells Kent. “Thou serv’st me and I’ll love 
thee” (1.4.86–87).
Oswald is punished for his own inhospitality and is victimized by Kent 
and Lear’s hospitable bond. In perhaps an act of immediate, reactive retri-
bution, he delays the payoff of Kent’s service when he stays for more abuse, 
which I suspect diminishes any potential comic relief for theatergoers.
KENT. Come sir, arise, away, I’ll teach you differences.
Away, away; if you will measure your lubber’s length again, tarry;
But away, go to, have you wisdom? So! [Pushes him out.]
(1.4.88–90)
Kent commands “away” four times apparently because Oswald just lies, 
sits, or stands there, whether in shock or defiance. He tarries until Kent 
gruffly but graciously pushes him off-stage, with a “So!” like “sol” in the 
early modern English hexachord, a welcome note after too many pauses, 
punctuation marks, and repetitions.31 In act 2, scene 2, Kent further avenges 
Lear by refusing Oswald’s request for a timely hospitality:
OSWALD: Good morning to thee, friend. Art of this house?
KENT: Ay.
OSWALD: Where may I set my horses?
KENT: In the mire.
OSWALD: Prithee, if thou lov’st me, tell me.
KENT: I love thee not.
(2.2.1–7)
Before Kent’s slew of barbs against this “knave,” “rascal,” and “eater of bro-
ken meats” comes delay, horses in the mire (14). Kent’s inhospitality here, 
like Oswald’s inhospitality toward Lear in act 1, scene 4, is temporal in kind. 
Oswald hastens from Lear before answering Lear’s demand for dinner, and 
he tarries on stage until Kent pushes him (and so, the play) to move forward. 
In act 2, scene 2, Kent stays Oswald with such verbal and violent acuity that 
Kent ends up held in the stocks.
A victim of Lear’s initial torrent of inhospitality and a servant to Lear’s 
needs for “ceremonial affection,” Kent is keenly aware of the intricacies of 
time and hospitality. He exercises a fleeting ability to change Lear’s time 
for the better until the storm. Once Lear hesitates to enter the hovel, Kent’s 
fantasies of hospitality—self-reliance and service—effect little. Lear grows 
mad, despite Kent’s help and Lear’s own head-bashing and raving. “Lie 
here and rest awhile,” Kent urges, and Lear finally listens (3.6.79), but he 
is still out of his wits by the time he reaches Dover. When Lear grieves over 
a dead Cordelia, Kent finally reveals his identity, as if such an act could 
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provide one final service to Lear, could distract from or defer the horror of 
the moment (5.3.276–290). Kent’s service, and the failures of that service, 
are temporal.
Beyond Kent, delay underlies the theatricality and the (in)hospitality of 
each of Lear’s scenes. Cordelia halts the pace of Lear’s love game; Lear 
must cope with Goneril’s accusations and subsequent inhospitality; Lear 
must ask repeatedly who put Kent in the stocks; Lear stays too long in the 
storm, then outside the hovel, then in the hovel; and he interrupts not only 
Gloucester’s retreat from despair after an imaginary fall, but also, poten-
tially, Edgar’s reveal to his father. Excepting Cordelia’s actions in act 1, 
scene 1, these delays do not have a clear narrative function; rather, they 
operate against conventional paces of plot and even character develop-
ment. A prime example, the end of act 1, scene 4, seems to come once 
Lear curses Goneril—“Create her child of spleen” (1.4.274)—commands 
his Fool and himself “Away, away!” then exits. Goneril chastises Albany to 
“[n]ever afflict yourself to know more of” Lear’s rage in a curt speech that 
suggests a conventional end to the scene: “But let his disposition have that 
scope / As dotage gives it” (283–285). The gathering could end here, but 
Lear storms back on stage to complain about losing “fifty of my followers 
at a clap,” to eviscerate his oldest daughter with more curses, and to pro-
voke sororal jealousy as a means toward future accommodation (“I have 
another daughter, / Who I am sure is kind and comfortable”) before leav-
ing again (286–302). There is little new to learn here: Goneril has already 
instructed Lear “[a] little to disquantity your train” (1.4.240); Lear has 
already chastised her in response (251–253); Lear has already observed 
that “[y]et have I a daughter left” (247). The scene sputters along: Goneril 
calls for Oswald twice in the span of fifteen lines and passes the time vent-
ing to a nonplussed Albany; the Fool, whom Goneril commands to follow 
Lear out, calls for Lear to “tarry, and take the fool with thee,” (because 
again, as with Oswald, leaving is wiser than tarrying in this play) (308); 
and even after Oswald arrives and rushes out to serve Goneril, she readies 
herself to chide her husband until his interruption finally ends the scene: 
“Well, well, th’event” (344). Perhaps Albany has in mind some resolution 
to the conflict, but the “event” that he readies to enter with his exit is 
another delay. After not getting dinner at Goneril’s house, Lear must ask, 
then holler for his horses at Gloucester’s (1.5.31, 46). Lear’s pace, and so 
the play’s, is a crawl.
As Lear waits, the Fool offers little respite for Lear and theatergoers. 
He mocks Lear, but the jests contribute to Lear’s growing stress:
FOOL: If a man’s brains were in’s heels, were’t not in danger of kibes?
LEAR: Ay, boy.
FOOL: Then I prithee be merry; thy wit shall not go slipshod.
LEAR: Ha, ha, ha.
(1.5.8–13)
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Physical risks from exposure to the cold, kibes, or chilblains make it excruci-
ating to walk; limping or crawling would have to result. As tropes, kibes on 
the brain signal the temporal limping and crawling that Lear desired in act 1, 
scene 1 and that the play has taken as its phenomenological modus operandi. 
Kibes, the painful outcomes of inhospitality, are best avoided with warmth 
and shelter; likewise, an ailing mind, the risk of a cold social encounter or an 
unwelcome moment, is best remedied through a self-willed merriment. Lear 
laughs instead, but he fails to keep his wits. For Lear, merriment is given by 
another, but the Fool refuses to give it. Instead, he reminds Lear that suste-
nance and satisfaction are not possible from his crabapple- daughter, Regan; 
he answers his own riddles to dwell on Lear’s blind hopes in his daugh-
ters’ hospitality—when he answers them, that is (“Canst tell how an oyster 
makes his shell?” “Nor I neither” [1.5.25–27]). His jests are either dull (“The 
reason why the seven stars are no more than seven is a pretty  reason” is 
“[b]ecause they are not eight,” as Lear surmises [1.5.33–35]) or raw (“I can 
tell why a snail has a house […] to put’s head in, not to give it away to his 
daughters and leave his horns without a case” [1.5.29–30]). Like Kent, the 
Fool serves time to Lear. Unlike Kent, the Fool does not cater to Lear while 
they wait, so Lear increasingly obsesses over his daughters’ ingratitude and 
his own vaguely acknowledged sins (“I did her wrong” [1.5.24]).
Not simply the delays of transport, but the Fool’s poor service feed Lear’s 
own mental delays and humoral instabilities, best expressed just before the 
horses are finally readied off-stage: “O let me not be mad, not mad, sweet 
heaven! I would not be mad. Keep me in temper, I would not be mad” 
(1.5.43–45).32 What cues theatergoers into Lear’s descent is not his repeated 
failure to find his daughters welcoming, nor even the “foul” storm (3.2.24), 
but rather his reactions to delays and his urge for either haste or patience. 
If it were possible to run through the play, to rush through moments of 
exposure, interiority, and suffering, a thrilling, hospitable tragedy would 
result, with Lear eventually ever on the move. He would progress like the 
Macbeth that Howard Marchitello gives us, the ambitious man whose polit-
ical rise parallels his maniacal pursuit of conflated chronological time, in 
which past, present, and future condense into one sphere over which he has 
influence, in which actions take less and less time to perform until they take 
no time at all.33 Macbeth (and Macbeth) experiences and tries to manipu-
late quantitative time through sheer speed of will. But to tarry is to dwell 
on Lear’s troubles here, to prime viewers who will sit through the weightier 
anguish of the times to come.
Expecting hospitable times, contending with delays, and struggling for 
patience from the play’s onset—despite what Kent provides him, because 
of what his ruling daughters and his Fool refuse him, and starting with 
what Cordelia could not or would not exchange with him—Lear grows 
mad, and his tragedy has inhospitable temporality as its cause. In his first 
scene, as host he demands to control time in his home—whence Felicity 
Heal reminds us hospitality ought to spring in the early modern world.34 
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Ordering Gloucester to “attend” France and Burgundy, Lear will not wait 
for Gloucester to return. “Meantime,” he will “express” his “darker purpose” 
(1.1.35) “to shake all cares and business from our age” with “fast intent” 
so that he can “[u]nburdened crawl toward death” (36–39). From speed 
to sloth, Lear plans to acquiesce to his experiences of time by relinquish-
ing political command. What matters to him is not when he divvies up the 
pieces of the realm or even to whom he will abdicate, but rather how long 
it will seem to take. Yes, Lear believes that what he does now can settle 
future affairs, that he can decree the future of history: “we have this hour 
a constant will to publish / Our daughters’ several dowers, that future strife / 
May be prevented now” (43–44). And he is cognizant of how France and 
Burgundy have “long in our court … made their amorous sojourn” for 
Cordelia (47). Nevertheless, Lear ultimately is concerned with what hap-
pens in the meantime, in the very moment when one waits for a person to 
return, a plot line to continue, a conflict to arise, a dinner to be served. The 
play sets us on a course to take on his preferred temporality, to focus on the 
meantime as opposed to the plot line or the end of times.
Lear’s “fast intent” to split the realm countervails the slow life he plans 
to lead after relinquishing political command. He will “[u]nburdened crawl 
toward death” (1.1.39)—his pace will slow to a crawl. To Lear, time is not 
a system of measurement, an observable phenomenon, so he does not fan-
tasize control over the pace of chronological time. Contrarily, Lear’s “fast 
intent” and “crawl” signal how his actions can shift his perception of time, 
how hastening and delaying are unburdening processes of duration. The 
goal is not to hasten abdication and delay death so much as it is to feel like 
abdication happens instantly and to experience death as delayed.
Lear gains pleasure from such contretemps first in the timing of his plans 
and soon after in Goneril and Regan’s proclamations. With little interest in 
the substance of their speeches, perhaps he is more attuned to the length 
and rhythm of the responses, juxtaposed as they are to his curt commands: 
“Goneril / Our eldest born, speak first”; “What says our second daughter, / 
Our dearest Regan, wife of Cornwall? Speak” (1.1.53–54, 67–68). For less, 
his daughters struggle to craft more, in the form of iambic verse, a steady, 
customary rhythm. Whether prepared or impromptu, Goneril and Regan’s 
speeches mostly manage iambic pentameter (1.1.55–61, 69–76).35 The pat-
tern during the love game is a lopsided exchange of affective temporality 
between father and daughter. Lear’s description of his favorite daughter 
offers the sort of cadence that Goneril and Regan tried to give him:
But now our joy,
Although our last and least, to whose young love
The vines of France and milk of Burgundy
Strive to be interessed, what can you say to draw
A third more opulent than your sisters? Speak.
(1.1.82–86)
184 Thomas J. Moretti
If the pattern of the exchange has been inversion, a type of sacrifice, less 
for more, then Cordelia is dutifully curt. “Nothing, my lord” (1.1.87). Lear 
should have expected as much, or as little, from his more loving words of 
welcome. When he commands more than a trochaic response from her, she 
provides three lines of iambic pentameter; when her second attempt proves 
insufficient, she utters the most impressive verse of the three daughters, but 
with the most jarring content:
LEAR: How, how, Cordelia? Mend your speech a little,
Lest you may mar your fortunes.
CORDELIA: Good my lord,
You have begot me, bred me, loved me. I
Return those duties back as are right fit,
Obey you, love you and most honour you.
Why have my sisters husbands, if they say
They love you all? Haply when I shall wed,
That lord whose hand must take my plight shall carry
Half my love with him, half my care and duty.
Sure I shall never marry like my sisters
To love my father all.
(1.1.94–104)
Ten lines of iambic pentameter—the first line shared with her father, the 
final three with feminine endings—and (in the Quarto) a line of iambic 
trimeter, Cordelia’s speech surpasses her sisters’ in metrical form.36 Perhaps 
the feminine endings rhythmically confirm what Cordelia’s content claims: 
Goneril and Regan are the same (“carry,” “duty”), but Cordelia is distinct 
(“sisters”); Cordelia seems to err in public, but her sisters inherently err 
(“sisters”). The point here is that her poetry should have entertained Lear. 
The irony here is that Lear suddenly cares more about content than form. 
Cordelia keenly understands the tacit rules of the love game—first to craft a 
poetically inverse response to her father (“nothing”), then to achieve metri-
cal stability—but in haste Lear changes the rules. From Cordelia, his “joy,” 
Lear expects a poetic performance that contains effusive, “opulent” profes-
sions of love. Suddenly, hospitable times are achieved by pace and content.
Cordelia’s inability to make time hospitable for Lear during the love 
game—to offer him a rhythmic oath of love and devotion—and Lear’s need 
for her to help him to pass his time on his terms is at the heart of his rash 
abandoning of Cordelia, done as it is with the very terms of inhospitality. 
Consider Cordelia’s punishment—to be held from Lear’s “paternal care, / 
Propinquity and property of blood […] as a stranger to my heart and me” 
forever (1.1.114–117). She will now lose to “[t]he barbarous Scythian,” a 
stranger who will “[b]e as well neighboured, pitied, and relieved, / As thou 
my sometime daughter” (117–121). “Unfriended, new adopted to our hate, / 
Dowered with our curse and strangered with our oath” (204–205), Cordelia 
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has little recourse—hence, Kent’s hope that “[t]he gods to their dear shel-
ter take thee, maid” (183). Her failure to placate her fatherly host leads to 
estrangement and hostility. It is as if Shakespeare scripts relationships that are 
contingent upon the proper timing of affecting gestures. France understands 
as much—Cordelia’s act was a “tardiness in nature” (237)—even though 
her inadequate timing is something France trivializes (he thinks it “most 
strange” that Lear has disowned Cordelia “in this trice of time” [214–219]).
The hospitable times that Lear expected after abdication but before 
death—in the meantime—are what Lear desires later with more eloquence 
and less haste and hate as he heads to prison with his “sometime daughter.” 
Filled with song, gossip, and contemplation, their pastimes together will out-
last the lunacy of the world: “we’ll wear out / In a walled prison packs and 
sects of great ones / That ebb and flow by the moon” (5.3.17–19). Always 
in joy, they will turn captors into captives who “the good years” “devour,” 
“flesh and fell” (24–25). Ersatz prisoners, these perennial hosts will “see 
’em starved” before their captors “shall make us weep” (26, 25). Lear and 
Cordelia will freely serve one another, while time will prove abhorrently 
inhospitable to Cornwall and company.
Of course, Lear will fail to manipulate time in prison, just as he has 
throughout the play. Haste and delay—the timely affects he desires and 
expects to control in act 1, scene 1—oppress him at each turn. The haste 
with which he loses fifty retainers—“fifty of my followers at a clap? / Within 
a fortnight?”—is a quick example (1.4.286–287). The immediacy of the 
storm on the heath, and his exposure to it, is a more complicated one. His 
imperative mood—“Blow,” “Rage, blow,” “Spit fire, spout rain” (3.2.1, 14)—
superimposes causality onto the scene to imagine that the elements attend 
him. His hasty, punctuated diction empowers this fantasy enough so that 
by the time he decides to seek refuge in the hovel, it can seem as if he has 
brought the cold upon his own head. He feels momentarily and instantly 
served by nature—he has demanded immediate service to this point—but 
his rage obviously neither hastens nor delays the storm, and it fails to pro-
tect him against the torrents. Earlier, his hasty acts against his daughters 
could foster dramatic progression, and thus hospitable times for theatergo-
ers. From this moment forward, he is mad enough to dwell on his pain. 
As a result, the play makes inhospitable demands on its audience members 
to stay focused during their experience of delay. When mad Lear is on stage, 
we follow the action at his decelerating pace. If the playwright and players 
will not relieve theatergoers from a play that dwells upon the denials and 
avoidances that result from Lear’s shame, and Gloucester’s, and Edgar’s, 
then how can theatergoers pass the time?37 What does it say about those 
who remain in their seats or spots as the play plods through Lear’s rants?
Before I examine the inhospitable times we have with an unaccommo-
dated and unaccommodating Lear, it is important to set these moments in 
relief by first noticing how many of the other characters and actions are 
rushed. To become the Duke of Gloucester himself, Edmund hurries Edgar 
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and, through suspicious delay, entices Gloucester to rush to conclusions 
about Edgar (2.1.21 and 1.2.27–102). Gloucester himself is prone to haste: 
“Kent banished thus? and France in choler parted? / And the King gone 
tonight? Prescribed his power, / Confined to exhibition? All this done, / 
Upon the gad? – Edmund, how now, what news?” (1.2.23–26). The shock-
ing turn of events in act 1, scene 1 is not enough for Gloucester, who asks 
for more. In act 5, scene 2, Edgar sits a slowed, blinded Gloucester under a 
“good host,” “the shadow of this tree,” but Edgar is so quick to return and 
to rush his blind father that Gloucester might not know whether to go or 
come: “Away old man! Give me thy hand. Away!” (5.2.1–2, 5). Gloucester 
delays when he refuses to leave—“A man may rot even here” under the 
shade of hospitality—but Edgar already confused the action with his hasty 
commands. In spite of Gloucester’s hesitation, the ensuing panic impresses 
upon audience members the feeling of a prestissimo tempo that, while sud-
den and abrupt, is rhythmic enough for dramatic cohesion.
This strategy to hurry along for heightened theatricality is briefly sati-
rized in the fool’s parting shot to Lear and to the play as a whole:
LEAR: […] We’ll go to supper i’ th’ morning.
FOOL: And I’ll go to bed at noon.
(3.6.81–82)
The rush to prolonged entertainment and satisfaction—supper in the morn-
ing, the end in the beginning, death after crawling—is what Lear expected 
from his generous abdication of the crown and division of the realm. In a 
rejoinder, the Fool repurposes Lear’s call for haste and leaves the play in the 
midst of things; he intimates that rushed action gives way to short, sudden 
outcomes; and he reminds us how far Lear has come from his original desire 
to “crawl.” The Fool leaves before Lear slows dramatic pace to the point of 
stasis. Should we follow the Fool? Do we want the impression of a dramatic 
pace slowing? Do we want larghissimo, a tempo for introspection, depth, 
and absorption?
When Lear next appears bedecked in weeds in act 4, scene 6, his 
speeches are disjointed, intriguing, and painfully slow. Although not blind 
like Gloucester, we are forced to see Lear “feelingly” through the nonsense 
(145). But stasis arrives with Lear’s punctuated repetition. “Fie fie fie! Pah, 
Pah!” (125). “Now, now, now, now!” (168). “Kill, kill, kill, kill, kill, kill!” 
(183). “Sa, sa, sa, sa” (199). If his late departures, increasing impatience, and 
mad digressions delay the play’s outcomes—the imminent war, Edmund’s 
plots, Cordelia’s arrival—his emphatic monosyllables are far more jarring, 
unorthodox adjustments in dramatic tempo. A terrible host in act 1, scene 1, 
he is more unwelcoming to playgoers here. This is not the harmonic music 
that Stanley Cavell links to King Lear, nor is it the kind of music that Agnus 
Fletcher imagines when he analogizes dramatic movement with musical pro-
gression.38 It is not Edmund’s villainous harmony—“fa, sol, la, mi” (1.2.137), 
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the second part of the hexachord, the C-scale that falters at the last note, the 
measured, recognizable, conventional pace that backslides once Edgar and 
Gloucester fall (or when Edmund falls himself).39 And it is not like Edgar’s 
delays—his lengthy parley with Edmund, who refuses its continuation 
(5.3.142–143), or his post-facto reveal to his father off-stage (5.3.180–198). 
Rather, Lear repurposes the inhospitable times of Cordelia’s first reply  in 
act 1, scene 1—nothing to dwell on but curt words and abrupt pauses. Lear’s 
madness has him leap headlong into the most unaccommodating of condi-
tions—no food, poor shelter, disturbing forms of entertainment, and abrupt, 
sometimes incomprehensible mixtures of utterance and pause. With nothing 
else to hear, and nothing as interesting to see, audience  members are forced 
to bear the delays that spectacular drama, entertainment, and recreation con-
ventionally avoid. Lear repeats elsewhere—“Lear” (1.4.262), “no” (5.3.8), 
“howl” (5.3.255), “no,” “never,” and “look there” (5.3.304, 307, 309)—and 
each time, with varying effect, whether audience members are entertained 
or not, time is slowed for them. Lear’s repetition of words pause us on the 
present, agonizing moment, and the rests between are hardly the sort that 
Nicholas Breton hopes bring happiness to the Countess of Pembroke, like 
music to the soul.40
Eleanor Johnson has discovered how the repetition of monosyllabic words 
became a meditative tool in the medieval monastic world.41 The “atomic 
prayer,” best represented in the prose style of the Cloud of  Unknowing, 
approximates God’s perception of time. “By praying ‘love, love, love,’ 
a practitioner can feel his atomic accord with God’s eternity […] atomic 
prayer is designed to create a sensible impression of how ‘atomic accord’ 
between words, will, time, and, ideally, God’s eternal love would feel.”42 Far 
from any religious purview of King Lear, Cloud nonetheless functions here 
to signal the power of language over timely affect. Unlike atomic prayer and 
its resulting accord, Lear’s atomic madness so entwines entertainment with 
inquiry, introspection, and empathy that by play’s end, we do not wonder 
with Kent that Lear (and King Lear) “hath endured so long” (5.3.315), nor 
do we care about who will rule the kingdom, nor do we dwell on Edgar’s 
last proclamation that the “young / Shall never see so much, nor live so 
long” (325). We still care about where Lear is looking. We dwell on the last, 
tragic moment, I contend, because Lear’s language so impacts our sense of 
time that we can hope somehow individually and communally to be held 
together (“entertained”) by the delays that we otherwise find so tortuous 
and inhospitable in the theater.
Of course, variations in audience, venue, and performance make possible 
a range of more tolerable versions of King Lear, but there remains a long 
and well-documented critical history of King Lear as a play too long and 
too inhospitable for performance—a sign, perhaps, that Shakespeare’s King 
Lear is an experiment in theatrical and poetic timing that sets unforeseen 
burdens for entertainment on the audience and the readers.43 Contemporary 
performances continue to wrestle with the amount of pain to theatricalize, 
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leading critic Charles McNulty to wonder whether the play should be per-
formed at all. “[T]he more I encounter this masterpiece of the theater, the 
more I’m inclined to go along with […] Harold Bloom, who […] concedes: 
‘Our directors and actors are defeated by this play, and I begin sadly to agree 
with [English essayist] Charles Lamb that we ought to keep rereading ‘King 
Lear’ and avoid its stage travesties.’”44 Revisions to craft a more tolerable 
theater experience seem equally to disappoint.45
Perhaps Shakespeare was repurposing and emphasizing the sort of dra-
matic pace that characters set in earlier plays: Duke Senior delays Orlando’s 
search for food in an attempt at civility and hospitality in the wilderness 
(As You Like It 2.7.88–118); and, as Daryl Palmer puts it, old Capulet, “the 
old host” in Romeo and Juliet, “longs to uphold the ancient  responsibilities” 
of hospitality.46 But Capulet, hardly intolerable, is closer to Senior than 
Lear.47 To watch or read King Lear is to encounter a version of The Book of 
Job, not because Lear’s and Job’s sufferings are always comparable, and not 
because both texts concern hospitality and inhospitality in the same way.48 
Job was more hospitable than Lear—Job “opened [his] dores unto him, that 
went by the way” (31: 32), Lear took “[t]oo little care of … poor, naked 
wretches” (3.4.28–34)—but both endure temporal pain. The Book of Job, 
like King Lear, is framed by the hopes of hospitable times. The narrative 
moments that bracket Job’s much more plodding lamentations also speed 
to and from those lamentations. Suffering begins and ends quickly, with 
minimal conversation and no reflection. In the “meantime,” the lamenta-
tions stretch out suffering with redundant content and syntax. As with Lear 
and with Gloucester, the textual and performative means of Job’s suffering 
is delay, as it is for readers who tend to Job’s long and open complaints to 
doubting friends. Where Job and Lear truly diverge is at their ends. From 
Job’s troubling and sudden return to grace we move to Lear’s shockingly 
appropriate loss: “Cordelia, Cordelia, stay a little” (5.3.269), a gesture of 
hospitality that arrives too late.
Between Lear’s first “howl” and his death, Kent, Albany, and Edgar pre-
fer a hospitable present for the sake of the future (“O, let him pass,” Kent 
demands [5.3.312]), but it is the inhospitable present that theatergoers find 
hard to deny. At the convergence of sympathy and longing comes the sort of 
enduring receptivity only available at the play’s most inhospitable entrance, 
when Lear enters with Cordelia’s body. To soothe and suppress the play’s 
increasing distress, critics like Samuel Johnson and Leo Tolstoy might have 
preferred a Natum Tate revision, a more historically accurate version—a 
hospitable play.49 Those who dare to watch, listen to, even obsess over the 
memories of Lear’s strange, mad, afflicting, and dying words discover the 
irony of inhospitable times in Shakespeare’s theater: “the weight of this sad 
time we must obey,” Edgar declares, but theatergoers are not left with time 
to obey. The death march sends the dead and living off-stage, where the 
dead resume their lives out of character and costume. Meanwhile, a con-
ventional jig might begin as a parting pastime before and as guests exit the 
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theater, where there is no longer time or place or body to grieve, to mourn, 
or to dwell upon.50 No time to feel, a hardly terminable feeling.
Theater is a unique hosting site in early modern England because it offers 
timed recreation as its main gesture of hospitality. The achievement or fail-
ure of its recreations hinges on timing and attendant experiences of that tim-
ing. Jigs, jests, murders, incest, maimings, soliloquies, duels, cross- dressings, 
barbs, blasts, scents, crowns, cheers, jeers, taunts, blasts, fogs, dogs, and 
bears are all tools for successful pastime in the theater. King Lear offers 
some of these, but its persistent challenge to theatergoers is to delay gratifi-
cation, to settle in with a grief always and already misplaced, and to bring 
home whatever woe is left over.
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Staging Shakespeare’s Hidden  
Hospitality in The Travels of the  
Three English Brothers
Sheiba Kian Kaufman
We are undoubtedly familiar with Manichean paradigms of global history 
that emphasize oppositional identities, prejudice, enmity, and strife between 
religions, nations, and cultures.1 However, simultaneous with this tumul-
tuous and often pessimistic story of our common past are lesser known 
narratives, both historical and fictional, that are imagined as collaborative 
and cooperative in varying degrees. In early modern studies, scholars have 
addressed these diverse modes of social interactions by examining depictions 
of both xenophobia and cosmopolitanism in the period.2 Leah S. Marcus, 
for instance, raises the question of early modern attitudes toward religious 
pluralism and the impossibility of Protestant cosmopolitan coexistence by 
identifying a Shakespearean thrust toward “insularity”: “English provincial-
ism was itself a construction, in no small part a reaction to the shock of 
separation from Rome and to the establishment of independent networks of 
connection with other peoples, especially in the New World, the Near East, 
and Asia.”3 For Marcus, Shakespeare’s plays “acknowledge cosmopolitan-
ism and religious diversity but reject them in favor of an achieved commu-
nal harmony.”4 In her response to Marcus, Julia Reinhard Lupton contends 
that Shakespeare uses Venice in both The Merchant of Venice (1598) and 
Othello (1603) as an “experimental setting, a place to test the possibilities 
of pluralism avant la lettre.”5 Identifying Shakespeare’s provincialism or his 
cosmopolitanism remains elusive because an integral component of peaceful 
and just coexistence relies upon exercising hospitality toward the stranger: 
to be a cosmopolite, a world citizen, one must feel at home in unfamiliar 
domiciles. This universal feeling of solidarity is conditioned through suc-
cessful acts of embracing a guest, politically and domestically. Yet, such hos-
pitality is often thwarted or hidden in Shakespeare’s Venetian plays.
In both Merchant and Othello, potential hospitable encounters take place 
off-stage or beyond the bounds of the play, leaving only the consequences of 
the exchange as markers for evaluating the success or failure of hospitality in 
the play. Shylock begrudgingly attends dinner with his Christian neighbors 
with little description of the event. The dinner is, nevertheless, a catalyst 
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for Jessica’s eventual conversion as it gives her the opportunity to flee her 
home. When Othello defends his amicable relationship with  Desdemona and 
Brabantio before the Duke, he describes a Brabantio we never encounter—
the welcoming, hospitable European who opened his door to a stranger, 
and not the startled, hostile father waking to the infectious alarms of Iago’s 
dehumanizing rhetoric. Following the Duke’s invitation to speak in the 
opening scene before the senate—“Say it, Othello”—Othello begins with 
a reference to this earlier invitation: “Her father loved me, oft invited me, / 
Still questioned me the story of my life/From year to year.”6 Ironically, like 
the irreverent image of the “beast with two backs” (1.1.116), such a vision 
of edifying intercultural hospitality is too unseemly to stage or of little dra-
maturgical interest; nevertheless, the narration of a hospitable golden age 
not only competes with Iago’s dramatized hostility but also signals toward 
a cultural and literary reserve of cosmopolitan coexistence and interfaith 
rapprochement that is pivotal for the new worlds Shakespeare engenders.
Moments of hidden hospitality in Othello and Merchant are primers in deci-
phering the extent of Shakespeare’s global visions and the interdependence of 
such vistas within his society, offering through such narrations a means to mea-
sure the range of cosmopolitan impulses in the period. A key text that reveals 
Shakespearean potentialities of interreligious and intercultural exchange is the 
1607 topical travel play The Travels of the Three English Brothers by John 
Day, George Wilkins, and William Rowley (henceforth Travels). In staging a 
fictional rendition of the international adventures of the historic Sherley broth-
ers and their attempts to forge an Anglo-Persian alliance with Shah Abbas I of 
Persia, Travels shares Shakespeare’s concern with the limited nature of English 
hospitality in a time of burgeoning global consciousness. Scholars have writ-
ten on Travels’ “allusive mode” as it calls upon various dramas of the period, 
including Christopher Marlowe’s Tamburlaine and The Jew of Malta.7 I would 
add, however, that a coherent thread underlying the play’s intertexuality is the 
possibility of offering or rescinding hospitality toward strangers found partic-
ularly in Shakespeare’s two Venetian plays. In analyzing the dynamics of hos-
pitality in early modern drama, I draw upon philosopher Richard Kearney’s 
discussion of what he calls “the anatheist wager”—the foundational moment 
in Abrahamic religions when the divine stranger manifests as an unheralded 
guest and the host is faced with a choice to respond with hospitality or 
hostility—and Bonnie Honig’s analysis of foreign-founder scripts alongside 
early modern and contemporary theories of cosmopolitanism.8 Through this 
double framework, I examine the dramatic portrayal of an improbably hospi-
table Persia in Travels in dialogue with the seemingly hostile Venetian terrain 
found in Merchant and Othello. From this perspective, Persia, an Islamic coun-
try with a pre-Islamic, biblical, and classical heritage, unexpectedly parallels 
 Venice, a contemporary city known in the period for its pluralism. By reading 
 Shakespeare’s narrations of hidden hospitality through corresponding scenes 
of manifest hospitality between English Christians and Persian Muslims in 
 Travels, a more nuanced vision of early modern religious pluralism emerges.
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Interreligious Hospitality
From its ancient theological foundations to its modern political configu-
rations, hospitality lies at the heart of human negotiations over rights and 
citizenship, and thereby offers a dynamic and understudied dimension to 
“globally oriented scholarship” of the early modern period.9 Furthermore, 
considering the dramatic function of hospitality in light of early modern 
England’s inchoate cosmopolitanism reveals the utility of drama as a frame-
work for burgeoning intercultural and, in particular, interreligious relation-
ships. Theories and practices of intercultural and interreligious hospitality 
are particularly useful in articulating early modern religious exchanges that 
call upon, further, challenge, and re-envision Pauline universalism and its 
claim that “[t]here is neither Jew nor Grecian, there is neither bond nor 
free, there is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus” 
(Galatians 3:28)10 in a post-Christian, Islamic temporality—that is, a tem-
porality following the advent and influence of Islam on European society 
and consciousness. The demanding presence of not only Christian sects but 
also non-Christian traditions, particularly Islam via the Ottomans, tests 
Paul’s injunctions and its “struggling universalism” and presents the historic 
drama of how to act harmoniously in the midst of such diversity, if such a 
relationship is even possible.11
Kearney’s timely discussion of the imperative for interreligious hospitality 
in Anatheism: Returning to God After God draws on Émile Benveniste’s sem-
inal study of the conflated Indo-European etymology of the word hospitality 
(hostis and hospes), and provides early modern scholars writing after the 
religious turn with a discourse to identify early modern religious exchanges 
that stage the perennial choice facing the host: to respond with hospitality or 
hostility to the uninvited guest, and to understand the conditions and con-
sequences of that response, historically and ethically.12 These foundational 
moments of anagnorisis, of recognizing and accepting the unknown guest, 
are “primal dramas of response that serve as portals to faith”; the core scene 
is found in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in the narratives of Abraham 
and the desert visit of the three strangers, Mary and the Annunciation, and 
Muhammad and the visit of the angel Gabriel.13 As Kearney explains, the 
primary contribution anatheism makes in the wake of the religious turn 
in theory is essentially hermeneutic and potentially cooperative in its aims 
and ambitions beyond scholarly discourse. Kearney responds to a range of 
philosophers and theorists, including Jacques Derrida and his theory of hos-
pitality with its demands of an “unconditional welcome,” one that is only 
perfect and true if it is “absolute” and above the juridical.14 Kearney con-
tends that “unconditional hospitality is divine, not human” and therefore a 
“surplus” rather than an unattainable and thereby disempowering goal.15
Hospitality as principle and choice in fiction and in life is, therefore, a 
state of generosity, curiosity, and humility, and an act that enables the pos-
sibility for potential cooperation among diverse cultures. Its dynamism is 
better captured in hospitability because it is the hospitable environment and 
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its accompanying gestures that comfort, nurture, and transform a stranger 
into a friend. The most successful attempts at hospitality, both secularly 
and religiously motivated, aim to make the guest feel as if the alien material 
surroundings he or she temporarily resides in are in fact akin to one’s own 
home—“the stranger that dwelleth with you, shall be as one of yourselves, 
and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of 
Egypt” (Leviticus 19:34).
Early modern and contemporary theorists of cosmopolitanism often 
account for the necessity of hospitality in the endeavor to make humans feel 
as if they are denizens of an ever-expanding homeland—cosmopolites. Even 
prior to Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1795) and its articulation of hos-
pitality as “the right of the stranger not to be treated in a hostile manner,” 
European peace proposals such as Émeric Crucé’s The New Cyneas (1623), 
written during the heyday of religious conflict in seventeenth-century 
Europe, account for a common hospitable core: “we seek a peace, which is 
not patched up, not for three days, but which is voluntary, equitable, and 
permanent: a peace which gives to each one what belongs to him, privilege 
to the citizen, hospitality to the foreigner, and to all indifferently the liberty 
of travel and trading.”16 Yet, Crucé, a little-known French monk, repeatedly 
adds another dimension to this just form of hospitality, namely, an ethical 
vision of a united humanity:
for how is it possible … to bring in accord peoples who are so different 
in wishes and affections, as the Turk and the Persian, the Frenchman 
and the Spaniard, the Chinese and the Tatar, the Christian and the Jew 
or the Mohammetan? I say that such hostilities are only political, and 
cannot take away the connection that is and must be between men. 
The distance of places, the separation of domiciles does not lessen 
the relationship of blood. It cannot either take away the similarity of 
natures, true base of amity and human society.17
Crucé’s proposal to seventeenth-century potentates is an example of a vision 
of universal fraternity that combines both the juridical–political views of 
Kantian hospitality and those ethical concerns Derrida, Kearney, and others 
later explore. Radically, in outlining his international plan for arbitration, 
Crucé includes all nations in a general assembly to be housed in Venice, and 
places the Ottoman Emperor second to the Pope in rank. To borrow Seyla 
Benhabib’s terms, in Crucé we see a “mediation between the ethical and 
the moral, the moral and the political.”18 Thus, historicizing early mod-
ern conceptions of cosmopolitanism and its hospitable foundation opens a 
window to understanding the various forms of hospitality depicted in the 
drama of the time. Neither completely about the law nor solely faith based, 
this multifaceted iteration of hospitality bridges boundaries and creates 
novel arrangements between seemingly incompatible groups, in Europe and 
beyond. Like the modern-day use of mediation as a tool of negotiation and 
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reconciliation, understanding early modern hospitality as mediated accounts 
for its complex representation as both principle and right.
Such mediated forms of hospitality are visible in the cultural reservoir 
the Travels’ playwrights invoke when they depict Persia as both antiquated 
and contemporary. Through this self-consciously hybrid portrayal that 
merges pre-Islamic and Islamic images and references, we witness a rhe-
torical return to seminal moments of interreligious hospitality toward the 
stranger found predominantly in the biblical books of Ezra, Nehemiah, and 
Esther. In these narratives, hospitality accommodates religious and polit-
ical alliances between the Persian Empire and the Jews in exile. Consider 
the story of Esther. The Persian King Ahasuerus (Xerxes) embraces his new 
wife with great joy and regal “grace and favor” (2:17) without questioning 
her parentage. However, despite Xerxes’ open arms and penchant for his 
favorite Esther, unbeknownst to him, the Jewish queen faces a formidable 
enemy to herself and her kindred. Like a Jewish Scheherazade, using her 
rhetorical gifts to delay her pending execution at the hands of a cruel and 
jaded ruler, Esther speaks on behalf of the Jewish people and protects them 
from impending destruction. She asks for a “petition” (5:7) to covertly set 
up Haman, the counselor promulgating the Jewish genocide, and reveal his 
perfidy at a banquet. Thus, “Esther’s banquet” becomes the very moment 
when the forces of hostility and corruption in the state are uprooted. More 
important, her political actions are enabled by the Persian king, thus reveal-
ing her sense of ownership and empowerment in this interreligious match.
In this vein, staging Persia initiates a wager for the audience—a wager 
to remember and accept interreligious interactions that make up a shared 
biblical consciousness. If “hospitality is a virtue of place” as Brian Treanour 
describes,19 then Persia reigns as a place where hospitable acts occur on 
stage; it is both particular and universal, defined nominally by an ancient 
locale and past temporality yet relatively unhindered by cultural markers 
that render its portrayal “exotic” or “orientalist.”20 The question animating 
my comparison of Shakespeare’s Venetian plays and Travels is what dis-
tinguishes hospitality in the latter. What hospitable acts toward strangers 
are openly explored in this textual reception, sprouting from an earlier 
Shakespearean germination of the problems of plurality?
“We Give Thee Liberty of Conscience”: 
Facilitating Interreligious Dialogue
Travels romanticizes the historic Sherley brothers’ travels abroad and ideal-
izes their relationship with the Safavid monarch, Shah Abbas I, referred to 
as the Sophy in the play.21 The episodic plot dramatizes the contemporary 
sojourns of Robert, Anthony, and Thomas Sherley in Persia, Venice, and 
Constantinople, respectively. When Anthony and Robert arrive in Persia, 
they are warmly greeted by the Sophy, entertained with mock battles that 
spur religious debate between the Persians and the English, and accepted 
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as ambassador and general by the Sophy in a campaign against the Ottoman 
Empire. While Anthony the ambassador travels with a dissembling and 
prejudiced Persian court attendant who has him arrested in a clandestine 
plot drawing heavily upon Merchant, Robert remains in Persia where his 
loyalty to the Sophy is tested as he challenges Persian martial traditions to 
free Thomas from the Great Turk who tortures him on stage. Ultimately, 
Thomas is freed, Anthony is vindicated, Robert marries the Sophy’s Niece, a 
“pagan,” and the play concludes with a hyperbolic exchange of conviviality 
in a utopian Persian court cast as an ideal realm for experimenting with 
religious pluralism.
My attempt to define the features of Persian hospitality in Travels rests 
on identifying complementary attributes characterizing the relationship 
between Persian hosts and English guests: liberty of conscience and suc-
cessful political, familial, and religious embraces in the commonwealth. 
Through this categorization, it becomes clear that Travels represents  Persian 
hospitality as neither unconditional nor conditional but rather as a rela-
tionship that mediates juridical and ethical demands between both the 
host and the guest. In terms of hospitality and hostility, we witness three 
models: the classic host–guest relationship with its challenges and tri-
umphs through Robert; a mockery of hospitality through Anthony’s 
manipulation by the Persian Cushan Halibeck and Zariph the Jew; and 
the perils of captivity through Thomas at the court of the Great Turk. 
The only case of successful interreligious hospitality that takes place in 
the play occurs in Persia. Here we see Shakespeare’s Sophy, mentioned 
twice in passing in Twelfth Night, take center stage in Travels in an alli-
ance with representatives of Christendom against the Great Turk, who 
appears as a stereotyped, hostile enemy to both Persians and Christians 
in the play.22
Undeniably and unfortunately, the play’s negative portrayal of the 
Ottomans differentiates the Persian Empire from the Ottoman Empire—
while hospitality may reign as the dominant paradigm on theatrical Persian 
soil, the play is not exceptional in extending its association of interreligious 
and intercultural hospitality beyond set parameters.23 The same can be said 
of the negative portrayal of Zariph the Jew, who betrays Anthony and serves 
as a metatheatrical avatar of Shakespeare’s Shylock. The play manipulates 
the real adventures of the brothers to recreate what Lawrence Publicover 
identifies as a “playhouse-friendly anti-Turkish narrative” as well as the 
stage Jew.24 There are several reasons why Persia, at this point in English 
dramatic history, escapes such early modern prejudices, one being that the 
temporal distance afforded by a combination of biblical and classical nar-
ratives sustain its reputation as ancient and distinct from other Muslim 
nations. In other words, while it is easy and familiar to stage the Turk and 
the Jew, since there is no parallel “Persia play” akin to the “Turk play,” 
as Jane Grogan notes, the Persian is not an easily depicted type in either 
medieval or early modern traditions.25
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Travels uses Anthony to magnify the social challenges of hosting Shylock 
in Merchant. As a reincarnation resurrecting the interreligious tensions 
within Shakespeare’s play, Anthony engages in interreligious dialogue at the 
court. This step toward interreligious exchange is presented in philosophical 
digressions on similarities between the Persians and the English following 
the opening courtly entertainment of mock battles. The congenial tone of the 
exchange between Anthony and the Sophy contrasts with the bitter banter 
of Shylock and Antonio’s initial dialogue in the opening scenes of Merchant. 
Antonio’s discussion with Shylock over the terms of the bond is riddled with 
anger, envy, and intolerance on both sides, prompting Antonio to deride 
Shylock’s biblical hermeneutics (“The devil can cite script for his purpose”) 
and Shylock to confront Antonio’s bigotry (“You call me misbeliever, cut-
throat dog, / And spit upon my Jewish gaberdine”).26 Shylock ultimately 
extends his accusations beyond Antonio to Christians as a single, stereotyp-
ical group: “O father Abram, what these Christians are, / Whose own hard 
dealings teaches them suspect / The thoughts of others!” (1.3.159–161).
Unlike the ongoing struggle to converse across religious lines in Merchant, 
civil interreligious dialogue is promoted in Travels. After the entertain-
ment of “Persian wars” and “wars as Christians use,” mock battles staging 
beheading in the Persian practice but not in the Christian version, the Sophy, 
in exaggerated awe of the Christian custom and the introduction of can-
nons into the Persian army (an historically inaccurate inclusion to bolster 
the Sherleys’ status as military innovators), takes on the wager to accept 
the brothers in his court as military commanders in his wars against the 
Ottomans:27
Christian or howsoever, courteous thou seemest;
We bid thee welcome in unused phrase.
No gentle stranger greets our continent
But our arms fold him in a soft embrace.
(1.36–37)
As part of this respectful rhetoric, the play’s opening scenes are saturated 
with repetitions of “welcome” and “stranger” overflowing from the Sophy 
toward Robert and Anthony, which he further extends to all theatrically 
transported Christians in the audience: “For thy sake do I love all Christians; / 
We give thee liberty of conscience” (1.190–191). The Sophy’s hospitality 
stems from his ability to invite the stranger, the uninvited Sherleys, into his 
court without reservation and with respect to their faith. The play’s emphasis 
on embrace (repeated at the end of the play) presents Persianized hospital-
ity toward English Christians as dynamic—as an active hospitability rather 
than a static and detached form of toleration. From the Latin verb tolerare, 
to bear and endure, toleration is not the guiding ethos in the Sophy’s court; 
instead, he enables an embrace, which in early modern usage is defined not 
only literally as the physical act of friendship but also figuratively through 
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a host of accepting actions: worship of a deity, welcoming of friends and 
services, or joyfully adopting a course of action, doctrine, individual, and 
more.28 The Sophy’s offer of “liberty of conscience” presents Persian hospi-
tality and its pact between host and guest as a reverential act that considers 
the interiority of the guest equally with his physical comfort and needs, 
thereby joining the materiality of the embrace with the immateriality of the 
conscience.
The Sophy’s liberality is a primary hospitable condition that enables 
ongoing religious dialogue rather than disagreement and antipathy in the 
play. When the Sophy asks the central question, “And what’s the difference 
‘twixt us and you?” (1.162), Anthony replies,
None but the greatest, mighty Persian.
All that makes up this earthly edifice
By which we are called men is all alike.
Each may be the other’s anatomy;
Our nerves, our arteries, our pipes of life,
The motives of our senses all do move
As of one axletree, our shapes alike …
We live and die, suffer calamities,
Are underlings to sickness, fire, famine, sword.
We are all punished by the same hand, and rod,
Our sins are all alike; why not our God?
(1.163–180)
Anthony’s description resonates with the universalistic aspects of Shylock’s 
well-known speech in act 3, scene 1 of Merchant: “Hath not a Jew eyes? 
Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions—
fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same 
diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same win-
ter and summer as a Christian is?” (3.1.49–53). Both monologues contrast 
interior and exterior states of faith with physical analogies, yet in contrast 
to Shylock’s pained confrontation with the Christian community in the play, 
Anthony’s speech begins with an emphasis on the “greatest” distinction but 
then undermines that apparent discrepancy by appealing to the similarity of 
“each … other’s anatomy.” He laments the primary inner value that prompts 
a distinction in outward practice (“But that’s not all: our inward offices/Are 
most at jar—would they were not, great prince!” [1.174–175]) and con-
cludes with a provocative inquiry to prompt the Sophy’s conversion (“why 
not our God”) that is interrupted when a messenger arrives.  Anthony’s 
unanswered question hovers over the play as a possibility in  Persia, a 
potential for Christian conversion that never comes to complete fruition. 
In  Travels, the playwrights extrapolate Shakespeare’s similarity motif to 
promote a genuine sense of familiarity that renders English and Persians 
more unified than distinct. Not only is Persia the setting for interreligious 
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discourse and debate, but the entire play is invested in what Grogan identi-
fies as the “vocabulary of likeness” that “produces intriguing moments that 
break down both boundaries of class and race, if discommodiously.”29 This 
sameness or similitude extends to the matter of religion and it is through 
successful Anglo-Persian hospitality that fictionalized interreligious dia-
logue can find a nonthreatening arena.
“A League ‘Twixt us and Christendom”: Political Embraces
The idea of religious commensurability between Persians and English 
Christians, with an emphasis across interconfessional lines to accommodate 
the historical Sherleys’ Catholicism, occupies much of the opening scenes 
and remains a prominent theme throughout the play. Although the historical 
Sherleys’ numerous international exploits are part of their individual ambi-
tions and schemes for fame and recognition, as biographers of the Sherleys 
explain, the idea of a Persian–Christian alliance is rooted in a centuries-long 
relationship between Persia and Europe dating back to humanist historiog-
raphy and mercantile accounts, if not ultimately to the tale of the Magi in 
the Bible.30 In her study of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European 
travelers and their encounters with Zoroastrians, the national religion under 
the Achaemenid Empire, Nora Kathleen Firby reminds us that
the memory of ancient Persia had never faded completely from the 
European mind, but after the rise of Islam, Persia was so isolated from 
the West that little factual knowledge was available in the Middle 
Ages. Cyrus was known to have freed the Jews from captivity. The 
tradition that wisdom was derived from the East was reflected in the 
New Testament story of the three wise men who traveled to the Nativity. 
The name of Zoroaster persisted as a source of Chaldean astrology 
and magic, or, more acceptably, as the instructor of Pythagoras and 
associated with Platonism.31
Through references to Persia’s ancient heritage and its “renownèd Persian” 
ruler,32 Travels portrays Robert and Anthony as adventurers in an esteemed 
land and not as English explorers founding an undiscovered country in a 
New World setting. As in the Esther story, the realm harbors corruption 
in the court and thus the brothers serve as foreign agents, refounders who 
prompt change in Persia by identifying the debased constituents. Honig’s 
study of foreign-founder scripts is helpful here in identifying the function 
and portrayal of refounders in early modern drama: “In the classic texts 
of Western political culture (both high and low), the curious figure of the 
foreign-founder recurs with some frequency: established regimes, peoples, or 
towns that fall prey to corruption are restored or refounded (not corrupted 
or transcended) by the agency of a foreigner or a stranger.”33 Although 
focused on conceptions of democracy, both Honig and Benhabib consider 
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how the foreigner can alter the landscape of a nation and challenge prevail-
ing traditions and possible prejudices. In this conception of the foreigner’s 
ability to instigate change, Othello and Travels find common ground: both 
Othello and Robert, with Anthony’s aid, attempt to refound their respective 
settings, domains that are in need of such regeneration because of the social 
prejudices infiltrating Persia and Venice in their own right.
Distinguished because of its imperial legacy in the case of the former and 
differentiated for its potential mercantile and cultural experiments in the lat-
ter, for both Persia and Venice there is no dramatic discovery of a new world 
but rather a rediscovery of a state and its pernicious prejudices, embodied 
in Shakespeare’s Iago and his nocturnal calumny against Othello, which 
creates and unleashes the infectious image of the “old black ram” (Othello, 
1.1.87) that corrupts the susceptible white ewes of Europe. In Travels, it is 
Halibeck and Calimath, a duo of courtiers paralleling Iago and Roderigo in 
their insidious machinations throughout the play, who personify the reluc-
tance to embrace foreign hands in the wars against the Great Turk.
As the Persian brothers witness the increasing fraternity between the 
Sophy and the Sherleys, exclamations of their hatred reverberate with Iago 
and Shylock’s rapacious language. Halibeck declares, “Heart, how these 
honours makes me hate these Christians,” and Calimath answers, “Poison 
finds time to burst, and so shall ours” (2.281–282). Halibeck and Calimath’s 
statements echo Iago’s initial protestations against Cassio’s promotion 
(Othello, 1.1.7–32).34 While the Sophy quickly assents to Anthony’s offer 
of an Anglo-Persian alliance against the Turks, “a league ‘twixt us and 
Christendom” (3.160), Halibeck and Calimath are truculent toward such a 
profane union, and Halibeck openly reminds the Sophy of his regal legacy 
and pre-Islamic heritage:
Shall you, whose empire for these thousand years
Have given their adoration to the sun,
The silver moon and those her countless eyes
That like so many servants wait on her,
Forsake those lights?
(2.190–194)
Coupled with the Sophy’s repeated invocation, “Next Mortus Ali, and those 
deities / To Whom we Persians pay devotion” (1.87–88; emphasis added), 
the references to the “sun” “moon” and “lights” refer to pre-Islamic Persian 
traditions of Mithraism. These European conceptions of ancient Persian 
 religion de-Islamize the nation through its associated paganism, its “natural” 
religion, and its yoking together of past and present temporalities that reg-
ister with the early modern understanding of classical and biblical Persia.35 
The playwrights thus rhetorically shape the Sophy’s court through refer-
ences to ancient Persian solar worship, the long-standing cultural miscon-
ception of the Zoroastrian faith of the Achaemenid Empire. This type of 
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hybrid religious identification provides a dynamic space within the play-
wrights’ pseudo-ancient Persia wherein strangers can become friends and 
the possibility of an East–West embrace materializes. This interstitial reli-
gious space allows for a theatricality of exchange, a fluidity of identities and 
hospitable relationships between the Sherley brothers and the inhabitants of 
their imagined Persian court.36
The first two scenes of the play, therefore, cater to a philosophical and 
spiritual discourse on the nature of an Anglo-Persian alliance and the poten-
tial advantages and disadvantages for the Persian court in accepting these 
foreign agents on behalf of the state. The playwrights further call upon 
the rhetoric of a Christian crusade, and thereby cast the alliance as one 
of the Sophy’s near conversion. Before the Sophy accepts the proposal he 
asks, “What profit may this war accrue to us?” and Anthony responds, 
“Honour to your name, bliss to your soul” (2.187–188). While Halibeck 
and Anthony debate the superiority of the Persian God and the Christian 
God, both mirroring each other’s dialogue in the repetition of “our God,” 
the Sophy remains an observer who ultimately accepts the wager to unite 
with “Christendom,” granting Robert the “place of general” (2.279) and 
Anthony the position of “Lord Ambassador” (1.267) who will be sent to 
Venice to obtain a jewel for the king with Halibeck at his side.
“You Forced My Thought to Love Him”: Familial Embraces
Like Iago and Roderigo who use their provincialized rhetoric to appeal to 
prevailing societal prejudices to color Brabantio’s view of Othello as a dark 
beast, Halibeck, in an aside, declares his hostility in deference to his culture 
and ancestry—“Ye Persian gods, look on: / The Sophy will profane your 
deities / and make an idol of a fugitive” (1.156–158)—revealing at once 
an esteem toward Persia’s imperial and pre-Islamic past and his encumber-
ing attachments to his exclusive Persian community. Despite Halibeck and 
Calimath’s protestations, the alliance between the Sherleys and the Sophy 
ensues, and the play subsequently turns to the romance between the Sophy’s 
Niece and Robert, beginning with a scene between the Niece and her maid 
Dalibra, which is noted for its debts to both the initial dialogue between 
Portia and Nerissa in Merchant and the discussion between Desdemona 
and Emilia regarding Othello’s jealousy.37 Resembling in context but not in 
tone Emilia’s sardonic comment—“they are all but stomachs, and we all but 
food” (Othello, 3.4.99)—Dalibra playfully inverts the bitterness of Emilia’s 
cannibalistic comparison when the Niece asks her what she thinks about the 
Sherleys: “if they be as pleasant in taste as they are fair to the eye, they are 
a dish worth eating” (3.6). When the Sophy’s Niece expresses “suspicion” 
(3.130) toward the Englishmen, her maid chides her, saying, “Strangers? 
I see no strangeness in them. They speak as well or, rather, better than our 
own countrymen” (3.22–23). Once the Niece meets Robert, she is caught 
between her desire for and doubts about a romance with him. Prompting 
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aspirations of ancient Persian solar sublimity for Robert, in lines that recall 
Desdemona’s comments about Othello—“I think the sun where he was 
born  / Drew all such humors from him” (Othello, 3.4.30)—the Sophy’s 
Niece encourages Robert’s saturation in the Persian environment: “The glo-
rious sun of Persia shall infuse / His strength of heat into thy generous veins / 
And make thee like himself” (3.80–82). As Robert leaves, the Niece, in an 
aside, bemoans the religious difference between them: “fare the well, good 
Sherley. / Were thy religion …” (3.107–108).
In “dreaming” (3.118) of the possibility of marriage with Robert, the 
Sophy’s Niece aligns herself with the story of Aeneas and Dido, an inter-
cultural union that was tragically doomed despite Dido’s welcome of the 
Trojan stranger. In conjuring this ill-fated couple, she reflects the anxieties 
found in these love stories, worrying that Robert, like the “true Trojan” 
(3.121) will play with her heart; the foreboding allusion also recalls the 
mythological references to “Cressid,” “Thisbe,” and “Dido,” in the moon-
light dialogue between Lorenzo and Jessica in the final act of Merchant, 
suggesting that there too lurks the possibility of a tumultuous future for 
the newlyweds. Moreover, when the Sophy’s Niece compares Robert to the 
“wandering knight, Aeneas” (3.120), her nomadic description of the leg-
endary founder echoes Roderigo’s pejorative identification of Othello as a 
“wheeling stranger / of here and everywhere” (Othello, 1.1.135). Despite the 
shade of suspicion, the Niece’s admonition of Persian cultural and religious 
imbibing works as Robert begins to assume a foreign persona. However, like 
Othello, Robert’s embrace of an alien culture proves perilous to the host–
guest relationship because his assimilation assails the ipseity of the host. 
Although the Sophy emphasizes the priority of Persian laws over the right 
to hospitality when he establishes the conditions of his hospitality toward 
Robert from the first mention of genuflection to his demand to maintain 
Persian martial traditions, as the play continues, his hospitality toward the 
Sherleys, and Robert in particular, brings to light the potential risks of the 
hospitable act. Hence, hospitality toward the favorable stranger, Robert, 
ushers forth various usurpations of the Sophy’s personhood and demands 
the Sophy’s response to such an imposition.
At the heart of the Persian martial “custom[s]” (6.25) in the play is the 
practice of killing prisoners of war, and it is the very malleability of this law 
that binds the Sherleys, the Sophy, and Persia in an alternative form of medi-
ated hospitality. Despite an early model of mercy in the mock battle opening 
the play, Robert initially relinquishes the Christian practice in loyalty to the 
Sophy, thereby proving his status as the law-abiding guest even to the extent 
of acting as general for the Sophy. When he enters—“Enter Robert and other 
Persians” (7)—he takes on the Persian ethos in his response toward the pris-
oners and abides by the laws limiting his rule: “We are now here the Persian 
substitute/And cannot use our Christian clemency” (7.14–15). Furthermore, 
in a moment of conflated religious identity, Robert turns to the Turkish pris-
oners and demands, “Speak, do ye renounce your prophet Mahomet? / Bow to 
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the deity that we adore / Or die in the refusal” (7.16–18; emphasis added). 
Here, the use of the plural first-person pronoun emphasizes Robert’s lack 
of differentiation from the Persian majority and recalls Othello’s identifi-
cation with his Venetian citizenship when he rebukes his drunken soldiers: 
“Are we turned Turks” (Othello, 2.3.161; emphasis added). While Robert’s 
proclamation leaves open the possibility that the Turk may need to answer 
in the Christian affirmative, a Persian soldier follows Robert in urging the 
prisoner to “[j]oin Mortus Ali then with Mahomet” (7.20–23), clarifying 
the expected answer. Finally, when a Christian in Turk’s habit enters as a 
messenger from his imprisoned brother Thomas in Constantinople, Robert 
quickly declares the disguised Christian’s death—“We’ll have no ransom 
but conversion” (7.26)—suggesting, through syntactical confusion conflated 
with the Persian soldier’s response, that conversion to Christianity or the 
Persian religion is acceptable.
When Robert challenges the Sophy’s identity and customs as he tries to 
free Thomas from the Great Turk, he reveals how “the guest’s hostility is an 
imminent possibility within the hostis relation, a menacing consequence of 
his potential interchangeability with the host,” which renders the Sophy’s 
realm unheimlich.38 The Sophy angrily conveys Robert’s heroic transfor-
mation in alchemical terms that draw upon the Niece’s solar references: 
“Dares that proud Sherley, whom our powerful heat / Drew from the earth, 
refined and made up great; / Dares he presume to contradict our will” 
(6.2–4). In addition to Robert’s military transgression, his relationship with 
the Sophy’s Niece is a cause of further antagonism for the Sophy who begins 
to see Robert as a potential threat to the throne. Like Brabantio in the open-
ing of  Othello, the Sophy learns about the possibility of a romance between 
his Niece and Robert not from either of the lovers, but from the injurious 
third-party voice, Calimath, which further fuels his growing rancor toward 
Robert. The outraged Sophy exclaims,
Alter our customs, steal our subjects’ bosoms,
And like a cunning adder twine himself
About our niece’s heart! She once his own,
He’s lord of us and of the Persian crown.
(11.25–28)
When the Niece is summoned and interrogated, like Desdemona, she boldly 
asserts her love of Robert—“That I love him: true” (6.43)—and turns upon 
the court as a solicitor on behalf of Robert: “If he had his due / You should 
all love him; he has spent a sea / of English blood to honour Persia” 
(6.43–45). Initially, however, the Sophy sees this union as one “against all 
rules of nature” (Othello, 1.3.102) and castigates his Niece:
Forgetful of thy fortunes and high birth,
More bestial in thine appetite than beasts.
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The princely lioness disdains to mate
But with a lion; time and experience shows
That eagles scorn to build or bill with crows.
(11.51–55)
The Sophy’s outrage at such a disparate marriage mirrors Brabantio’s 
speech before the Duke—“in spite of nature, / of years, of country, credit, 
everything”—(Othello,1.3.97–98) and Iago’s later affirmation of it: “Not to 
affect many proposed matches / Of her own clime, complexion, and degree” 
(Othello, 3.3.233–234). Like Othello’s nostalgic report of Brabantio’s prior 
hospitality—“her father loved me, oft invited me” (1.2.128)—the Niece 
reminds the Sophy of his earlier visible embrace of the Sherley brothers: 
“You forced my thought to love him, and like a tutor / First taught my 
tongue to call him honourable” (6.59–60). Thus, while this latter theatrical 
embrace is staged and then reiterated in Travels, in Othello the hospitable 
welcome resides beyond the parameters of the play, and thereby marks the 
beginning of the play as already far removed from harmonious relationships 
and the potential for unity found therein.
Later in the scene when the Sophy’s anger at his unruly guest quickly 
dissipates once Robert explains his motivations for keeping the prisoners 
and his lack of ambition for the crown and his Niece, the Sophy tests her 
devotion to Robert by presenting a “counterfeit head like Sherley’s” (stage 
direction). In response to the prop, the Niece alludes to Antigone’s legendary 
actions: “Let his dissevered head and body meet. / Return them me, let me 
the credit have / And lay his mangled body in a grave” (6.232–234). After 
the Sophy reveals his fabrication and eschews his temporary senex stance, 
he reverses her declaration with a statement that invokes Desdemona’s fore-
boding desire to be shrouded in her unsullied wedding sheets and transforms 
the tragic sartorial symbol into one of celebration: “And having joined his 
body to the head / His winding sheet be thy chaste marriage bed” (6.237).39 
The Sophy’s understanding and accommodation of Robert’s transgression 
against Persian military and marriage customs exemplifies the mediated 
form of hospitality I have been tracing in the play: the Sophy maintains his 
dignity and right to rule and judge throughout the play, but allows for cer-
tain compromises with his guest, depending on his background and worth 
to the realm. In this sense, laws and customs of the realm are presented as 
flexible and conciliatory to the guest rather than binding or arbitrary.
“I Am, Like Thee, a Stranger in the City”:  
Religion at the Dinner Table
As the Shah’s ambassador, Anthony travels with Halibeck to meet the Emperor 
of Russia and the Pope. Anthony’s stop in Venice consumes three consecutive 
scenes at the center of the play and draws heavily upon Merchant.40 Anthony, 
like Antonio, is caught in a monetary exchange with Zariph the Jew who 
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desires to “taste a banquet all of Christians’ flesh” (9.23). However, while the 
scene borrows from Merchant, it departs in significant ways, including in its 
metadramatic portrayal of the stage Jew, Zariph. Anthony, who owes him 
“gold” for a “jewel” he bought for the Sophy, asks Zariph for “forbearance” 
and reminds him that he too is a visitor to Venice: “I am, like thee, a stranger 
in the city. / Strangers to strangers should be pitiful” (9.35–36). Furthermore, 
while Shylock’s accusations toward the Venetian Christians—“villainy you 
teach me I will execute” (Merchant, 3.1.59–60)—is never acknowledged by 
the Christians in Merchant, Anthony takes ownership of such hypocrisy. 
When Zariph contends, “If we be learnt of Christians / Who, like to swine, 
crush one another’s bones” (9.37–38), Anthony answers, “Is it sin in them? ’ 
Tis sin in you” (9.39). Lastly, when Anthony invites Zariph to a banquet, he 
refuses and meta-dramatically answers: “No banquets; yet I thank you with 
my heart—[aside] And vow to play the Jew; why, ’ tis my part” (9.50–51).41
In Merchant, Shylock’s attendance at the dinner provides an opportunity 
for his daughter Jessica to escape his household, pilfer his money and posses-
sions, and ultimately elope with Lorenzo and convert to Christianity. Thus, 
the off-stage banquet, with the potential of Pauline unity and inclusion, not 
only eschews any harmonic ends, but also further intensifies Shylock’s anger 
toward the Christians in the play. In approaching the play from the point 
of view of “culinary exchange” rather than financial negotiations, David 
Goldstein points out that despite the play’s obsession with the language of 
food, staged eating is absent in Merchant. Goldstein identifies the poten-
tial for community building through the “commensal event” of a shared 
meal and concludes that in Merchant “every opportunity for eating together 
offers, and then withdraws, the possibility of hospitality.”42 This commen-
sal void seems to have captured the interest of the Travels’ playwrights, 
presumably for rhetorical rather than ethical ends, and thus Shakespeare’s 
elusive banquet is staged with great immediate costs to Anthony because 
of Halibeck’s machinations. Through this staging, the playwrights probe 
the conditional state of what could happen when such fraught hospitality 
between Christians and Jews is staged.
In Travels, Anthony is host to the banquet, a dramatic moment that often 
magnifies the “vulnerability” of the host, leaving him in a “dramatic snare” 
that leads to his demise as Daryl W. Palmer explains.43 Here, Zariph and 
Halibeck, Jew and Muslim united in hostility, conspire against Anthony, an 
“uncircumcised slave” (10.10) and have him arrested during the course of 
the banquet in Venice with its overt biblical allusions to the Last Supper. When 
Anthony is arrested, his earlier appeals to fraternity and solidarity evapo-
rate, as he calls Zariph an “[i]nhuman dog … true seed / of that kiss-killing 
Judas” (11.91–93) who betrays him “in midst of courtesy” (11. 91). Rather 
than the Sophy’s embrace, Anthony is caught “in a serpent’s arm” (11.112). 
While Zariph enjoys the theatrical indulgence of his pernicious action, 
declaring he will relive this scene again—“I shall dream of this happiness 
tonight” (11.109)—Halibeck acts with greater malignant efficiency. Earlier 
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in the scene, he cuts Zariph’s indulgences short to describe his Iago-like 
motivations, stemming from an unadulterated hatred of the foreigner and 
his exterior status rather than his interior value: “Ere any stranger shall with 
me walk even, / I’ll hate him, were his virtues writ in heaven” (10.56–61).
While Anthony suffers at the hands of this malicious partnership, his 
brother Thomas is abandoned by his crew and subsequently captured 
and tortured by the Great Turk until letters from “England’s royal king” 
(12.130) secure his release. His captivity scene is cast as the inverse of the 
Sophy’s hospitable embrace as the Jailor describes the physical terms of his 
Turkish imprisonment as analogous to the hostile gestures rival Christian 
groups extend one another in the struggles of the Reformation: “for I am 
sure … these five or six month at least he has had nothing but the hard 
board for his bead, dry bread for his food and miserable water for his drink. 
And we Turks think that it is too good for these Christians too; for why 
should we do any better to them, since they do little better to one another?” 
(12.10–15). As with the favorable depiction of the Pope, and later a hermit 
counseling Robert on his spiritual duty to maintain his Christian faith in 
Persia, the play’s investment in a united Christendom accommodates mul-
tiple purposes beyond commentary on interconfessional challenges of the 
time. Richard Wilson elucidates the Catholic interests of the play, which 
were intertwined with attempts by Catholic gentry, including the Sherleys, 
to gain toleration under James who had made such ecumenical promises 
before taking the throne.44 In using Persia as “a screen for Catholicism” 
so that Persia and England can unite in a “new Crusade,” the play’s adven-
turers, like its Persian setting, register multiple temporalities.45 In alluding 
to medieval romance, the brothers are akin to Christian knights; yet, as 
contemporary representations of early modern travelers and self-fashioned 
ambassadors, they are also at the cusp of the burgeoning discourse of trade 
and cross-cultural exchange.
Forms of Coexistence
The global aspirations of Travels are not easily reconciled with either its 
archaic representation of medieval knights-errant or its portrayal of an 
exclusive form of Anglo-Persian coexistence. As Anthony Parr summarizes, 
“this ecumenical vision has its human limits in the play—no room in it for 
Turk or Jew.”46 This limited form of Christian tolerance appears in another 
European peace proposal contemporary with Crucé’s utopian vision of 
international peace and prosperity: The Grand Design of Maximilien de 
Béthune, Duke of Sully. Unlike Crucé’s Cyneas, which reads like a discur-
sive prototype of the League of Nations, Sully’s plan for a “very Christian 
Republic in a state of enduring internal peace” aims to unite Christian rul-
ers, allow tolerance for Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists, and establish 
an army “for maintaining continual war against the infidels,” the  Ottoman 
Turks.47 In comparing the rhetoric of both proposals, a continuum of 
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tolerance and intolerance emerges with Crucé’s wide embrace on one side 
and Sully’s limited embrace closer to the other end. In the plays I have been 
discussing, we see the enactment of these varying punctuations on the con-
tinuum through distinct forms of receiving the stranger in the common-
wealth. Thus, in Travels when Jew and Turk are expelled from scenes of 
hyperbolic solidarity between Persians and Englishmen in the play, their 
separation is both a product of their stage histories as well-known types in 
the drama of the period and a depiction of limited toleration in the play. 
Although Robert’s Persian welcome and final absorption into the realm is 
radical and utopian in its own right, the play in its entirety gravitates away 
from the Crucé end of the spectrum, revealing thereby the tension between 
utopian politics and Realpolitik.
Although lacking in the overt, exaggerated, and mediated hospitality 
characterizing Persia and its exclusive form of coexistence between Persians 
and Christians, the Venice of Merchant and Othello refuses to throw out its 
guests. Shakespeare does not exile the ethos of the Jew or the Moor in his 
plays but rather dramatizes the early modern problematic of religious coex-
istence in the forced conversion of the one and the “death into citizenship” 
of the other.48
In Merchant, Shylock’s formal rather than spiritual conversion, although 
damaging to his person in ways Travels avoids by skirting a conversion of 
the Sophy’s court, assures his physical presence in Venetian society while 
his will ensures material security for Lorenzo and Jessica, an interreligious 
marriage based on conversion unlike that of Robert and the Sophy’s Niece. 
Robert as Englishman in Persia may participate in altering or eliding certain 
laws and customs, but Shylock, a Jew in Venice, is subject to the law and 
must fulfill his pact as resident “alien” as Portia reminds him in the trial 
scene: “The law hath yet another hold on you” (4.1.358). The play ends 
with a textually burdened, detached, juridical solution rather than with an 
equitable compromise between Antonio and Shylock,49 yet it also signals 
toward a future Christian state that desires to uphold a Jewish presence with 
all its potential commercial ramifications in a state of conditional hospital-
ity. As Aryeh Botwinick posits, in Merchant “a Judaically softened and mod-
ulated Christianity, as the state religion that even a Jew can live with, can 
serve as the basis for a new vision of civilizational amity and progress.”50 
In this imperfect arena of early modern cultural and religious exchange, 
this same inherent desire for change is found and amplified in Travels and 
Othello: the Christian Venetian state absorbs Judaism and the Moor as 
reconverted Muslim just as Persia absorbs and accommodates Christianity 
through the Sherleys.
While it may seem that through Othello’s suicide the Moor and all instances 
of the stranger, whether pagan or Muslim, are expunged from the play, it is in 
his final speech that Othello reasserts his Venetian citizenship—“I have done 
the state some service, and they know’t (Othello, 5.2.338)—and reminds 
the Venetians of their obligation toward him as a naturalized citizen by laws 
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established in Cardinal Contarini’s The  Commonwealth and Government of 
Venice (1599), which articulates that “foreign men and strangers” could be 
naturalized “either in regard of their great nobility, or that they had been 
dutiful towards the state, or else had done unto them some notable service.”51 
Moreover, this is Othello’s second declaration of his citizenship; he invokes 
his contributions to the state at crucial moments of potential estrangement 
from his naturalized home. His first reference to his citizenship is recalled 
when he finds he must prove himself worthy, perhaps to himself as well as to 
the magnifico, when his marriage is questioned: “My services which I have 
done the Signory / Shall out-tongue his complaints” (Othello, 1.2.18–19). 
Othello is confident that his inner attributes, his “demerits” and “parts” 
alongside his “title” and “perfect soul” will be enough to fairly “manifest” 
him as a consort for Desdemona (Othello, 1.2.22, 31, 32). Indeed, as the 
Duke presents Othello with the impending crisis in Cyprus, ordering him 
to engage in battle “[a]gainst the general enemy Ottoman” ( Othello, 
1.3.49–50), the state of emergency trumps Brabantio’s resistance to 
 Othello’s integration through marriage and the state officiates the union. 
Because of the state’s dependence on him, because “the fortitude of the place 
is best known” to him, and “opinion, a more sovereign mis / tress of effects, 
throws a more safer voice on” him (Othello, 1.3.221–224), his citizenship 
and marriage are not lost.
Othello commits suicide by tragically completing one last service to the 
state against the “general enemy,” and by invoking his right as a Venetian 
when his citizenship is most dubious, he ensures that his presence as part of 
the state and its legacy is not erased. On the potential ramifications of Othello’s 
suicide, Lupton argues that on the one hand, “Following the directive of Paul 
in Romans 2, Othello has indeed circumcised himself in the heart, reentering 
the Christian covenant through his expiatory death. Moreover, this sacrifi-
cial cut also signs and seals Othello’s death into citizenship, his entry into the 
archives of state memory as a citizen-soldier.”52 However, as Lupton further 
suggests, the “reinscriptive cut,” taken from Judaism, is a “legally ratifying 
and self-identifying mark that dislodges Othello from the Christian historical 
order by locating him in a different covenant.”53 His death as “circumcised” 
Moor reasserts Othello as Honig’s “much-needed” foreign element in the 
“vulnerable moment” concluding the play.54 Othello’s reinscription through 
his reference to the Contarini document and through his suicide transforms 
him into a sacrificial non-Christian refounder whose alliance with the Venetians 
purges the state of its most corrupting element, Iago, much like the Sherleys’ 
arrival and service in Persia rids the Persian court of the representative forces 
of disunity and hostility, Halibeck and Calimath.
When the Great Turk tortures Thomas on the rack on stage in an attempt 
to make him reveal his identity and then to recant his faith and join the 
Turks, the steadfast Sherley brother refuses to “turn apostata” (12.114). 
Thomas’s reference to apostata follows another critical invocation of the 
term; during her interrogation, the Niece reproaches the Sophy for his 
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mercurial attitude when he recants his welcome of Robert, claiming, “And 
is affection turned apostata” (11.63). As in Othello, “turning” in Travels 
is a problematic term, a phrase reverberating with the early modern fear 
of “turning Turk”—a moment of Christian “betrayal,” “subversion,” and 
ultimately “renunciation both of God and of country.”55 As Daniel Vitkus 
explains, the “idea of conversion that terrified and titillated Shakespeare’s 
audience was a fear of the loss of both essence and identity in a world of 
ontological, ecclesiastical, and politically instability.”56 Considering the cul-
tural aspersion toward such an act, it is notable that Travels only flirts with 
the idea of cultural and religious conversion through Robert, “the Persian 
substitute” and the Sophy’s exaggerated embrace of the Christian brothers. 
In this drama of similitude and exchange, Grogan concludes that “if the 
play began with an over-emphatic insistence that it is the Persian who will 
be made to be like Englishmen through the ministrations of the Sherleys, 
what the play actually depicts is Englishmen acting like Persians: inglese 
persiani.”57 Ultimately, as in the case of religious dialogue versus conver-
sion, where the aim is to find common ground but not necessarily convert 
one another, the representative of each faith maintains his or her position, a 
solution that Shakespeare does not posit in Merchant and Othello. Instead, 
for Shakespeare, religious hospitality remains conditional, contingent, and 
elusive, an improbable and imagined social ideal known primarily through 
its absence and negation.
Like Merchant, Travels concludes with all potential catastrophes diverted; 
Anthony is cleared of his charges, and both Halibeck and Calimath are 
punished, the former to death and the latter to oversee his brother’s execu-
tion. The Sophy promises to grant Robert his free reign in Christianity, an 
idealized ending that embraces Robert as the law-decreeing host founding 
his own hospitable domain within Persia for Christian immigrants. Robert 
will baptize his child with the Sophy himself as godfather, “erect a church / 
Wherein all Christians that do come / May peaceably hear their own religion,” 
and “raise a house … where Christian children” will only know “what by 
Christians is delivered them (13.177–179,187–191). Although detailing 
aspects of a sequestered domicile with little interreligious interaction, Robert’s 
description of a wider society wherein Christians and Persian Muslims live 
and maintain their individual identities both revisits and revises the con-
clusion of Merchant, wherein only a Shylock bereft of his religious identity 
is tolerable in Venetian society, and emphasizes his camaraderie with the 
Sophy, of feeling at home in Persia.
While neither the Sophy nor his Niece become Christians in the play, 
the entertainment of concluding with “[a] show of the Christening” (13; 
stage direction), with its overt symbolism of the rebirth of  Christianity 
in the East, suggests that the initial interreligious dialogue between 
Anthony and the Sophy coupled with Robert’s Persianized ways, influ-
ences the Persian court. Persia is not a Christian country, but it is hospi-
table to Christians through the combined royal forces of the Sophy and 
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his Niece. While Robert claims that through his baptized child “ Sherley 
in Persia did the first Christian make” (13.55), it is the Sophy who 
orchestrates the christening, claims that his “royal hand / Shall make 
thy child first Christian in our land” (13.200–201), and appropriates his 
proper position as sovereign host, subordinating Robert by the end of 
the play. Yet, the inclusion of a Christian religious rite also recalls the 
Sophy’s opening proclamation of “liberty of conscience” in Persia; the 
Sophy and his purified court retain their Persian identity and faith, but in 
a novel arrangement, allowing for coexistence with Christians. His court 
is not converted or attempting to convert others, unless they are Turkish 
prisoners, but rather an unusual haven for Christians to live alongside 
non-Turkish, Persian Muslims. The question Anthony asks the Sophy, 
“and why not our God,” is not overtly answered through scenes of con-
versions, but rather through acts of hospitability toward Christianity in 
not only politically promoting Robert and Anthony but also in going 
beyond tolerance and participating in a Christian ceremony in Robert’s 
newfound home.
In remembering its Shakespearean forbearers’ challenges with wel-
coming and integrating the foreigner, whether through political alliances, 
marriage, or conversion in irrevocably changed forms, Travels pushes 
encounters into embraces in its pursuit of Anglo-Persian hospitality. 
While in both Merchant and Othello hospitality between cultures and 
religions is thwarted despite the cosmopolitan reputation of Venice, in 
Travels, Persia provides a religious loophole, a means by which the play-
wrights can avoid the long-standing and multifaceted relationship among 
the People of the Book—Jews, Muslims, and Christians—to create unity 
in a pseudo-ancient Persia. With its pagan past in some instances more 
alive than its Islamic present, a tangible Persia exists, puzzling while pro-
viding early modern audiences with a distinct utopian setting to stage 
improbable receptions. Through its anachronisms and mediated forms of 
hospitality, the play parallels Persia and Venice in its diversity and poten-
tial for coexistence, claiming that the former can be even more hospitable 
to such opportunities than the latter, given the right circumstances. At the 
same time, because Shakespeare’s Venice contingently and conditionally 
hosts Shylock and Othello, representative minorities of two cultural 
and religious traditions, its attempts at pluralism are potentially more 
radical (and devastating) than even the strides Persia makes in Travels. 
In reading these scenes of hospitality and hostility, it becomes clear that 
Shakespeare begins to adumbrate the conditions necessary for cosmopol-
itanism, and the Travels playwrights provide an arena and situation to 
activate those potentialities. As Shakespeare’s Venetian plays negotiate 
unlikely unions that lead to changed worlds, Travels plays with the ide-
alism of hospitality in far off lands, calling upon the audience to engen-
der novel social realities by staging that which is hidden and potentially 
hopeful in Shakespeare.
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10 Hospitality in Twelfth Night
Playing at (the Limits of) Home
Joan Pong Linton
Hospitality is a recurrent theme in Shakespeare, but nowhere does inhospi-
tality so pointedly implicate the household as a social institution as it does 
in Twelfth Night through the figure of the stranger. In the opening scene, 
four survivors from a shipwreck make their ways into the society of Illyria, 
a place that, as Antonio warns Sebastian, “to a stranger, / Unguided and 
unfriended, often prove / Rough and unhospitable” (3.3.9–11).1 Antonio 
may be biased, since he is a known enemy to Orsino’s men, and can walk 
abroad only at peril to himself. But as we learn towards the end, even the 
Captain, one “bred and born / Not three hours’ travel from this very place,” 
and familiar enough to catch its latest gossip (1.2.20–21), inexplicably ends 
up in prison. In truth, neither of Illyria’s two noble houses seems ready to 
entertain strangers, the one headed by a nubile countess who has cloistered 
herself from the world, the other by an eligible duke occupied with enter-
taining himself. While Viola finds service with the Duke, Sebastian engages 
in the tourist’s “mere extravagancy” (2.1.9–10), assuming roles that fit into 
Illyria’s household and commercial economies. Sebastian is buying his right 
to be in Illyria, Viola is earning it. While neither requires hospitality, the issue 
remains latent in the play’s persistent interest in strangers and “ domesticating 
strangeness,”2 to borrow a term from Catherine Lisak’s essay and title.
According to Felicity Heal, in early modern English the term stranger 
“was used with equal regularity” both “as a description of the alien who 
was unknown” and “as a term of domestic art, to describe an individual 
who was not attached to a particular familia.”3 In this context, the hospi-
tality extended or withheld was household hospitality; that is, hospitality 
grounded in the patriarchal household economy with its gender and prop-
erty relations conceptually unified around the male host as owner. To con-
temporary audiences, Viola and Sebastian would be strangers in both senses, 
and they are domesticated through marriage into Illyrian families. In her 
analysis, Lisak attends to strangeness in terms of characters’ deviations from 
social norms, and the ways in which “Illyrians take it upon themselves to 
tame or hold at bay strangeness.”4 Strangeness thus defined pertains to insid-
ers as much as outsiders, including the households of Orsino and Olivia. 
I would suggest that the romantic comedy’s conventional expectations are at 
work here motivating the characters and drawing the play toward domestic 
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closure in marriage—but with a twist. Specifically, the play’s drive toward 
marriage and domestication stalls at the last moment on two discoveries. 
First, the twins’ reunion leaves no doubt that Olivia has married a total 
stranger; and second, the absence of Viola’s “woman’s weeds” suspends her 
nuptial and recalls the stranger in her whose integration into Illyrian soci-
ety thus remains deferred (5.1.265). Into this suspended closure steps Feste 
singing about, among other things, fearful householders who “shut their 
gates,” excluding strangers as “knaves and thieves” (5.1.382).
This jarring of conventional expectations, with underlying household 
anxieties exposed by Feste’s song, confronts the audience with the family 
as the social institution that functions to include strangers by marriage or 
exclude them as threats to household property. Since inclusion bypasses 
 hospitality, and exclusion withholds it, we come to realize that at the heart of 
Illyrian inhospitality is the inability to countenance the stranger as stranger, 
irreducible to the self, be it the foreigner or familial outsider, or the stranger 
within oneself. Insofar as social roles reinforce normative expectations and 
obligations, they function to define identities and regulate behaviors within 
a social network. However, social roles cannot prevent their bearers from 
straying beyond the boundaries they define, no more than they can fix 
individuals’ identities and behaviors. In this light, the stranger becomes the 
paradigmatic figure of the otherness in us all that exceeds the social roles 
we perform and the capacity of the household to contain. It is the stranger’s 
irreducibility to the self that haunts Illyrian society, in a play that sets up 
encounters, disguises, and unveilings as occasions for posing the question 
of hospitality and imagining its possibilities at the limits of the household.
I focus on two encounters in particular, each connected with a biblical 
subtext that serves to provide implied commentary for a culture conversant 
with scripture in diverse venues, from the pulpit to private devotions. The 
first encounter concerns Olivia, whose refusal to play hostess, coupled with 
her quick about-face in unveiling herself to the disguised Viola, furnishes 
the comic action through which the play problematizes household hospi-
tality from the perspective of its female protagonists. Such action finds its 
latent seriousness in the subtextual story of Susanna and the Elders, reveal-
ing the hostess’s dispossession as the object of sexual possession. The second 
instance concerns Paul’s anticipated face-to-face encounter with the divine, 
which Feste invokes in his final song, recalling the play title’s suggestion of 
seasonal hospitality5 associated with the coming into the world of Christ 
as the quintessential stranger, the Messiah dispossessed of his divinity in 
assuming humanity. In my analysis I am interested in the possibilities of 
an alternative hospitality that enacts dispossession as a performative ethics 
between strangers, and its implications for an ethics of performance for the-
ater in its diverse venues, entertaining strangers at every turn.
To understand Olivia’s inhospitality we need to go behind closed doors 
to witness her situation as head of her household. Despite her vow to abjure 
male company, her uncle has invited in a would-be suitor in order to fleece 
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him; her steward would “be Count Malvolio,” bedding her and lording over 
her household (2.4.30); and even her clown is not above playing “Pandarus,” 
taking money at the gate (3.1.45). These designs on Olivia’s person by her 
male dependents as their means to wealth reveal her vulnerability as the 
unmarried head of an aristocratic household in disrepair—a household with 
no intact boundaries. In this sense the strangers are already in the house, 
these familiar faces whose mercenary motives and transactions have thor-
oughly infiltrated its social space, and redefined her as property up for grabs, 
turning any semblance of hospitality into a form of prostitution.
In theorizing the position of the hostess and of the feminine within what 
she calls the “hospitality relation,” Tracy McNulty writes:
In archaic practice, as well as in biblical narratives, feminine participa-
tion in the hospitality act is often limited to the exchange or offering of 
women between men. In both contexts the host’s wife and daughters 
are considered not as subjects, but as his chattel: dependent “things” 
that make up the host’s personal property as master of the home.6
In this way sexual possession becomes a thing to give and exchange in the deal-
ings between host and guest. As McNulty clarifies, “in insisting on the ‘thingly’ 
status of woman in the hospitality relationship,” the point “is not so much to 
denounce the objectification of women in a male economy but to examine 
the agency and ethical status of this positioning.”7 McNulty goes on to draw 
two important implications: first, regarding the status of woman as the host’s 
property, “that she is able to act as an extension of the host’s  personhood”; 
and second, regarding female property, that in “being both identified with and 
in excess of the male master and host, … it is able to facilitate reciprocal rela-
tions between men, such as the relationship of mutual obligation that often 
binds the host and guest following an initial act of hospitality.”8
These functions of the hostess present in archaic practice and biblical 
narratives would seem to persist in the medieval European literary tradition, 
most visibly in the courtly and chivalric romances, including the French 
Arthurian tradition and its English offshoots, where hospitality and the traf-
fic in women are thematically linked. In these stories, hospitality scenes are 
often fraught with uncertainty, since they involve exchanges between per-
fect strangers and therefore an element of risk. As Ad Putter points out, the 
elaborate protocol of hospitality detailed in these romances and in contem-
porary conduct books reflects a felt need to regulate hospitality exchanges 
in order to minimize “ambiguity and potential conflict.” Protocols cannot 
eliminate anxieties, however, since “codified etiquette can be consciously 
acted and dissembled.”9 Here the figure of the stranger takes on additional 
freight of hidden motives and hostile intentions. In a system where women 
mediate as property in the exchange between men, masculine anxieties come 
to focus on the hostess whose uncertain virtue may undo host or guest, or 
both, and on the unattached hostess who flouts all rules of hospitality.
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In a text like Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, not only is the hostess 
an extension of the host’s personhood, but her wifely virtue becomes central 
to hospitality’s intertwined and multilayered social relations grounded in 
the patriarchal institution of property. Gawain’s trawthe and his pentangle 
virtues are put to the test in three days of luftalking and courtly seduction 
by his hostess and exchange of winnings with a host, all undertaken in the 
name of hospitality. When Gawain is caught keeping a gift from the hostess 
(for love of life, and not for cunning or courtship), which the host finds for-
givable, the gift as “female property” seals a new bond between the Green 
Knight and Gawain, who then learns that his hostess has all along served 
her husband faithfully. The same concern with the hostess’s virtue becomes 
a symptom of male anxiety that Shakespeare explores, typically in tragic 
mode, in instances where a virtuous hostess is victimized through the failings 
or absence of the host. Thus Lucrece is raped for her virtue, of which her hus-
band has boasted before other men, and the tragedy that begins The Winter’s 
Tale results from an overly jealous host who misreads his wife’s hospitable 
gestures as signs of her sexual infidelity with a guest who thus overstays his 
welcome. The pattern recurs in Cymbeline, which the first Folio classifies as 
a tragedy. Imogen is betrayed by a husband who bets on her virtue, provides 
his opponent access to her hospitality, believes without investigation the 
 latter’s false proofs of her infidelity, and in jealousy plots her death. Between 
the lies of the guest (who likens her to Lucrece and Philomel) and the credu-
lity of the absent host, the hostess’s person is reduced to a personal effect (the 
stolen bracelet) and an anatomical detail (the mole on her breast accidentally 
glimpsed)—a man’s possession, by marriage or by stealth.
The “thingly status of woman in a hospitality relationship” remains at 
issue in a comedy like Twelfth Night, albeit submerged in laughter. Olivia 
would seem to enjoy a measure of autonomy as hostess of a house without 
a male host, but as we have seen there is no lack of parodic substitutes 
who would play the keeper of Olivia’s body as property to be used how 
they will. All this takes place unbeknownst to Olivia, of course, in comedy’s 
grand style of carnival misrule; indeed, much of the comedy depends on her 
remaining blithely oblivious until the play’s end of what goes on behind 
her back. The effect is to provoke not only laughter at the shenanigans as 
they unfold but also judgment of the characters, since the laughter is, after 
all, premised on our judgment that household authority and hospitality are 
being misappropriated and abused. As new household arrangements are 
configured out of the old, and hospitality relationships are reinvented, the 
one structural constant is the hostess’s position as the (present, absent, or 
would-be) host’s presumed property and sexual offering to a guest.
At the same time, the play approaches the hostess’s precarity through a 
biblical subtext linking Olivia’s situation with the story of Susanna and the 
Elders, an apocryphal story from the Babylonian exile. Susanna’s husband, 
for all his wealth and fame, is unable to protect her from the lecherous elders 
and the harshness of miscarried justice. Likewise, Olivia’s dead father and 
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brother are powerless to protect her from the predatory intentions of her 
own male dependents. The apocryphal story of Susanna enjoyed enormous 
popularity in Europe and England. In “liturgical preaching” throughout the 
patristic, medieval, and Byzantine eras, she was the most important among 
female biblical figures whose exemplary virtue substantiated the Christian 
doctrine of the spiritual equality of the sexes.”10 Ambrose, Tertullian, 
Augustine, and Abelard present her as an exemplar of chastity.11 In England, 
the Susanna story had a long popular tradition in sermons: “If a medieval 
Christian went to church on the Saturday before the third Sunday in Lent … 
he or she would hear read as the epistle for that day the entire account of 
Susanna from Daniel 13.”12 The story “appeared in a variety of forms in 
Renaissance England: popular wall pictures, ballads and drama.”13 According 
to Tessa Watt, Susanna was one of the four most popular subjects of bibli-
cal wall paintings,14 and while diverse factors may account for the story’s 
popularity, the appeal of the ballad versions “lay in the image of naked 
Susanna washing herself in the orchard, an object of fantasy which probably 
titillated the viewers of Renaissance paintings on the theme just as much as 
it did the wicked elders whose lechery was supposedly condemned.”15 Then, 
too, the story may have had special appeal for Shakespeare and his wife, 
who named their firstborn Susanna.
In Twelfth Night, Olivia is specifically linked to Susanna through Sir Toby’s 
drunken singing: “There dwelt a man in Babylon, lady, lady” (2.3.71). The 
first part of the line directly replicates the first line from both chapter 13 of 
the Book of Daniel and the “Ballad of Constant Susanna”; the words “lady, 
lady” form the refrain in sixteen of the ballad’s nineteen stanzas.16 In citing 
“lady, lady,” the play both refers to Susanna as a household name and con-
nects the biblical heroine with the title Olivia most frequently goes by within 
her household. That this subtext should emerge during Toby’s carousal with 
Sir Andrew further indicates the business Toby has in mind, although the 
two men never come close to the enormities that the lecherous elders perpe-
trate. Another set of parallels comes from Thomas Garter’s Commody of the 
moste vertuous and Godlye Susanna (1578), a moral play that allegorizes 
the elders as Sensualitas and Voluptas. These include the comic treatment 
of “matters grave and sad” (Pro. l. 19); the clock strike which Susanna’s 
servant takes as a warning “for losing of the time” (ll. 645; 708; cf. Olivia in 
III.i.122: “the clock berates me with the waste of time”); the name Toby for 
Tobit, which Susanna’s father invokes as one whom “God himselfe did … 
alwayes ayde / And sent him home his sonne agayne” (ll. 890–91); and Ill 
Reporte’s play on his name William to produce “ill will” (ll.1124–37; cf. 
the name Malvolio). A third connection concerns Olivia’s order to “let the 
garden door be shut” (3.1.84), which echoes Susanna’s words in Daniel, 
“and shut the garden doors” (Daniel 13:17).17 A fourth connection comes 
through a speech by Viola calling on Time to untie the romantic knot in 
which she is caught. Viola’s “alas the day” (2.2.36) echoes the biblical voices 
of Joel and Jeremiah chastising their community for its corruption and 
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prophesying Israel’s delivery from exile.18 In speaking out against “wicked 
counsel,” Jeremiah singles out Ahab and Zedekiah as “false prophets” and 
“ adulterers” (Jer. 29.20–23), the very judges who are Susanna’s accusers, 
according to Jerome and the Wycliffite tradition in England.19
There is, to be sure, a noticeable disproportion between text and subtext 
in these instances, that is, between Toby’s misrule and the elders’ miscar-
riage of justice, between Toby the riotous uncle and Toby the pious father, 
between Olivia preparing to woo Cesario and Susanna to wash herself; and 
between Viola’s wish to be delivered from romantic entanglement and Israel’s 
deliverance from exile. The disproportion is great enough to suggest parody 
operating both locally to produce comic effects and collectively to draw 
attention to the story being parodied. The parody works precisely because 
we need not assume a direct parallel between text and subtext; at the same 
time, there is enough of a connection to make the differences purposeful and 
productive. Within biblical tradition, Susanna is one of the female figures 
whose exemplary virtue proves instrumental to challenging or reaffirming 
established institutions. For resisting rape, Susanna is tried in public by the 
elders whose abuse of hospitality thus locates the household in a larger arena 
of political theology. In particular, the story “challenges the traditional legal 
method by which two witnesses could falsely accuse a man and their testi-
mony was accepted as true” without cross-examination.20 Susanna is herself 
defenseless against this legal method, especially since her false accusers are 
the very judges and witnesses in her trial, and this legal miscarriage of justice 
is foregrounded throughout the story. Susanna is acutely aware of her vic-
timization, and she twice cries out “with a loude voyce” against the elders, 
the first time to summon help to prevent her imminent rape, and the second 
to God to deliver her from injustice and imminent death (Daniel 13.24, 42). 
In English communities the image of Susanna as the chaste woman who 
speaks out against injustice had a particular appeal across temporal, gender, 
and religious differences.21 In particular, the fourteenth century alliterative 
poem, A Pistel of Susan, launches “a sharp critique of a legal and social sys-
tem where false witnesses can malign and doom the vulnerable.”22 In this 
context, Susanna’s story is applicable to Olivia’s situation in pointing to the 
built-in injustice of social and legal practices that, recognized as the norm 
or law, inevitably produce victims, whether or not the victims are aware of 
their situation.
The Susanna subtext further participates in a pattern of biblical and reli-
gious echoes in the play, often misappropriations readily noticeable by an 
audience familiar with the sources. Some of the misappropriations reflect 
comically on their speakers, as when Andrew calls Malvolio Jezebel (2.5.36), 
and when Toby cites 2 Corinthians, “let us therefore eat, drink,” leaving 
out the words immediately following: “for tomorrow we die” (2.3.11; 1 
 Corinthians 15.32). Other echoes tamper with religious rituals, as when 
Toby and his accomplices, pretending to cure Malvolio of his madness, 
address him in the language of exorcism. Religious ritual is thus mocked 
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by being repurposed for a mean-spirited prank, playing on both the contem-
porary belief that madness is a symptom of demonic possession and the 
Protestant hostility to exorcism as a Catholic ritual.23 Together, these parodic 
misappropriations provide the context for Olivia’s first meeting with Viola 
disguised as Cesario, an encounter in which Olivia’s household problems 
find indirect airing through the interweaving of religious and secular rituals.
In this meeting, a courtly love message is delivered through the ritual of 
catechism. Olivia has just come away from speaking with Feste, who ven-
tured to “catechize” her for her excessive mourning (1.5.54). She now turns 
catechist, addressing Cesario as her catechumen, examining him/her on the 
“lesson” that he had “taken great pains to con” (1.5.154–155). Professing 
that she would “hear this divinity” and “comfortable doctrine,” she asks 
Cesario, “Where lies your text?” (a cue for the catechumen to respond by 
citing chapter and verse from the bible). When Viola replies that it has come 
from “the first [chapter] of [Orsino’s] heart,” Olivia pronounces it “heresy,” 
a well-worn topos that keeps up the banter (1.5.193, 197, 200, 201). This 
catechistic mockery of the courtly ritual builds up to Viola’s request, “Let 
me see your face” (1.5.202), words that transgress both ritual and social 
barriers between them, releasing Viola from the role of courtly go-between 
and Olivia, in complying with the request, from the role as court lady. This 
moment of unveiling is powerful on several registers, unfolding as it does in 
layers of parodic revelation.
First, in unveiling her face, Olivia declares that “it shall be inventoried, 
and every particle and utensil labeled to my will: as, item, two lips, indiffer-
ent red; item, two grey eyes, with lids to them; item, one neck, one chin, and 
so forth” (1.5.216–218). Her inventory mocks the blazon as a device that 
turns the lady into a cypher of the courtly lover’s economic and political 
ambitions—the veil behind which the lady becomes a version of McNulty’s 
“hostess [who] is often cast as bereft of individual identity … an indetermi-
nate thing rather than an integral moral person.”24 Second, Olivia’s itemized 
list “labeled to my will” mimics “the legal document containing instructions 
about the disposal of her property.”25 The effect is to reduce her facial fea-
tures to the household items that a woman legally owns. In this connection, 
Olivia’s follow-up question, “Were you sent hither to praise me?” (1.5.218) 
may well be asked in the spirit of a shared joke, but not without underlying 
pathos, if we realize how little in control she is of her bodily inventory. 
As Dympna Callaghan points out, “Olivia cannot know that in the very 
next Act, without her consent, her private parts will be on display for every-
one’s amusement.”26 In a borrowed hand, Olivia’s maid will publish her 
will: “will” in the sense of her sexual desire and her genitals spelled out by 
Malvolio, “her very C’s, her U’s and her T’s and thus makes she her great 
P’s” (2.5.78–79). Earlier we’ve observed her male subordinates turn her into 
disposable property; here her maid takes away from her what she considers 
most intimately hers to give. If Maria’s forgery estranges Olivia from her 
own will and body, it only makes explicit how much Olivia is a stranger 
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in her own house alienated from its ownership. Olivia’s dispossession gives 
new meaning to her remark, “ourselves we do not owe” (1.5.280), referring 
to her lack of self-possession, having fallen for one she has just met and 
takes to be a suitor’s servant. The verb “to owe,” with its dual sense of hav-
ing and owing in Elizabethan usage, also calls attention to a system of social 
and sexual relationships, including those pertaining to hospitality, grounded 
in the patriarchal household economy, in which the hostess is at once obli-
gated to others and dispossessed of herself.
The verbal violation perpetrated by Maria’s forged letter and  Malvolio’s 
voiced fantasy, coming only two scenes after hearing Toby’s allusion to 
Susanna, calls to mind the elders’ false accusation of Susanna. With this, 
we come to a third parodic register in Olivia’s unveiling, which echoes 
Susanna’s unveiling at her trial, an order imposed by the elders “that thei 
might so be satisfied with her beautie” (Daniel 13.32), before sentencing her 
to death. Remarkably, at this point where Olivia seems most directly to con-
nect with Susanna, the text also most decisively diverges from its subtext. 
For Susanna, the unveiling is deeply and publicly shaming, but it also sets 
up for her full vindication when Daniel proves the elders liars and Susanna 
guiltless of their accusation (of adultery with an unidentified young man). 
By contrast, Olivia unveils without shame if only because, for once, some-
one has breached decorum to express an interest in her as a person quite 
apart from her social position.
That Cesario is in fact a cross-dressed Viola requires some discussion, 
because it is central to the plot’s complication, and this centrality implicates 
theater in the fourth parodic dimension of Olivia’s unveiling. While Olivia 
takes Viola for Cesario for almost the entire play, it is Viola who has, from 
the start, engaged Olivia with a theatrical sense of self. To Olivia’s host-like 
inquiries, “What are you? What would you?” Viola answers with a play on 
the courtly trope of secrecy, “What I am, and what I would, are as secret 
as maidenhead” (1.5.187; 189–90). At the same time, she also answers like 
an inexperienced and self-conscious actor: “I have taken great pains to con 
it [her speech]”; “that question’s out of my part”; “I am not that I play” 
(1.5.154–155; 158–159; 164). This self-conscious performance targets the 
scripted nature of their exchange, and from her responses Olivia clearly 
catches on: “Are you a comedian?” and “If I do not usurp myself, I am 
[the lady of the house]” (1.5.162; 166). The effect is to translate the host–
guest ritual Olivia initiates into the practice of theater, and this in turn sets 
up for Olivia’s catechism as Cesario’s mock initiation into the courtly per-
formance we have seen earlier. It is this theatrical sense of self Viola brings 
out in Olivia that enables the latter to open herself to experience in the 
moment and to disclose—discover—her own strangeness as the lady of the 
house who does not own herself. Olivia is in effect opening herself to a new 
kind of hospitality and home-making with her new-found playmate.
For Viola’s part, a theatrical sensibility defines her condition as a stranger 
in search of a home in Illyria. She would have served Olivia, but, the option 
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being closed, decides to serve the Duke instead, assuming male disguise. 
As we can see, the process is not entirely her own making and entails unin-
tended consequences, but it is this sense of not being in control—of not 
owning the process—that allows her, and Olivia, too, in their interaction, to 
let go of the social roles they inhabit and the ritualized practices they mock. 
To be sure, no one really owns the social process, although some may have 
more control over their own and other people’s choices. The difference in 
Viola and Olivia’s case is that they are willing to go off script, if only for 
a moment. In doing so they produce a lived sense of come what may that 
propels their play beyond conventional social and dramatic expectations. 
Their shared levity belies a deeper sympathy, each taking a chance at living 
in what is virtually a man’s world without the protection that a brother 
could provide. Face to face, their mock theatrics translates into a moment of 
improvisational play that mocks the world they live in, a co-production in 
which each brings “home” the stranger as an anagrammatic other.
In building on each other’s wit and pleasure, Olivia and Viola’s improvi-
sation goes beyond mockery as implied social critique to enact a mutually 
hospitable relationship. Realized in the performance, and carried by the fun 
of the moment, this alternative hospitality undoes the host–guest relation-
ship to reposition them as strangers to one another in at least three senses. 
First, despite their similar losses they have no shared personal history or 
network of familial support. Second, in disowning the social roles by which 
they are known in Illyria, they disclose selves that exceed those roles. And 
third, each encounters in the other a strangeness she has helped to actualize 
in the spirit of play. Without each other Viola can no more become  Cesario 
than Olivia a desiring subject. The process of self-transformation and dis-
covery is intersubjective and relational, with the stranger one encounters 
and the stranger one becomes both transcending the devices of theatri-
cal  counterfeiting—Olivia’s unveiling, Viola’s disguise—from which each 
arises. In this light, openness to the stranger in oneself and in the other is 
the “home” and hospitality they have improvised for each other. “Home” as 
such is not a physical place, but is rather the projection of ethos in its root 
sense of dwelling or abode, the “opening of the familiar to the unfamiliar.”27
In its root sense, then, ethos as home remains active if suppressed in the 
dominant, proprietary sense of home and, as such, enables hospitality as 
an ethics of dispossession. To be sure, dispossession is often privative and 
oppressive, but as Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou point out, it can 
also be relational, as when individuals dispossess themselves of normative 
roles and values organized around the “sovereign and unitary subject” and 
its operational “logic of possession.”28 In opposing privative forms of dis-
possession, Butler and Athanasiou propose that we “think about dispos-
session outside of the logic of possession,” because for them “ethical and 
political responsibility emerges only when a sovereign and unitary subject 
is effectively challenged.”29 In Olivia and Viola’s case, relational disposses-
sion engenders a performative ethos in which hospitality no longer revolves 
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around the home as property and the host as owner but around the relation-
ship between dispossessed selves, individuated from yet radically in sympa-
thy with each other, as their anagrammatic names assert, a relationship that 
requires no hostess to mediate.
To be sure, this performance of “unhomely” hospitality lasts but a 
moment, before both characters rejoin their social script and comedy’s 
marriage plot, with Olivia advancing upon an alarmed Viola who retreats 
behind courtly platitudes. But the fact that the unveiling should happen at 
all, and between them, suggests the play’s dialogical impulse in bringing its 
female protagonists into co-productive play that, while it lasts, transgresses 
the limits of home and hospitality normatively conceived and practiced. 
Here we see the creative potential of the performative, as Butler suggests: 
“As much as ‘performativity’ exposes the normativity of certain kinds of 
descriptive claims, it also offers a way to think about how new discourse can 
emerge precisely where it was not already legitimated.”30 Although there is 
as yet no recognizable space in social practice for the home and hospitality 
Olivia and Viola have co-produced, their encounter inhabits, in Foucault’s 
terms, the “interstice” or “non-place” made possible by theater, between text 
and subtext, in the felt sense of comic disproportion, the mocking imbri-
cation of religious and social rituals.31 In this sense, Twelfth Night speaks 
to McNulty’s “thesis that the feminine contests the autonomy of the host 
by giving voice to the alterity within [the host’s masculine] personhood, 
functioning as the internal marking of the Other.”32 Such alterity within 
personhood, then, locates the transgression of household hospitality at the 
heart of “personation,” theater’s defining practice. To lay the groundwork 
for this discussion, we must first examine the theological dimension that the 
play builds into the theatrical encounter. With this, we turn to yet another 
subtextual unveiling—the anticipated face-to-face encounter Feste invokes 
in his closing song.33
When that I was a little tiny boy,
With hey, ho, the wind and the rain,
A foolish thing was but a toy,
For the rain it raineth every day.
But when I came to man’s estate,
With hey, ho, the wind and the rain,
’Gainst knaves and thieves men shut their gate,
For the rain it raineth every day.
But when I came, alas, to wive,
With hey, ho, the wind and the rain,
By swaggering could I never thrive,
For the rain it raineth every day.
But when I came unto my beds,
With hey, ho, the wind and the rain,
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With tosspots still had drunken heads,
For the rain it raineth every day.
A great while ago the world begun,
With hey, ho, the wind and the rain,
But that’s all one, our play is done,
And we’ll strive to please you every day.
(5.1.376–395)
In Feste’s song, the opening lines from the first two stanzas—“When I was a 
tiny little boy” and “When I was come to man’s estate”—echo Paul’s words 
in 1 Corinthians: “When I was a child, I spake as a childe, I understode as a 
childe, I thought as a childe; but when I became a man, I put away childish 
things” (13:11). The echoed verse is the first half of an oft-quoted analogy: 
“For now we see through a glasse darkely: but then shal we se face to face. 
Now I knowe in parte: but then shal I knowe euen as I am knowen” (13:12). 
The entire chapter surrounding those verses dwells on love, culminating 
in the final verse: “And now abideth faith, hope & loue, euen these thre, 
but the chiefest of these is loue” (13:13). Throughout the letter, Paul’s mes-
sage of love comes with his rebuke of the Corinthians for setting divisions 
among themselves: “And I colde not speake vnto you, brethren, as vnto spir-
itual men, but as vnto carnal, euen as vnto babes in Christ” (3:1). Becoming 
spiritual would require the love that heals divisions, as Paul explains,
For ye are all the sonnes of God by faith, in Christ Iesus.
For all ye that are baptized into Christ, haue put on Christ.
There is nether Iewe nor Grecian: there is nether bonde nor fre: there is 
nether male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Iesus.
(Galatians 3:26–28)
The practice of love includes hospitality: “contribute to the needs of the 
saints” (Romans 12:13); “Be not forgetful to lodge strangers: for thereby 
some haue receiued Angels into their houses vnawares” (Hebrews 13:2).
Like Paul’s Corinthians, the worldlings in Feste’s song are carnal men, 
subjects of the flesh, and here the relation between text and subtext is no 
longer parodic but proportional. Feste sings as one well past his boyhood 
years yet remains mired in the carnal worries of “man’s estate”: for “’gainst 
knaves and thieves men shut their gate”; or when one “came to wife” but 
“by swaggering could I never thrive,” hinting at marital disappointment and 
even sexual betrayal (5.1.382; 384; 386, 388).34 These lines may address 
the experience of itinerant actors, peddlers, and vagrants who for lack of 
resources fail to marry and set up house, and as strangers are taken for 
thieves and knaves. The same lines may also speak to householders who 
fail to extend hospitality for fear of loss and cuckoldry. Taken separately, 
either reading would reinforce the distrust and failure that haunt Illyrian 
housekeeping, with ownership of property and women dividing haves from 
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have-nots. Taken together, the readings would heal the division by virtue 
of linguistic ambiguity, confounding identities that are positioned as polar 
opposites within the household economy.
Feste’s song ends on a pessimistic note, the final stanza locating Illyria 
within the history of “the world begun” from “a great while ago,” a world 
that has endured endless cycles of inhospitable weather (5.1.392). Yet in its 
Pauline echoes the song holds open the possibility of atonement, consistent 
with Paul’s instruction for the end time: “Circumcision is nothing, & vncir-
cumcision is nothing, but the keeping of the commandments of God. / Let 
euerie man abide in the same vocation wherein he was called” (1 Cor. 7:19–20). 
In the end time, divisions will no longer separate people; as Giorgio Agamben 
explains, the messianic call will transform them from within, resulting in 
“almost an internal shifting of each and every worldly condition by vir-
tue of being ‘called’”; operating beyond the logic of possession, “the mes-
sianic vocation is not a right, nor does it furnish an identity; rather, it is a 
generic potentiality [potenza] that can be used without ever being owned.”35 
Through Paul, then, Feste delivers, to extend Sheiba Kian Kaufman’s term, 
a “narration of hidden hospitality” (anthologized in this collection) to lis-
teners on stage and off, calling them as they are to their messianic potential.
The song is remarkable because Feste is replicating at the level of linguis-
tic performance the messianic vocation that Paul describes, and this sug-
gests the theological engagement with scripture, conscious or otherwise, that 
informs the play as a whole and Shakespearean theater more broadly. Agam-
ben’s reading of the messianic in Paul is, again, instructive here. First, the 
transformative dimension of the messianic vocation operates as kairos in the 
“recapitulation of the past (… an abbreviated, summary chronos)” produc-
ing “a plērōma, a saturation and fulfilment … that anticipates the eschato-
logical plērōma when God ‘will be all in all.’”36 Second, the messianic kairos 
is oriented to the present, not the future, although a present uniquely open 
to the future. Agamben draws from Walter Benjamin’s notion of Jetztzeit, 
the “now-time” or “actuality” in the now, in which the past becomes intel-
ligible as a “historical index,” being grasped in the specificity of the present 
as a call to thought and action that endows the present with a weak messi-
anic power.37 Third, the messianic operates by way of profanation, which 
Agamben differentiates from secularization. Whereas secularization marks 
something as sacred for exclusive use by a few and preservation of a “power 
apparatus,” profanation “restores something like a natural use that existed 
before being separated into the religious, economic, or juridical sphere,” in 
doing so “mak[ing it] available for a new use.”38 Put another way, “whereas 
secularization … transfer[s] sacred things from one jurisdiction to another, 
profanation … ‘absolve[s]’ sacred things from priestly and secular building 
codes alike, for new, inoperative, rehearsals (as art, festival or theater).”39
In its Pauline echoes, then, Feste’s song recapitulates a messianic aware-
ness that is already present in the play, one that is in fact part of the cul-
tural imagination of Susanna as a figure of Christ, reinforced by a long 
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tradition of Gospel typology and Lenten sermons.40 Coming at the end of 
the play, this recapitulative turn reframes both Susanna’s story and Paul’s 
message as historical indices to which Olivia (improvising with Viola) and 
Feste ( improvising on Paul) form part of a fictive “constellation” that mate-
rializes for the audience, in Benjamin’s terms, as “a now-time shot through 
with splinters of messianic time.”41 This fictive constellation includes the 
other characters as well, insofar as their parody of scriptural sources also 
prompts the audience to retrospection. Synergistic parody thus functions as 
the play’s profanation of scripture, one way of reclaiming for hospitality the 
encounter with, and accommodation of, the stranger that opens theater, as a 
worldly vocation, to its potentialities. Where theology and theater converge, 
this latent history constitutes a Shakespearean cultural matrix from which 
characters are styled in their individuated dispositions to the world, in ways 
that surprise the economy and necessity of the Aristotelian plot.42
The urgent, recapitulative force of messianic time operates in the play as a 
whole, through its rendering of time as an embodied experience, what Feste 
retrospectively figures as “the whirligig of time” (5.1.364). Specifically, time 
seems to have stood still with business as usual in Illyria until a clock strikes 
in act 3, scene 1, when the action begins to accelerate toward the end, and 
then to stop just short of a nuptial ending.43 The clock strike, we may recall, 
occurring soon after Olivia/Susanna orders the garden gate to be shut, is for 
Olivia a call to action, and it renders the audience time-conscious amid con-
verging lines of action hastening the play’s dénouement. In analyzing “timely 
affects as a key feature of hospitality” in King Lear, in his chapter for this 
collection, Thomas J. Moretti writes: “At one moment, [Shakespeare] accel-
erates dramatic action and poetic output to heighten theatrical affect and 
to delight audiences; just as suddenly, he slows tempo to make the theater 
inhospitable enough for insight, depth, and awareness.” Moretti’s purpo-
sive deployment of “hospitable time” and “inhospitable time” is relevant to 
Twelfth Night, for in taking the audience through the “hospitable time” of a 
whirligig ride, the play just might end up with its stalled nuptial taking the 
prize as a limit case of “inhospitable time” by indefinitely suspending expec-
tations of comic closure at the play’s end. But if we consider that the nuptial 
functions ritually to integrate the household by appropriating the stranger, 
then the deferred nuptial effectively suspends this ritual force of integration 
and appropriation. In thus disrupting “homely” or household expectations, 
Shakespeare’s theater is not inhospitable but differently hospitable, a differ-
ence Feste drives home when he engages the audience with the “unhomely” 
hospitality of messianic atonement, opening the self as home, beyond pos-
sessiveness, to the stranger. Recapitulating history since “the world begun” 
in the whirligig spin to the finish, Feste’s song situates the play’s suspended 
closure in the now time of the audience’s messianic awareness, at the end of 
Twelfth Night festivities, on the threshold of an epiphany.
Hospitality as an unhomely practice has its place, then, in Shakespearean 
theater’s complex production of pleasure and reflection. This is crucially 
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the case in a play that problematizes household hospitality as the presumed 
model for hospitable practices; and specifically so where the encounter with 
and accommodation of the stranger are provocatively and metatheatrically 
focused on the practice of personation. In this respect Twelfth Night con-
nects with the contemporary discourse and debate on theater, bringing a 
messianic dimension to an emerging interest in characterization. Andrew 
Gurr has shown that this art of characterization came with the profession-
alization of actors, noting in particular the shift in terminology from 
“playing” to “personation”:
The term, the noun “personation,” was suggestive of a relatively 
new art of individual characterization, an art distinct from the 
orator’s display of passions or the academic actor’s portrayal of the 
 character-types. … The first use of the term was recorded in 1599–1600, 
at the end of the great decade in which Alleyn and Burbage made their 
reputations. … By 1600 characterization was the chief requisite of the 
successful player.44
Louis Montrose further connects the concept and practice of dramatic per-
sonation to “other material and ideological developments … that mani-
fested the emergence of what we now characterize as merchant capitalism 
and bourgeois subjectivity.”45 Dramatic personation thus relates to a notion 
of personhood grounded in a household economy with its logic of posses-
sion, its proprieties and exclusions, aligning with an increasingly commer-
cialized society.
The relation is an inverse one, insofar as the art of individual character-
ization, requires the actor temporarily to undo the possessive boundaries 
of personhood in becoming the character he plays. Thus Richard Flecknoe 
praises Richard Burbage as “a delightful Proteus, so wholly transforming 
himself into his part and putting off himself with the Cloathes, as he never 
(not so much as in the Tyring-house) assum’d himself again until the play 
was done.”46 In his Apology for Actors (1612), Thomas Heywood extols 
the actor’s skill in the performance of English history, “what English blood 
seeing the person of any bold English man presented and doth not hugge his 
fame, and hunnye at his valor, pursuing him in his enterprise with his best 
wishes, and as beeing wrapt in contemplation, offers to him in his heart all 
prosperous performance, as if the personater were the man personated.”47 
In the skillful production of a theatrical person, then, the actor achieves an 
ethos that blurs the line between self and other, host and guest, not unlike the 
relational dispossession Olivia and Viola undergo in co-producing hospital-
ity. Indeed, Heywood’s “all prosperous performance” ambiguously includes 
the spectator as co-producer in the personation, locating character as “the 
corporeal product of an intersubjective communication between actor and 
audience.”48 Artistic skill has little appeal for theater’s detractors, of course. 
John Cocke in “The Character of a Common Player” mocks his subject 
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as a commercial opportunist, “a shifting companion: for he lives effectually 
by putting on, and putting off.”49
Yet it is significant that, just when theater was establishing itself as a 
commercial and cultural institution, skill in personation should be aligned 
with an ethic of dispossession, and that Twelfth Night should locate this 
ethic in the performance of an unhomely hospitality. In Olivia and Viola’s 
encounter, such performance is in fact a staging of the theater’s foundational 
practice, which begins with an actor’s coming into character by “putting on” 
the stranger he becomes for the duration of the performance. The character 
thus produced inhabits the interface between actor and audience, mediat-
ing in the co-production of the theater experience as a form of hospitality 
between strangers. Characters have, in this sense, a virtual existence through 
actors and audiences as their living mediums without being possessed by 
either. Realized in the performance, staged or imagined, this experience of 
“intersubjective communication” blurs the roles of actors and audiences, 
actors being, after all, also readers of the plays they enact and audiences to 
each other’s performances, and audiences as readers and spectators are also 
performers through their imaginative participation. In each co-productive 
interface, then, theater’s messianic power lies ultimately in the play’s ability 
to energize actors and audience, and the latter’s ability to experience the 
strangeness of characters as a call to hospitality.
The idiom of “putting off” and “putting on” persons shared by writers 
for and against theater has a theological reference in the New Testament, 
especially in Paul’s letters. Whereas in Galatians 3:27 the faithful “have put 
on Christ” at baptism, Paul exhorts them to “put on Christ” as an ongoing 
practice, imitating Christ as a way of life. The implied clothing metaphor 
mediates an inner transformation in which “putting off the old man,” the 
flesh that inclines to sin, is prerequisite for “putting on the new man,” the 
Christian self.50 While Paul’s repeated exhortations suggest that putting off 
the sinful flesh is neither an easy nor a decisive transformation, supporters 
of theater emphasize the moral efficacy of skillful personation. To resume 
Heywood’s comment: “so bewitching a thing is lively and well spirited action, 
that it hath power to new mold the hearts of the spectators and fashion them 
to the shape of any noble attempt.”51 For writers against theater, however, 
actors indulge rather than put off their sinful flesh, thereby becoming Satan’s 
instrument corrupting spectators by deception. Thus Stephen Gosson writes 
in Plays Confuted in Five Actions (1582), citing the authority of church 
fathers, that “Stage Playes are the doctrine and inuention of the Devuill … 
the better thereby to enlarge his dominion and pull vs from God.”52
In Agamben’s terms, one can say that the attack on theater aligns with the 
secular in its use of church authority, mobilizing the logic of demonic posses-
sion in a zero-sum battle over souls between church and theater. By contrast, 
theater is profane in defense of its profession as grounded in a relational 
practice with audiences that goes beyond possessiveness. While antitheatri-
cal attacks are not matched in number or ferocity by protheatrical defenses, 
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Jeffrey Knapp has shown that “a surprising number of writers throughout 
the English Renaissance depicted plays as godly enterprises.”53 Such defense 
is largely indirect, of which plays are a source, among other things poking 
fun at the stage Puritan who is guilty of the very things he condemns in 
others. Such profanation is Malvolio who, although “sometimes he is a kind 
of Puritan,” as Maria describes him, nevertheless goes cross-gartered for his 
lady’s pleasure—and ours (2.3.125).
Against the backdrop of the theater debate, we may trace the contours 
of an ethics of theater as hospitable performance in the characterization 
of Viola. Donna Hamilton reminds us that “Twelfth Night displays its 
connection to the issues of religious controversy with a disarming play-
fulness. The characters do not talk directly about religion and church 
politics, but religion and church politics often provide the language for 
what they do talk about.”54 In particular, Maurice Hunt notes that “the 
devil is mentioned at least twenty times”55 in the play, notably in asso-
ciation with Viola, including her own soliloquy on Disguise, which she calls 
“a wickedness, / Wherein the pregnant enemy does much” (2.2.25–26). 
At issue here, Hunt observes, is theater’s transvestite practice, citing Gosson 
who finds deplorable “in stage plays for a boy to put on the attire, the 
gesture, the passions of a woman.” In calling Disguise to account, Viola 
would seem to adopt the antitheatrical position, but Cesario, the name 
she chooses for her disguise, suggests otherwise, especially in light of two 
cultural associations.
The first association is Christ’s counsel to his disciples to “giue to Cesar 
the things that are Cesars, and to God those that are Gods” (Mark 12:17). 
Putting on a theatrical person does not entail possession by the pregnant 
enemy; rather, Cesario provides the cover behind which Viola remains in 
but not of the world, a stranger to secular ways. Cesario thus marks 
Viola’s messianic potential as an inner resistance to the possessive logic that 
defines “the things that are Cesars,” a resistance built into Shakespearean 
theater’s comic negotiation of the secular order that remains attuned to the 
emancipatory (messianic) potential of religious themes. The second asso-
ciation suggests Caesarean birth, a medical procedure traced to imperial 
Rome. In this relation, Cesario’s substitute prematurity enables Viola not 
to “be delivered to the world, / Till I had made my occasion mellow, / What 
my estate is” (1.2.37–39). Here Christian identity finds its bearings in mes-
sianic time: in anticipating her own unveiling, Viola must both wait and 
be ready when occasion ripens to put off her worldly disguise. That Viola 
should be unveiled before she can put off Cesario’s clothes suggests that her 
timing is overtaken by that of the marriage plot. Nor is it accidental that 
Malvolio, the bearer of ill will should hold the key to the prison that holds 
the keeper of her “maid’s garments” (5.1.268). This last-minute revelation 
by Viola unveils Malvolio’s connection to secular authority in its extreme 
inhospitality, the prison as the secular order’s ultimate hold on her—and 
theater’s—messianic potential.
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From a metatheatrical perspective, being “unveiled” in disguise makes 
Viola the poster-child for Shakespeare’s apology for actors. As a character 
caught acting, Viola exemplifies “the early dramatic figuration of an actor–
character” which, Robert Weimann explains, “thrived on a doubleness in 
(im)personation.”56 As Weimann further notes, what the actor–character 
does onstage “is the most basic, ordinary task in the profession of the actor,” 
and is often done “in support of the play’s larger issues.”57 In Twelfth Night, 
beyond her part in presenting hospitality as an issue, Viola also performatively 
extends theater’s hospitality to the audience. From her first appearance, she 
has functioned to draw audience members into the play. They enter Illyrian 
society with her, and like her, as strangers. They witness her decision to put 
on disguise, reappearing as Cesario. Their alignment with her allows them 
a perspective on the play’s world that is at once involved yet distanced, fil-
tered through the “bi-fold gestus in the actor–character involving both the 
personater and the personated.”58 They are privy to her self-presentation as 
a “eunuch” who “can sing / And speak … in many sorts of music” (1.2.52, 
53–54), couching the actor’s skill in neutered flesh and the versatility of an 
instrument through which the human voice sounds in materializing individ-
uated theatrical persons (cf. the Latin personare, to sound through).59 They 
note her worldly act when Cesario pays for access to Olivia. They see wisdom 
in Feste’s cynical wit through her eyes when Cesario remarks, “this is a 
practice / As full of labor as a wise man’s art” (3.1.58–59).
Through her role as actor–character, Viola renders an account of theater’s 
hospitality within a fictive account of Illyrian household inhospitality, and 
at both levels Twelfth Night professes a performative ethics that is always 
open to profane epiphanies—yet, skirting ever so closely the “apparatuses” 
of a nascent capitalism. As Agamben argues, “capitalism is nothing but a 
gigantic apparatus for capturing … profanatory behaviors,”60 to which the-
ater also remains open and vulnerable. In Viola’s unveiling, the play leaves 
to the hospitality of the audience’s imagination whether atonement would 
be possible with the “notoriously abused” Malvolio (5.1.366), or redemp-
tion for Feste, the figure of commercial theater, that self-professed pander 
who demands payment at the gate.
notes
I would like to thank the editors or the present volume and the participants of the 
Shakespeare Association of America 2013 “Shakespeare and Hospitality” seminar 
for their hospitable engagements with earlier versions of this essay.
 1. All quotations of Shakespeare’s plays are taken from The Norton  Shakespeare, 
based of the Oxford Edition, ed. Stephen Gleenblatt et al. (New York: 
Norton, 1997).
 2. This term appears in Lisak’s essay, “Domesticating Strangeness in Twelfth 
Night,” Twelfth Night: New Critical Essays, ed. James Schiffer (Abingdon, 
Oxford: Routledge, 2011), 167–83.
Hospitality in Twelfth Night 239
 3. Felicity Heal, Hospitality in Early Modern England (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990), 9.
 4. Lisak, “Domesticating Strangeness,” 172.
 5. Whether or not the title may be an afterthought, an addition made to differenti-
ate this play from a previous one titled What You Will is not at issue here, since 
even as an afterthought, the addition of Twelfth Night only helps to bring out 
what is latent in the text.
 6. Tracy McNulty, The Hostess: Hospitality, Femininity, and the Expropriation of 
Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).
 7. Ibid., xxvii.
 8. Ibid., xxxvii.
 9. Ad Putter, Sir Gawain and the Green Knight and French Arthurian Romance 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 52.
 10. Catherine Brown Tkacz, “Susanna Victrix, Christus Victor: Lenten Sermons, 
Typology, and the Lectionar,” Speculum Sermonis: Interdiscplinary Reflections 
on the Medieval Sermon, ed. Georgianna Donavin, Cary J. Nederman, and Richard 
Utz (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2004), 56.
 11. Lynn Staley, “Susanna’s Voice” in Sacred and Profane in Chaucer and Late 
Medieval Literature: Essays in Honour of John V. Fleming, ed. Robert Epstein 
and Will Robins (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 46.
 12. David Lyle Jeffrey, “False Witness and the Just Use of Evidence in the Wycliffite 
Pistel of Swete Susan” in The Judgment of Susanna: Authority and Witness, ed. 
Ellen Spolsky (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1996), 59–60.
 13. Lindsay Kaplan, “Sexual Slander and the Politics of the Erotic in Garter’s 
Susanna” in The Judgment of Susanna: Authority and Witness, ed. Ellen Spolsky 
(Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1996), 73.
 14. Tessa Watt, Cheap Print and Popular Piety, 1550–1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). In Watt’s view, the wall paintings “illustrate the fusion of 
various cultural strands: the Protestant impetus for popularization of the scrip-
tures, the iconophobic tendency to avoid the more sacred figures of  Christianity 
and the traditional demand for narrative” (203; quoted in Kaplan, 73).
 15. Ibid., 119.
 16. The line-filler refrain “lady, lady” disappears in the stanzas 16–18, which nar-
rate Daniel’s intervention. The ballad “was licensed in 1562–63, although the 
known version is based on the earliest print, which dates from ca. 1625” (Ross 
W. Duffin, Shakespeare’s Songbook [New York: Norton, 2004], 27).
 17. The Geneva Bible. Facsimile of the 1560 edition (Madison: University of  Wisconsin 
Press, 1969). All biblical references are from this edition unless otherwise noted.
 18. Naseeb Shaheen, Biblical References in Shakespeare’s Plays (Newark: University 
of Delaware Press, 1999), 236–37.
 19. Jeffrey, “False Witness,” 61.
 20. Walter A. Elwell and Philip W. Comfort, ed., Tyndale Bible Dictionary (Wheaton, 
IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 1992), 349.
 21. The Catholic bishop John Fisher in 1535 invoked Susanna in A Spiritual 
Consolation written … to hys sister Elizabeth, as did the Lollard treatise The 
Testimony of William Thorpe (1407), reprinted in all editions of Foxe’s Acts and 
Monuments; Nicholas Ridley likewise, in speaking out against injustice, and Sir 
Walter Raleigh, in his own defense (Staley 54–59).
240 Joan Pong Linton
 22. Staley, “Susanna’s Voice,” 50.
 23. Robin Briggs, Witches & Neighbors: The Social and Cultural Context of European 
Witchcraft (London: HarperCollins, 1996), 80, 389. 
 24. McNulty, The Hostess, xlii.
 25. Dympna Callaghan, “‘And all is semblative a woman’s part’: Body Politics in 
Twelfth Night,” Textual Practice 7, no. 3 (1993): 428–52, 58.
 26. Ibid.
 27. McNulty, The Hostess, xviii (crediting Heidegger).
 28. Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou, Dispossession: The Performative in the 
Political (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 7.
 29. Ibid., 7; ix.
 30. Ibid., 120.
 31. Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, History, Genealogy” in Aesthetics, Method, and 
Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, vol. 2, trans. Robert 
Hurley et al., ed. James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 1994), 369–92.
 32. McNulty, The Hostess, xxv.
 33. My analysis of Feste’s song assumes a degree of integration with the play that 
goes beyond normal practice in early modern theater. That Shakespeare may 
have written the words for this song rather than inserting a ready-made one 
could account for this integration (Duffin 449; Tiffany Stern, Documents of 
Performance in Early Modern England [Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009], 147). Stern, with whom I agree, sees the song as “providing reflec-
tive commentary on the play” (166).
 34. Feste may be singing about the man who regrets marrying because (1) swaggering 
does not compensate for cuckoldry; or (2) bragging leads to sexual betrayal 
(a  topos that recurs in The Rape of Lucrece and Cymbeline). The line may 
also be read as the hapless man full of swagger yet unable to get a wife, unlike 
Petruchio in The Taming of the Shrew, who has come “to wive and thrive,” and 
succeeds in both (1.2.53).
 35. Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to 
the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 
22, 26.
 36. Ibid., 76.
 37. Ibid., 145.
 38. Giorgio Agamben, Profanations, trans. Jeff Fort (New Work: Zone Books, 
2007), 85, 86.
 39. Julia Reinhard Lupton, Thinking with Shakespeare: Essays on Politics and Life 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 238.
 40. As judicial victim, Susanna came under the same two-witness method by which 
“Jesus, and others had been found guilty without any cross-examination” (Ellwell 
and Comfort, 349). Guiltless and falsely accused, she “prefigures Christ in his 
Passion”; in her vindication “Susanna as victrix” prefigures the resurrected 
“Christ as victor” (Tkacz 55, 57).
 41. Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, vol. 4, eds. Howard Eiland and Michael 
W. Jennings. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002–2003), 387.
 42. Paul Yachnin and Jessica Slights argue that “character is the organizing principle 
of Shakespeare’s plays” and that “Shakespeare tends to overturn the Aristotelian 
ranking of plot and character” (in Shakespeare and Character: Theory, History, 
Performance, and Theatrical Persons, ed. Paul and Jessica Slights [New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009], 6, 7).
Hospitality in Twelfth Night 241
 43. We learn from both Antonio and Orsino that three months have passed between 
the first and fifth acts (5.1.88; 93), and we infer that only several hours elapse 
between the clock striking in act 3, scene 1 and the play’s end, so the first two 
acts take up the bulk of the three months. At the end of act 3, scene 1 Olivia 
begins pursuing Cesario in earnest. Two scenes later, Sebastian goes sightseeing 
with Antonio’s money, promising to return within an hour. By act 4, scene 1 
Sebastian has met Olivia, and they marry two scenes later. At the beginning of 
the final scene, the priest confirms that the two exchanged vows 2 hours earlier; 
discoveries then follow, and Malvolio exits.
 44. Andrew Gurr, The Shakespearean Stage 1574–1642, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 99–100; also quoted in Louis Montrose, 
The Purpose of Playing: Shakespeare and the Cultural Politics of the  Elizabethan 
Theatre (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 91.
 45. Montrose, The Purpose of Playing, 92.
 46. Quoted in Montrose, The Purpose of Playing, 38; emphasis mine.
 47. Thomas Heywood, An Apology for Actors (1612) (New York: Scholars’ 
 Facsimiles & Reprints, 1941), B4r; emphasis mine.
 48. This is Yachnin and Slights’s summary phrase for Leanore Lieblein’s argu-
ment in their coedited volume (Paul Edward Yachnin and Jessica Slights, 
ed., Shakespeare and Character: Theory, History, Performance, and Theatrical 
 Persons [Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009], 177–35). For Lieblein’s excel-
lent discussion of Heywood’s Apology see Shakespeare and Character, 123–25 
and 129–30.
 49. Glynn Wickham et al., ed., English Professional Theatre, 1530–1660 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 179; Helen Ostovich et al., ed., Locating 
the Queen’s Men, 1583–1603: Material Practices and Conditions of Playing 
( Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 11.
 50. See, for example, Romans 13:11–14; Colossians 3:8–12.
 51. Heywood, An Apology, B4r.
 52. William Carew Hazlitt, ed., The English drama and stage under the Tudor and 
Stuart princes, 1543–1664 (New York: Burt Franklin, 1964), 171.
 53. Jeffrey Knapp, Shakespeare’s Tribe: Church, Nation, and Theatre in Renaissance 
England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 2.
 54. Donna Hamilton, Shakespeare and the Politics of Protestant England (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1992), 82.
 55. Maurice Hunt, “Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night and ‘The Pregnant Enemy’: The 
Devil in What You Will,” Upstart Crow 30 (2011): 5.
 56. Robert Weimann, “The Actor-Character in ‘Secretly Open’ Action: Doubly 
Encoded Personation on Shakespeare’s Stage,” in Shakespeare and Character: 
Theory, History, Performance, and Theatrical Persons, ed. Paul Edward Yachnin 
and Jessica Slights (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 178.
 57. Ibid., 185.
 58. Ibid., 179.
 59. As Patricia Parker points out, the “eunuch” is an early modern name for an 
instrument that makes no sound of its own, but “is able like no other instrument 
to ‘imitate the human voice’ … while amplifying it and adding something ‘new’” 
(Parker, “Twelfth Night: Editing Puzzles and Eunuchs of All Kinds,” Twelfth 
Night: New Critical Essays, ed. James Schiffer [Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 
2011], 56–57).
 60. Agamben, Profanations, 87.
11 Thinking Hospitably with Timon 
of Athens
Toward an Ethics of Stewardship
Michael Noschka
All too often, to think about hospitality is to become affronted by the 
 inhospitable. According to Marx’s famous reading, inhospitality in Timon 
of Athens is brought into effect by gold, what he defines as “the alienated 
ability of mankind” and what Timon rebukes as humanity’s “common 
whore … that puts odds / Among the rout of nations” (4.3.43–44).1 Recent 
stagings channel such Marxist anxieties. The National Theatre’s internation-
ally broadcast 2012 production, for example, has been hailed as “a  parable 
of the crisis of the modern business elite.”2 I would suggest, however, that 
the anxieties levied within Timon in both its contemporary and early mod-
ern stagings go deeper than Marxism and our own fiscal anxiety alone can 
gloss. As G. Wilson Knight writes, Timon of Athens “is far more than an 
economic extravaganza.”3 If it is not the specter of the Market, then what in 
Timon do we continue to find so haunting?
Derrida turns to Shakespeare to create a word, hauntology, and like 
Hamlet’s Ghost (or Marx’s specter), I would propose that a spirit haunts 
Timon.4 This spirit, I suggest, is a call for hospitality in its biblical sense, 
which is at once material and spiritually invoked. From a theological per-
spective, the material care for another’s physical well-being (food, drink, 
clothing, shelter, etc.) is rooted in the spiritual mandate “thou shalt love 
thy neighbor as thyself.” This neighbor love is the practice of agape, the 
self-denying biblical concern for the other. Between roughly the 1580s and 
1630s there was a revival in the understanding of Christian charity as agape 
in early modern England; concomitant was the discussion in sermons and 
conduct literature regarding the degree to which agape’s practice (or, indeed, 
its deficit) belonged to the cultural understanding of both stewardship and 
hospitality.5 To read Timon, I argue, is to experience hospitality’s failure as 
a material practice alone and to witness the inhospitality of the exclusively 
material. In Timon, Shakespeare treats both hospitality’s imminent death 
and its possible (immanent) resurrection through acts of stewardship funded 
by agape.
Although it may seem “odd perhaps to consider Timon of Athens a 
 religious play,” as Julia Reinhard Lupton reminds, “the word religion recurs 
three times in Timon, more than in any other play by Shakespeare.”6 Thomas 
Carter’s influential work on the subject of Shakespeare and the Bible finds 
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no less than thirty-five references in Timon, indicating a deep scriptural 
archive underwriting this play.7 In a similar vein, both Knight and James 
Bulman have called attention to the play’s likeness to a parable.8  Shakespeare 
approaches Timon not as parable or allegory but rather as a script of lived 
action, one that resonates across the Hebrew and  Christian Bibles in what 
Lupton has called Timon’s “greekjew world,” or what  Daniel Boyarin 
describes as the “Hellenistic Jewish cultural koine” of the  Mediterranean 
in the first-century Near East.9 The script of hospitality I  track across 
 Shakespeare’s Athens and its outer wilds draws deeply upon two specific 
parables. Shakespeare introduces Timon through direct allusion to the para-
ble of the Five Talents, a story espousing an ethics of stewardship. Similarly, 
in his self-sacrificing care for Timon, Flavius, the play’s exemplary steward, 
enacts the model of hospitality recounted in the parable of the Good Samaritan. 
Both of these parables, in turn, comport as agape in their call for material 
and spiritual succor. Taking up this agapeic turn, Shakespeare seems to ask 
his audiences both then and now, through this particular  Athens and the 
actions of these particular Athenians, to consider the very real possibility of 
hospitality as stewardship.
My argument is concerned not with tracking typologies but with 
disclosing models of behavior. For Derrida, hospitality defined through any 
act of gift giving is impossible because such an act is always already caught 
up within an inescapable system of exchange that both expects and demands 
reciprocity. In Derridean terms, “there is no gift in gift exchange; there is 
only exchange.”10 This essay shifts attention away from reading Timon in 
terms of an economic model of exchange in order to attend to Shakespeare’s 
representation of relational dwelling and its failures within the oikos. While 
it is true that oikos serves as the root for our modern (and early modern) 
economy, in order to move beyond this economic circuit of thinking I here 
use the term in a phenomenological sense of lived and shared proximity to 
and existence with others.
The terms I wish to use—dwelling, oikos, hospitality as stewardship—
can be defined properly only in the process, but some prefatory discussion is 
helpful. I use dwelling in its Heideggerian sense and as the Hebraic yashab. 
Dwelling is a neighborly nearness; it is the state of being in proximal rela-
tionship to and with others, with the express desire to secure an other’s care, 
safety, and flourishing.11 In what follows I use the term oikos to mark the 
space for dwelling as person, home, and wider community. The degree to 
which oikos denotes “home” or even “community” likely needs no further 
gloss, but the person as oikos is a concept that may require more explana-
tion. I use the term here in the sense of dwelling, or rather in-dwelling, as 
in the in-dwelling of the spirit—the Greek pneuma and its Hebrew counter-
part ruach—the divine life force of biblical tradition that animates humans 
exclusively and is distinguished from soul (nephesh), the aspect the human 
shares with the animal in their collective creaturely estate.12 Biblical 
stewardship, the relational care of and for others, is a form of giving like 
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tithing, but with a caveat: stewardship is a giving back of what is not truly 
one’s own to begin with, but rather of what one has been given by God. 
Biblical stewardship enters Western thought through the Genesis narrative, 
which reports mankind’s first vocation as the caring for all creaturely life.13 
Genesis also narrates stewardship’s first encounter with the inhospitable. 
The story of Cain and Abel narrates the first acts of tithing and murder, 
yoking the two together in a correlation to which Timon returns at its con-
clusion with Alcibiades’s acceptance of a tenth of Athenian lives in lieu of 
full-scale invasion (5.5.31–35, 54–58). Cain’s query to God—“Am I my 
brother’s keeper?”—is answered time and again across the Hebrew and 
Christian Bibles: Yes, you are.14
My reading of Timon seeks to shift critical attention away from gift 
exchange, biblical or otherwise, in order to better attend to hospitality in its 
vocation as stewardship, a mode that offers not only an alternative econom-
ics (oikos-pneumatics) but one that also better services the alterior, a term 
of philosophical shorthand used to designate the other in his or her alienat-
ing exteriority or estate as a lower class of being (subaltern).15 My ulterior 
motives—that is, my concern with an ethics of and for the other—follow 
Timon’s necessarily spiritual tack to the degree that within this particular 
Athenian locale Shakespeare gives us pause to consider hospitality beyond 
a wholly material register; that is, beyond a system of inescapable exchange 
and the aporia of Derrida’s impossible gift. After giving a brief overview of 
hospitality and stewardship in early modern England, I turn attention to 
Timon as a script for lived action, first by reading Timon in the context of 
the parable of Five Talents and then by turning to his steward Flavius in con-
junction with the parable of the Good Samaritan and its call for hospitality 
as an other-servicing dwelling-with.
oikos-Pneumatics
Felicity Heal has uncovered a vast archive of early modern English 
hospitality literature written between the 1580s and 1630s.16 Sermons and 
conduct literature figure prominently in this discussion, as does social com-
mentary. Heal attests that “for most authors revealed religion, and espe-
cially the New Testament, provided the fundamental injunctions enjoining 
a householder to be hospitable,” often citing Matthew 25:35–36, Romans 
12:13, and Hebrews 13:2 as hospitality’s spiritual proof texts.17 Although 
“scripture provided the most powerful spur to hospitable behaviour,” as 
Heal reminds, the Greek and Latinate thinking of Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca 
each “provided analyses of generous behaviour that were peculiarly perti-
nent to the host.”18 Timon, believed to be written between 1604 and 1606 
and printed in the First Folio of 1623, correlates with Heal’s archival “cho-
rus of lamentation” drafted to address the perceived decline in the proper 
practice of hospitality in early modern England.19 Whether by scriptural or 
secular precedent, it was a commonly held opinion that nobility especially 
and gentility as well were called to be good hosts. Thus Clement Ellis writes 
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typologically of the Englishman’s estate in The Gentile Sinner; or, England’s 
Brave Gentlemen (1660) that the nobleman or gentry is expected to keep 
“Hospitality his Housekeeper, Providence his Steward, Charity his Trea-
surer.”20 Ellis’ typological associations encode the spiritual understanding of 
hospitality in the period that I will be tracing through Shakespeare’s Athens.
Hospitality as housekeeper marks the domestic arts of household man-
agement. Yet when the oikos is considered as a site of domesticity (home) 
as well as of selfhood relative to the in-dwelling of the spirit, the practice 
of hospitality bears a decidedly spiritual aspect, a practice of immanence 
requiring service to and for others: proper housekeeping in deed. The stew-
ard in Ellis’s typology is providence, a term signifying both prudence and 
the prudent management of one’s resources (actions befitting a steward), as 
well as a scriptural bearing in the Pauline sense of God’s grace given prov-
identially to guide the course and direction of a believer’s life. Charity, the 
Christian practice of agape, a self-sacrificing and other-servicing love, funds 
the treasury of Ellis’ typology of hospitality.
In the more modern sense of stewardship as an economic vocation, the 
steward’s primary role was the management of his lord’s estate. In this 
comportment the steward was effectively an ambassador, “serving as his 
master’s voice, as well as his eyes and ears,” speaking on the lord’s behalf to 
tenants, craftsmen, nobles, lawyers, or magistrates.21 The steward’s vocation 
required him to be equally adept at navigating social interactions among the 
lower and upper classes alike with the full weight of his master’s authority. 
It is in this capacity that D. R. Hainsworth has described the steward as “a 
‘mediator’ in the anthropological sense of the word.”22 And while it is true 
that the steward was tasked with meeting all expenses of estate income, 
including the taking in of “rents, fines and dues and transmitting that money 
to London,” this role, even in its ostensibly secular turn, continued to bear 
a spiritual charge.23 That is, estate management (stewardship) was also rec-
ognized during the period to be the vocational calling of all humankind laid 
out in the Bible.
Under this paradigm, whether highborn or low, all were called to the 
service of others. It is in this vein that critics have referred Flavius to a 
biblical manner of stewardship. Maurice Hunt, for example, sees the char-
acter of Flavius as Shakespeare’s attempt “to recapture an ideal image of 
the steward,” one who “comes closest to expressing a cardinal principle of 
Christianity.”24 We see charity given its cardinal direction, to borrow Hunt’s 
phrasing, in the marginal notes for 1 Peter 4:8 in the Geneva Bible:
Of all the duties of charity, he [God] commendeth one, namely, which 
was at that time most necessary, to wit, hospitality, which he will have 
to be voluntary and most courteous and bountiful. He showeth the 
use of charity, to wit, that every man bestow that gift which he hath 
received to the profit of his neighbor. A reason, because that what gift 
soever we have we have received it of God upon this condition, to be 
his disposers and stewards.25
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Per the Geneva’s annotations, biblical stewardship is understood as the 
management of funds from on high as gifts entrusted by God whose expen-
diture is expected to profit one’s neighbor. In its original Greek, what the 
King James Version translates twice as charity in v.8, is literally love (agapēn 
and agapē,), thus conceiving hospitality as stewardship and operant under 
the banner of agape.26 Hospitality funded by agape is a premise central to 
the parables of the Five Talents and Good Samaritan, particularly as they 
are conscripted by Shakespeare in the drafting of his Athens and its outer 
environs.
In Timon’s domestic sphere Shakespeare would seem to take up an advo-
cacy for the praxis of agape demonstrated most readily by Timon’s failures 
and Flavius’s actions, that is, through their respective acts of stewardship. 
The scholar and Jacobean Biblical translator John Bois encapsulates the 
early modern English theological understanding of stewardship:
All of vs then are stewards, and disposers of some goods of God: Cler-
gie men are stewards of Gods house, which is the Church; all Magis-
trates are stewards of the common house, which is the weale publike; 
Masters are stewards of their own priuate houses; al men are stewards 
and clerks of the priuie closet of their conscience. There is none so 
mighty that is greater or so meane that is lesse than a steward to the 
King of Kings.27
In Bois’s formulation one finds an understanding of stewardship’s alternate 
economics as oikos-pneumatics, a spiritual economy under whose manage-
ment are the overlapping oikoi of the individual, home, and community or 
state. This alternate economics is funded by agape that takes as its manage-
ment the care and well-being of others. I here use the term funded in the 
sense of the Latin fundus, as a building ground or site of foundation. Agape 
in its comportment as hospitality has been recently taken up by Caron 
Gentry who argues that hospitality in its acknowledgement of “the deep 
responsibility the self has for others” is, in effect, agape.28 As a contempo-
rary of Shakespeare’s, clergyman Thomas Adams demonstrates this under-
standing of agape in the call for his parishioners (and the readers of his 
sermon) to “[w]alke in Loue” by enacting hospitality.29 As Adams enjoins,
He [St. Paul] doth not say, talke of it, but walke in it. This precept is 
for course, not discourse. Loue sittes at the doore of many mens lips, 
but hath no dwelling in the heart. We may say truely of that charitie; 
it is not at home.30
In an equally Pauline turn, Shakespeare scripts Timon’s actions and 
associations through the overlapping language of home, dwelling, and char-
ity. In short, hospitality as lived agapeic action, what Adams describes as 
walking in love.
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(Im)material Hospitality
Shakespeare, I propose, invites us through his Athenian tragedy to consider 
the possibility of an alternate economics (oikos-pneumatics) whose currency 
is love and whose concern is its proper management. Even if one subscribes 
to the paradigm of hospitality as gift-exchange, it nevertheless remains that 
Shakespeare writes of Timon’s giving in a decidedly biblical mode. His first 
appearance on stage is in conversation with Ventidius’s messenger who 
pleads on his master’s behalf for Timon to pay the noble’s five talent debt. 
As if to signal exchange, the messenger responds to Timon’s pledge of surety, 
“Your lordship ever binds him” (1.1.106). Yet Timon’s rejoinder confirms 
no expectation of reciprocity as yet; in fact, it speaks of quite the opposite. 
In a Torahic gesture reminiscent of the call to care for widows, orphans, the 
lame, and poor,31 Timon enjoins the messenger:
Commend me to him. I will send his ransom;
And, being enfranchised, bid him come to me.
’Tis not enough to help the feeble up,
But to support him after.
(1.1.107–110)
The koine of Timon’s response recalls both the Hebraic yashab and Chris-
tian stewardship. Despite its initial fiscal gesture in paying the ransom, 
Timon’s express concern is to “support” his enfeebled friend. Relative to 
yashab we might consider such support as a spiritual-architectural propping 
up, a “support” for dwelling intimated by Timon’s desire conveyed to the 
messenger, “bid him come to me.” By his own account, proximity (yashab) 
is at the center of Timon’s action. True to the Hellenistic Jewish composite 
of Shakespeare’s Athens, Timon’s response also marks an act of Christian 
stewardship, dispensing the wealth in his charge (whose Hellenized koine 
and material coin are equally funded by agape) for the good of others, in 
this case Ventidius’s release from bondage.
The specific monetary amount owed by Ventidius overtly recalls the par-
able of the Five Talents.32 The story tells of a master who before going on a 
journey divides his wealth among three servants, “every man according to 
his several ability.”33 Upon the master’s return, the first and second servants 
have doubled the value of that with which they were entrusted. Hearing of 
their gain, the master famously replies: “Well done, thou good and faithful 
servant: thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over 
many things.”34 Unlike his peers, the third servant digs a hole in the earth 
and hides his money in an act that reverses Timon’s digging in the wilder-
ness outside Athens’ walls. When the master questions the final servant and 
learns that he has not cultivated his investment, the servant is stripped of his 
status and the parable delivers its warning: “For unto every one that hath 
shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not 
shall be taken away even that which he hath.”35
248 Michael Noschka
As a script for lived action, there is much in this parable that bears exege-
sis, in terms of both scriptural intent and Shakespeare’s development of scrip-
ture in Timon’s Athens. First is the matter of Ventidius’s five talent debt and 
its subsequent payment by Timon; this sum in its original historical context is 
exorbitant. A talent in the Greco-Roman world of the first-century A.D. was 
the measurement of roughly twenty years’ wages for a common laborer.36 
Whether in its Shakespearean or scriptural purview such wealth is staggering.
Biblical scholar Arland Hultgren has suggested that Jesus casts his para-
ble as the management of such near otherworldly wealth in order to convey 
the duty and risk involved in spiritually funded stewardship.37 The first two 
servants who double the value of the talents entrusted to them by their 
master do so specifically by engaging in business,38 yielding return on their 
master’s deposit only by risking the loss of the respective talents entrusted 
to them and through the hard work of those talents’ cultivation. Return-
ing to the original Greek of the parable, Hultgren confirms “[t]hat the two 
may have simply made wise investments is ruled out by what is said to the 
third slave at 25:27.”39 Thus the parable’s fiduciary fecundity demonstrates 
its achievement not by matter of investment but by manner of work that 
requires risk, a hazard the third servant is unwilling to take (hence his action 
of burying his apportioned talent until the master’s return). In the parable’s 
Shakespearean expression there is similarly no sense of work but merely 
ready (albeit dwindling) money relative to Timon. In effect, Timon might as 
well have buried his wealth in the ground; the negative return on investment 
is essentially the same. As a script of lived action, Timon also enacts no true 
sense of stewardship in its Christian vocation but rather demonstrates prod-
igality, a point to which I will shortly return.
With its double repetition of “[w]ell done, thou good and faithful ser-
vant” and its caution against poor management, the parable of Talents 
speaks directly of stewardship. Jesus’s point exhibits concern for spiritual 
return on (God’s) investment; that is, the development of one’s “talents” 
for an invested return in the lives of others. The message of the parable is 
therefore not to increase monetary wealth but the number of lives touched 
by the Gospel’s good news.40 It expresses concern for the stewardship of 
people. The parable of the Five Talents concerns the use of one’s “talents” 
for the growth of the Church through the giving of one’s life (one’s special 
abilities or talents) to others out of the economic (oiko-pneumatic) inher-
itance funded by and through agape per the injunction given in the Great 
Commandment: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.41
Shakespeare intimately connects Timon with the Five Talents by book-
ending his character with allusions to this parable. Timon’s first entry onto 
the stage in act 1 is a direct scriptural gesture through his payment of a five 
talent debt (ostensibly an act of neighbor love). His latter connection is 
a matter of lexical historiography: reminiscent of the third servant’s poor 
banking methods, Timon finds a wealth of buried “talents” (a mark of 
unfaithful service) in the Athenian wilds of Act Four.42 Unlike the ethics of 
the parable, however, Timon’s management of his talents yields an inverse 
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of return. Rather than the ostensible neighbor love of Timon philanthropos, 
act 3 culminates with his tragic spiral into misanthropy and complete dis-
dain for the entire human race, duly noted by his terse declamation, “Hence-
forth hated be / Of Timon man and all humanity” (3.7.96–97) and the even 
more emphatic, “I am Misanthropos, and hate mankind” (4.3.52).
Despite this tragic shift, Timon’s initial actions on the stage (and page) 
nevertheless bear the carriage of seemingly genuine charity. We should 
remember that his first two actions are to pay for Ventidius’s release from 
prison and to raise his servingman Lucilius to equal marriageable (i.e., 
economic) weight with the Old Athenian’s daughter.43 Scholars, however, 
remain divided on this point. Reading Timon’s actions with a more cyn-
ical eye, Grace Tiffany has argued that “Timon’s apparent magnanim-
ity” is nothing but “an investment without collateral, an ancient Ponzi 
scheme.”44 L. C. Knights maintains that “it is not moral truth we recognize 
but self-indulgence in easy emotion” in Timon’s generous gestures.45 Yet 
the initial exchange between Timon and Ventidius in act 1, scene 2 suggests 
otherwise.
Ventidius’s first words report an inclination toward repayment. “I do 
return those talents,” he tells Timon, “Doubled with thanks and service, 
from whose help / I derived liberty” (1.2.5–7). In parable-echoing language, 
Ventidius would double the return of Timon’s five talent trust. Shakespeare, 
however, offers a clever caveat in Ventidius’s elocution: what is doubled is 
not the monetary sum but rather “thanks and service” for his “derived lib-
erty,” bringing to mind the aspect of the steward as oikonomos, one released 
from bondage under the law.46 As if speaking the same language of stew-
ardship, Timon, it would seem, interprets his answer and its action as that of 
dutiful hospitality, rejecting Ventidius’ offer of remuneration:
O, by no means,
Honest Ventidius. You do mistake my love.
I gave it freely ever, and there’s none
Can truly say he gives if he receives.
If our betters play at that game, we must not dare
To imitate them.
(1.2.7–12)
Unfortunately, Timon will indeed imitate those bettors who play at the game 
of reciprocity (equal or greater return on investment). By the close of act 2 he 
dispatches servants “severally” to Lucius, Lucullus, and  Sempronius request-
ing a return of fifty talents from each (2.2.181–187), and to the Athenian 
Senators he sues for an excessive one thousand talents (2.2.190–193). 
This desire (need) for reciprocal return or its excess serves as a measure of 
Timon’s poor and indeed conflicted understanding of stewardship. At this 
moment, however, his account to Ventidius directs attention to mistaken 
“love.” I would posit that here Timon implicitly calls to mind agape as a 
hospitality of relational dwelling in “support” of a friend in need.
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When next Timon acknowledges to those gathered around his table that 
“We are born to do benefits” (1.2.95), he tacitly invokes 1Peter 4:9–10. 
According to Ken Jackson, “No character pushes down through Christi-
anity to its desire for the ‘other and … utterly other’ in a way Timon does, 
forcing us to consider where that response and responsibility to ‘give’ comes 
from.”47 For Emmanuel Lévinas, the desire for the other espoused in the 
Gospels is “already read” in the prophet Isaiah.48 I would suggest that 
Timon’s responsibility to give comes from the nuanced distinction in the 
period between Christian and secular liberality, the former funded by agape 
and the latter by the desire for reciprocity.
The Renaissance idea of inner beauty manifested by outward appearance 
extended to the conceptualization of liberal hospitality. “The idea of an indis-
soluble link between gentility and household generosity,” Heal writes, “was 
here reinforced by an argument that liberality was the particular prerogative 
of gentlemen and one of the most visible manifestations of true, that is inner, 
nobility.”49 For Shakespeare’s contemporary audience, then, it would likely 
be expected that Timon manifest his nobility through liberal action. In its 
secular turn, however, such liberal generosity was reserved only for peers 
or near social equals. That is, liberal hosts expected return on their expen-
diture. Shakespeare offers a glimpse of such opinion in a passing remark 
between two Lords concerning Timon’s coveted (if unwise) hospitality:
Plutus the god of gold
Is but his steward; no meed but he repays
Sevenfold above itself; no gift to him
But breeds the giver a return exceeding
All use of quittance.
(1.2.275–279)
It is thus that Timon’s magnanimity is understood by his peers. To extend 
hospitality to Timon is to expect to receive “a return exceeding / All use of 
quittance.” His good graces on such summation prove a wise investment, 
one guaranteeing a return “[s]evenfold above itself.”
Counterpoised to such secular understanding of liberality was its Christian 
practice of freely giving to those in need, with an emphasis given to per-
sons of lower social status. In Nevv Booke of Spirituall Physick for Dyuerse 
 Diseases of the Nobilitie and Gentlemen of Englande (1555), William Turner 
argued that English hospitality suffered a “dropsye,” a socio-spiritual dis-
ease in the form of secular liberality. On this same point Thomas Adams 
writes a parable over a half century later of English hospitality’s demise:
A great man had curiously engrauen at the gate of his Pallace, the 
image of Bountie, or Hospitalitie. The needie Trauellers with ioy spy-
ing it, approach thither in hopefull expectation of succour. But still 
silence or an emptie Eccho answers all their cries and knockes: for 
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hospitality may stand at the gate, but there is none in the house … 
For Charitie is not at home: onely the shadow without … giues faire 
and fruitlesse hopes.50
On Adams’ account it is the poor and disenfranchised, the “needie Trauel-
lers” of this world, who desperately need receipt of liberal hospitality, not 
well-apportioned gentlemen and nobles who cannot know the “faire and 
fruitlesse hopes” suffered by those unfortunates whose “cries and knockes” 
remain unanswered without their doors. Hospitality as secular liberality is 
thus, following Adams, an act of idolatry, a mere image of (Christian) hospi-
tality, its “emptie Eccho.” As with Adams, for Turner the onus of hospitality 
falls especially upon the nobility since they have been graced with the bur-
densome gift of great wealth and the subsequent responsibility to steward 
it wisely. It is from this perspective that I would read Timon’s misplaced 
hospitality in order to better understand its failure.
The grand hospitality of Timon’s initial banquet scene opens as guests 
rise in ceremony at Timon’s entry into the hall. Yet in a gesture that seems at 
first a gentle reproof, he waves them off:
Ceremony was but devised at first
To set a gloss on faint deeds, hollow welcomes,
Recanting goodness, sorry ere ’tis shown;
But where there is true friendship, there needs none.
Pray sit. More welcome are ye to my fortunes
Than my fortunes to me.
(1.2.14–19)
Here Timon reads his guests’ collective act of reciprocal hospitality, showing 
deference to the host through “[c]eremony,” as a “hollow welcome.” While it is 
true that Timon does so not do so in censure but graciousness (his point is that 
true friendship needs no such pomp), his comment nonetheless calls attention 
to the dissembling nature of their (no doubt social and socialized) response 
whose intent Shakespeare pens as a desire “[t]o set a gloss on faint deeds.”
Tragically, at this point in his own narrative Timon does not realize 
he is caught up in such a false economy of hospitality. He will realize all 
but too late that his own hospitality has been coveted and abused by hol-
low “ trencher-friends” who prove themselves to be naught but “detested 
 parasites” and “[c]ourteous destroyers” (3.7.88, 86, 87) of his goodwill. The 
gathered nobles are clever actors at the table and further dissemble by way 
of an entreaty that continues to “gloss” their “faint deeds”:
Might we but have that happiness, my lord, that you would use our 
hearts, whereby we might express some part of our zeals, we should 
think ourselves forever perfect.
(1.2.80–83; emphasis mine)
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This is the secular liberality censured by Turner. As my italicization shows, 
the nobles’ intention is self-gratification, not hospitality’s comportment as 
service to the other. In a Hamlet-esque turn, their speech act is seeming hos-
pitality only. The voiced desire to give something of themselves to be used by 
Timon reveals instead an expectation of return—even if only by payment in 
self-aggrandizement (“we should think ourselves for / ever perfect”). That is, 
they do what custom among peers dictates: you offer to return the hospital-
ity you have received, even if only as an empty rhetorical flourish designed 
to maintain social appearances.
Timon’s response to their entreaty, however, begins to show the cracks 
in the foundation of his hospitality. “O, no doubt, my good friends, but the 
gods themselves / Have provided that I shall have much help from you, / 
How had you been my friends else?” (1.2.84–86). Perhaps subconsciously, 
Timon here admits that he indeed harbors some expectation of reciprocity 
(“the gods themselves / Have provided that I shall have much help from 
you”). His interrogative quip, “How had you been my friends else,” no 
doubt voiced cheerfully and with good-humored charm, further suggests 
such assumption of use. It is important to note that the poor, homeless, or 
otherwise abject are not those shown welcome at Timon’s table, despite 
the intent purported otherwise in his hospitable speech to Ventidius’ mes-
senger (“’Tis not enough to help the feeble up, / But to support him after” 
[1.1.109–110]). Rather, those “feeble” gathered to benefit from Timon’s 
hospitality are those who can return the favor—even if they ultimately fail 
to do so.
It was widely recognized in the period that opposition or hindrances to 
hospitality as Christian liberality existed in two common forms. As Turner 
phrases it, “lyberalitie is set betwene .ii. vices, yt is, prodigalitie & couetusnes.”51 
Such opinion is confirmed by Gervase Markham whose treatise A health to 
the gentlemanly profession of seruingmen (1598) follows a similar cultur-
al-medical frame with regard to the declining health of English hospitality 
as Turner’s Nevv Booke of Spirituall Physik:
According to thy abilitie mainteyne Hospitalitie: for that is the har-
bourer of two hopes, prayse, & prayers: yet let Liberalitie be the 
Linke to light thee, least Couetousnes might corrupt, or Prodigalitie 
procure penurie, in medio concistet virtus, euery meane betwixt two 
extreames, is a vertue: so is liberalitie, betwixt auarice and prodigal-
itie, being placed: this meane in al musicke yeelds a most heauenly 
harmonie.52
The mean that yields harmony for Turner resonates as discord in Timon, 
where the preservation of means (available resources, money) trumps hos-
pitable action for everyone but an unwise Timon. The treatise also equates 
covetousness with avarice, a transaction concomitant with the behavior of 
Shakespeare’s Athenian nobles in their refusal to remit Timon any form of 
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financial aid. Lucullus perhaps voices such accounting best: “this is no time to 
lend money, / especially upon bare friendship without security” (3.1.37–38).
Flavius discerns what Timon does not. In act 2, with creditors closing 
in, the steward pulls his master aside in a moment of intimate reproach so 
that he may help Timon understand the gravity of his situation (2.2.159–
165). On Flavius’s report, Timon gluts himself on hollow praises even 
as his “friends” englut themselves on his bounty (2.2.161). Shakespeare 
references bounty seven times in relation to Timon throughout the play’s 
course, suggesting its import. Flavius’s gesture to the heavens, “‘Heavens,’ 
have I said, ‘the bounty of this lord!” (2.2.159), even if only in exclamation 
(or perhaps invocation), advances a divine eye toward Timon’s bounty. For 
Flavius, this bounty is that which has been entrusted to Timon by the gods, 
or by God in Timon’s greekjew parlance. Yet for those of wider  Athens, 
Timon’s bounty is reducible to the plea of the prostitutes Phrynia and 
Timandra: “More counsel with more money, bounteous Timon” (4.3.166). 
What Timon sees in himself as philanthropic—“I could deal kingdoms 
to my friends, / And ne’er be weary” (1.2.215–216)—Flavius reports as 
“prodigal bits” (2.2.160). Taking up the charge of prodigal, Rolf  Soellner 
accuses Timon of being “one cause of a societal crisis in Athens,” on the 
grounds that “his prodigality supports the corruption and Hobbesian 
values of the city.”53
During the period, such charges of societal crisis were posed vehemently 
by conduct literature such as Turner’s Spirituall Physick. By Turner’s indict-
ment, “Thys commonly vsed liberalite in Englande nowe, is no true liber-
alite, but rather prodigalitie, for it is quyte contrarie both to ye liberalitie 
that God describeth and appointeth.”54 Turner’s jeremiad admits a material 
aspect to hospitality (food, drink, shelter, and clothing) but maintains that 
such apportioning should come from spiritual precedent. The prophet Isaiah 
is invoked to remind the elite classes (“all Emperores, kynges, dukes, erles, 
lordes, knyghtes, gentlemen and al other ryche men”) of their overriding 
vocation as God’s stewards on this matter.55 Yet “[t]his commaundement 
of God,” Turner inveighs, “is commonly broken in occupyenge of lyberali-
tie,” that is, in the practice of secular liberality.56 Such is Timon’s hospitality 
despite what seem to be his good intentions otherwise. The poor and home-
less, those “poore & wanderyng men, or wayfaring men, or straungers that 
haue no houses,” occupy the center of Turner’s argument,57 yet we see no 
poor in Timon except for the servants discharged after the fall of Timon’s 
estate, the two prostitutes accompanying Alcibiades (to whom he shows 
open contempt), and the eponymous character himself in the play’s final 
two acts.
It is only rich nobles who receive Timon’s hospitality, or rather, his prod-
igality. Moreover, it is from these same noble “friends” that his prodigality 
expects reciprocity. It is thus that Timon speaks to Flavius of his financial 
crisis as a type of blessing, “for by these / Shall I try friends” (2.2.177–178). 
Such trial is the reciprocity expected of hospitality as secular liberality. With 
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creditors at the doors even Ventidius is expected to repay the five talents 
of a debt now reinstated. Flavius is thus dispatched to Ventidius with the 
following charge:
Greet him from me.
Bid him suppose some good necessity
Touches his friend, which craves to be remembered
With those five talents.
(2.2.220–223)
Once more, Shakespeare associates Timon with the parable of the Five Tal-
ents. It would seem, however, that Timon has here forgotten his own argu-
ment for a hospitality funded by agape (“you do mistake my love …”) in 
his initial dialogue with Ventidius. Perhaps such is the nature of prodigality.
Dwelling-With
Timon is a play concerned with dwelling, the relational proximity of lived 
hospitable nearness. However, it is as misanthropos that Timon delivers a 
final instruction to his steward: “thou shalt build from men” (4.3.5128). 
This injunction recalls the Decalogue’s own “thou shalts,” which Lévinas 
has described as spaces where “[a]lterity becomes proximity.”58 That is, in 
the “thou shalt” Lévinas locates an ordinance of the other. Heidegger finds 
a similar correlation between self/other at the level of neighborliness in his 
native German bauen, “to build.” For Heidegger, there exists in bauen a 
“covert trace,” a lost etymological residue, of Nachbar, “the neighbor.”59 
As he puts it: “The Nachbar is the Nachgebur, the Nachgebauer, the near-
dweller, he who dwells nearby.”60 Per Heidegger’s genealogy, also in-dwelling 
within bauen is the verb to be.61 Dwelling pace Heidegger is an ontological 
status; to live authentically is to dwell. Contrary to Timon, it is to build 
(bauen) in nearness to others.
Flavius understands well this comportment of dwelling. On this point 
John Jowett’s reading of Timon’s steward bears repeating in full:
he distributes his last money to the servants under his authority, reserv-
ing only what he intends to give to Timon. This does not greatly enrich 
the servants because the money is so little, and the script is written so 
that the servants express no gratitude beyond the communal embrace 
shared by giver and receivers alike.62
Jowett’s description aptly illustrates how Flavius builds in nearness to oth-
ers. What is built is the “communal embrace,” a commune of shared rela-
tionality that is simultaneously a religious encounter in its aspect as religare, 
a site of communal binding and union. If Flavius is “pathologically loyal,” 
to borrow A. D. Nuttall’s phrasing, then it is to his vocation as an imitation 
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of the life of Christ as a steward.63 Hunt reads Flavius in this fashion: “This 
self-sacrificial spirit [agape], however, seems to live more fully in the steward 
Flavius, an impression encapsulated for a later age as a Christian truth: ‘For 
the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life a ran-
som for many’ (Mark 10:45).”64 It is in answer to the call “not to be served 
but to serve” that both Jesus and Flavius demonstrate dwelling’s spiritual 
aspect as oikos-pneumatics.
Heidegger constructs his dwelling through a framework he describes 
as the fourfold. Its elements—earth and sky, divinities and mortals—are 
conjoined in a matrix of interdependence. For Heidegger, proper dwelling 
retains an aspect beyond creaturely/material estate, thus the inclusion of 
a supra/supernatural (or “pneumatic”) component (and comportment) in 
the divinities. This fourfold further comports with the biblical paradigm of 
stewardship in its vocational calling to “cherish,” “protect,” “preserve,” and 
“care for” those with which one dwells—whether human, animal, environ-
mental, or thing.65
As misanthropos there is arguably none more alterior within or without 
Athens than Timon, and yet Flavius would dwell with him in genuine care:
That which I show, heaven knows, is merely love,
Duty and zeal to your unmatchèd mind,
Care of your food and living; and, believe it,
My most honoured lord,
For any benefit that points to me,
Either in hope or present, I’d exchange
For this one wish: that you had power and wealth
To requite me by making rich yourself.
(4.3.507–514)
The steward’s care flows from a love that “heaven knows,” one of “[d]uty 
and zeal;” thus it is a love of conscious and willful moral choice.66 In 
short: agape. Flavius’ “one wish,” though qualified as exchange, does 
not  concern itself with the transaction of wealth as gold but  relational 
 proximity; it is a wish that Timon would be rich in dwelling, the shared 
nearness of a genuine love for the other. Implicit in Timon’s  rejoining, 
“Thou singly honest man, / Here, take”—at which point the stage 
directions report “[He gives FLAVIUS gold]” (4.3.515–516)—is an 
echo of the  parable of the Talents. One all but hears Timon speak to 
his once-steward, “Well done my good and faithful servant.”67 And like 
the good  stewards of the parable, Flavius is entrusted with more (here, 
gold and the injunction to build away from men) because he has proven 
himself a wise  caretaker. Flavuis’ response to Timon’s outpouring of 
wealth—“O, let me stay / And comfort you, my master” (4.3.525–526)—
discloses a desire for relational dwelling, even as Timon voices his dis-
dain for all human contact.
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There is perhaps no greater biblical representation of stewardship qua 
dwelling than the story of the Good Samaritan. In the world of first-century 
Palestine, when baited by a lawyer on the question of neighbor-love—“And 
who is my neighbour?”—Jesus answers with this well-known parable.68 
By its account it is not the outwardly religious (the priest or the Levite) 
who offers hospitality to the person in need, in this specific case a man left 
wounded and naked by the roadside in the wake of abuse by highwaymen. 
It is the foreigner, the stranger, the alien, the alterior—the Samaritan—who 
offers succor. The narrative tells that it is he who shows “compassion” for 
his fellow man by dressing his wounds with wine and oil, expensive com-
modities in those days. The Samaritan then establishes this unknown man at 
an inn for which he pays all expenses.
Exegesis from the Church Fathers through the early modern period 
tended to allegorize this parable following the model set forth by 
 Augustine.69 From this hermeneutic paradigm, the wounded man in need of 
care is Adam, Jerusalem is the heavenly city, Jericho symbolizes mortality, 
the good Samaritan is Christ, and so on.70 Reformation theologians tended 
to adopt Luther’s disdain for allegorization (he famously derided Origen’s 
allegorizing as being “worth less than dirt”) and yet Luther himself none-
theless allegorized the parable in terms of his prevailing interest in sola 
fide.71 Calvin, however, is unique among the Reformers in that his read-
ing of the Good Samaritan rejects the hitherto prevailing Christological 
interpretation.72 Instead, in his A Harmony of the Gospels (1555), Calvin 
reads the Good Samaritan as a model of hospitality in human-to-human 
praxis. Upon Calvin’s explication Jesus’s impress in the parable is “to show 
that neighbourliness which obliges us to do our duty by each other is not 
restricted to friends and relations, but open to the whole human race.”73 
Calvin’s reading coincides with Jesus’s erasure of the neighbor–enemy dyad 
in his Sermon on the Mount. Such openness (to use Calvin’s word), how-
ever, proves risky business.
Like the parable of the Five Talents, the Good Samaritan’s association 
with risk is connected to a cultural understanding of its message. The priest 
and Levite in the story, for example, are perhaps not as incredulous as they 
might first seem. Vallet reads the parable as a narrative about taking risks 
for the sake of others.74 In this context he reminds contemporary readers 
and exegetes alike that both the priest and Levite faced the risk of being 
unclean for an extended period of time, more if the body they touched was 
dead, less if they came into proximal relation with an unclean person.75 
In either case these religious men faced social ostracism prescribed by the 
law, even if only for a short time, a risk they are unwilling to hazard. Yet 
in the world of first-century Palestine, the Samaritan faced no less risk than 
the priest or Levite. As Sylvia Keesmaat has contextualized, Samaritans too 
followed Torah and thus risked defilement from touching an unclean body. 
Moreover, as one traveling with the wealth identified by the parable, the 
Samaritan risked similar attack by robbers on the Jericho road.76 What 
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differentiates the Samaritan from the holy men in the narrative is his will-
ingness to act in agape, in concern for the other, in loving hospitality, despite 
the risks involved. Like the Samaritan, Flavius risks no less in carrying gold 
into the Athenian wilderness to aid Timon. He too is a prime target for 
bandits, though not from those on the Jericho road but the highwaymen 
who canvass Athens’ woods. Echoing the risks of the priest, Levite, and 
Samaritan alike, Flavius chances not only loss of wealth and material pos-
sessions, but also the potential threat to his well-being. Even so, Flavius 
would tend to Timon’s needs following the script of Christian liberality set 
forth in parable.
The Samaritan’s actions conjoin material hospitality to the spiritual call 
to care for others. The parable’s Greek is also telling. The “ compassion” 
by which the Samaritan is moved is from the verb splagxnizomai, meaning 
“to be moved in one’s inward parts.”77 A 1578 sermon by John  Stockwood 
confirms that such an understanding of the Greek was recognized in 
 Shakespeare’s time. Describing the splagxnizomai experienced by the 
 Samaritan,  Stockwood reminds his fellow Englishmen,
The Lorde worke in vs bowels of compassion … euery one according 
to the portion that God hath bestowed vpon vs, maye indéede féele 
and be touched inwardlye, wyth the miseries of the néedie, and in con-
sideration of the same, gyue muche almes to all the people.78
Whether one reads Jesus’s parable or Stockwood’s exegetical gloss, the 
Samaritan’s actions provide witness of hospitality as visceral care not fiscal 
remove. Flavius’s would-be care for Timon is of this order. That is,  Flavius 
“indéede féele[s]” and is “touched inwardlye, wyth the miseries of the 
néedie” he witnesses in Timon’s unaccommodated estate outside  Athens’ 
walls. He would even hazard the full extent of his wealth (a would-be 
 giving of “muche almes”) to Timon in his desire to fund the man with what 
remains of his own dwindling gold, coin that, admittedly, the misanthrope 
readily rejects.
I concede that there is no direct allusion to the Good Samaritan in Timon, 
unlike those to the Five Talents.79 Yet I would argue that the script it enacts 
enters Shakespeare’s text not directly from the Bible, but rather through 
the switch points of Timon’s dwelling. Likewise, Timon as oikos, as a space 
of dwelling, whether within Athenian city limits or removed to its outer 
wilds, presents an example of the person as a site for the practice of hos-
pitality as stewardship in both its failures and potentiality as dwelling.80 
In Apemantus, for example, Shakespeare demonstrates dwelling’s failure as 
hospitality. By his own account the cynic visits Timon near his cave-turned-
home with the express mission “[t]o vex thee” (4.3.237) even as he offers to 
“mend” Timon’s “feast” (4.3.284) of a freshly uncovered root, an ostensible 
act of hospitality in the offering of food to the poor. Penning Apemantus’ 
inverse in the character of Flavius, Shakespeare scripts dwelling’s potential 
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as hospitality. Flavius’s is a hospitality premised on agape, an economics 
(oikos-pneumatics) of care rather than exchange. Like the Samaritan, he 
expects no return on his investment, desiring instead only genuine and 
self-sacrificial concern for the other person’s well-being. While it is true that 
Apemantus never actively nor vocally seeks wealth in the form of gold, the 
cynic’s desired coin nonetheless takes the form of Schadenfreude. Flavius, 
in contrast, seeks no remuneration. Thus it is in the person of Timon, or 
rather at the site of Timon’s person, that Shakespeare offers two divergent 
modes of hospitality for our reflection: the one of exploitation, the other of 
dwelling as care.
“What is the state of dwelling in our precarious age?”81 Heidegger poses 
this question as he concludes his contemplation of proximal living. In answer 
he offers the following: we “must ever learn to dwell,” which can only be 
accomplished if we learn to “think for the sake of dwelling.”82 By this he 
means to think for the sake of relational nearness and the care of and for 
others.83 Timon, I’ve suggested, offers a space to ruminate upon hospitality 
as stewardship and its Shakespearean renditions as one such thinking for the 
sake of dwelling. Not unlike Heidegger’s fourfold, my argument has worked 
in the key of pneumatics. In Spiritual Shakespeares, Ewan Fernie has sought 
to distinguish (to distance) the spiritual, which precedes revelation, from the 
religious, which is bound to scripture and covenant. I have not done so; my 
Timon investigates a spirit that remains invested in the religious. The play’s 
Athens and its exteriors exhibit an understanding of religion as religare, a 
communal binding together through shared proximity (dwelling) and care 
(agape) for one another. By Fernie’s definition,
spirituality precedes religion and may well take place outside it. 
 Spirituality is an experience of truth, but it is concerned with the truth 
not of this world but of a world that has not yet and perhaps will 
never come to be. Spirituality is a mode of opposition to what is.84
To the degree that spirituality is a mode of opposition to what is, Shakespeare 
offers in Timon what I have suggested as a pneumatico-ethical form of hos-
pitality in its dispensation as stewardship. The spiritually entruthed world 
Fernie envisions that has not yet come and perhaps will never come to be is 
messianic in its gesture, encoding a desire which, if unfulfilled, harbors the 
potential for despair on the order of Timon’s misanthropy. This spiritual yet 
nonreligious messianism, however, cuts itself off from the equipment for 
living developed in positive religion, in the form of prayers, precepts, and 
parables that help guide our care for one another.
Yet in Timon, Shakespeare offers a glimpse of the messianic in its think-
ing for the sake of dwelling. Through a false or poetic etymology, Timon’s 
name shares a phonemic association with time.85 Indeed, his tragedy may 
well be that he does not steward well in the time that he is given, a con-
cern archived across the literature on hospitality in the age of Shakespeare. 
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Thinking for the sake of dwelling witnesses a similar gesture in Giorgio 
Agamben’s The Time That Remains as the philosopher turns his herme-
neutic eye toward the Apostle Paul’s delineation of “ho nyn kairos” in 
his letter to the Romans.86 Agamben translates this phrase as “time of 
the now,” signaling not a messianic time of the future, a waiting on the 
horizon of tomorrow, but a messianic time now, today, in one’s present 
moment—an enactment of the what-could-be-tomorrow today.87 This ho 
nyn kairos is nothing short of the contemporary practice of a hospitality 
funded by agape. Such call to action in early modern England is espoused 
in Adams’s The Happiness of the Church (1619) whose exhortation sup-
ports the Pauline ho nyn kairos in action as agape. According to Adams, 
the Englishman’s fault in hospitality is his dearth of agape, his failure to 
“walke in loue.”88 Following Adams, ho nyn kairos must be enacted by 
active (immanent) stewardship today: “The starued soule delights not to 
heare Charitie, but to feele it.”89 Like the Good Samaritan one must choose 
tangible action over empty intent, “bread of the Buttery” over “bread of 
the Sanctuary.”90
Shakespeare’s Athens, like the parable of the Good Samaritan, affords 
the opportunity to think hospitably in the key of stewardship. Both then 
and now. It is a space of ho nyn kairos. In its wider registers, hospitality as 
stewardship is a challenge to reverse Timon’s tragic epitaph:
‘Here lie I, Timon, who alive
All living men did hate.
Pass by and curse thy fill, but pass
And stay not here thy gait.’
(5.5.75–78)
As an ethical practice stewardship is a challenge to dwell rather than pass 
by. If we take up the call to think for the sake of dwelling, then we must ask 
ourselves with whom we could and should dwell, rather than continue to 
pass by unaffected.
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